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CROSS PURPOSES

Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of
right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do.
- Karl Llewellyn

I

INTRODUCTION

Religious symbols and imagery mark the American public
landscape. Biblical statuary, religious inscriptions, crosses, creches, and
menorahs occupy positions of prominence in parks, civic buildings, and
2
Implicating both the First
public squares across the nation.
of religion as well as
establishment
Amendment's prohibition against the
its guarantee of expressive freedom, these symbols have given rise to a
vast and complicated jurisprudence that, in certain of its aspects, has
been justly criticized as conflicting and incoherent.3 The confusion is not
surprising, given the complexity of the constitutional calculus. An array
of factors enters the analysis, including the size, location, and historical
context of the display at issue, its private or public sponsorship, and the
extent of access to the public space by those seeking to exhibit other
expressive symbols.
While application of these factors often produces erratic results, the
courts have spoken with relative clarity in at least one area: the
constitutionality of permanent religious displays on public land. The rule
is increasingly clear that government may not permit its parkland and
public spaces to be used as permanent platforms for symbolic religious
But while the courts have developed a substantial
expression.4
jurisprudence that carefully addresses the question of constitutional
liability in this context, there is very little authority addressing the more
difficult and equally important remedial questions raised by such
displays. It is not difficult to conclude that a solitary, towering Latin
cross at the center of a public park violates constitutional norms: one can
5
hardly imagine a more potent representation of religious endorsement.
It is much more difficult, however, to determine what must be done to
correct the violation. May the cross and the land beneath it be sold rather
than requiring that the display be removed from public property? If so,
does it matter how much land attends the transfer? May government sell
the cross and underlying property on condition that the symbol be
preserved?

1.

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83-84 (1960).

2. See infra notes 121-24.
3. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) ("confusion reigns" in Establishment Clause doctrine addressing temporary religious
displays on public land; leading Supreme Court authority "is a confusing matrix composed largely of
minority opinions that reach contradictory results and focus on the minutiae of scenic design and
physical arrangement").
4.
See infra notes 109-41 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 121.
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The absence of authority addressing such questions reflects the fact
that, until relatively recently, unconstitutional displays were simply
removed from public land in the typical case-a remedy that directly
resolved the violation without need for elaborate judicial analysis. Over
the last decade, however, government defendants have proposed
increasingly complex remedies to avert the removal of unconstitutional
displays, raising difficult questions that the federal courts have yet to
answer satisfactorily.
This Article examines the broad range of remedial issues that
increasingly arise in cases involving impermissible religious displays on
public land. It argues that many of the newly proposed remedies fail to
affirm the constitutional values at issue, and that the limited existing
jurisprudence has not rigorously and consistently subjected the proposals
to appropriate constitutional scrutiny. As a result, the doctrine is at risk
of being trivialized despite the apparent victories, thus eroding rather
than bolstering the force and dignity of the endorsement prohibition.
The Article is divided into three sections. Part I, an analytic
preface, discusses the prevailing "perception of endorsement" test used
to assess whether government action has the effect of advancing religion
in violation of the Establishment Clause. The discussion focuses on the
central analytic construct of the "objective observer," endowed with
essentially perfect factual information, who is charged under the
endorsement test with the task of assessing the perceived effect of
government conduct. Part H reviews the application of the test to the
question whether permanent religious displays on public land are
constitutionally permissible. As set forth in Part II, courts have
consistently held that the permanent integration of religious imagery with
the physical presence of government itself violates the endorsement
prohibition.
Part III, the principal focus of the Article, begins with the premise
that the objective observer not only must discern the constitutional
violation but also must arbitrate its remedy. Framing the remedial
analysis from the vantage of an essentially omniscient observer yields
important insights regarding the scope and rigor of the inquiry. Most
generally, the analysis so framed requires that any remedial proposal
withstand close scrutiny to assure that it does not subtly perpetuate
government's established religious preference. To survive such review,
a remedy must satisfy the interrelated imperatives of physical separation
and expressive neutrality. This proposed two-part inquiry requires that
remedial measures (1) achieve evident and substantial physical
separation between government and impermissible religious displays (2)
through means that the objective observer would perceive as strictly
neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue. These dual
principles are then applied across an array of remedial proposals
advanced in recent cases concerning endorsed religious speech.
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Throughout the discussion, the remedial implications of the proposed
two-part inquiry are contrasted with the significantly less demanding
requirements imposed by several of the courts that have addressed the
same questions.
The Article argues in conclusion that the considerable divergence
between the enforcement of rights and remedies in this area diminishes
the vitality and dignity of the constitutional doctrine. Moreover, by
giving rise to the appearance that litigation challenging government's

endorsement of symbolic religious expression is a technical exercise with
trivial consequences, constitutional adjudication in this context threatens
to impair its own integrity as well.
I.

ENDORSEMENT AND THE OMNISCIENT OBSERVER

A. The Endorsement Standard

In 1971 the Supreme Court adopted the tripartite Lemon test to
evaluate claims arising under the Establishment Clause of the First
Under Lemon,
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6
(2)
must not have
purpose,
secular
a
have
(1)
must
government conduct
and (3) must7
religion,
inhibiting
or
the primary effect of either advancing
government.
and
religion
between
entanglement
excessive
to
not lead
The test has inspired fierce and voluminous criticism 8 arising largely
from the view that the standard is unmanageably fact-bound 9 and alsoin the view of proponents of a less separationist Establishment Clause
jurisprudence-that it reflects an undue hostility toward religion in the
public sphere.10
While never expressly repudiating Lemon," l an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court has relaxed the standard over time and now
applies a markedly different variant of the original formulation. 12 In
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court

fundamentally altered the focus of the Lemon test by introducing the

6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
7. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
8. Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
463, 468-69 (1994) [hereinafter Gey 1] ("[The Lemon test] is possibly the most maligned constitutional standard the Court has ever produced.").
9. E.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Gey I, supra note 8, at 469; Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its
Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 503 (2002); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and DoctrinalIllusions: EstablishmentNeutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266, 269 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CIII. L. REV.
115, 116 (1992); Choper, supra note 9, at 501-03.
11. Justice Scalia has famously derided the standard as "some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and bur" Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
ied ....
12. Gey I, supra note 8, at 467; see Choper, supra note 9, at 499.
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concept of endorsement as the touchstone of the inquiry.13 By collapsing
Lemon's first two prongs into the single query whether a "challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion," the Court exchanged Lemon's original condemnation of all
non-secular purposes for a prohibition against the smaller universe of
purposes which affirmatively endorse religion.' 4 Likewise, the Court
replaced Lemon's original prohibition of effects which advance religion
with a proscription against its evident endorsement-a subset of the
former which, rather than concerning itself with any direct assistance to
religion, more narrowly targets assistance in the form of apparent
sanction. 15 Finally, the Court "dispense[d] with the 'entanglement'
prong"' 6 altogether and now subsumes that inquiry into its analysis of the
endorsing effect of certain forms of government aid.' 7 While the Court
occasionally employs alternative standards to assess the establishment
prohibition, 18 the endorsement test indisputably governs the
constitutionality of symbolic religious expression on public land.19
In embracing the endorsement principle in Allegheny, the Court
adopted a position that Justice O'Connor had advanced separately in
prior opinions. O'Connor argued that endorsement would clarify much
of Lemon's analytic confusion while focusing the Establishment Clause
inquiry on the core values that the provision should be understood to
promote. 20 In O'Connor's view, "[tihe Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community.",21 A prohibition against
endorsement promotes this fundamental objective because endorsement
"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to

13.
14.

492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.

15.
Gey L supra note 8, at 478 ("Even substantial state support for religion is permissible
under Justice O'Connor's standard if the state cleverly packages the support, either by including
nonreligious beneficiaries in the same program that benefits religious individuals or by providing a
homogenizing context that subsumes the religious message within a general statement of support for
social pluralism.").
16.
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).
17.
Tenafly Eruv Ass 'n, Inc., 309 F.3d at 174 n.36; see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 23233 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000); Moore v. City of Van, 238 F. Supp. 2d
837, 850 n.22 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
18.
See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 27, 48-58 (2002); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19.
DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 411 (2d Cir. 2001); see, e.g.,
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1174, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2321-22 (2004)
(O'Connor, J.,
concurring); cf Steven G. Gey, When Is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000

U. ILL. L. REv. 379, 391 n.58, 444 (2000) [hereinafter Gey II].
20. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
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adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. ,,22
With respect to assessing whether state conduct has the effect of
religious endorsement-the second prong of the modified Lemon
analysis-the Allegheny Court embraced the "perception of
endorsement" approach first articulated by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v.
Donnelly.23 Under Justice O'Connor's formulation, the Court must ask
"whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 24 The
test requires the Court to focus on the perception of an objective observer
who possesses "reasonable as opposed to heightened (or diminished)
sensitivity" 25 and who is "deemed more informed than the casual
passerby., 26 This determination is "not entirely a question of fact" 27 but
is instead "a legal question 28to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts.
The Court illustrated the endorsement analysis in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe.29 In Santa Fe, the Court considered
a policy that permitted students "to deliver a brief invocation and/or
message ...during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football
. 0 Although the policy did not
games to solemnize the event ...

explicitly endorse religious messages, the Court concluded that "the
actual or perceived endorsement of [religion] ...is established by factors

beyond just the text of the policy." 3' The Court noted that it must
ascertain "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the [policy], would perceive it
as a state endorsement" of religion, 32 and stressed that the inquiry
knowledge of "the history and context of the community and
presumed
33
forum."

The "perception of endorsement" test thus posits an exceedingly
well-informed observer who is knowledgeable of the "history and
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 688.
Id. at 690.
Id.

25.
26.

Idleman, supra note 18, at 26.
Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O'Connor,

J., concurring).
27. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694. Cases decided under analogous state constitutional provisions
similarly turn on whether a challenged religious display creates an appearance of governmental
endorsement or preference. The No Preference Clause of the California Constitution, for example,
bans actual as well as apparent religious preference. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; see, e.g., Hewitt v.
Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1567 (9th Cir. 1991); Carpenter v. City of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 629

(9th Cir.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

1996).
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 298.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 317 (internal quotation omitted).
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implementation" of challenged government conduct as well as the
"history and context of the community and forum" to which that conduct
relates-i.e., virtually every relevant factual consideration bearing on
whether religious expression enjoys the apparent endorsement of
government.34
Justice O'Connor asserts that this observer is
"reasonable" in the sense that he or she reflects, as in tort law, "'a
personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined
by the [collective] social judgment.' ' '35 However, because "reasonable
behavior" reflects the application of reasonable judgment to a reasonable
understanding of the relevant facts, the assertion is only half right. While
O'Connor's observer possesses reasonable sensibilities, he or she brings
that judgment to bear on essentially perfect factual information that far
exceeds any collective social norm. 36 The constructed persona is, in all
relevant respects, factually omniscient.
B. Criticism andAnalysis of the Standard
Justice O'Connor's modification of Lemon has inspired criticism
from a number of quarters. Various commentators have challenged the
endorsement standard as both a retreat from and a step beyond the proper
degree of separation between government and religion envisioned by the
Establishment Clause. 37 Others, while accepting the concept of actual or
perceived endorsement as an appropriate articulation of the constitutional
prohibition, argue that Justice O'Connor's particular formulation is
flawed.38 While a survey of the critical literature is beyond the scope of
this Article, a brief assessment of the most serious objections will place
in sharper relief the test's remedial implications.
The primary objection to Justice O'Connor's standard, advanced by
a number of scholars and embraced to some degree by several Justices of
the Supreme Court, is that the test is too protective of separationist
interests by wrongly defining the constitutional right in terms of an
intangible "expressive" injury subjectively experienced by an idealized
observer. 39 This inquiry, they argue, is flawed in two respects: it injects

34. See also Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (court must assess endorsing
effect of government policy in light of its "history and administration").
35.
Id. at 780 (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).

36.
In disclaiming Justice Stevens' characterization of the objective observer as "ultrareasonable," O'Connor points to only one body of information with which the observer is unfamiliar: "the
vagaries of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 781.
37.
Compare, e.g., Gey I, supra note 8, at 478 with Choper, supra note 9, passim.
38.
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.

39. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 9, at 525-26. A competing critique, advanced by separationists, argues that the endorsement test improperly dilutes the values underpinning the Establishment
Clause by superseding the principle of strict neutrality implied by the original Lemon formulation.
See Gey L supra note 8, at 478. Unlike the critique discussed below, this objection has no proponents on the Supreme Court and plays essentially no role in the current judicial debate regarding the
appropriate scope of the Establishment Clause prohibition.
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too much subjectivity into the judicial analysis 40 while improperly
thwarting the broader community's "felt need" to express religious
conviction in circumstances where no concrete injury is inflicted. 41 They
argue that the standard instead should focus on whether government
conduct coerces participation in or support for religious activity, which
can be measured without reference to the subjective perceptions of an
idealized observer.4243 These arguments have been elaborated by several
scholars and jurists.
1. The Question of Subjectivity
Justice O'Connor's "perception of endorsement" test indisputably
injects a degree of subjectivity into the analysis of constitutional injury.
There is considerable debate, however, over the extent to which the
standard is indeterminate. The objection is met in part by O'Connor's
particular formulation of the test, which posits an objective observer who
bases his or her judgment on essentially all relevant factual
considerations." In structuring the analysis in this manner, the test links
the perception of the observer to a full factual record and thus diminishes
the discretion with which the test can be applied.45 Indeed, the artifice of
the objective observer is essentially read out of the analysis insofar as the
inquiry turns on the court's own assessment of the reasonable inferences
drawn from the totality of circumstances. 46 The court expresses its own
perception of endorsement-in the guise of an idealized observer-based
upon the complete record.47 The specter of a constitutional standard
turning on the irreconcilable sense perceptions of competing reasonable
observers, whose judgments arise from widely divergent knowledge and
experience, is accordingly unfounded-provided that the court in fact
weighs the entire record rather than subjectively isolating some subset of

40.

See, e.g., Smith, supranote 9, at 292-93.

See, e.g., Choper, supra note 9, at 526-27.
41.
See id. at 504; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
42.
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).

43. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Choper, supra note 9, passim; cf. McConnell, supranote 10, at 157-66.
44. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text; see, e.g., ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth,
358 F.3d 1020, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing observer's detailed knowledge of factual and historical record, court notes that "[tihis is a well informed observer indeed"), reh'g granted and opin-

ion vacated,2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004).
45. In criticizing the construct of the objective observer, Professor Smith argues that "a purely
fictitious character will perceive precisely as much, and only as much, as its author wants it to perceive; and there is no empirical touchstone or outside referent upon which a critic could rely to show
that the author was wrong." Smith, supra note 9, at 292. An observer as knowledgeable as the one
posited by Justice O'Connor, however, does in fact have an empirical touchstone-the full record.
Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An
46.
Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 88 (1990).
Id. at 90 ("[Tjhe 'objective' or 'reasonable' observer is, in the final analysis, the judici47.
ary.").

48.

See Smith, supra note 9, at 292.
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evidence that a highly informed (but not entirely informed) observer
purportedly might apprehend .
The test articulated by Justice O'Connor nonetheless embeds within
it a potentially significant degree of subjectivity, not because the
standard employs an idealized observer but because the observer (in
reality, the fully-informed court itself) is asked to discern actual or
apparent "endorsement"-a concept that, depending on its definition,
may inject an irreducible degree of discretion into the analysis. If the
court construes the term to mean only a purposeful message of official
sanction, both the purpose and effects inquiry collapse into the single
question whether an intentional endorsing message has been made and
thus can be perceived. This analysis is not appreciably more or less
determinate than any other inquiry into legislative purpose. ° While not
notable for its subjectivity, 51 however, this understanding of endorsement
would significantly restrict the reach of the constitutional prohibition in
view of the fact that legislatures infrequently act with such demonstrable
intent in matters of religion.52 In turn, the construction would fail to
address the concerns regarding political standing that undergird the test
itself.5 3 For this reason, Justice O'Connor has rejected this narrow
understanding of endorsement and directed that the constitutional inquiry
look beyond the professed legislative rationale to determine not merely
its sincerity 54 but also the communicative impact of the resulting
55
governmental action, irrespective of intent.
In applying this broader standard, however, it is unclear whether the
idealized observer should consider the communicative impact of
government action entirely without regard to evidence of legislative
intent or instead should assess such evidence as part of its broader effects
inquiry. O'Connor's formulation of the objective observer implies the
latter, since the observer is deemed aware of the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute.56 But if such evidence is probative of
49.
Cf Choper, supra note 9, at 512-13 (comparing lower court decisions that impute to the
objective observer widely divergent levels of factual knowledge).

50. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-60; cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971)
("[l]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment."); Feigenson, supra note 46, at 84-85.
51.
Cf McConnell, supranote 10, at 143 ("[T]he argument about legislative purpose is one of
the most important questions cutting across the fields of constitutional law. It affects everything
from the Equal Protection Clause to the Commerce Clause to the Bill of Attainder Clause.").

52. Cf Pinette, 515 U.S. at 791-92 (Souter, J., concurring).
53.
Smith explains: "a focus ... upon legislative intent.., diverges from the purpose which
Justice O'Connor attributes to the 'no endorsement' test. . . . If [political alienation) is the purpose
of the test ...

then the pertinent fact controlling the application of the test should [not] be . . . the

perhaps indiscernible intent of government officials ....

[T]he controlling standard, rather, should

be the actual perceptions of real citizens." Smith, supra note 9, at 294.
54.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75.

55. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
56.

Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.
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the endorsing effect of government action, and if the observer is truly as
well informed as O'Connor implies, the effects and purpose inquiries
will still merge, as discussed above,5 7 and O'Connor's effort to
differentiate between purposeful and apparent endorsement
disintegrates-at least in those circumstances where legislative intent is
discernible.
To make sense of an independent effects inquiry performed by an
objective observer, then, the court must focus predominantly on facts
that, considered without regard to direct evidence of legislative motive,
give rise to an appearance of official sanction-i.e., that are inferentially
supportive of purposeful endorsement. Especially in instances where
legislative intent is not easily discernible, the effects test should focus
exclusively on such facts. Concurring in Pinette, Justice O'Connor
suggests this understanding of the constitutional inquiry:
The Clause is more than a negative prohibition against certain narrowly defined forms of government favoritism; it also imposes af-

firmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to
take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a pri-

vate religious message. That is, the Establishment Clause forbids a
State from hiding behind the application of formally neutral criteria

and remaining studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions.58

This explication requires, at least "in some situations," that the court
disregard direct evidence of permissible intent and focus instead on the
59 The
apparent rather than intended meaning of government action.
indeterminacy of this analysis will vary dramatically depending upon the
kind of evidence that the court weighs in support of the allegation.
a. Evidence of Comparative Advantage
Evidence reflecting a comparative advantage conferred on religion
by government-e.g., differentially favorable treatment of religion in the
allocation of public resources or assistance 6 -is highly probative of an
intent to endorse and can be measured with significant objectivity. If
government refuses to accept a Christian symbol for display in a public
57. Smith, supra note 9, at 293-94 ("[O'Connor's description of the well-informed observer]
comes very close to saying that the observer knows... what the legislators intended.... [T]he judge
who examines the text, background, and implementation of a law and concludes that the law was not
intended to endorse religion should rule that an 'objective observer' examining the same factors
would draw the same conclusion. To rule otherwise would be to confess that the judge is not being
'objective."'); Feigenson, supra note 46, at 88 ("[Bjecause the objective observer looks to the 'in-

tended' meaning rather than the 'objective' meaning, Justice O'Connor collapses the effect test into
the purpose test.").
58. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Where the government's operation of a
59. Id. ("Governmental intent cannot control ....
public forum has the effect of endorsing religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor
actively encourages that result, the Establishment Clause is violated.") (citation omitted).
Cf Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714-15
60.

(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
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park while simultaneously permitting the display of Jewish imagery, the
Christian faith has been objectively disadvantaged. When religion or a
religious sect enjoys such a comparative advantage, an impermissible
message of favoritism or preference 61 quite likely is communicated
unless the arrangement is justified on the basis of some other neutral
effect (e.g., the accommodation of religious free exercise).62 By
affording comparatively advantageous treatment to religion in the
allocation of its benefits and resources, government communicates to the
political community that religion occupies a place of preference and that
nonadherents are correspondingly disfavored-the very effect that
Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard seeks to avert.63
With respect to the permanent religious displays considered in this
Article, this variant of apparent endorsement is highly relevant; nearly all
such displays found to violate the Establishment Clause enjoy some kind
of measurable advantage over other religious and secular speech. 64 In
this context, the constitutional inquiry largely reduces to a determination
of differential advantage enjoyed by a particular religious display, vis a
vis competing expressive viewpoints, that cannot be justified on the basis
of some other neutral effect. Where religious speech enjoys superior
communicative status in any objectively measurable respect-be it
access to the forum, placement of the display, duration of occupancy, or
size of the expressive symbol-the well-informed observer will
reasonably conclude that the expression appears to enjoy the preference
of government. 65 At a minimum, such differential treatment places a
61.
See, e.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763 ("Our cases have accordingly equated 'endorsement'
with 'promotion' or 'favoritism."') (Scalia, J., writing for plurality); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591; Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
62. An example of such a permissible benefit would be the exemption of religious adherents
from generally-applicable regulations requiring that they act in violation of religious beliefs. While
not constitutionally compelled by the Free Exercise Clause after Employment Division, Department
Of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), such a legislative accommodation would not
violate the Establishment Clause provided that it did not discriminate between similarly-situated
religious adherents. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 9, at 508-09; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 632
(O'Connor, J., concurring); but see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise

Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 320 (1991). Identifying the permissible boundaries of religious accommodation outside the context of compelled religious practice, however, requires subjective judgments that introduce an additional layer of indeterminacy into the analysis. Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48 (1985).
63. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. This objectively measurable dimension of
apparent endorsement enjoys broad doctrinal and scholarly support. See, e.g., supra note 61;
McConnell, supra note 10, at 156-57 ("The target of the endorsement test should be favoritism or
preference ....[A] 'favoritism' or 'preference' test would enjoy the historical support that the pure
'endorsement' test so conspicuously lacks. The supporters of constitutional protections for religious
freedom were insistent that sect equality is an indispensable element of that freedom. To be sure,
their principal focus was on differences in material treatment, but it is no great stretch to extend the
principle to lesser evils."); Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response To

Steven D.Smith, 78 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 729, 735-36 (2003).
64. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 2004)
("[A]lthough it is not always an easy task to reconcile all of the Court's decisions, one principle has
remained clear: the government may not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another."),
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heavy burden on government to offer some very persuasive reason why,
based on the surrounding facts, its conduct does not have an endorsing
effect.
b. Evidence of Intrinsic Advantage
By contrast, evidence reflecting an intrinsic advantage conferred on
religion-e.g., the inclusion of religious institutions in government
programs or activities that are perceived to confer some special sanction
or status upon participants6--is also consistent with an intent to endorse,
but the probative force of the evidence is irreducibly linked to the
subjective perceptions of the arbiter. 67 To the extent that government
action does not distinguish between qualified religious and secular
beneficiaries, either because the benefit is conferred broadly or because it
is uniquely relevant to one or more religious recipients, 68 it is impossible
to identify any objective advantage conferred on religion. Accordingly,
the determination whether such conduct too closely aligns government
69
Even if
with religion is inevitably a function of subjective judgment.
two competing onlookers share identical information, the conclusions
that they may draw regarding any appearance of endorsement arising in
this context will remain the product of subjective perception. 70
Permanent religious displays erected on public property can also
communicate a message of intrinsic advantage and in this sense the
analysis of their constitutionality can be highly subjective. Apart from
any concrete advantage that religious speech enjoys in its access to a
communicative forum, the permanent display of religious symbols on
public parkland or adjacent to civic institutions strongly identifies the
speech with government itself.7' Assessing the degree to which such
linkage occurs, and the extent to which it communicates a message of
endorsement, is necessarily a function of the arbiter's personal values
and perspective.

rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Nos. 04-1321 and 041524, 2005 WL 81886 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2005).
66. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 10, at 156 (criticizing application of endorsement standard in circumstances where "the government 'endorses' religion along with many other institutions

or ideologies").
67. See Gey I, supra note 8, at 478-79.
68. E.g., infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
69. Compare, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (majority upholds parochial school's participation in textbook loan program on grounds that "[t]he law merely makes
available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge"), with

id. at 257 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the program impcrmissibly promotes religion because "[tihe textbook goes to the very heart of education in a parochial school").
70. Gey I, supra note 8, at 478-79 ("[E]very individual perceives the world differently, depending on factors such as the individual's background, prejudices, sensitivity, and general personality.").
71. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court's decisions in Pinette and Allegheny reflect this
kind of discretionary assessment of communicative impact. In both
cases, the Justices reached widely divergent conclusions regarding the
endorsing effect of the temporary religious symbols at issue based on
widely divergent views of how closely the displays associated religion
with government. 72 In Pinette, for example, the Justices sharply
disagreed over the perceived endorsing effect of a Ku Klux Klan cross
73
privately erected in the plaza adjacent to a state capital building.
Likewise in Allegheny, the Court sharply divided over the question
whether a Nativity scene in a courthouse appeared to endorse religion,
given that it stood alone at the base of the building's "Grand Staircase, 74
and whether the display of a menorah outside the building in conjunction
with a Christmas tree and a sign reading "Salute to Liberty" had a
different communicative effect. 75 As these cases demonstrate, the
question whether the public display of any particular symbol
communicates that the government has conferred some form of intrinsic
advantage on religion does not lend itself to predictable assessment.
2. The Question of Measurable Injury
The second major criticism of the endorsement standard-that it ties
constitutional injury to the expressive impact of a challenged practice
rather than to coerced religious observance or support-raises more
fundamental concerns regarding the nature and purpose of the
constitutional guarantee. While a general discussion of the question is
beyond the scope of this Article, the critique has profound implications
for the specific types of Establishment Clause violations discussed
below. Under the critics' alternative analysis, the presence of a religious
monument, display, or statue on public land would neither violate nor
even implicate the Establishment Clause because its presence would not
coerce religious observance. 76 Accordingly, the permanent display of a
privately-erected and maintained religious monument (say, a 150-foot
tall crucifix on the steps of the Capitol Building) would be a
constitutional nonevent because any injury inflicted would merely be
72.
73.

Infra notes 73-75.
Pinene, 515 U.S. at 763-65 (Scalia, J., writing for plurality), 782-83 (O'Connor, J., con-

curring), 808-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and 817-18 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting),
74.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602 (Blackmun, J., writing for plurality), 663-67 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75.
Id. at 613-21 (Blackmun, J.,
writing for plurality), 632-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
637-46 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 652-655 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), 663-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("No
one was compelled to observe or participate in any religious ceremony or activity .... Passersby
who disagree with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn

their backs, just as they are free todo when they disagree with any other form of government
speech."); Gey I, supra note 8, at493 ("The placement of passive religious symbols on government
property almost always would be upheld under the coercion standard, in contrast to the separationist
approach, because it is virtually inconceivable that any religious symbol would 'coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise."').
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expressive-that is, nothing would be at stake but the "distressed
sensibilities 77 of religious minorities who might perceive the display as
alienating and degrading of their position in the polity. 78 Implicit in this
critique is the premise that such injury is not sufficiently damaging to the
aggrieved party-and thus, by aggregation, to the polity itself-to
79
outweigh the majoritarian "felt need" to express religious conviction.
This premise undervalues in at least two respects the impact of
permanent religious symbols displayed on public property. First, it fails
to acknowledge the concrete personal injury resulting from such offense:
burdening or precluding the use of public space by nonadherents.80
Indeed, one of the two competing standing doctrines in this context
rests not on subjective "expressive" injury but on the concrete loss
suffered by persons for whom the use of public space is measurably
limited by the symbols of an alien faith. 81 As the Eleventh Circuit
recently recounted in Glassroth v. Moore, "[f]or Establishment Clause
claims based on non-economic harm, the plaintiffs must identify a
'personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees.' 82 The court found such an injury in Glassroth because
plaintiffs had altered their conduct and incurred expenses "in order to
minimize contact" with a Ten Commandments monument erected in the
rotunda of Alabama's State Judicial Building, in part by avoiding entry
into the building itself.83
Second, the coercion critique fails to admit the broader structural
implications of these injuries. When a symbolic endorsement of religion
taints and constrains the use of public space, more is at stake than the
"distressed sensibilities" of impliedly hypersensitive religious minorities.
By selectively burdening access to public institutions and property, the
unconstitutional endorsement may distort the integrity and
77. See Choper, supra note 9, at 528.
78. See, e.g., id at 525-26; but see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("I doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the perma[S]uch an obtrusive year-round relinent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall ....
gious display would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf
of a particular religion."). As Professor Gey observes, "[this seems true, but so what? Under the

coercion standard, if no one is coerced into practicing the particular faith represented by the cross,
where is the violation of the Establishment Clause? . . . The real reason that Justice Kennedy's
theory will not support his attempt to draw minute factual distinctions is that, at the most basic level,
Justice Kennedy is not wholly committed to his theory." Gey 1,supra note 8, at 496-97.
79.
80.

Choper, supra note 9, at 526-27.
See, e.g., Marc Rohr, Tilting at Crosses: Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the Estab-

lishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495, 510-19 (1995) (discussing the two doctrines).
See, e.g., Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 619 n.2
81.
(9th Cir. 1996); ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986); ACLU v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1103-08 (11 th Cir. 1983).
82.
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1292 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
83.
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1292-93.
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representativeness of deliberative government itself and thus undercut its
legitimacy. 84 For example, if religious monuments in the rotunda of a
city hall deter religious minorities from entering the building to offer
comment on matters of public concern-or, more generally, from
participating in a civic discourse that they perceive as hostile to their
faith 85-the deliberative process will be literally skewed. While this
distorting effect may seem trivial in the context of a single religious
display erected in a park, courthouse, or civic building, implementation
of the coercion standard may lead to a proliferation of such symbols in
the public domain and accordingly result in a meaningful diminution of
86
public participation by disaffected or intimidated religious minorities.
Because the coercion standard places virtually no constraints on
government's ability to erect sectarian displays on public property, 87 it is
not difficult to envision government officials-particularly those in
regions where the political power of a dominant religious sect is most
potent and the corresponding threat to the political integration of
religious minorities is most severe-who exploit the opportunity to
broadly transform public facilities and property into platforms for
religious speech.88 In this context, the possibility of deterring political
participation by disaffected religious minorities is a genuine risk. 89 In
turn, the threatened injury transcends the expressive interests of an
aggrieved minority and implicates the integrity of the political process
itself.90
In contrast to the assertion that the endorsement concept is too
protective of separationist interests, others argue that Justice O'Connor's
formulation is not sufficiently attentive to the injuries arising from
religious preference.
Justice Stevens, while accepting apparent
endorsement as the appropriate constitutional standard, argues that
O'Connor's objective-observer test wrongly discounts the perceptions of
ordinary individuals and should be calibrated instead to "the universe of

84.

Feigenson, supra note 46, at 69 & n.82.

85.

Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) ("When the government appropriates

religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate into theological decree.' Those who disagree no longer
are questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of a higher authority who is beyond

reproach.") (internal citation omitted).
86. Feigenson, supra note 46, at 81.
87. Any retreat from this position requires the recognition that such symbols may have a
psychologically coercive effect on religious minorities, which in turn subjects the coercion standard
to the very criticism that its proponents direct toward O'Connor's endorsement test-that it rests on
a subjective rather than concrete injury. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

88.
Compare McConnell, supra note 10, at 169 (in contrast to "a triumphalist majority religion," argues that the "more serious threat to religious pluralism today is a combination of indifference to the plight of religious minorities and a preference for the secular in public affairs"), with Gey
I, supra note 8, at 489 ("[G]iven the fractious political battles along religious lines that recently have
taken place in large cities on both coasts, I doubt that the problem of overreaching by politically
active religious groups is as inconsequential or as infrequent as Professor McConnell believes.").
89.
90.

Gey I, supra note 8, at 495.
Feigenson, supra note 46, at 79.
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reasonable persons." 9' Several commentators have echoed this concern
and observed that, by tying the standard to an idealized observer with
essentially perfect knowledge, O'Connor betrays her ultimate objective:
92
assuring that religious affiliation has no impact on political standing.
Political standing is not experienced by omniscient observers but by real
people with perceptions and emotions that arise from unique personal
experience.9 3 In articulating the endorsement test, O'Connor thus faces
an insoluble dilemma: either to promote political inclusion by adopting a
standard that depends on the vagaries of myriad unique and competing
perspectives,9495or to promote a more objective test that conflicts with its
very rationale.
There is considerable force to this objection. As Professor Gey has
observed:
By employing an "objective observer" to decide questions of
endorsement, Justice O'Connor relays the message to religious
minorities that their perceptions are wrong; or, even worse, that their
perceptions do not matter. I can think of no more effective way to
"send[] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community.
It is not true, however, that the application of O'Connor's test inevitably
undercuts separationist values by providing an endless source of
legitimating rationales for apparent religious preference. This aspect of
the critique does not account for the circumstance-encountered with
some regularity-where the apparent preference arises not from the
challenged government action, viewed in relative isolation, but instead
from its broader factual context. In such situations, the test articulated by
Justice O'Connor is potentially more protective of separationist values
than the standard proposed by Justice Stevens. For example, in a recent
challenge to a cross on undeveloped federal property, the government
asserted that the cross was permissible because the land would likely
appear to an objective observer to be privately owned.97 Underscoring
the sophistication imputed to the observer under Justice O'Connor's
formulation, the district court rejected the argument and noted that the

91.
92.

Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Feigenson, supra note 46, at 55; Gey I, supra note 8, at 481; Smith, supra note 9, at 294-

93.

Feigenson, supra note 46, at 55; Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and the State,

95.

100 HARv. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987).
94.
But see Feigenson, supra note 46, at 94-101 (arguing that the perceptions of ordinary
individuals could be integrated into the application of the endorsement standard by borrowing the
methodology of defamation law).
95. See, e.g., id. at 90-91.
96. Gey I, supra note 8, at 481.

97. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2002), ajTd,371 F.3d 543 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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relevant inquiry presumed knowledge of public ownership. 98 The test,
then, is not necessarily less protective of separationist values, as Justice
Stevens asserts, but is instead concerned with comparatively less
superficial appearances of endorsement-regardless of whether that
standard makes it more or less likely in any particular case that a
violation will be found.
As set forth in Part III, below, this conclusion has important
implications for the analysis of remedies under the Establishment Clause.
Careful consideration of the factual and historical context of an
unconstitutional display will likely require more stringent corrective
measures to dissipate the appearance of religious endorsement than an
alternative approach that considers remedial outcomes in greater
isolation from the circumstances giving rise to the violation itself. The
well-informed observer, knowledgeable that government has, in fact or
appearance, subjectively embraced and promoted a religious message,
will carefully assess any proposed remedy to assure that it eradicates the
taint of endorsement. 99 To survive such scrutiny, a remedy must not
merely restore superficial neutrality but rather convince a skeptical
observer that government's preferential sentiment no longer colors its
conduct.'t°
II. APPLICATION OF THE ENDORSEMENT STANDARD TO PERMANENT
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS ON PUBLIC LAND: THE THRESHOLD QUESTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY

Justice O'Connor's reformulation of Lemon broadens the evident
scope of permissible religious expression on public land. A display that
formerly advanced religious interests in violation of Lemon may now be
permissible on grounds that it does not evince official endorsement of its
message.101
This refinement is evident in the Supreme Court's
assessment of temporary and seasonal religious displays, which reflects
considerable tolerance for various forms of religious expression in the
public domain. 0 2
Despite this relaxation of the constitutional
proscription, however, certain forms of symbolic religious speech remain
squarely at odds with the Establishment Clause. Specifically, courts
regularly conclude that religious symbols permanently displayed on
public property create in the well-informed observer a perception of
endorsement and thus violate the effects prong of O'Connor's
reformulated Lemon test, irrespective of government's articulated

98.
99.

Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
See infra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.

100.
101.

Id.
See supra notes 11- 19 and accompanying text.

102. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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purpose
in erecting
display.
Cases
0 4 supporting the proposition are
legion, and
departuresthefrom
it are103
rare.
A. The General Prohibition

As the United States Supreme Court observed over half a century
ago, symbolism is a direct and powerful method of expression:
The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea,
institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes
and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to
knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or
design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through
crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks
through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical
raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as
religious symbols come to convey theological ones. 105

When potent religious symbols such as crosses, menorahs, and crucifixes
are placed on public land, there is a real risk that the objective observer
will impute to government the symbolic message itself. As Justice
Souter has observed, "[w]hen an individual speaks in a public forum, it is
reasonable for an observer to attribute the speech, first and foremost, to
the speaker, while an unattended display (and any message it conveys)
can naturally be viewed as belonging to the owner of the land on which it
stands.' °6 The risk of attribution is heightened dramatically when the
religious display is
not merely a temporary presence but instead a
07
permanent fixture. 1

While temporary religious displays can be diluted in their endorsing
effect by various secularizing influences and thus have been upheld in a
103.
See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text, and infra notes 121-24. In those instances
where government erects a display with the demonstrable purpose of endorsing its religious message, the constitutional infirmity is clear. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1296-97
(11 th Cir. 2003); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2001); Books
v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 302-04 (7th Cir. 2000); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d
924, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1980); ACLU v. Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d 873, 883-89 (N.D. Ohio 2002),
afftd, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763-64 (E.D.
Tenn. 2002); Adland v. Russ, 107 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784-85 (E.D. Ky. 2000), aftd, 307 F.3d 471 (6th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003). The focus of the discussion below is on the more
general case where permanent religious displays are erected on public land in the absence of such
dispositive evidence of impermissible intent and are thus assessed by considering whether they give
rise to a perception of endorsement.
104.
See infra notes 121-24.
105.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); see, e.g., Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
106.
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
107.
See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[Wlhile
previous ... uses of the Park suggesting religious activity could be clearly tied to a speaker, the
display of this unattended, solitary, semi-permanent symbol could not; and in the absence of a live
speaker to whom responsibility could be attributed, the City was perceived as fulfilling the role of
sponsor."); Alberto B. Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette's Imbalance of Free
Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 214-15 (2003).
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variety of contexts, 08 the permanent presence of a religious symbol on
public property tips the constitutional calculation decidedly toward the
appearance of endorsement.1°9 Even Justice Kennedy, who emphatically
opposes the endorsement standard as inappropriately hostile to the
accommodation of religion, suggests that the permanent display of
religious symbols fundamentally alters the constitutional equation. 110 In
his dissenting opinion in Allegheny, Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia) repeatedly distinguished the
temporary religious display at issue from more suspect cases involving
"permanent," "year-round," and "continual" religious symbols on public
property,"' and pointed to the permanent display of a cross atop a
municipal building as an archetypical case of unconstitutionality: "I
doubt not . . .that the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall .... [S]uch an

obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government's
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular
religion."'12 Inrejecting Justice Kennedy's intimation that the temporary
nature of a display might immunize a religious symbol from
constitutional challenge, the Allegheny majority underscored the
indisputably suspect nature of permanent religious displays-indicating3
upon the predicate proposition."
that every Justice of the Court agreed
14
principle
the
affirm
cases
A host of

108. E.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763; Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (1lth
Cir. 1993) (en banc); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993); Arm. United for
Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1541, 1546 (6th Cir. 1992);
Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
109. See infra note 114.
110. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 667-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Id. at 661, 664-65 & n.3; see id at 608 n.56 ("In describing what would violate his 'proselytization' test, Justice Kennedy uses the adjectives 'permanent,' 'year-round,' and 'continual,' as if
to suggest that temporary acts of favoritism for a particular sect do not violate the Establishment
Clause.") (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 661.
Id at 608 n.56 ("In any event, the Court [has] repudiated any notion that preferences for
113.
").
particular religious beliefs are permissible unless permanent ....
114. See, e.g., Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at 773; Books, 235 F.3d at 306; Gonzales v.
N. Township of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1423 (7th Cir. 1993); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d
1518, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (Beezer, J., concurring); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1412 (7th
Cir. 1991); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1030; Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th
Cir. 1985); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Nos. 04-1321 and 04-1524, 2005
WL 81886 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2005); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 873 (S.D.
Ind. 2000); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 842, 858 (S.D. Ind. 2000),
1996); Clever
aff'd, 259 F.3d 766; Doe v. County of Montgomery, 915 F. Supp. 32, 38 n.16 (C.D. Ill
v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 937 (D.N.J. 1993); Murphy v. Bilbray, 782
F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Ellis, 990 F.2d 1518; Joki v. Bd. of Educ. of
Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist., 745 F. Supp. 823, 831 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch.
Dep't, 722 F. Supp. 834, 843 (D. Mass. 1989); ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 235 (S.D. Tex.
1984); cf. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1986); McCreary v. Stone, 739
F.2d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1984); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 788 F. Supp. 445, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1991),
afftd, I F.3d 775; Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 313 (Or. 1986).
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The endorsing message communicated by permanent religious
displays typically results from both the comparative advantage conferred
on religious speech by its superior access to an expressive venue as well
as the intrinsic advantage conferred by the proximity of religious
symbols to, and their integration with, the physical presence of
government itself. Cases involving permanent religious displays usually5
arise in the physical context of public parks, plazas, or civic buildings.' 16
These spaces figuratively or literally manifest government authority.
Affording religious speech permanent access to such quintessentially
public space communicates to nonadherents that they are political
outsiders, in derogation of the core value protected by the endorsement
test, by literally merging the physical presence of the state with the
message of another faith. 1'7
Scores of suits have challenged permanent religious symbols on
grounds that the displays violate the federal Establishment Clause or
analogous state constitutional provisions. While no per se rule of
unconstitutionality has been recognized' 18-and, indeed, such a rule
would conflict with the fact-specific inquiry mandated by the
endorsement standard"9-the challenged displays have been struck
down in the overwhelming majority of recent cases. 20 Courts have
specifically rejected the constitutionality of crosses and crucifixes.'

115.
See, e.g., infra notes 121-24.
116.
Cf Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 766, 772 (D. Md. 2003).
117.
Cf. Idleman, supra note 18, at 25 ("Because it is perception-based, moreover, 'the endorsement test is particularly concerned with whether governmental practices create a "symbolic
union" of church and state."') (quoting Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 264 (6th Cir.

2000)).
118.
Cf Lopez, supra note 107, at 224 (proposing per se rule barring the permanent display of
religious symbols on public land on grounds that religious organizations may monopolize available
public space; "[t]o combat the exclusion fostered by the dominance of the public forum allowed
under existing government policy, the only remedy that is truly neutral is to ban all permanent religious messages from public grounds"). As set forth infra notes 121-41 and accompanying text, this
proposed rule would largely confirm the outcomes reached under existing doctrine, with the exception of cases involving symbols with mixed secular and religious significance.
119.
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
120.
See infra notes 121-31. Some older cases upheld the permanent display of such symbols.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972); Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976).
121.
Decisions striking down the permanent display of crosses and crucifixes on public land
include: Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004); Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996) (decided under the California Constitution); Separation of Church
and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996); Gonzales, 4 F.3d 1412; Ellis, 990
F.2d 1518 (decided under California Constitution); ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Murphy, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (decided under the California Constitution); Jewish War Veterans v.
United States, 695 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1988); Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222; cf. City of St. Charles, 794
F.2d 265. Courts also have struck down the display of crosses on government shields, seals, and
insignia. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528; Harris,927 F.2d at 1412-15; Friedman,781 F.2d at 781-82; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1436; contra, Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding cross on city insignia).
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Commandments,
permanently displayed on public property. Courts have reached this
conclusion irrespective of whether the religious symbols were erected by
2
125
government or private parties, 2 financed with private or public funds, 26
adjacent to or distant from government buildings, 27 displayed alone or in

Decisions striking down the permanent display of religious statuary on public land in122.
clude: Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000),
and Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991) (decided under the California Constitution).
Decisions striking down public monuments or plaques engraved with the Ten Command123.
ments, as well as the posting of the Ten Commandments in public buildings, include: Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. City of
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004); Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., Nos. 02-3776
and 02-3777, 2004 WL 68523 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2004); ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438
(6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004); Glassroth, 335 F.3d 1282; Adland v. Russ, 307
F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002); Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d 766; Books, 235 F.3d 292; Mercier,
305 F. Supp. 2d 999; Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Mercier
v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WL
81886; Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d 873; ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757; ACLU v. Grayson County, No. Civ.A.4:O1CV202-M, 2002 WL 1558688 (W.D. Ky. May 13, 2002); ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp.
2d 1024 (D. Neb. 2002); ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001);
Kimbley, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856; Adland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 782; ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp.
2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000); ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v.
Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F.
Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cit. 1994); Ring v. Grand Forks Pub. Sch.
Dist. Number 1, 483 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 87 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Young v. County of Charleston, No. 97 -CP-10-3491, 1999 WL
33530383 (S.C. Com. PI. Jan. 21, 1999).
A few courts have upheld monuments engraved with the Ten Commandments on grounds
that the inclusion of secular symbols diminishes the religious effect of the text (particularly where
the text does not dominate the display), where the text itself is deemed predominantly secular rather
than religious, or where the display has existed for an extended period of time and thus purportedly
gained independent historical significance. Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir.
2004); Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cit. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004);
Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003); ACLU v. Mercer County, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Ky. 2002); Christian v. City of Grand Junction, No. 01-CV-685, 2001 WL
34047958 (D. Colo. June 27, 2001); Suhre v. Haywood County, 55 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D.N.C.
1999); Colorado v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995). A thirtyyear-old decision of the Tenth Circuit upholding a Ten Commandments monument based on similar
reasoning appears to have been repudiated. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th
Cir. 1973); see Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000 n.3 (10th Cit. 2002), and Summum
v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 910 n.2 and 912 n.8 (10th Cit. 1997). The split in authority over the
permissibility of such displays will likely be resolved by the Supreme Court this term, following its
grant of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Van Orden and the Sixth Circuit's opinion
in McCreary County.
See, e.g., Kaplan, 891 F.2d 1024 (menorah); Doe, 915 F. Supp. 32 (sign stating "The
124.
World Needs God"); Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (Star of David).
125.
Compare, e.g., Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64, Kimbley, 119 F. Supp. 2d at
859-60, and Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 224, with Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1414, Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1525, and
Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205, 1216-17.
Compare, e.g., Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 759-61, with Rabun, 698 F.2d at
126.
1110 & n.22.
Compare, e.g., Glassroth, 335 F.3d 1282, and Books, 235 F.3d at 306, with Separation of
127.
Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 625-26 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring), Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at
1008-09, and Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
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combination with other religious or secular items, 28 or characterized as
serving either a religious or secular purpose.' 29 The permanency of the
symbols plays a central role in this reasoning. 130 As the court in Doe v.
County of Montgomery noted:
Unlike the vast majority of Establishment Clause cases (where a
particular religious symbol is intended to be displayed for a short
period of time, usually around the Christmas season), the sign here is
displayed on the Courthouse 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.
Both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have recognized that
such a situation presents a more compelling scenario for finding a
constitutional violation.' 31

The handful of cases departing from this paradigm involve less
potent religious symbols which are occasionally characterized as secular
in effect and thus outside the Establishment Clause prohibition. 32 This
conclusion is especially likely when the challenged symbol is part of a
larger display that includes secular objects in addition to religious
imagery.' 33 The most common case involves monuments engraved with
the Ten Commandments. The minority of courts upholding such
displays typically accord determinative significance to their
characterization of the text as contextually secular, 134 in contrast to the
undeniably sectarian import of other religious symbols,' 35 and cast the
monument as but one component of a larger collection of displays
memorializing some broad, secular theme.136 In dissenting from the
denial of certiorariin a recent case, Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated

the proposition: "To be sure, the Ten Commandments are a 'sacred text
in the Jewish and Christian faiths,' concerning, in part, 'the religious
duties of believers.' Undeniably, however, the Commandments have
128.
Compare, e.g., McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at
778 (Coffey, J., dissenting), Books, 235 F.3d at 317 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), Grayson County, 2002 WL 1558688, and Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, with Carpenter,93 F.3d
627, Gonzales, 4 F.3d 1412, Ellis, 990 F.2d 1518, and Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202.
129.
Compare, e.g., Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64, and Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at
233-34, with Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 12-14.
130. Supra note 114; see, e.g., Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1423; Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at
773; Kimbley, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
131.
Doe, 915 F. Supp. at 38 n.16,
132. See, e.g., supra note 123.
133. See, e.g., Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173; Mercer County, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 794; Suhre, 55 F.
Supp. 2d at 395-96. In a related context, the Supreme Court has expressed approval of its own
depiction of Moses and the Ten Commandments, in conjunction with the display of various other
historical figures, on the wall of its courtroom: "Indeed, a carving of Moses holding the Ten Commandments, surrounded by representations of other historical legal figures, adorns the frieze on the
south wall of our courtroom, and we have said that the carving 'signals respect not for great proselytizers but for great lawgivers."' City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 121 S.Ct. 2209, 2212
(2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (internal citation omitted).
134. Supra note 123.
135.
See, e.g., infra note 140.
136. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 ("[A]lmost without exception, the only public displays
of the Ten Commandments that courts have upheld are those that are included in a larger display
with an overall secular message.").
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secular significance as well, because they have made a substantial
contribution to our secular legal codes." 137 Rehnquist concludes that the
disputed monument, in the context of its physical display alongside two
secular monuments on the lawn of a municipal building, "simply reflects
the Ten Commandments' role in the development of our legal system,
Monument reflect the history and
just as the war memorial and Freedom
13 8
culture of the city of Elkhart."'
139
Whether one accepts the force of this or any similar distinction,
the argument is necessarily inapplicable to government's display of an
intrinsically sectarian religious symbol such as a cross, crucifix, or Star
of David. 140 However broadly or narrowly the courts may construe the
religious character of a creche or a monument to the Ten
Commandments, the irreducibly religious import of certain symbolsand the resulting infirmity 14of their permanent display on public land-is
not in meaningful dispute. '
B. Exceptions to the GeneralRule

Courts are regularly urged to depart from this analysis on grounds
that various secularizing influences dissipate the endorsing effect of
permanent sectarian symbols. Most common is the effort to secularize
the use of a religious symbol by characterizing its function as a memorial

City of Elkhart, 532 U.S. 1058, 121 S.Ct. at 2211 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the
137.
denial of certiorari) (internal citations omitted).
138. Id. at 2212. The myriad cases dealing with temporary Christmas displays, in which courts
often uphold the inclusion of a creche amid secular items such as the now-infamous plastic reindeer
of Lynch v. Donnelly, involve analogous reasoning. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 679-83.
Substantial weight is often accorded the fact that a creche is an historical representation of the birth
of Jesus rather than an exclusively religious symbol, which assertedly fortifies the secular effect of
the overall display. Id.; see, e.g., ACLU v. County of Delaware, 726 F. Supp. 184, 190 (S.D. Ohio
1989); Stein v. Plainwell Cmty. Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43, 47 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406
(6th Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court is expected to address and resolve the question this term. McCreary
139.
County, 354 F.3d 438, cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 310; Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173, cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 346.
140. Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Conn. 1985) ("The cross, in the
context of Christmas, is a purely religious symbol. Unlike a creche, it has no historical connection to
the holiday. The only purpose served by the display of the cross, even inthe context of the Christmas holiday, is to express religious sentiment."); see generally Barnette. 319 U.S. at 632; Carpenter,
93 F.3d at 630; Separation of Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 620; Harris, 927 F.2d at1403; St.
Charles, 794 F.2d at 271; Rabun, 698 F.2d at 1103; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1429 & n.26; Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Hewitt v. Joyner, 705 F. Supp.
1443, 1449 (C.D. Cal.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 940 F.2d 1561; Jewish War Veterans, 695 F.
Supp. at 13; Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 234; Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
See, e.g., supra notes 121-22.
141.
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to war veterans, 142 although government defendants have also
characterized the function of such displays on other secular groundsasserting, for example, that a disputed cross serves merely as a tourist
attraction 143 or a navigational reference for overhead aircraft. 144 Courts
almost always find that these rationales are a pretextual excuse for
otherwise unconstitutional activity and conclude, irrespective of pretext,
that the endorsing effect of a sectarian symbol is not dissipated by any
additional secular function it may serve. 145 As one court observed,
"[e]ven if one strains to view the [religious] symbols in the context of a
war memorial, their primary effect is to give the impression that only
Christians and Jews are being honored . ,,146
There are only a handful of circumstances in which courts have
recognized possible exceptions to the general rule barring the permanent
display of sectarian symbols on public land. In particular, where
religious symbols have independent historical significance, or where
private religious displays are erected in a public forum for permanent
symbolic speech, courts have reasoned that the objective observer will
perceive no endorsement of the religious message.
1. The Historical Rationale
Cases involving an historical rationale for the permanent display of
religious symbols address two distinct arguments. The first involves
sectarian symbols that are linked to independent historical events, while
the second involves symbols whose historical significance derives from
the duration of the display itself. The persuasive force of the respective
assertions differs considerably.
When a religious symbol is linked to an event of independent
historical significance, courts typically find that the communicative
147
impact of the display is predominantly secular and thus permissible.
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Ellis v. City of La Mesa, "[e]ven a purely
142.

See, e.g., Separationof Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 619; Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1421;

Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1527; Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 & n.8; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1437-38;
Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 13-14; Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 233-35.
143. Rabun, 698 F.2d at 1110-11.
144.
145.

Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1433.
E.g., supra notes 121-24.

146. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 235.
147. See, e.g., Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422 n.9 ("We distinguish between the historical significance that a symbol may achieve because of an unusual or unique event or circumstances surrounding it, from the local cultural landmark significance that a symbol may achieve simply because it is
displayed."); cf Okrand, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 922 (upholding display of Katowitz Menorah, saved from

the Holocaust, on grounds that its "unique historical background [renders it] much more a museum
piece than a symbol of religious worship").
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religious symbol may acquire independent historical significance by
148
virtue of its being associated with significant non-religious events."
Thus the public display of an historic crucifix on the wall of publiclyowned California mission 149 is not likely to be deemed an endorsement
of religion in view of the secular significance of Catholic missionaries in
the cultural, ethnic, and political history of the state. 150 This outcome is
consistent with the principles underlying the endorsement standard, since
there is no genuine comparative advantage afforded religion by such an
historical display (unless government excludes secular items of similar
historical significance), nor is there any intrinsic advantage conferred on
are displayed as historical
religion (provided that the religious symbols
151
artifacts rather than objects of veneration).
The proposition that permanent religious displays should be upheld
on the basis of mere longevity, however, has been widely repudiated, as
illustrated by the reaction to the district court's decision in Carpenterv.
City and County of San Francisco.152 In upholding defendant's display
of the Mt. Davidson Cross, the lower court in Carpenterreasoned that
the symbol was not predominantly religious in its effect because
President Roosevelt had dedicated the exhibit and because the cross had
153
gained recognition over the intervening years as a "cultural" landmark.
The Seventh Circuit replied:
The [Carpenter] court's decision that local and cultural landmark
status gave secular effect to the cross in that case smacks of
bootstrapping . . . . [T]he landmark status seems to have been
achieved, in large part, by virtue of the duration of the display-the
longer the violation, the less violative it becomes .... We do not
accept this sort of bootstrapping argument as a defense to an

148.

Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1526.

149.
Dana Wilkie, Mission Funding Hits Constitutional Roadblock, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE, March 10, 2004, at Al (two of California's 21 missions are owned by the state; the re-

mainder are owned by the Catholic Church).
150. See generally, James Sandos, Between Crucifix and Lance: Indian-White Relations in
California, 1769-1848, in CONTESTED EDEN: CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE GOLD RUSH 196-229
(Ram6n A. Gutirrez & Richard J. Orsi, eds., 1998); ROBERT H. JACKSON & EDWARD CASTILLO,
INDIANS, FRANCISCANS AND SPANISH COLONIZATION:

THE IMPACT OF THE MISSION SYSTEM ON

THE CALIFORNIA INDIANS 11-107 (1995).

151.
Similarly, the display of religious symbols with independent artistic significance-e.g., a
painting of the Crucifixion in the National Gallery-is permissible as well, provided that the same
conditions are satisfied. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
152. Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337, 349-50 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (decided under the California Constitution), rev'd, 93 F.3d 627.
Carpenter,803 F. Supp. at 349-50.
153.
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Establishment Clause violation,
nor have we found any other case
54

that adopted this reasoning.'

The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court, ruling that the
cross lacked any "history independent of its religious significance" and
noting that "there is nothing about FDR's155transcontinental contact that
converts the Cross into an historical relic."'
This analysis is consistent with Justice O'Connor's discussion of the
role of history in assessing the endorsing effect of a religious practice or
display. In Allegheny, O'Connor responded at length to Justice
Kennedy's charge that application of the endorsement test "without
artificial exceptions for historical practice" 56 would require the
invalidation of "many traditional practices recognizing the role of
religion in our society."' 157 In defending the constitutionality of various
forms of "ceremonial deism,"1 58 Justice O'Connor stressed that such
practices will not "survive Establishment Clause scrutiny simply by
virtue of their historical longevity alone" but rather are permissible
because they do not violate "the values protected" by the constitutional
provision. 159 She specifically linked the permissibility of ceremonial
deism to its "nonsectarian nature"-a consideration almost never present
in disputes regarding the display of religious symbols on public landand summarized the relevant inquiry as focusing on whether
"longstanding practices . . . serve a secular purpose rather than a

sectarian one and have largely lost their religious significance over
time." 16 Accordingly, as framed by O'Connor, the historical context of a
challenged display is relevant not because of the mere passage of time
but instead because independent historical developments
may effectively
161
divest the display of its religious significance.

154.
155.

Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422.
Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 631; see also Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1526 ("[A] display's historical

significance must be independent of the display's religious content."); Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at
1431.

156.
157.
158.
159.

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.

160.

Id. at 631; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2325-26 (2004)

(O'Connor, J., concurring).
161.

In a recent departure from this prevailing analysis, the Third Circuit revived the longevity

rationale to justify the display of a Ten Commandments plaque in a Pennsylvania county courthouse.
The court in Freethought Society v. Chester County held that "the age and history of the plaque
provide a context which changes the effect of an otherwise religious plaque." 334 F.3d at 264; see
also Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 406-12 (adhering to Freethoughtanalysis). In attempting to characterize the religious display as a secular undertaking, the court offered the tautological proposition that
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The weight of authority rejecting the longevity rationale properly
reflects the values underpinning the prohibition against apparent
endorsement. The endorsing effect of a permanent sectarian symbol that
enjoys preferential access to an expressive venue-for example, the
towering crosses at the apex of hilltop parks at issue in the Carpenterand
Murphy cases-is not likely diminished by the passage of time. To the
contrary, the duration underscores the depth of connection between the
religious display and government itself.162 When an irreducibly sectarian
symbol on public land becomes so embedded in the self-identity of a
political community that it attains the status of a cherished landmark, the
fundamental concern of the endorsement standard-"send[ing] a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders" 163-is
squarely
implicated.
2. The Public Forum Exception
The only other potential qualification to the general prohibition
against permanent religious displays is the improbable case where
government creates a public forum for permanent symbolic speech, thus
permitting the perpetual display of many different private symbols
without regard to content or viewpoint T 64 Because government could
not favor the message of any proposed display in regulating access to the
forum, all symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment would
require equal accommodation without regard to how gravely it might
offend the viewing public.165 As the Supreme Court noted in Pinette,
"giving sectarian religious speech preferential access to a forum close to
the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter) would violate
"[tlhe reasonable observer, knowing the age of the Ten Commandments plaque, would regard the
decision to leave it in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to preserve a longstanding
plaque." FreethoughtSoc'y, 334 F.3d at 265. The analysis transforms the endorsement inquiry into
a standardless race against the clock: if a concededly religious display survives long enough without

challenge, the endorsing effect may disappear at some moment of the court's own choosing and the
commemorated text then transmutes into a secularized object communicating merely the fact that it
is old. As the court noted in Gonzales, this reasoning unhinges the inquiry from any meaningful
connection to the actual communicative impact of a religious display. Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422.
162.
Carpenter,93 F.3d at 631 ("Rather than having a history independent of its religious

significance, the Mount Davidson Cross' history is intertwined with its religious symbolism ....
'This kind of historical significance simply exacerbates the appearance of govemmental preference
for a particular religion."').
163. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164.

See, e.g., Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.

165.

Id. ("Perhaps like other communities experiencing similar controversies, the City is wary

of the types of displays it would have to accept if it used content-neutral criteria in evaluating

them."). The court in Mercier describes a controversy in Boise, Idaho, in which the city council
voted to remove a Ten Commandments monument from a public park after receiving a request from
an anti-gay activist to erect an accompanying monument "claiming that Matthew Shepard is in hell
because he was gay." Id.
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the Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it
would involve content discrimination).' 66 The constitutional principles
governing the administration of any public forum of this nature would
thus give rise to the peculiar scenario of crosses, swastikas, pentagrams,
myriad other private symbols, all displayed side by side
menorahs, and 167
on public land.

While such a forum would diminish the appearance of endorsement
for any particular viewpoint, religious or otherwise, it would create
significant problems regarding regulation of access, apportionment of
space, and the accommodation of other public uses. Because each parcel
would represent a unique and differentially valuable venue for symbolic
expression, and because the public space available for this use
necessarily would be finite, how would government apportion the
property among multiple applicants? 168 As a matter of public policy,
why would government conclude that such a m6lange of private symbols
would be the best use of public space? 169 Finally, it is questionable
whether such an arrangement would sufficiently dissipate the appearance
of endorsement, since those speakers fortunate enough to obtain space
would express their views in perpetuity and to the permanent exclusion
of every other competing message. 170 Such considerations suggest that

this possible exception to the general prohibition against permanent
property is more likely a theoretical concern
religious displays on public
7
than a practical option.' '
166. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766; see also Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379,
383 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
167. Cf.Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 665 (Cal. 1978) (Noting diversity of religious imagery, including "Coptic, Universalist, [and] Scientology crosses, the Buddhist wheel,
Shinto torii, Confucian yang-yin, Jain swastika, Zoroastrian vase of fire, [and] Unitarian flaming
chalice," court observes that "[tlhe [Los Angeles] city hall is not an immense bulletin board whereon
symbols of all faiths could be thumbtacked or otherwise displayed. Would it be justifiable, say, to
allow only a Star of Bethlehem, a Star of David, and a Star and Crescent?").
168. Cf Pinente, 515 U.S. at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (identifying "the fortuity of
geography" and "the nature of the particular public space" as factors which might lead to the apparent endorsement of private religious speech in a public forum).
169. Cf supra notes 165, 167.
170. See supra note 168. In her concurring opinion in Pinette, Justice O'Connor signaled that
private religious speech likely will not offend Establishment Clause principles if "allowed on equal
terms in a vigorous public forum that the government has administered properly." Pinette, 515 U.S.
at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She stressed, however, that "a private religious group may so
dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of
approval," Id. at 777-78 (citation omitted); see Lopez, supra note 107, at 223 ("A facially neutral
policy that allows domination of a public forum . . . by the permanent religious messages of one
religious tradition in the absence of others prefers some religious sects over others and, at the very
least, favors religion over nonreligion.").
171.
In a related context, the Tenth Circuit recently assessed the First Amendment implications
of a Ten Commandments monument displayed-evidently without challenge--on the grounds of a
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As the preceding discussion reflects, a very substantial body of
federal decisional law condemns the permanent display of sectarian
symbols on public property. If the expressive effect of a symbol is
clearly religious, courts virtually never uphold its permanent display
unless it possesses independent historical significance or is privately
displayed in a public forum. This jurisprudence reflects the evident fact
that the permanent integration of sectarian symbols with the physical
presence of government itself communicates a powerful message of
preference for the favored creed, in violation of the central value of
political inclusion that animates Justice O'Connor's endorsement
standard.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ENDORSEMENT STANDARD TO
IMPERMISSIBLE RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS: THE REMEDIAL INQUIRY

Having refined the Lemon inquiry by shifting the analytic focus to
the question of actual or apparent endorsement of religion, and having
entrusted the latter inquiry to an exceptionally well-informed observer,
Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard requires a corresponding
refinement of the analysis of remedies. The existing jurisprudence
addressing permanent religious displays, however, reflects little attention
to the quite rigorous remedial implications of the endorsement test. In
contrast to the careful and consistent assessment of the prohibition itself,
the analysis of remedies is an ad hoc and often superficial exercise with
little doctrinal grounding-in keeping with the unfortunate treatment of

municipal building in Ogden, Utah. Summum, 297 F.3d at 99-1000 & n.3 ("Summum's concession
[that the display did not violate the Establishment Clause] may have been unwise; the Establishment
Clause issue is certainly not so straightforward as the City would presume."). Plaintiffs, rather than
seeking removal of the monument, argued that its presence required the city to accept for display
monuments commemorating other religious beliefs, and challenged the city's refusal to permit the
placement of a monument to the tenets of "Summum" on that basis. Id. at 1000. The circuit court
concluded that Ogden's display of various monuments established a nonpublic forum, since the
"gallery of permanent monuments on the Municipal Grounds constitutes 'public property which is
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,"' and thus that the city's administration of the property was subject only to the requirements of reasonableness and viewpointneutrality. Id. at 1002-03. However, the court found that the city's refusal to "treat with equal
dignity speech from divergent religious perspectives," id. at 1011, constituted precisely such impermissible viewpoint discrimination, id. at 1009, and accordingly barred Ogden from "display[ing] the
Ten Commandments Monument while declining to display" competing religious monuments. Id. at
1011. Thus, even in circumstances where a permanent religious display survives or averts challenge
under the Establishment Clause, the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in a nonpublic forum may
compel the inclusion of competing religious speech.
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remedies generally as "the poor cousin" '72 of corresponding substantive
rights. Against this backdrop, Part III begins by posing a general
framework for the remedial analysis, then turns to its application across a
range of measures that have been proposed in recent litigation
The discussion focuses
concerning permanent religious displays.
exclusively on injunctive remedies, since damages for such violations are
case 173 and are thus an insignificant
nominally valued in the typical
1 74
scheme.
aspect of the remedial
As a preliminary matter, it is important to situate the discussion
within the broader context of remedies law. Injunctive relief may take
many forms and promote a range of objectives, and the identification of a
proper remedy presupposes a particular remedial goal. While the general
objective of all remedies is to "return a plaintiff to her rightful positionthe position she would have been in but for the constitutional
wrong"175-the particular means necessary to achieve that result will
vary considerably depending upon the nature of the unconstitutional
conduct at issue. Violations rooted in complex institutional practices,
such as the entrenched racial inequalities at issue in the Supreme Court's
desegregation jurisprudence 76 or the prison conditions addressed in
contemporary Eighth Amendment law, 177 present difficult remedial
challenges that the federal courts have met over time with widely
divergent approaches. In some instances, the courts have employed

172.

Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.

REv. 673, 679-80 (2001) (hereinafter Thomas 1) (remedies "given short shrift in legal jurisprudence").
173.

Chambers v. City of Frederick, 292 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772-73 (D. Md. 2003). Where

plaintiffs seek damages in addition to injunctive or declaratory relief, they often plead for a nominal
award only. See, e.g., id.; King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2003); Mellen
v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1750 (2004); Bonham v. Dist.
of Columbia Library Admin., 989 F.2d 1242, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Yacovelli v. Moeser, No.
1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *10 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004). For a general discussion of the
difficulties faced by plaintiffs seeking damages in Establishment Clause cases, see Doug Rendleman,
Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren
Court's Establishment Clause Legacy? 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1343, 1355-64 (2002).

174. See also Rendleman, supra note 173, at 1353 n.40 ("The other basic category of remedy,
restitution, hardly figures into constitutional remedies at all."); Mike Wells, ConstitutionalRemedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157, 220 (1998) (noting the inadequate
deterrent effect of attorneys' fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
175.
Thomas I, supra note 172, at 725.
176.
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialismand Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM.

L. REV. 857, 896-99 (1999); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection:On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation,101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2455-59 (2003).
177. See, e.g., Note, Complex Enforcement: UnconstitutionalPrison Conditions, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 626 (1981).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

prophylactic remedies 178 that "reach beyond the limits of the legal
violation to prohibit conduct that itself is permissible, but nevertheless
must be restricted in order to prevent future violations"'' 79 because "other
narrower remedies are ineffective due, for example, to . . . the

defendant's ability to evade a simple prohibition."' 80
In other
circumstances, the courts have embraced an incremental approach that
addresses only partially the web of conduct facilitating a constitutional
violation.18 ' These competing approaches to intractable constitutional
problems reflect sharply conflicting views regarding the practicality of
federal court supervision of complex institutional processes' 82 as well as
profound disagreement
over the constitutional legitimacy of expansive
equitable decrees. 83
The unconstitutional display of permanent religious symbols
presents a very different question. Unlike the structural violations at
issue in desegregation or prison litigation, the illegality is typically a
discrete and concretely remediable event.' 84 The violation arises from a
single act of government in sanctioning the display of a religious symbol
on public property, and its remedy requires only the termination of the
endorsing relationship between government and the symbolic speech. 185
While one could envision a broad prophylactic remedy in this contexte.g., an injunction prohibiting a particularly recalcitrant and repetitive
violator from displaying any religious imagery, to preclude the
possibility that another violation might ensue-the scenario is
implausible. Instead, the analytic task is to undo the violation itself
178. E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 28788 (1977).
179.
Thomas I, supra note 172, at 691-92.
180.
Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding ProphylacticRemedies Through The Looking Glass of
Bush v. Gore, II WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 389 (2002) (hereinafter Thomas 11).
181.
E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 598-606 (1983); cf Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
182. John Choon Yoo, Who Measuresthe Chancellor'sFoot? The InherentRemedial Authority of FederalCourts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1122-23 (1996); Rendleman, supra note 173, at 1371;
cf Lawrence G. Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91
HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
183.
Compare, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-

ing), Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124-33 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), and Yoo, supra note
182, at 1141-66, with Thomas I, supra note 180, at 380-82, 389, and Levinson, supra note 176, at
900-01.
184.
Rendleman, supra note 173, at 1373 ("[C]ourts that have devised plaintiffs' remedies for
officials' Establishment Clause infringements have not adduced logistical difficulties, separation of
powers, and federalism to justify delayed and partial relief.").

185.
Cf id. at 1354 ("Judges grant structural injunctions for school desegregation, electoral
reform, and, more recently, prison condition remedies. Usually these tasks are bigger jobs than the
courts typically ask of Establishment Clause injunctions against religious observances.").
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through means of a preventive or reparative injunction. 81 6 The following
discussion focuses on the contours of such relief and thus bypasses the
wider debate over the power of the federal judiciary to impose broad
prophylactic decrees. While the remedies proposed below are more
demanding than the measures required by at least some of the courts that
have considered these issues,187 their scope corresponds to the parameters
itself, which reaches deeper than many
of the constitutional violation
188
acknowledged.
have
courts
A. Analytic Framework
The endorsement standard rests on the principle that government
may not communicate a message of political exclusion or inferiority to
religious nonadherents. 8 9 When a religious display violates the
Establishment Clause, injunctive relief must address directly and
eradicate completely that disaffecting injury. 190 Any remedy falling short
of this objective will exacerbate the harm by communicating that the
prohibition is a mere formality that the political establishment, through a
complicit judiciary, will render irrelevant in application.19' This is not an
abstract concern. In decisions addressing the remedial requirements of
the Establishment Clause in this context, several courts have sanctioned
that trivialize rather than vindicate the constitutional
ineffectual measures
19 2

interests at

stake.

This deficient jurisprudence derives, in part, from the absence of
any consistent methodology to frame the remedial inquiry. The courts
have instead produced a patchwork of ad hoc and often irreconcilable
194
rigor.
dispositions' 9 reflecting a considerable disparity of analytic

Procedurally, a court may either issue a simple preventive injunction barring the contin186.
ued endorsement of a religious symbol or delineate in greater detail the reparative steps required to
achieve that objective. In some cases, the remedy unfolds in two steps. The court first issues a
preventive injunction permitting the defendant to take whatever steps it deems appropriate to comply. If the plaintiff believes that defendant's remedial efforts are inadequate, he or she then requests
the court to issue a modified reparative decree specifying the particular steps necessary to cure the
illegality. Compare, e.g., Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Cal. 1991), with Murphy v. Bilbray, Nos. 90-0134-GT and 89-0820-GT, 1997 WL 754604 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997).
See, e.g., infra notes 356-66 and accompanying text.
187.
188.
See infra notes 202-45 and accompanying text.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Books v.
189.
City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 308 (7th Cir. 2000).
Cf Thomas H, supra note 180, at 389.
190.
Cf Levinson, supra note 176, at 914.
191.
E.g., infra notes 356-66, 391-94.
192.
See generally Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Nos. 04-1321 and 04-1524, 2005 WL
193.
81886 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2005); Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *12-*13 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Paulson
v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (decided under the California Constitution); Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1134 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); Paulson v. City of San Diego, 262
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Some decisions require that permanent religious displays be removed
from public property,' 95 others merely require their relocation, 196 while
still others permit their sale along with a portion of the underlying public
land. 197 Some decisions authorize the sale of religious displays and the
underlying realty only on condition that the property be sold at open
auction without preference afforded purchasers seeking to preserve the
symbol,' 98 while others permit negotiated sales with buyers committed to
retaining the display. 199 The courts have diverged as well regarding the

amount of underlying land that must be sold to eradicate the appearance
of endorsement; some have closely scrutinized transactions involving
tiny parcels 200 while others have expressed no concern over the size of
the transferred plot.z 0l Notably absent from this decisional law is any
effort to assess the specific requirements of the endorsement test in the
remedial context. The test, however, should squarely frame the analysis.
1.

Level of Scrutiny

As a preliminary matter, the endorsement standard should be
understood to require close and skeptical consideration of any remedy
proposed by a government defendant.20 2 This demanding remedial
F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 294 F.3d 1124; Kong v. City and County of San Francisco,
No. 00-15261, 2001 WL 1020102 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2001); Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999 (W.D.
Wis. 2004), rev'd, 2005 WL 81886; Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis.
2003), rev'd, 2005 WL 81886; Paulson v. City of San Diego, Civ. No. 89-0820GT (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2000), rev'd en banc, 294 F.3d 1124; Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, No. 98C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2000); ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp.
2d 1024, 1036 (D. Neb. 2002); Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (decided under the California Constitution); see also, Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1529-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (Beezer, J., concurring); Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 626 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring); Chambers,292 F. Supp. at 772.
194.
Compare, e.g., Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, and City
of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1036, with Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124, and Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d
999 and 276 F. Supp. 2d 961.
195.
Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21.
196.
City of Plattsnouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
197.
Mercier,2005 WL 81886; City ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d at 497; Kong, 2001 WL 1020102.
198.
Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *10-*11.
199. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
200. Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11; Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
201.
Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
202.
The endorsement standard generally requires that "government practices relating to
speech on religious topics 'must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny,"' Capital Square Review
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted), but the particular degree of scrutiny applicable in the remedial context has not been addressed by the Supreme Court. Among the lower courts, the Seventh Circuit has held that any proposed remedy should be examined with respect to its "substance ... as well as its form to determine
whether government action endorsing religion has actually ceased." City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at
491.
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scrutiny is a necessary consequence of the endorsement test's relaxation
of the Lemon liability standard. While Lemon prohibited "aid" to
religion, the endorsement standard prohibits only such aid that
reasonably implies government's subjective embrace of a religious
beneficiary. 0 3 Having shifted the focus to government's actual or
perceived intentions-and in so doing limited the reach of the
constitutional prohibition-the new standard should be understood to
impose a greater remedial burden on government in those instances
where a violation is found. The need for greater scrutiny results from the
evident fact that government aid to religion, considered objectively
without regard to its apparent motivation or purpose, is more easily
undone than the perception that government is subjectively attached to a
religious beneficiary and seeks to promote its interests.
The concept of endorsement implies a particular type of intended
behavior. 204 While objective conduct, without more, may give rise to a
perception of endorsement (e.g., affording religion superior access to
government benefits or resources), it does so by implying an underlying
purpose that itself is impermissible. 20 5 Conferring a comparative
advantage on religion offends the endorsement standard because it
suggests to the objective observer that government subjectively prefers
206
or embraces a particular religious viewpoint. °6 The politically
disaffecting impact of prohibited conduct-the ultimate concern of the
endorsement inquiry-derives from its apparent motivation. 207 A
constitutional violation thus rests on the conclusion that government, in
fact or appearance, has acted with the subjective intention of promoting
religion, not merely that it has unwittingly conferred some advantage
upon it.

To remedy such a violation requires that the apparent favoritism
itself be undone. Accordingly, courts must closely scrutinize the history
and context of any proposed remedy, beginning most obviously with the
underlying violation, to determine whether the corrective action will
eradicate the perceived endorsement, and specifically whether any
superficially neutral proposal is a subterfuge for subtle religious
preference. Justice O'Connor's admonition in Pinette is particularly
relevant in this regard: no circumstance more clearly justifies the
imposition of an "affirmative obligation[]
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

.

.. to take steps to avoid being

See supra notes 14-15, 21-22 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message 20 8 than
a finding of endorsement itself, which demands a remedy that not merely
restores superficial neutrality but rather convinces the objective observer
29
that government's preferential sentiment no longer colors its conduct. 0
The analysis of the en banc court in Paulson v. City of San Diego
illustrates the distinction.210 In Paulson, the City of San Diego purported
to remedy its impermissible display of a Latin cross in the center of a
public park by auctioning the cross and a small parcel of the underlying
parkland on condition that all bidders agree to use the property as a war
memorial. 2 1 The city made clear that the existing cross satisfied the
war-memorial use restriction but that purchasers were not required to
retain the symbol. 212 In the district court and before the original threejudge panel of the Ninth Circuit, the transaction was upheld on grounds
that it separated the city from the display in a manner that was
sufficiently neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue, since
the city did not require that the cross be preserved.2 13 On rehearing,
however, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit struck down the sale,
reasoning that the city conferred a material advantage on purchasers
seeking to retain the cross through the imposition of the war-memorial
use restriction. 214 As the court explained, only purchasers intending to
display the cross could satisfy the use restriction without further
investment; all others would be forced to incur the substantial additional
expense of removing the existing symbol and constructing a new
memorial in its place. 2t5 Forced to reserve funds for these expenditures,
bidders opposed to the cross had comparatively less money available
with which to purchase the property. 1 6
While the en banc decision rests on a provision of the California
Constitution barring aid to religion, 1 7 the Paulson court's reasoning
208.

Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777.

209. Cf Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 381-82 (1997) (upholding injunction
barring otherwise protected expressive activity based on defendants' record of unlawful conduct);
Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
210. 294 F.3d 1124.
211.
212.

Paulson,294 F,3d at 1127.
Id. at 1127, 1132.

213.
Id.at 1128; Paulson, 262 F.3d at 894 ("Because the land was sold in an open bidding
process, with its express provision that the purchaser's intent to keep or remove the cross from the
property would not be considered in evaluating bids, any appearance of preference for religion is
dispelled.").
214. Paulson,294 F.3d at 1132-33.
215.
Id.
216.

Id.

217.
Id. at 1133 n.7. The vacated panel decision affirmed the transaction on Establishment
Clause grounds as well as state constitutional grounds. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 891 n.3.
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219

properly reflects the endorsement inquiry in the remedial context. The
well-informed observer, knowledgeable of the city's long battle to "save"
the cross, 218 would scrutinize the transaction with far greater care than if
the proposal had been made in a different context-for example, if the
city had obtained the cross and surrounding parkland as a gift and had
immediately volunteered to conduct an auction to remove the symbol
from its newly acquired property.2 19 The endorsement standard's
historical and contextual analysis necessarily requires more searching
scrutiny of a proposed remedy than would be required in circumstances
where the relevant conduct is not the coerced response of political
220
Aware
officials to an adverse and often fiercely unpopular court order.
of government's embrace of religion and viewing subsequent conduct in
light of that offense, the objective observer will skeptically assess

218. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1126.
219. A recent opinion of thc Seventh Circuit conversely implies that the analysis of remedies
under the Establishment Clause should be more lenient than the assessment of identical conduct
arising in a nonremedial context. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *8. In upholding a highly suspect
remedial sale, see, e.g., infra notes 275, 363-66, 392-94 and accompanying text, the Mercier court
asserts that the remedial posture of the case lends justification to a land transfer that otherwise might
be barred as an endorsement violation. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *8. The court stresses that it is
"not endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell off patches of government land to various
religious denominations as a means of circumventing the Establishment Clause," id., but offers no
explanation why it should be permissible for government to do precisely the same thing in circumstances where it has refused to acknowledge the infirmity of its conduct, invited a constitutional
challenge, and lost. See id. at *2. As set forth above, a well-informed observer would likely view
the coerced remedial response of an entrenched defendant with considerably greater suspicion than
actions voluntarily taken by government in advance of litigation to resolve a constitutional concern.
220. Government officials often face significant political pressure to defend against challenges
to religious displays on public property, as illustrated by a recent controversy in Los Angeles. After
initially agreeing to a demand that the County of Los Angeles remove a cross from its official seal,
the Board of Supervisors faced "a massive public outcry," including "angry letters, e-mails and
phone calls [that] flooded" their offices along with a formal letter of protest from the Cardinal of the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles. Troy Anderson, Big Outcry Over Tiny Cross, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June
4, 2004. Government defendants facing such pressure often adopt a defiant public posture in response to adverse judicial rulings. For example, a member of the San Diego County Board of Supervisors publicly characterized a federal court order striking down a cross at the center of a County
park as "asinine" and "foolish ... in a nation where we are one nation under God." Transcript of
December 10, 1991 San Diego County Board of Supervisors Meeting, at 6, Ex. 18 to Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce Injunction, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134-GT). Another member asserted that "the problem is . . .
frankly, an absurd court ruling by a judge who really is encouraging intolerance in our society." Id.
at 12. In the Paulson case, public officials responded to the initial order barring display of the cross
in a public park by launching a campaign to "save" the symbol through a negotiated sale to an entity
committed to its preservation. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1126. Given the pressure brought to bear on
public officials in such cases, it is highly unlikely that an objective observer would embrace their
proposed remedies without exceedingly close review.
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corrective action to assure that superficially neutral means are not
employed to effectuate government's established religious preference. 22'
2. Principles of Analysis: Separation and Neutrality
When government attempts to erase the perception of endorsement
arising from a permanent religious display on public land, its
"affirmative obligations" should be understood to encompass two
interrelated and demanding duties: (1) achieving evident and substantial
physical separation from the offending display (2) through means that are
strictly neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue.
Courts must carefully scrutinize any proposed remedy to assure that
both requirements are satisfied.222 A superficially neutral remedy that in
fact or appearance tends to favor religious speech perpetuates rather than
eliminates a message of endorsement, and thus not merely fails to
remedy the violation but also independently violates the constitutional
223
proscription.
a. The Futility of Message Dilution and the Corresponding
Necessity of Physical Separation
As Justice Souter explained in Pinette, a religious display on public
property-irrespective of its public or private sponsorship-implicates
the endorsement prohibition because an objective observer will likely
attribute the sectarian message to the owner of the underlying land.224 To
end that perception, government must either physically separate itself
from the display or transform the message of the imagery itself. Courts
have hypothesized three ways in which an endorsing message might be
diluted: by moving the display to another location on public land, 25 by
transforming the public property into a public forum for other permanent
displays, so that none enjoys preferential status,226 or by transforming the
display through the inclusion of additional items which purportedly
221.

Cf Sue Fox & Karima A. Haynes, Debate Over Crosses on City Seals Hits a Nerve, L.A.

TIMES, June 11, 2004, at BI ("Erasing a cross, it now seems clear, is a politically perilous pursuit.
What began as a murmur ... swelled into a full-throated roar this month after the American Civil
Liberties Union . . . call[ed] the small cross on the [Los Angeles] county seal an unconstitutional

'endorsement of Christianity.' When county supervisors voted last week to abandon the cross, the
reaction was swift and furious. Thousands of people... flooded the supervisors with calls to keep
the cross.").
222.
See supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
223.
Cf Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1133-34 (remedial sale fails to cure original constitutional viola-

tion and independently violates California Constitution).
224. Pinete, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
225.
City ofPlattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
226. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
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secularize its message.227 Each of these proposed measures, however,
will fail to effectively dissipate the endorsing effect of a permanent
religious display, at least in the typical case.
Relocating a permanent display to other public property simply
shifts the unconstitutional message of endorsement to a new locale. In
assessing constitutional liability in the first instance, courts have ruled
consistently that the objective observer is deemed knowledgeable of the
ownership of public property-even if the land is not evidently
associated with government-and have struck down religious displays
irrespective of the location or nature of the public land upon which they
sit. 22 8

In the remedial context, the objective observer's level of

knowledge regarding the ownership of the underlying property should be
229
deemed even more precise, for the reasons discussed previously.
Accordingly, it is difficult to envision any public property that might
constitutionally support the permanent display of an otherwise
impermissible sectarian symbol unless the symbol is placed in some
closed or inaccessible space that the public (and thus the objective
observer) cannot view. In any other public setting, the attribution of an
impermissible religious message to the owner of the underlying property
will not abate.
Likewise, the suggestion that government might remedy an
unconstitutional religious display by transforming its physical setting
into a public forum for permanent symbolic speech-thus permitting the
perpetual display of many different private symbols without regard to
content or viewpoint-is both practically implausible and analytically
suspect, for reasons set forth earlier. 230 These shortcomings are
exacerbated in the remedial context, where an existing religious display
will likely occupy a desirable position within the larger physical space
and thus retain an inherent communicative advantage over other symbols
that might be added to the surrounding property. 231 For example, in a
number of cases involving permanent Latin crosses displayed in public
parks, the religious symbol sits at the center and often the apex of the

227.
Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 489-90 (6th Cir. 2002); ACLU v. McCreary County, 145
F. Supp. 2d 845, 852-53 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
228.
229.
230.

See, e.g., Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
Supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 496 ("The statue is an unattended object fifteen
231.
feet in height and made of marble. For this reason alone, citizens who wish to endorse other religions or sects on 'equal terms' would find it exceedingly difficult to erect an object of equal expressive power or to maintain it on government property.").
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public property. 32 Opening the surrounding slopes for the display of
other permanent imagery will not establish a true public forum, since the
original religious symbol will retain literal superiority over all other
speech and thus will continue to enjoy an expressive advantage.
Finally, the proposition that an impermissible religious display can
be contextually "secularized" by the inclusion of additional items within
the display itself is, at best, a limited remedial option that applies only to
imagery whose religious meaning is sufficiently mutable-for example,
a creche or an inscription of the Ten Commandments, both of which
have been construed by some courts as potentially historical rather than
233
religious representations, depending upon the manner of presentation.
With respect to intrinsically sectarian symbols, such as a cross or Star of
David, the addition of secular items cannot alter the irreducibly religious
character of the original imagery. 34

The secularizing effect of an augmented display is also considerably
less potent in the remedial context, irrespective of the intensity of the
religious imagery at issue. As the Sixth Circuit observed in striking
down a revised display, "the [reasonable] observer is charged with
knowing the history of the respective displays, and in each case the
history indicates that the displays were originally intended to enshrine
the Ten Commandments; it was only upon fear of litigation that the
displays were modified to include secular material in the hope of
rendering the displays constitutional. 235 When otherwise impermissible
religious imagery is coercively "secularized" under threat of court order,
the objective observer will examine the revised display with heightened
scrutiny to assure that government has not simply draped the symbol in
secular dress to disguise its sectarian message.2 36 When viewed with
such skepticism, the remedial efficacy of augmenting an impermissible

232.

Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1520-21 (Mt. Helix and Mt. Soledad crosses); Carpenter v. City and

County of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 628, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Separation of Church & State
Comm., 93 F.3d at 618; Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1998).
233. Supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 140; see, e.g., ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 459 (6th Cir.
2003).
235.
McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 461; see Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; Turner, 290 F.
Supp. 2d at 1371; ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
236.
See, e.g., McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 459-61; Turner, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1371; cf
Adland, 307 F.3d at 486-87; Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768-69, 771-73
(7th Cir. 2001); Books, 235 F.3d at 307; ACLU v. Grayson County, No. Civ.A.4:01CV-202-M, 2002
WL 1558688, at *4-*5 (W.D. Ky. May 13, 2002); ACLU v. Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d 873, 890-92

(N.D. Ohio 2002); ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 699-700 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v.
Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675-77 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
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Moreover, the premise of the
display is necessarily diminished.
remedial proposal is itself subject to considerable criticism, as courts and
regard to the corresponding analysis of
commentators have noted with
238
displays.
religious
seasonal
Accordingly, at least with respect to intrinsically sectarian symbols
(and arguably with respect to less intensive religious imagery as well),
the only practical alternative is to physically separate government from
the unconstitutional display. Such separation can be achieved in two
ways: removing the offending display or privatizing the land beneath it.
Removing an impermissible symbol is a direct and effective remedy that
Privatizing the
unmistakably achieves the required separation. 39
analysis of
additional
requires
and
straightforward
is
less
land
underlying
its
relationship
and
parcel
transferred
of
the
the particular characteristics
to the remaining public land, if any. As discussed below, a remedial sale
must achieve both evident and substantial separation from adjacent
Clause.24 0
public property to affirm the interests of the Establishment
b. The Accompanying Requirement of Strict Neutrality
Achieving evident and substantial physical separation between
government and an impermissible display is a necessary but not
sufficient remedial goal. Additionally, such separation must be achieved
through means that are strictly neutral with respect to the religious
expression at issue. For example, it accomplishes very little to sell land
underlying a religious display on terms that prohibit the purchaser from
displacing the symbol; while physical separation may be achieved,
government has done nothing to dissipate its disaffecting promotion of
the religious message.

Id. For example, a solitary display of the Ten Commandments that is later supplemented
237.
with secular material is more likely to accord the original text a place of prominence-and less likely
to coherently integrate it with the various surrounding items-than a display designed from the

outset to reflect the interrelation and significance of multiple texts. The inclusion of Moses as a
lawgiver among many others on the frieze above the Supreme Court's courtroom stands in contrast
to the tactical addition, in the midst of litigation, of secular items to a longstanding religious display.
Compare, e.g., ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 652-53 (1989), with McCreary
County, 354 F.3d at 454, 460.

238. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 170 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (prevailing analysis immerses judges "in the minutiae of graphic design, our rulers and
calipers in hand, scrutinizing each symbol for acceptable proportion, color, and gloss"); Am. Jewish
Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Laura
Ahn, Note, This is Not a Crhche, 107 YALE L.J. 1969 (1998).
Infra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
239.
Infra notes 327-66 and accompanying text.
240.
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As the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed over the last half
century, "[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of
'neutrality' towards religion, favoring neither one religion over others
nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents. ,,24 1 While the
principle of neutrality is thus embedded in Establishment Clause
doctrine, the Court has struggled to apply it in a manner that properly
distinguishes between impermissible benefits conferred upon religion
and the permissible accommodation of private religious practice.2 42 In
the remedial context, however, the neutrality principle must be strictly
construed to assure that preferential treatment of religious expression is
completely extinguished. In those instances where government purports
to remedy a violation through the privatization of an endorsed display,
any accommodation of the sectarian symbol must be subject to searching
scrutiny,

as discussed

above,243

to assure

that

the rhetoric

of

accommodation is not employed to subtly perpetuate government's
established preference. Accommodations in the remedial context thus
should be permitted only if they afford endorsed religious speech no
expressive advantage vis a vis competing private viewpoints .244 To
otherwise permit government to project its perceived favoritism into the
sphere of private expression will perpetuate rather than dissipate
apparent endorsement in the view of a skeptical observer.245
This understanding of religious accommodation in relation to the
remedial inquiry is consistent with the respective constitutional interests
at play. The accommodation of private religious practice arises from the
free exercise and free speech rights of individuals and entities who might
otherwise be thwarted in the expression of their faith.246 While relevant
to the construction of the endorsement prohibition,247 these constitutional
241.
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill.
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S 687, 696 (1994) (citations
and internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992); Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 592-94; Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 450 (1971); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
242.
See supra note 62.
243.
Supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.

244. See supra notes 60-65; cf infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (discussion of a
permissible remedial accommodation).
245. Infra notes 367-413 and accompanying text; cf Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
246. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In cases involving the lifting of
government burdens on the free exercise of religion, a reasonable observer would take into account
the value underlying the Free Exercise Clause in assessing whether the challenged practice conveyed
a message of endorsement.").

247.

Id.
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interests "do[] not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Thus, where an Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause., 248
violation has occurred, a court must first assure that the perception of
endorsement has been eradicated before turning to the constitutional
interests associated with the newly privatized speech. The process of
privatizing an impermissible display is itself state action that must
249
the interests
comport with the dictates of the Establishment Clause;
upon, not
contingent
are
ownership
resulting
recipient's
the
from
arising
250
and until
Unless
transfer.
preceding
the
of
legality
independent of, the
by
preference
religious
apparent
its
remedies
government effectively
a
fashion,
neutral
strictly
a
in
hands
transferring a symbol to private
inchoate.
remain
rights
speech
private recipient's free exercise and free
Two decisions have addressed the relationship of the Establishment
Clause and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses in this contextthe Seventh Circuit's opinion in City of Marshfield and the original panel
25 1
In Paulson, the court
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Paulson.
and free speech
exercise
free
the
that
proposition
the
accept
appeared to
upon
contingent
are
display
religious
privatized
a
rights associated with
252
court's
The
remedy.
preceding
the
of
the constitutional validity
253
of the remedy, however, ignored
analysis of the "legitima[cy],
254
significant preferential features of the transaction and thus sanctioned
a substantive outcome that still elevated the expressive interests of the
The other relevant decision-Freedom From
private recipient. 2 55
Religion Foundation v. City of Marshfield-is less clear in its analysis.
The court states "that because our holding limits private speech in a
public forum, any remedy must be narrowly tailored to avoid an
256
To the extent this suggests that a
Establishment Clause violation.,
Lee, 505 U.S. at 587; see, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302
248.
(2000); Pinene, 515 U.S. at 775-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch.
Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101, 1104 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000).
See infra notes 307-26 and accompanying text.
249.
This result corresponds with basic principles of property law, which require that a pur250.
chaser with "actual notice of the pendency of [a] proceeding" take the property "subject to any
judgment that may be rendered" in the action. Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 408 (Cal. 1956);
see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1908(a)(2) (West 2004); see also Duncan v. Farm Credit Bank, 940
F.2d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 1991) (state lispendens rules govern federal court proceedings).
City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487; Paulson, 262 F.3d 885.
251.
Paulson, 262 F.3d at 896 ("[Blecause the land was legitimately sold to the private Asso252.
ciation, we must recognize and protect the Association's rights of Free Exercise and Free Speech as
the Constitution demands no less.").
Id.
253.
See supra notes 210-16.
254.
Id.; Paulson, 262 F.3d at 891-6.
255.

256.

City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
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remedial order respecting the transfer of an impermissible display must
be narrowly drawn for the purpose of facilitating the resulting private
religious expression, it conflates separate constitutional interests that
should be addressed distinctly and sequentially. In so doing, the analysis
invites the preferential treatment of religious speech, at least where the
required remedial "narrowing" is achieved at the expense of strict
neutrality.
Equitable remedies must be tailored to address the illegality at
hand. 7 In the Establishment Clause context, this maxim requires that
remedial orders reach no further than necessary to dispel the appearance
of endorsement. 258 Among its potential consequences, an excessively
broad remedy might impair a private recipient's ability to engage in
protected religious expression, and a court should assess such an effect in
determining the scope of remedial measures. 9 Any constitutional
excess, however, can only be determined by first establishing the
baseline requirements of the Establishment Clause and then measuring
the remedial proposal against that benchmark. Those requirements
demand that government first separate itself from an unconstitutional
display through means that are strictly neutral with respect to endorsed
symbolic speech.
B. The Remedial Analysis

Because there are two alternative means to achieve physical
separation-removal of an impermissible symbol and privatization of the
property beneath it-the first step of the remedial analysis is to establish
whether government defendants are free to choose between the two in
every case. While in many instances both alternatives are permissible,
provided that certain rigorous safeguards are met, there are at least two
circumstances in which courts should require that displays be removed
rather than sold with the underlying public land. After addressing this
threshold question, the remaining task is to determine the specific
requirements of the separation and neutrality principles for each of the
260
two remedial options.
257.
1 IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2955 (2d ed. 1995) ('The primary objection to broad injunctive orders is

the fear that they will impose unnecessary restraints on individual freedom and prohibit lawful and
socially desirable activity. In particular, a court must be cautious in framing a broad injunction lest
it prohibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights."); FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order
granting an injunction... shall be specific in terms .... ").
258.
Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
259.
See, e.g., infra note 361.

260. This analysis does not consider the special case of symbols held in trust by government,
which require sui generis remedies that reflect the unique interplay of trust law with the endorsement
standard. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1529-30 (Beezer, J., concurring). The discussion presumes instead that
government has an exclusive interest in the public property at issue and thus that its constitutional
duties alone will shape the remedy. In circumstances where the property is held in trust, however,
the grantor may impose restrictions on the use and disposition of trust property that also must be
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1. Achieving Physical Separation: The Initial Remedial Choice
The most direct remedy in cases involving impermissible religious
displays is to remove the symbol. Removing a display achieves
complete physical separation between government and the offending
object and thus addresses the concern at the core of such disputesnonadherents' ability to use public space without the disaffecting
influence of the endorsed religious symbol. In many earlier cases,
including litigation involving large structures such as crosses, this
or opposition. 261
remedy was ordered without discernible controversy
However, defendants increasingly seek to avoid the remedy by
attempting to sell or transfer religious symbols and the land beneath them
262
to private parties. 2 2 In the general case, this alternative remedy satisfies
Clause provided that certain
the requirements of the Establishment
stringent conditions are met.263 However, there are at least two

assessed in determining an appropriate resolution. Id. Where the trustor demands that a religious
symbol remain on trust property, for example, and retains a reversionary interest to assure that the
command is respected, the objective observer likely will take a quite different view of a remedy
designed to preserve the symbol than in circumstances where government acts alone to perpetuate a
religious display. For those interested in the complex questions raised by this unusual intersection of
trust law and the Establishment Clause, the parties' briefing in Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, addresses
the issue in considerable detail.
See, e.g., Eugene Cross Now in Place on Bible College Campus, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
261.
June 26, 1997 (describing removal and relocation of cross at issue in Separation of Church & State
Comm., 93 F.3d 617); Andrew Herrmann, Indiana Township Ends Fight to Keep Crucifix in Park,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993 (describing decision to remove from public park the crucifix challenged in Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993)); Susan Jacobson, St. Cloud Man Bears Legacy of Cross Fight, OSCEOLA SENTINEL, Sept. 13, 1991 (describing
plaintiffs success in "forc[ing] the city to remove a cross from its water tower' in Mendelson v. City
of St. Cloud, 719 F Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1989)); Alan Sverdlik, Guerrero Goes to Washington,
ATLANTA J.-CoNST., May 31, 1989 (reporting that the decision in ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber
of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (1 ith Cir. 1983), "forced Georgia officials to remove an illuminated cross from the Black Rock Mountain campgrounds"); Judy Wiessler, Order to Remove Star,
Crossesat Park Stands, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 12, 1985 (documenting order to remove cross and
Star of David at issue in ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984)); Jewish War Veterans,
695 F. Supp. at 4 ("[T]he Court is compelled to require that the [65-foot tall Latin] cross be removed
or replaced by a nonreligious symbol."). Several cases involving Ten Commandments displays have
also resulted in orders requiring their removal. See, e.g., Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 896; Grayson
County, 2002 WL 1558688, at *6; ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757, 767 (E.D. Tenn.
2002); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 876 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Pulaski County, 96
F. Supp. 2d at 702-03; ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000);
HarlanCounty Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 679; see generally,Dan Popkey, Former Eagles Official
Likes Monument Solution, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 28, 2004 ("At least 26 monuments in 15
states have moved since 2000 under court order or legal threat.").
262. Buono, 371 F.3d at 545-46 (describing transfer of cross property during pendency of
appeal); Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (analyzing sale of Mt. Davidson cross property); Ellis, 990 F.2d at
1528-29 (describing transfer of Mt. Soledad and Mt. Helix crosses and underlying property to private parties during pendency of appeal); Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (analysis of transfers); Paulson,
294 F.3d 1124 (analysis of second sale of Mt. Soledad cross); Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-21
and 276 F. Supp. 2d at 974-78 (analyzing sale of Ten Commandments monument and underlying
property during pendency of litigation); Chambers, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (property transfer conducted to avert constitutional challenge).
263. See infra notes 327-434 and accompanying text.
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circumstances where the removal of a religious display, rather than the
transfer of land beneath it, should be required.2 6
a. Displays That Must Be Removed
Privatization of the public fora typically at issue in cases involving
permanent religious displays 265 represents a largely noneconomic loss to
the public, whose aesthetic, expressive, and recreational enjoyment of the
property is permanently impaired or prohibited.266 The privatization of a
public forum, for example, forever removes from the public's reach a
unique venue for expressive activity. This loss cannot be measured
economically and thus cannot be compensated through payment of a sum
of money-particularly to the government itself, which is often the
critical focus of the expressive activities that no longer can occur. Just as
the deprivation of expressive rights gives rise to an award of nominal
damages only, given that the loss cannot be expressed economically,267
so too the loss of a public forum cannot be fully captured and
compensated monetarily. When government chooses to privatize public
property of this nature, there is a compensation gap in the transaction-a
loss of value to the public that is not captured by payment of the
purchase price. Presuming that the sale is rational, that gap must be
closed by the realization of other noneconomic objectives of equivalent
value to the political community.
While government is entitled to close public fora rather than
continue to accommodate private speech, 268 any effort to do so must

264.
Given the fact-intensive nature of the endorsement inquiry, there also may be situations
where the specific history and context of a particular display requires its removal in a case that falls
outside the circumstances set forth below. For example, in the Paulsoncase, the federal courts have

already struck down two remedial attempts by the city to sell the cross at issue based on the conclusion that both transactions evinced religious preference. Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124; Murphy, 1997 WL
754604. The City Attorney has now proposed a third sale. Matthew T. Hall, A New Idea for Mt.
Soledad-Leave Decision To A New Buyer, SAN DtF.Go UNION-TRIB., June 29, 2004, at B 1. If the
transaction goes forward, its communicative impact cannot be assessed without reference to this
tainted history. Cf Mercier, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 979 ("At this point, selling a larger section of the

park or putting up more signs and disclaimers would fail to communicate a genuine message that the
endorsement has ended.").
265.
The phrase "public fora," as used in this context, does not describe public property that
has been opened for permanent symbolic speech, in contrast to the remedial proposal discussed
above. Supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. It instead describes the typical setting of impermissible religious displays in parks, plazas, and other public spaces that are traditionally held
open for temporary expressive use. These spaces are almost never openly available for permanent

symbolic expression, but instead contain selected displays that reflect-in fact or appearance-the
endorsement and often the express sponsorship of government itself.
266. This is especially true in light of the requirements for a constitutional sale, which mandate
that sufficient property be transferred to eradicate the appearance of endorsement. See infra notes

338-66 and accompanying text. Because a significant amount of public land must be transferred, the
public's loss of access will likely be substantial.

267.
Allah v. AI-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000); Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071,
1071-72 (8th Cir. 2000); Trewhella v. City of Lake Geneva, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1069-70 (E.D.
Wis. 2003).
268. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 783-84 (Souter, J., concurring).
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itself be free from the appearance of endorsement.269 In the context of
land sales proposed to remedy an unconstitutional religious display, any
equalizing noneconomic value realized by the political community must
derive from an objective that is independent of, and neutral toward, the
display at issue. It cannot be enough for government to inflict this losswhich could be avoided altogether by removing the display-simply in
the hope of preserving a religious symbol in its original location. That
objective, standing alone, promotes no independent and neutral goal of
value to the entire community, but instead reflects yet another special
benefit bestowed on religious expression. 270 As the district court in
Mercier v. City of La Crosse observed, "[ilf anything, the sale . . .
exacerbates the violation because it communicates to nonadherents that
not only is the City willing to display a Judeo-Christian symbol on public
property, but it is also willing to carve up a public park to insure that the
symbol does not have to be271moved or share its space with displays
expressing other viewpoints."
If, however, the relocation of a religious symbol cannot be
accomplished without significantly diminishing its communicative
effect, other neutral concerns are then in play-most importantly,
government's interest in promoting religious tolerance through the
respectful treatment of the icons of private faith. Two circumstances
implicate such an impairment of the expressive effect of a religious
symbol: where removal risks damaging or destroying the symbol itself,
and where the expressive force of the symbol is inextricably tied to its

269.

City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491; cf RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NLMMER ON

FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:51 ("[A] more difficult question is whether general First Amendment
principles prohibiting viewpoint discrimination are sufficiently hale to prohibit a governmental
entity from closing down a public forum in direct retaliation against a particular group's expressive
message."). For purposes of free speech analysis, there is an important distinction between the
closure of a public forum to all expression to avert the necessity of accommodating offensive speech
and the closure of a public forum so that one preferred expressive symbol might remain. While the
former results in no speech whatsoever, the latter results in the perpetuation of a single viewpoint.
Cf Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2004) (in
challenge to non-remedial sale of public forum property to religious organization, court rejects free
that transaction reflects no viewpoint preference for purspeech objection on grounds, inter alia,
chaser). Moreover, at least where a forum is closed by a remedial sale-the intent of which is to rid
government of the appearance that it favors a particular religious viewpoint-the regulatory premise
of the sale itself should subject the transaction to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. Cf First
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2002) (government's
subjective intent in regulating expressive activity relevant in determining degree of scrutiny).
270. As discussed more fully below, infra notes 367-94 and accompanying text, no sale of
public property to remedy an unconstitutional religious display can rest on the requirement that the
purchaser preserve the religious symbol. However, even in the absence of such an express requirement, a sale whose only discernible purpose is to preserve the possibility that the symbol might
remain still lacks an independent and neutral rationale.
Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1013; see also id. at 1020 (sale of entire park "could be prob271.
lematic if the sale's only purpose was to maintain the monument's location and continue the promotion of its message").
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particular physical setting (irrespective of the endorsing effect of public
272
ownership).
The first scenario would apply to large fixtures on public land such
as the crosses at issue in the Carpenter, Ellis, and Paulson cases;

evidence in Paulson specifically indicated that the Mt. Soledad cross
could not be removed without risking its destruction. 273 If government
must literally tear down a religious symbol to remove it from public land,
that unavoidably provocative act and the apparent hostility it manifests
toward religion may fuel private religious animosity that is in the interest
of all members of the political community-adherents and nonadherents
alike-to avert. The second scenario would likewise apply to the display
of large religious symbols, such as crosses, whose communicative impact
is linked to their ability to be seen from afar. Relocating a 50-foot cross
from a hilltop to a less prominent vantage will appreciably diminish its
communicative power-and if government so requires, it risks
communicating a message of disrespect for the diminished symbolic
expression. By contrast, moving a Ten Commandments monument
between the same two points will have no such diminishing effect, since
its communicative effect requires that the audience be close enough to
read the engraved text and is therefore unrelated to its particular physical
placement.274

In sum, when the communicative power of a religious symbol will
be substantially diminished if it is removed and relocated to private land,
government has an independent and neutral basis to sell the underlying
property in the interest of averting private religious strife. When a
symbol can be moved without any significant impairment of its
272.
It is important to note that these scenarios would permit, but not require, government to
sell land beneath a religious display. Government may choose to remove the display instead, even if
the symbol's communicative force is diminished as a result. Defendants have argued that to remove
a display in such circumstances is constitutionally impermissible under the Free Exercise Clause.
See, e.g., Updated Brief by the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association, at *10-*11, Paulson, 294 F.3d
1124 (No. 00-55406), available at 2002 WL 32099878. Free exercise, however, must be asserted
against the government, not on its behalf. At least with respect to religious symbols erected by
government, there can be no constitutional objection. Alternatively, if the display was erected on
public land by private parties, the question of ownership must first be resolved-and in the case of
the large symbols at issue here, they are likely to be deemed fixtures upon the land and thus the
property of the landowner. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 660 (West 2004). Even if the symbol itself
is deemed the property of a private individual or entity, however, government can require its removal as owner of the underlying land. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1013 (West 2004). The Free
Exercise Clause cannot give a private individual who erects an unconstitutional religious display on
public land an effective right to occupy the parcel in perpetuity and to force a closed sale of public
forum property to accomplish that result.
273.
Defendant City of San Diego's Brief at 2 n.1, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 89-0820GT).
274. The operation of this principle has the counter-intuitive effect of providing a more accommodating remedy for larger and more entrenched displays, and thus would appear to reward
violations of greater magnitude. That legitimate perception must be factored into the analysis of
apparent endorsement and underscores the significance of the other stringent conditions that must be
present for such a sale to satisfy constitutional requirements. See infra notes 327-434 and accompanying text.
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expressive force, however, government has no such basis to deprive the
27 5
public of its use and enjoyment of the surrounding property.
b. Public Property That Cannot Be Sold
Even if a religious symbol cannot be relocated without significantly
diminishing its expressive force, there is at least one situation where
removal still must be required. This circumstance involves a religious
display on property that is so intrinsically public in character, and so
closely enmeshed with the political community's self-identity, that any
sale of the land itself would evince actual or apparent endorsement of the
religious expression at issue. There are some public spaces that are
literally invaluable to the political community; to sell them for any price
communicates a message to nonadherents that government will go to any
length, and sacrifice anything, to preserve the religious symbol in its
present location. Were a cross displayed on the grounds of the Lincoln
Memorial, for instance, or on Inspiration Point overlooking Yosemite
Valley, the sale of land surrounding the display on any terms would
communicate to the political community that its most cherished physical
276
The
space may be bartered away in the service of a religious message.
many
in
sale
a
supporting
countervailing neutral considerations
circumstances 277 are overwhelmed in such instances by the magnitude of
the public's noneconomic loss-a sacrifice so facially disproportionate
2 78
that it can only be understood as an expression of endorsement.
Glassroth v. Moore279 is the obvious case. There, the state of
Alabama has only one permissible remedy to cure its unconstitutional
placement of a two-ton Ten Commandments monument in the foyer of
its Supreme Court building, even if the display cannot be moved without
impairing its communicative effect. 280 Any attempt to sell the land
underlying the monument, for any price, communicates that the state
would rather auction off the seat of its highest court than disrupt the
display of a sectarian text. The determination whether any particular
The one remedial sale that clearly offends this principle was struck down by the district
275.
court but upheld on appeal in an opinion that addresses none of the considerations discussed above.
Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-05, rev'd, 2005 WL 81886. In another transaction, where the court
upheld the sale of land beneath a 15-foot marble statue of Jesus Christ, the record does not reveal
whether the display could have been moved without damage. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489,
497; see also Buono, 371 F.3d at 545 (land underlying small cross to be transferred into private
hands).
This result may be mandated independently by statutory provisions governing the sale of
276.
national monuments, public parks, and historic landmarks. See generally, Johanna H. Wald, The
Presidio Trust and our National Parks: Not a Model to be Trusted, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
369 (1998) (describing unsuccessful legislative attempts during the 104th Congress to ease restrictions on the sale of national park property).
See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
277.
Cf Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9 ("Obviously, a city could not sell space under the
278.
dome of its City Hall or the sidewalk in front of the courthouse steps. Such sale would be, on its
face, a sham.").
335 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003).
279.
See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284.
280.
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parcel meets this standard is necessarily fact-bound, turning on the
particular nature of the physical space and the court's subjective
determination of its significance to the public. Nevertheless, the
principle is not unbounded; for example, it would almost certainly
exclude typical municipal parkland and conversely include national
parks, monuments, and historic landmarks as well as the seats of local,
state, and national government.
2. The Easy Remedy: Removing a Religious Display
The removal of an impermissible symbol unambiguously separates
government from endorsed religious speech. Accordingly, the only
remedial question is whether the removal has been accomplished with
sufficiently strict neutrality. The neutrality inquiry is specifically linked
to the source of financing for the religious display.
Where an offending display has been privately financed, the symbol
need only be returned to its donor for relocation.2 8' Because government
did not expend funds to obtain or construct the symbol, it need not
receive compensation for returning the object--even if formal ownership
of the property has been transferred to government. The well-informed
observer, focusing on the substance of the transaction rather than the
formality of title, would perceive no actual or apparent benefit conferred
on religion by simply returning a donated symbol to its original
purchaser, even if government could have sold the object for gain.
Religion receives no preferential benefit when government foregoes a
windfall and instead returns a gift of religious property.282
The more difficult case involves the removal of symbols that
government itself has purchased or constructed. In such cases, donating
the symbol to a private entity for display elsewhere would constitute an
impermissible gift of public resources in support of religious speech.283
If government chooses to transfer the symbol to a private entity, it thus
must receive fair market value to compensate the public for its
investment. However, government need not obtain that value through an
open auction. Because the value of the property relates exclusively to its
expressive content, the only purpose of an open auction would be to
preserve the possibility that someone opposed to the display might
purchase it with the intention of suppressing that expression by either
destroying the symbol or otherwise limiting its communicative reach.
Precluding the suppression of private religious speech, however, does not
confer any special benefit on religion or reflect an impermissible
281.

See, e.g., Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1002, 1018.

282.
Id. at 1014 ("I agree that the City would not violate the establishment clause simply because it chose to return the property to its original owner rather than another interested party.").

283.

E.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1980); Annunziato v.

New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, 555 F. Supp. 427, 433 & n.17 (D. Conn. 1982); cf Mercier, 2005 WL

81886, at *9.
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preference; it instead advances government's neutral interest in
promoting religious tolerance by averting the denigration of private
religious imagery. 284
It accordingly should be permissible for
government to sell the symbol through a negotiated transaction with a
purchaser committed to preserving the display, provided that the fair
market value of the object is recovered. 8 5
3. The Difficult Remedy: Selling a Display and the Land Beneath It
In a number of recent cases involving large crosses or religious
statuary, and in another involving a Ten Commandments monument,
defendants have declined to remove religious symbols and have instead
proposed to remedy the violations by selling or transferring the
underlying land.286 Other municipalities have recently sold property
beneath religious displays in an effort to avert litigation.28 7 Privatizing
the underlying property has the obvious political virtue of preserving the
religious display in its original location, undisturbed but for the formality
of title.
Precisely because the remedy is potentially a mere
recharacterization of title with little or no substantive effect on the
perception of governmental endorsement, any proposed sale or transfer
requires significantly greater scrutiny than the removal of an offending
display.
As discussed above, the sale of property beneath a challenged
religious symbol should be permitted only when the removal and
relocation of the display will significantly impair its communicative
force and only if the property at issue is not invaluably public in
character. 288 Within these constraints, several additional conditions must
be met for a sale to satisfy the requirements of the Establishment Clause.
While proponents of such sales argue that the mere fact of privatization
ends the controversy without further inquiry into the terms of the
transaction, the remedial logic of the endorsement test requires
substantially closer review.
284.

E.g., Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 ("The City may respect the 'religious sensibilities'

of its citizens who follow the Ten Commandments by giving the [donated] monument to a person or
group that wishes to give the monument the respectful display that it deserves in another forum.").
285. By contrast, the sale of the land beneath a religious display must be done through an open
process, see infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text, because the property can be put to many
different uses. Most obviously, the sale of real property allocates permanent access to a venue for all

manner of private expression. Government cannot permit only those whose expressive intentions
coincide with its own to participate as potential purchasers.
286.
See supra note 262.

287. See, e.g., George W. Griggs, High-Profile Crossfor Sale in Simi, L.A. TIMES, May 29,
2004, at B I ("Seeking to avoid a lawsuit, Simi Valley park officials plan to sell a 12-foot cross that
has stood atop Mt. McCoy... for more than 60 years ....
The Simi Valley Historical Society...
offered to buy the cross a year ago ... to ensure it remained a fixture in the community .... [The
transaction was arranged] after a recent controversy erupted in Ventura over a cross that had stood

for decades in city-owned Grant Park. Acting under the threat of a lawsuit, the city sold the cross in
September for $104,000 to a local historic preservation group.").
288. Supra notes 265-80 and accompanying text.
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a. Preliminary Arguments: Mootness and State Action
In several cases involving unconstitutional religious displays,
defendants have sold property beneath religious symbols during the
pendency of litigation and then argued that the transaction ends the
controversy, irrespective of the terms of the sale, on grounds of mootness
or the termination of state action. The argument is at odds with both
doctrines.
(1) Does a Sale Necessarily Moot the Case?
The broadest mootness argument made in this context contends that,
irrespective of the constitutionality of the sale or the question whether it
remedies any preceding violation of the Establishment Clause, changed
circumstances render the case moot and require new litigation if
plaintiffs wish to challenge the transaction. 289 The claim, typically
asserted following entry of a permanent injunction and designed to
preclude
appellate review, 29 conflicts with basic principles of equitable
jurisdiction.
It is a tenet of equity that "the spirit and purpose of an injunction,

not merely its precise words ... must be obeyed."29 '

In ascertaining the

requirements of an equitable command, "[t]he language of an injunction
must be read in the light of the circumstances surrounding its entry: the
relief sought by the moving party... and the mischief that the injunction
seeks to prevent." 292 In applying these principles to efforts by a party to
thwart or otherwise evade an injunctive decree, "courts have inherent
equitable power to modify their injunctions to ensure that any injunctive
relief granted fully vindicates the rights accorded by the underlying
judgment. 29 3 This power derives from the principle that "[e]quitable
jurisdiction having once attached, it will be continued for the final
adjudication of all rights involved and thus avoid further litigation in the
future .... 294 Once "a court of equity has ...

obtained jurisdiction, it

289. See, e.g., Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief at 3-4, Buono, 371 F.3d 543 (No. 0355032) ("any challenge.., to the land transfer ...must be brought in a new action ....Whether...
the land transfer itself violate[s] the First Amendment [is an] issue[] that cannot be raised in this
case, but must be the subject of a new lawsuit.").
See, e.g., Buono, 371 F.3d at 545; but see Mercier,276 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (sale follow290.

ing filing of complaint alleged to moot dispute).
291. Nat'l Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see, e.g.,
Youakim v.McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995); Pridgen v. Andresen, 891 F. Supp. 733,
740 (D. Conn. 1995); Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F. Supp. 112, 144 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
292. United States v. Christie Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972); see Youakim,
71 F.3d at 1283.

293. Transp., Inc. v. Mayflower Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 952, 954 (4th Cir. 1985); see, e.g.,
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1968); Taylor v. United States,
181 F.3d 1017, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999); Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1531 (Beezer, J., concurring); Larken Minnesota, Inc. v. Wray, 881 F. Supp. 1413, 1419-20 (D. Minn. 1995), aftd, No. 95-2219, 1996 WL
362672 (8th Cir. July 1, 1996).
G. L. CLARK, EQUITY § 24 at 35 (1954).
294.
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will do complete justice by deciding the whole case and determining the
whole controversy. 295
When defendants seek to escape the reach of an injunction by
selling the property beneath an enjoined display, these principles are
applicable. To "decid[e] the whole case and determin[e] the whole
controversy, ''296 a court must conduct a substantive review of the
transaction to confirm that the underlying constitutional violation has
indeed been eradicated and that the sale itself does not independently
offend constitutional norms. Only after establishing that the transaction
satisfies the constitutional and remedial requirements imposed by the
Establishment Clause may a court sitting in equity terminate its decree.
A less sweeping variant of the changed-circumstances argument
contends that the sale of land beneath a religious symbol constitutes the
voluntary cessation of illegal conduct and therefore moots the case.
Unlike the broader argument, this contention presumes that the sale does,
in fact, terminate all illegality and therefore presupposes that the court
will examine the transaction to establish its constitutional and remedial
adequacy. If the sale survives this substantive review, defendants must
additionally establish to a very high degree of certainty that the illegality
will not recur once the suit is dismissed.
The Supreme Court instructs that "[m]ere voluntary cessation of
allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; it if did, the courts would
be compelled to leave 'the defendant . . . free to return to his old
ways.' 97 The two-part standard to secure a dismissal is accordingly

stringent. Defendants must establish that "(1) 'subsequent events [have]
made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior [cannot]
reasonably be expected to recur,' and (2) 'interim relief or events have
completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation.' 298 In meeting this standard, "[t]he defendant's burden is a
heavy one to ensure the allegedly illegal activities do not temporarily
cease only to resume after the claims have been dismissed.

299

With respect to the first prong, courts have paid considerable
attention to whether the voluntary cessation occurs only after an adverse
judgment has been entered against the defendant. 300
In such
circumstances, even changes that are the product of legislative enactment
295.
McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 203 P. 132, 138 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
296. McKevitt, 203 P. at 138.
297.
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (quoting
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000).
298.
Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998)
(internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003);
Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Town of Orange, 303 F.3d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 2002).
299.
Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 574 (2d Cir. 2003).
300. Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003).
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rather than the exercise of administrative discretion are not always
considered sufficiently irreversible to satisfy the test.30' Thus in the case
of Buono v. Norton, where Congress recently passed a law requiring the
transfer of public property beneath an enjoined cross 30 2 but took various
steps to preserve the symbol prior to the adverse ruling,30 3 the Ninth
Circuit noted that "there is nothing in [the new statute] that prevents the
land from being otherwise returned to the government ....
At a minimum, this inquiry imposes on defendants an obligation to
sell property without reserving a right to reacquire the land. For
example, if government maintains a reversionary interest that is triggered
by the purchaser's alteration or removal of the religious display, the
terms of the sale itself memorialize government's vested right to
reacquire ownership for the purpose of continuing its unconstitutional
While this limitation may appear self-evident, similar
conduct.
provisions have been included in recent transactions purporting to moot
the enforcement of injunctions barring the display of religious symbols
on public land.30 5
The second prong of the inquiry-whether "interim relief or events
have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation" 3°6-subsumes within it the full set of issues relating to the
requirements of the Establishment Clause in the context of a remedial
sale, which are discussed separately below.
(2) Does a Sale Necessarily End State Action?
Defendants also assert that state action terminates whenever a
challenged religious symbol is transferred to private property,
irrespective of the terms of the transaction, based on the fact that the state
no longer exercises dominion over the display.30 7

Any disposition of

301.

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1983).

302.

Act of Sept. 30, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-87 § 8121, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003).

303. Consolidated Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 113, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (forbidding expenditure of public funds to remove cross); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-248 § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519 (2002) (same); Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-117 § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002) (designating cross a national memorial).
304.

Buono, 371 F.3d at 546; see, e.g., Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 4, Buono, 371 F.3d

543 (No. 03-55032) ("[There is] no reason to believe that Congress will not amend or repeal [the
statute mandating the sale], or otherwise attempt to return the cross to federal land, if the appeal and
the district court's judgment were dismissed.").
305. Buono, 371 F.3d at 545; Ex. 1 to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the Injunction, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134GT).
306.

Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1274.

307. See, e.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491; Appellee City of San Diego's Supplemental
Brief, at *8 & n.8, Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124 (No. 00-55406), available at 2002 WL 32099877; Appellee Council of Armenian American Organizations of Northern California's Response Brief, Kong,
2001 WL 1020102 (No. 00-15261), available at 2000 WL 33986165; Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the Injunction at 6-10, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 900134-GT) ("There simply is no state action.").
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public property, however, is itself state action that must comport with the
requirements of the Constitution. 30 8 In at least two circumstances, the
structure of a remedial sale may perpetuate religious endorsement and
thus constitute impermissible state action, irrespective of the fact that it
privatizes the property in question: where government projects its actual
control over the property by dictating the terms of its private use, and
where a transaction is structured so that the privatized speech continues
to enjoy the apparent endorsement of the state.
Where government purports to remedy a constitutional violation by
transferring property with restrictions on its use, courts clearly retain the
ability to scrutinize the transaction for constitutional infirmity. The
principle was made plain in Evans v. Newton, 309 where the Supreme
Court held that the transfer of segregated public parkland to a private
successor trustee for the continued operation of the property on a
discriminatory basis failed to terminate state action. 310 As Evans made
clear, state action does not dissipate when public land is transferred to a
private entity in a manner that perpetuates an unconstitutional use. The
same principle governed a number of cases barring various attempts by
municipalities to preserve racial discrimination through the privatization
of segregated public facilities. 3u' Thus in Hampton v. Jacksonville, the
Fifth Circuit held that the sale of property to private individuals on
condition that they continue to operate the land as a golf course was
insufficient to sever the city's involvement in racial discrimination at the
facility. 312 Because the reversionary clause in the deed obligated the
purchasers to operate the land exactly as the city had before them, the
conduct of the new owners
remained state action for purposes of the
313
Fourteenth Amendment.
The same state action analysis is applicable to efforts by
government to assure that private recipients of public land preserve
otherwise unconstitutional religious displays.3 t4 In Murphy v. Bilbray,
308.
Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1010- 11 ("[Defendant] is correct that there is an important
difference between public speech and private speech and that there is no establishment clause viola-

tion without state action ....
However, there is government action in this case: the City's sale of
property to [a private purchaser].").
309. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
310.

Evans, 382 U.S. at 302.

311.

United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425, 430-32 (5th Cir. 1974); Wright v. City of

Brighton, 441 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1971); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 123-24 (3d Cit.

1968); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1962).
312. Hampton, 304 F.2d at 323.
313. Id. at 322.
314.
Cf Chambers, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 772. The typical objection to this argument is that race
discrimination is disfavored in both the private and public context, whereas private religious practice
is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Responding Brief of the City of San Diego at 19, Paulson,

294 F.3d 1124 (00-55406) (argument constitutes an attempt "to equate . . . the free exercise of religion ... with the practice of racial discrimination"). However, the matter at issue is government's
preferential facilitation of a private sectarian message, which enjoys no constitutional favor. E.g.,
infra note 372; see Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 1975).
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for example, the defendants transferred a cross and a tiny plot of land
beneath it to a private organization following an adverse judgment in the
district court)' 5 The transfer was made at no cost to the recipient and on
condition that the cross be preserved; moreover, the government
indemnified the recipient for all costs associated with defending the
transfer and retained a reversionary interest permitting it to reacquire the
cross and underlying property in the event that a court struck down the
display in its new setting.3t6 On such facts, it is implausible to claim that
a transaction terminates state action with respect to a challenged religious
display, simply because title to the property is nominally transferred to a
private party. 317 The Murphy defendants31 8ultimately reached the same
conclusion and abandoned the transaction.
Even without projected control in the form of a deed restriction,
reversionary interest, or other limitation on the private recipient's use
and control of the property, a sale can still reflect apparent endorsement
-and thus constitute state action within the reach of the court's remedial
authority-simply by virtue of the perceived relationship of government
to the privatized display. While government defendants have cited the
plurality opinion in Pinette for the proposition that no endorsement
violation can arise from private religious expression, 319 only four
members of the Court embraced that position. 320 A majority of the Court
took the opposing view, articulated by Justice Souter in his concurring
opinion, that "[bly allowing government to encourage what it cannot do
on its own, the proposed per se rule [of the plurality] would tempt a
public body to contract out its establishment of religion, by encouraging
the private enterprise of the religious to exhibit what the government
could not display itself."'321 In the remedial context, this reasoning
requires scrutiny of any transaction that purports to privatize religious
expression to assure that the speech does not continue to imply state
endorsement of its message. Indeed, the rationale for applying such
scrutiny to the remedial sale of a permanent religious symbol is
significantly more compelling than in Pinette itself, where there was no
315. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528-29.
316. Exs. 1,2, and 6 at 46, lines 10-15, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the Injunction, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134GT).
317.

Cf Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9 (impermissible to conduct "a sale to a straw purchaser

that left the City with continuing power to exercise duties of ownership").
318. County's Brief in Response to Brief of the Attorney General at 2, 5, Murphy v. Bilbray,
Civ. No. 90-0134-GT (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998) (order denying motion to appoint successor trustee).
319. See, e.g., City Appellee's Brief, Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (No. 00-15261), available at
2000 WL 33986166.
320.

Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757.

supra note 19, at 428-29. This analysis is
321.
Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring); see Gey 11,
echoed in recent rulings extending First Amendment speech analysis to formerly public property that
retains the character and appearance of a public forum. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333
F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003); FirstUnitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1131; Venetian Casino Resort,
L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 941-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
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prior finding of endorsement and the private symbolic speech had been
temporarily erected in a public forum for unattended displays. 2
In City of Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit expressly embraced this
analysis:
Absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective
way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of
religion. We are aware, however, that adherence to a formalistic
standard invites manipulation. To avoid such manipulation, we look
to the substance of the transaction as well as its form to determine
whether government action endorsing religion has actually ceased.323
This inquiry, the court noted, must include scrutiny of the resulting
religious speech on private land insofar as "private speech which
reasonably may be understood to constitute a public endorsement of
religion" is at issue. 324 The Marshfield court concluded that the private
speech could indeed be imputed to government, based on the lack of
demarcation between the public and private parcels, and found an
Establishment Clause violation on that basis. 325 At least three other
courts have similarly rejected remedial sales on grounds that they failed
to dissipate the appearance of preference for private religious speech.326
The holding in each case properly reflects the premise that state action
for purposes of the endorsement inquiry does not end with a title transfer
but instead terminates only if the privatized message no longer enjoys the
apparent preference of government.
b. The Attributes of the Transferred Land: The Requirements
of Physical Separation
Any sale of public land beneath a religious display formally
separates the symbol from government.
The relevant substantive
inquiry, however, is whether such separation succeeds in dispelling the
appearance that government endorses the religious speech. To satisfy
this requirement, the physical separation of government from a religious
322.
Pinette,515 U.S. at 757-59.
323.
City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
324.
Id. at 494.
325.
Id. at 494-95.
326.
Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124; Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-19, and 276 F. Supp. 2d at
974-978; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *9-*11; see also, Buono, 371 F.3d at 546 (court declines to
decide constitutionality of planned remedial sale but notes "that the presence of a religious symbol
on once-public land that has been transferred into private hands may still violate the Establishment
Clause"); cf Paulson, 262 F.3d at 896. Additionally, the court in Kong upheld a remedial sale after
reviewing it within the framework of City of Marshfield, suggesting acceptance of the premise that a

sale does not necessarily terminate state action and must independently survive Establishment
Clause scrutiny. Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1.-*2. Finally, in reversing the district court decision
in Mercier,the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed City of Marshfield in this respect and explicitly noted that
remedial transactions must be subject to independent scrutiny to assure that there are "no unusual
circumstances surrounding the sale ... so as to indicate an endorsement of religion." Mericer, 2005
WL 81886, at *9.
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display must be both evident and substantial. The former requirement
relates to the visible demarcation of public and private parcels; the latter
relates to the amount of land sold and its relationship to adjoining public
property, if any.
(1) Evident Separation
The purpose of every remedy in this context is to communicate to
the objective observer that government no longer endorses religious
expression. The first requirement of any remedial sale thus must be to
demonstrate the actual separation between government and an endorsed
display. It does little good to sell property underlying a religious symbol
if the change in ownership is apparent only to those who conduct a title
search. While the objective observer is deemed knowledgeable of the
ownership of property, 327 that observer will also take note that
government has made no attempt to forthrightly manifest its separation
from a display. In the remedial context, the failure to differentiate public
and private parcels following a remedial sale reasonably suggests that
government is not fully committed to dissociating itself from endorsed
religious speech.32 8 As a result, courts reviewing remedial sales have
required in every case that public property be visibly demarcated from
the transferred land.329
Demarcation typically has two components: some type of physical
delineation of the transferred parcel coupled with signs that identify its
private ownership. Physical delineation can take the form of a fence, 330 a
series of bollards, 33 1 or even a dense forest surrounding a transferred

clearing. 332 So long as the transition is evident to a reasonable observer,
the delineation requirement is met.333 The additional necessity of signs
or plaques identifying the ownership of transferred property reflects the
fact that government may fence off portions of its own land for a variety
of reasons, and thus that the delineation of a parcel does not necessarily
imply its private status. To make clear to a skeptical observer that
government has embraced the constitutional objectives of a remedial

327. Supra notes 97-98.
328.
Cf. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In context, a disclaimer helps
remove doubt about state approval of respondents' religious message."); id. at 794 (Souter, J., concurring).
Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *10; Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895-96; Kong, 2001 WL 1020102,
329.
at *1-*2; City of Marshfield,2000 WL 767376, at *1; Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 8 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 3, 2000); cf Ciy of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494-97 (remedial sale fails for lack of demarcation).

330.
331.

City of Marshfield,2000 WL 767376, at * 1.
Paulson,Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 7-8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000).

332.
333.

Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2.
Cf City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
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sale, the private ownership of a transferred parcel should be stated
unambiguously. 334
While all courts accept the necessity of demarcation in the context
of a remedial sale, some require little or nothing more. 33 5 As Justice
Souter made clear in Pinette, however, the endorsement analysis
demands further scrutiny. "Of course, the presence of a disclaimer does
not always remove the possibility that a private religious display
'convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred,' when other indicia of
endorsement... outweigh the mitigating effect of the disclaimer .... ,,336
In Allegheny, for example, the Supreme Court held that a sign identifying
the private ownership of a creche in a county courthouse "simply
demonstrates that the government is endorsing the religious message of
that [private] organization, rather than communicating a message of its
own .... Indeed, the very concept of 'endorsement' conveys the sense
of promoting someone else's message." 337 With respect to property
transferred in a remedial sale, the additional inquiry bearing on the
appearance of endorsement relates to the size of the transferred plot and
its relationship to adjacent public land.
(2) Substantial Separation
Irrespective of the clarity of its demarcation, a transferred parcel
will fail to dissipate the appearance of endorsement if it does not also
create substantial separation between government and an impermissible
display. The necessity of this separate inquiry is illustrated by the
remedial sales conducted in the Murphy and Paulson cases after the
district court struck down the defendants' display of large crosses at the
apex of hilltop parks.338 The Paulson defendants purported to remedy
their violation by selling the 43-foot cross and a fifteen-foot square
parcel of land at its base to a private entity.
In Murphy, the
defendants' transaction included a 36-foot cross and a 30-foot diameter
parcel of land beneath it. 34° In both cases, the transferred plots were
surrounded by over 99% of the original public parkland. 341 The district
court struck down the sale in Paulsonon grounds, inter alia, that the plot

334.

Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895-96; Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2; Paulson, Civ. No. 89-

0820-GT, at 8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000); City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1.
335.
Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895 (according determinative significance to "whether the distinction between the public and private area is clearly marked"); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497;
Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 7-8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000); City of Marshfield, 2000 WL

767376, at *1.
336. Pinette,515 U.S. at 794 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
337. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600-01; see, e.g., Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1430-31.
338.
Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1438.
339.
Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1422 n.2.
340.
341.

Id.
Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1422 n.3.
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was too small to dissipate the appearance of preference.342 The court
observed that, given the tiny size of the parcel, "it is hard.. . to imagine
that any visitor to the Mt. Soledad hilltop and cross would not conclude
that the City was directly involved in the preservation and maintenance
of the Mt. Soledad cross." 343

Facing the same fate, the Murphy

defendants unwound the transfer and proposed a new transaction
involving a larger parcel. 3 "
These are easy cases: the plots at issue were so slight, and the
nominally privatized religious symbols such an immense and dominating
presence over the immediately surrounding parkland, that no reasonable
observer would likely perceive the transactions as effectively separating
government from religious speech. As such, the sales illustrate the need
to assess the size and character of the transferred land; if demarcation
alone were sufficient, both transactions would have ended the inquiry
provided that the tiny parcels had been adequately bounded. The more
difficult task is to define the parameters of the analysis in closer cases
involving more substantial property transfers. In short, how much is
enough? This is necessarily a fact-bound question that turns on the
particular circumstances of each display and the court's subjective
perception of them. Since in almost all cases the size and configuration
of a transferred plot is uniquely related to the display at issue, there is no
comparative benchmark against which to assess its preferential effect.
Instead, the offense to the endorsement principle is the intrinsic
advantage conferred on a religious beneficiary by the intimate proximity
and relationship of its sectarian display to adjoining public land.345
Despite the irreducibly subjective nature of this determination, 34
there are several objective factors that should guide the inquiry.
Returning to the core concern of the endorsement prohibition-the
political disaffection of religious outsiders-any remedy should be
designed to restore the beneficial use of public property to persons for
whom its enjoyment has been burdened by the symbols of an alien
faith. 347 To do so requires that public property adjoining a transferred
342.
343.
344.

Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at * 11.
Id.
County's Brief in Response to Brief of the Attorney General, at 2, 5, Murphy, Civ. No.

90-0134-GT (Sept. 28, 1998). This subsequent transaction was also struck down on grounds that the
larger parcel was still too small to dissipate the appearance of preference. Murphy, Civ. No. 900134-GT (Sept. 28, 1998).
See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text. It is important to stress that this
345.
determination is made in the remedial context and thus rests on the knowledge that government
previously supplied the platform for the religious speech in question and had, in fact or appearance,

endorsed it. An objective observer would likely draw an entirely different and more benign
conclusion from government's close physical proximity to private religious speech in the absence of
this history of support and preference.
346. Id.
347.
See Rabun, 698 F.2d at 1104-05. This determination, however, cannot be made from the
perspective of the religious minorities themselves, but instead from the vantage of the objective

observer. Pinene, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

20041

CROSS PURPOSES

symbol be reasonably free of the dominating influence of the religious
display. If public property remains in the literal shadow of a transferred
symbol, for example, the objective observer will likely perceive that
government continues to communicate a disaffecting message of
endorsement to nonadherents. As Professor Gey has observed in a
related context:
[When private religious speech is] so dominant, so prominently
placed, or so persistent that it becomes a fixture of a public forum[,

it] not only coerces a dissenter in the Lee [v. Weisman] sense of
effectively forcing the dissenter out of the forum . . . but [it] also
indicates when the dissenter is likely to perceive the message that he
or she is not
348 welcome as a full-fledged member of the political

community.

One analytic factor, then, is the size of a religious display in relation
to the amount of land transferred. A more substantial amount of property
must be sold to effectively separate government from a 100-foot cross
than to accomplish the same result with respect to an equivalently
situated 25-foot display. A second consideration is the character of the
surrounding public property. If the surrounding public space is open and
usable, 349 rather than densely forested or inaccessible, 350 more land must
be transferred to achieve sufficient separation because a greater amount
of the adjacent public property will be perceptibly dominated by the
transferred display. Similarly, if the religious symbol sits at or near the
apex of the property, with open slopes descending away from the
display, it likely will appear to be the focal point of the literally inferior
surrounding property and thus exert an especially powerful and farreaching visual influence over the adjacent land. 351 A third consideration
is the relationship between the private symbol and any supporting
amenities or infrastructure remaining on adjoining public land. Where
the remaining public property supports the use and enjoyment of the
private religious display-for instance, by providing adjacent park
benches to facilitate its viewing or other amenities such as parking,
drinking fountains, trash receptacles, and the like-the efficacy of a
remedial sale is less compelling than in circumstances where the
transferred parcel is not dependent on the infrastructure of the
surrounding property.352

348.

Gey I, supra note 19, at 444. Professor Gey proposes to measure this unconstitutional

effect by examining whether "a dissenter is likely to feel obliged to opt out of a forum to avoid
participating in a religious exercise." Id.
349. See, e.g., Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 5.
350.
E.g., Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2.
351.
E.g., Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1436.
352.
See, e.g., Appellant's Excerpts of the Record, Ex. 6 at 82, 86, 87, and 93, and Ex. 7 at
102-04, 106-07, 109-13, and 115, Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124 (00-55406).
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While the analysis of these factors, alone and in combination, must
turn on the facts of each case and ultimately be governed by the
subjective sensibilities of the court itself, their application should be
guided by a practical assessment of the ability of nonadherents to use and
enjoy the remaining public land.353 In certain cases this inquiry may
substantially constrain government's remedial discretion. For example,
if public property cannot be subdivided in a way that effectively
separates some portion of the original land from the dominating presence
of a religious symbol, government's only alternative will be to sell the
entire parcel if it declines to remove the display.35 4
While a few courts have acknowledged the relevance of this
inquiry, 35 others have ignored it and sanctioned sales without regard to
the size and configuration of the transferred plot.356 Most notably, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in City of Marshfield accords exclusive
significance to demarcation and, in so doing, sanctions the transfer of a
small parcel of land at the center of a park to accommodate the continued
display of a large statue of Jesus Christ.357 While this failing may reflect
the limited objections asserted by plaintiffs in the case, 358 the resulting
precedent directly conflicts with the remedial analysis proposed above.
City of Marshfield's narrow focus on demarcation-diluted further by its
conflation of the endorsement inquiry with the free speech and free
exercise rights of the private purchaser 3 59-yields an exceedingly faint
remedy: the court requires only that the defendant "construct some
defining structure, such as a permanent gated fence or wall, to separate
City property from [the private] property accompanied by a clearly
visible disclaimer ....,360 On remand, this directive resulted in an order
imposing a "minimal enclosure" comprised of a four-foot high wroughtiron fence surrounding the private plot. 36 ' The 15-foot marble statue thus

353.
354.

Cf supra note 348.
Murphy, Civ. No. 90-0134-GT, at 6 (Sept. 28, 1998) ("With the proposed split [of the Mt.

Helix park], the presence of the cross still overshadows the amphitheatre, which would be entrusted
to the County .... In this Court's view, the [transfer of] the entire property ...

would cure the

constitutional infirmities."); cf Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 ("If the City had sold the entire to
park to the Order, there would be a stronger argument that the City had 'divorce[d] itself from the
religious content' of the monument.").
Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1011, 1019; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11; Murphy, Civ.
355.

No. 90-0134-GT, at 6 (Sept. 28, 1998).
356. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895-96; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497; City of Marshfield,
2000 WL 767376, at *1.
357.
358.

City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497,
Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (describing the limited objections offered by plaintiffs in

City of Marshfield).
359. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
360. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
361.
City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1. Plaintiffs alternative proposal-the construction of a ten-foot high masonry wall-was rejected by the district court as too restrictive of the
private purchaser's speech interests. Id. The district court's ruling in this regard was appropriate:
the demarcation requirement should be understood to require only that public and private property be

clearly delineated, not that private speech be shrouded. The flaw in the City of Marshfield analysis,
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stands exactly as it did prior to the litigation but for its fenced .15 acre
enclosure, surrounded on all sides by public parkland and sidewalks.36 2
Whether or not the court would have required more aggressive remedial
measures had it engaged in the broader analysis proposed above, its
singular focus on demarcation invites lower courts to authorize
transactions, as in Murphy and Paulson, which offend rather than affirm
the endorsement doctrine.
Any doubt regarding the risk posed by the Marshfield precedent
was resolved by the Seventh Circuit's recent opinion in Mercier. Noting
that the remedial sale at issue essentially mirrored the transaction upheld
in Marshfield,363 the majority in Mercier authorized the sale of a 20-by22-foot parcel of parkland underlying a religious monument without
364
addressing any concern regarding the size of the transferred plot.
Writing for the majority, Judge Manion suggests instead that the sale of
such a "tiny share of the public domain ' 36s is actually preferable to a
more substantial land transfer:
By selling the parcel around the Monument, the City has not suddenly deprived the visitors to the Park of normal access and enjoyment. Visitors to the Park remain free to utilize the park grounds,
much the same way as before the sale. Other than the twenty by
twenty-two-foot-space fenced around the Monument, which has occupied the space for forty
years, access to the Park is not limited by
366
the now-private parcel.

By deeming it a virtue that park visitors will experience essentially
no change in their use of the public space, the Mercier court turns the
remedial inquiry on its head: the obvious objective of meaningful relief
is not to preserve the status quo but rather to alter it in some appreciable
respect. In particular, the "visitors" with whom the endorsement prohibition is concerned are not those identified by Judge Manion, who "remain
free to utilize the park grounds, much the same way as before the sale."
They are, instead, the religious nonadherents whose "normal access [to]
and enjoyment" of the park was constrained in the first instance by the
constitutional violation, and whose present use of the park property may
well be burdened in a nearly identical fashion by the immediately adjainstead, is its failure to separately consider the endorsement implications of the size and configura-

tion of the transferred plot.
362.

City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489-90; City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1.

363.
E.g., Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *7 ("Recall that the fencing and signs installed by [the
defendant] is [sic] identical (even to the point of having the same-size lettering) to that ordered by
the district court in Marshfield.");see also id. at *6,*8.
364.
Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *3. The circuit court ignored the question despite the fact
that the lower court had expressly addressed it. See Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1011, 1019.
365.
Mercier,2005 WL 81886, at * 12 (Bauer, J., dissenting).

366.

Id. at *9.
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cent religious display. Any remedy that ignores this foundational
distinction will likely perpetuate rather than resolve the constitutional
transgression.
c. The Method of Sale: The Requirements of Neutrality
In addition to achieving evident and substantial physical separation,
a remedial sale must accomplish that objective through means that are
strictly neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue. A
number of recent transactions purporting to remedy impermissible
displays contain terms that transgress this requirement.
(1) Viewpoint Neutrality and the Prohibition Against
Express Religious Preference
In selling public property to remedy the unconstitutional display of
a religious symbol, government allocates an exclusive and permanent
right of access to land that is primarily, if not singularly, of value as a
venue for expressive activity. While the end result of a permissible
transaction is a private parcel free of constitutional constraints, the sale
itself is state action regulating the use and disposition of public
property.367 As a practical matter, it is beyond dispute that a remedial
sale regulates speech activity by allocating among competing viewpoints
an exclusive right of access to a valuable (and in some instances a
premier) 368 platform for speech. In so doing, government must comply
with the fundamental neutrality requirements imposed by both the Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses. As a matter of free speech, it is a
bedrock principle that government may not engage in viewpoint
discrimination.3 69 As a matter of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
favoring sectarian speech violates the endorsement prohibition. 70 In this
regard, the requirements of the two constitutional commands largely
correspond.37'
These neutrality rules impose clear requirements on the structure of
a remedial sale. First and most fundamentally, government may not
transfer property on condition that the recipient embrace the viewpoint of
the endorsed display.37 2 Similarly, a viewpoint restriction that favors a

367.
368.

See supranotes 269, 307-26.
E.g., Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1422.

369.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); SMOLLA,
supra note 269, § 2:12 ("Thus, the Court has erected what is essentially an absolute bar against

'viewpoint discrimination ....
'");
see supra note 269.
370.
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
371.
Id.; Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 384-85.

372.
See, e.g., Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11 ("[T]he exclusion of any other purchasers of
or bidders for the land ...gives the appearance of preferring the Christian religion over all others.").
If the selected recipient clearly acquiesces in the symbolic expression, it should make no difference
whether the express terms of a negotiated transaction formally require the purchaser to preserve the

display-the outcome is obvious in either case. Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 ("It was a surprise
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broader spectrum of religious expression is equally indefensible-for
example, a requirement that the purchaser either maintain the existing
display or erect an alternative sectarian symbol in its place.373 Finally, a
restriction on the property that permits the purchaser to retain or remove
the existing display but prohibits the erection of any competing symbolic
speech 374 discriminates in the same manner, since the only viewpoint that
can possibly be communicated from the transferred land is the one
expressed by the original display.
No doubt the public will be troubled, at least in certain
circumstances, by a remedy that prohibits defendants from engaging in
viewpoint discrimination with respect to the use of transferred property.
It is not likely a popular proposition to suggest that government, in
implementing a war-memorial use restriction on property underlying a
hilltop cross,375 must permit the removal of the symbol and the erection
of a competing monument castigating all war as sinful. If government
wishes to exercise such expressive control, however, it may easily do so
(and without selling its own property) provided that it does not endorse a
sectarian symbol in the process. Government's impetus in conducting a
remedial sale is not to secure a war memorial that meets the expectations
of the general public, for example, but instead to extricate itself from the
endorsement of symbolic religious speech. If the former rather than the
latter were at issue, the land would not be sold in the first instance and
government could develop the property on its own terms without
constitutional concern.376 Once government chooses to remedy an
endorsement violation by selling property beneath a religious symbol,
however, it necessarily relinquishes its right to control the viewpoint
communicated from the transferred land.377
to no one when the Order chose to keep the monument in its present location."); Murphy, 1997 WL
754604, at *11; cf Mississippi, 499 F.2d at 430-32; Wright, 441 F.2d at 451.
373.
Cf Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54 ("[Tlhe political interest in forestalling intolerance extends
beyond intolerance among Christian sects-or even intolerance among 'religions'-to encompass

intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain."); Torcaso,367 U.S. at 495.
374. See Hall, supra note 264, at B 1 (recounting proposed remedial sale on such terms).
375.
Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1127-28.
376. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234-35 (2000).
377.
Some defendants have challenged this neutrality requirement by claiming that endorsed
displays are historically significant and thus that their preservation promotes a secular and viewpoint-neutral goal. E.g., Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the
Injunction at 16, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134-GT). At least one court appears to have
embraced the argument. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9 (concluding that the defendant "had an
historical reason" for selling religious monument and underlying public property to a purchaser
committed to preserving display, based on the fact that the monument purportedly commemorated
efforts by local youth to protect city from a 1965 flood); cf supra notes 142-63 and accompanying
text. The argument overlooks the fact that the identical assertion would have been dispositive of the
preceding liability determination: if a religious display is sufficiently historical to render its preservation a secular objective in remedial litigation, then the symbol must be sufficiently historical to
remain on public land in the first instance. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. Indeed,
because greater scrutiny should be applied to government action in the remedial context, supra notes
202-21 and accompanying text, it is more likely that the historical preservation claim will prevail at
the liability stage.
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To accomplish a sale on non-preferential terms, government may
auction the property to the highest bidder,378 hold a drawing among prospective purchasers, 379 or otherwise transfer the property based on the
objective application of viewpoint-neutral criteria. In virtually all instances, the sale of public land will be governed in part by state and local
law. 380 While any sale must comply with such provisions to the extent
that they do not conflict with remedial requirements, the fact that a procedure is authorized as a matter of local law does not answer the constitutional inquiry. In two recent cases, for example, courts have authorized
viewpoint-biased remedial sales based predominantly on the conclusion
that the transactions complied with state law. 381 Those remedial transfers, however, were fundamentally different than nearly any other land
sale: the subject properties were traditional public fora, sold to remedy
the defendants' endorsement of religious speech, and purchased for the
sole purpose of perpetuating a religious message. 382 On such facts, a
land transfer cannot
be governed solely by standards applicable to the
sale of vacant lots. 383
While a prohibition against viewpoint bias in remedial transactions
may not seem a particularly controversial proposition, several reported
cases-including Buono,3 City of Marshfield,3 85 Paulson,386 and
Mercier387-involve negotiated sales with recipients who were committed to preserving the religious symbol.388 In Paulson, and before the
district court in Mercier, the infirmity was deemed fatal. 389 As the lower
court in Mercier noted:
The City has neither allowed any other group to express a message in
the park (at least permanently) nor established a neutral program to
determine which groups may purchase a portion of the land to express their messages. Instead, the Common Council passed a "spe-

378.
Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1960) (upholding remedial
transaction where a segregated public pool was "sold at public auction to the high bidder"); see also

Woodland Hills Homeowners Org. v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 266 Cal. Rptr. 767, 775-76
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (lease of surplus school property to religious organization did not violate California Constitution, where lease resulted from open bidding); cf. Mississippi, 499 F.2d at 432;
Hampton, 304 F.2d at 323.
379.
Cf. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 ("Perhaps the most neutral method of ending the
City's endorsement would be to hold a public auction for the monument or give the monument away

through a drawing.").
380. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *7-*8; see, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 25520-25535 (West 2004).
381.
382.
383.
384.

Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9; City ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d at 492-93.
E.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d. at 489-90.
Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *7-*8, * 11.
Buono, 371 F.3d at 545.

385.
386.

City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489-90.
Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1126; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11.

387.
388.
389.

Mercier,305 F. Supp 2d at 1012.
See also supra note 287.
Mercier,305 F. Supp. 2d at 1012; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 *11.
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By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in City of Marshfield did not even
address the fundamental bias in the transaction before it and thus impliedly sanctioned the preference. 391 Of considerably greater concern, the
same circuit recently reversed the district court in Mercier and expressly
sanctioned a viewpoint-biased transaction with the cursory observation
that the objection was foreclosed by the holding in Marshfield.392 By

elevating Marshfield's silent acquiescence in a viewpoint-biased remedial sale to the status of controlling precedent, and by declining to assess
or even acknowledge the lower court's contrary analysis,393 the Seventh

Circuit's decision in Mercier exemplifies the risk posed by judicial indifference (or antipathy) toward the vigorous remediation of endorsed religious speech. In the words of the Mercier dissent, the remedy authorized
by the majority opinion "borders on a fraud., 39 4 If embraced by other
courts, the perfunctory analysis giving rise to that outcome could substantially eviscerate the endorsement prohibition in this context.
(2) Structural Neutrality and the Prohibition Against
Preferential Effects
Presuming that government transfers property with no express preference for a particular religious viewpoint, the structure of the transaction may still comparatively benefit prospective purchasers seeking to
preserve the symbol. These preferential effects should be impermissible
as well-at least in the remedial context, where the objective observer
will scrutinize any sale to assure that it is strictly neutral with respect to
endorsed speech. Structural preferences can take at least two forms.
First, viewpoint-neutral content restrictions on the expressive use of
transferred property may increase the likelihood that the endorsed display will remain. Second, facially neutral requirements regarding the
development of transferred property may differentially burden bidders in
ways that work to the advantage of those seeking to retain the display.

390. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citations omitted).
City of Marshfield,203 F.3d at 492-93.
391.
392. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886. at *9 ("Although Appellees point to the fact that the land was
offered solely to the Eagles, that was also true in Marshfield, where the City of Marshfield did not
solicit alternative bids for the statue."); see also id. at *8 ("The desire to keep the Monument in place
cannot automatically be labeled a constitutional violation ....

The court in Marshfield approved the

sale when removal was an obvious option, so the Appellees' complaint ...is contrary to the holding
in Marshfield.").
393.
Supra note 390.
394. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *12 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
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(a) Preferential Content Restrictions
Unlike viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible in almost
all settings, viewpoint-neutral content discrimination 395 -while still
highly disfavored-is permissible under a wider range of circumstances,
largely depending on the forum-designation of the property in
question. 39696 For example, requiring that transferred property be used as a
war memorial may be a permissible content regulation provided that it is
viewpoint-neutral.39 7 However, restricting the content of expression on
transferred property in a way that facilitates the preservation of the
existing display must be subject to special scrutiny to assure that the sale
satisfies the neutrality requirements of the Establishment Clause.
The risk of apparent endorsement corresponds to how narrowly a
facilitating content restriction has been drawn. As less and less
alternative speech is permitted, the probability of preserving an endorsed
display likely will increase. For example, any content restriction that
limits expression on transferred property to the topic of religion, even if
that restriction is viewpoint neutral, must be scrutinized closely for
preferential effect--e.g., by considering whether, in the context of a
particular case, the restriction so narrows the field of potential purchasers
that those interested in preserving the display are clearly advantaged.398
Similarly, a war-memorial use restriction placed on transferred
property 399 often will not merely facilitate the continued display of a
challenged symbol but virtually restate the government's characterization
of the display itself.40 Such an exceedingly narrow and perfectly
tailored content restriction creates a very high risk, in both fact and
appearance, that government is merely seeking to achieve indirectly what
it no longer may accomplish openly. By contrast, broader restrictions,
such as limiting the use of property to "open space" or "public park"
purposes, permit a greater range of competing viewpoints and thus pose
far less of an endorsement risk.4° l

395. Amato v. Wilentz, 753 F. Supp. 543, 553 (D.N.J. 1990) ("Content refers to the topic or
matter treated in a particular work. Viewpoint refers to one's opinion, judgment or position on that
topic.").
396. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-47 (1983); Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 806.
397.
Cf. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132 ("Here, the City sought to sell the land atop Mt. Soledad for
the undeniably appropriate secular purpose of ensuring the presence of a war memorial on the site.").
398. Government would also have to articulate a sufficiently compelling rationale for such a
content-restriction that itself reflects no religious preference; the mere hope of preserving the existing display in its present location is not adequate. Supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
399.

See Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1127-28.

400. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1527-28; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1437-38; see, e.g., Separation of
Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 619-20; Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 14-15; Eckels, 589
F. Supp. at 233-35.
401.
City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490; cf Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *2 (Canby, J., concurring).
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The endorsing effect of any content restriction will turn on the
specific facts of the proposal, its articulated rationale, the historical and
factual context of the display at issue, and-once again-the subjective
sensibilities of the reviewing court. Unlike viewpoint discrimination,
which unambiguously advances the interest of one religious viewpoint
over others and thus can be comparatively assessed, the endorsing effect
of a facilitating content restriction cannot be determined by objective
comparison alone. Because at least some competing speech will enjoy
formally equal access, the court must make a subjective determination
whether the use of such "formally neutral criteria ''4 2 effectively favors
the endorsed display.4 3
The scant decisional law addressing this issue ignores its
significance. The only court yet to consider the question-the original
three-judge panel in Paulson-dismissed concerns regarding the
endorsing effect of a facilitating war-memorial use restriction on grounds
that the city permitted the participation of bidders who did not intend to
preserve the cross. 4 04 The fact that government does not expressly limit a
transaction to purchasers committed to preserving a symbol (and thus
does not engage in viewpoint discrimination), however, does not end the
inquiry. As Justice O'Connor stressed in Pinette, the endorsement test
requires that courts look beyond "the application of formally neutral
criteria" to ascertain more subtle preferential effects.4 °5 The Paulson
panel also cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in City of Marshfield in
support of its analysis, 4 6 yet that decision addressed the propriety of a
regulation permitting the use of transferred property for "public park
purposes" and thus had no occasion to assess the permissibility of a
content restriction that narrowly facilitates religious speech. 407 By
sanctioning the use of a narrow content restriction without any
meaningful scrutiny of its endorsing effect, the panel decision in Paulson
set virtually no limits on a remedial tactic that may significantly promote
endorsed religious expression.4° 8

402. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
403.
Once the court assures that a transaction does not in fact or appearance continue to promote religious speech, the remedial requirements of the Establishment Clause are met. The remaining questions regarding the permissibility of viewpoint-neutral content regulations in the context of a
remedial sale turn on principles arising under the Free Speech Clause-e g., the forum-designation
of the property at issue, the resulting standard of review, and the adequacy of government's articulated purpose in imposing a particular restriction.
404.
Paulson, 262 F.3d at 892.

405.
406.
407.

Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Paulson,262 F.3d at 892.
Ciry ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.

The endorsing effect of the content restriction considered in Paulson was exacerbated by
408.
the defendant's decision to assess, as part of its selection process, each bidder's expertise in maintaining war memorials. Appellant's Excerpts of the Record, Ex. 3 at 2, t 2-3, Paulson, 294 F.3d
1124 (No. 00-55406). This criterion significantly benefited the defendant's favored purchaser-an

organization that originally constructed the cross and had maintained it for the preceding half century. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1125-26. Because the number of other private entities with expertise in
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(b) Special Burdens Imposed on Competing Viewpoints
Another way in which the structure of a remedial sale may promote
endorsed religious expression is by imposing facially neutral obligations
regarding the development of the property that place a special burden on
purchasers intending to remove the display. As discussed previously, the
sale struck down by the en banc court in Paulson had this effect. 40 9 By
requiring that all purchasers maintain a war memorial, and by stipulating
that the existing cross would satisfy the use restriction, the transaction
imposed a unique burden on bidders seeking to display a non-Christian
memorial: they alone would be required to incur the substantial expense
of removing the cross and constructing an alternative memorial in its
place.4 10 This requirement gave purchasers seeking to preserve the
display an objective advantage, since they were not required to reserve
funds for construction and thus could submit a comparatively higher
bid.41 ' This preferential effect would not be difficult to remedy. If the
defendant offered to deliver the property with or without the religious
symbol, at the buyer's direction, and additionally offered any purchaser a
set amount of financial assistance to be used in the buyer's discretion to
either construct a new war memorial or improve the existing one, no
bidder would be comparatively disfavored.
The preferential effect highlighted in Paulsonis present even where
no affirmative development duty is imposed, to the extent that purchasers
opposed to an existing religious symbol must pay for its removal before
erecting an alternative display. In virtually any remedial sale where
property is transferred "as is," the transaction will thus disadvantage
bidders intending to use the property for competing expression.
However, there is a notable difference between the two scenarios. In the
former, government requires as a condition of purchase that bidders
agree to develop the property in a way that materially disadvantages
those opposed to the existing display. In the latter case, no bidder is
required by government to do anything with the property or to spend any
additional funds after its purchase. While competing speech is still
burdened, since only those purchasers opposed to the existing symbol
face the additional expense of its removal, government does not
coercively effectuate that bias by requiring the expenditure as a condition
of sale.
the arcane task of memorial maintenance is likely minute, this sale term effectively emptied the
universe of qualified competitors. The original three-judge panel dismissed this preferential effect

on grounds that, if the war-memorial use restriction itself was permissible, it was rational for the
defendant to seek purchasers with expertise in that undertaking. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 892-93. With
the gloss of this "expertise" inquiry, then, a facially neutral war-memorial use restriction was transformed into a powerful mechanism to bias the sale in favor of preserving an endorsed display. Id.
409. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
410. Id.; Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132-33.
411.
Id.
412. E.g., Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2.
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Despite the absence of explicit coercion, however, any sale
structured in this way still offends the neutrality principle. By requiring
purchasers to accept property with an affixed sectarian display,
government forces those opposed to the display to either acquiesce in
symbolic speech with which they disagree or to incur the expense of
removing the fixture. Both options place these purchasers at a
comparative disadvantage in promoting their own expressive agenda,
since they can only obtain the property on equal financial terms if they
agree to communicate a competitor's message. As a result, government
should be required to deliver the property with or without the religious
symbol, at the buyer's direction. In addition to eliminating a significant
preferential effect, this arrangement advances government's interest in
assuring that the symbols of private faith are treated with care and
respect. Rather than risk that a private purchaser will destroy a display in
a provocative fashion, government can remove the symbol in a dignified
manner and, if possible, preserve it for sale or transfer to a private
entity."'
While government thus should be required to remove a symbol if
the purchaser so directs, it should not be obliged to fund the construction
of an alternative display. While this, too, is a cost that purchasers
intending to preserve the symbol may avert, it is not one that must be
offset to affirm the neutrality interests at stake. Here, all purchasers
receive the property in a condition that does not offend any expressive
interest; it is delivered either with no expressive symbol or with a display
that the purchaser has sought to preserve. The purpose of the neutrality
requirement is not to equalize perfectly the size, grandeur, and economic
value of all private symbolic speech that may be communicated from a
transferred parcel, but instead to eliminate government's influence over
the prevailing private viewpoint. By agreeing to remove an unwanted
religious fixture from transferred land, government accomplishes that
objective.
(3) Procedural Transparency and the Prohibition Against
Reserved Discretion
In addition to these substantive neutrality requirements, a
permissible sale must be structured to assure that selection criteria are
applied in a fair, consistent, and objectively verifiable fashion. This
requirement, rooted both in free speech and endorsement principles,414
condemns any effort by government to retain significant discretion in
determining the prevailing bidder-for example, by reserving the right to
accept or deny bids without cause 415 or to rank purchase offers based on
unreviewable judgments regarding the aesthetic merit of competing plans
413.
414.
415.

See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 385; cf supra note 269.
See infra note 420.
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to develop the property.41 6 The only courts to consider such retained
discretion in the context of a remedial sale, however, have dismissed
these concerns and sanctioned the practice.
Among the basic principles governing the regulation of expressive
activity is the requirement of clear and neutral rules. 417

Whenever a

policy "allows for arbitrary application, it is not a valid time, place, and
manner regulation . .

.

.In the Establishment Clause context, such a

regulation also has the potential for impermissibly favoring a particular
religious viewpoint. ' 4 18 Reserving discretion to accept or reject purchase
offers without cause thus conflicts with core obligations imposed by both
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.4 9
In the recent remedial sales at issue in Kong and Paulson, however,
government defendants expressly reserved such authority in their bid
invitations. 420 The Ninth Circuit in Kong ignored the objection and
upheld the sale of the Mt. Davidson cross without addressing plaintiffs

argument. 42 1 In Paulson, both the district court and the original threejudge panel of the Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the objection.422

The panel decision in Paulson articulated three rationales for its
decision. First, the court characterized the constitutional principle as
applicable only in instances where a regulatory scheme contains no
standards whatsoever, and noted that "[s]uch truly absolute discretion
without any standards is clearly distinguished from the city council's
discretion here.' 4 23 Whether no criteria or hundreds are set forth,
however, a blanket reservation of discretion permitting the decisionmaker to disregard any or all of them should condemn the entire process.
Indeed, in City of Lakewood, the Supreme Court struck down a
regulatory scheme that contained numerous criteria on grounds that the
ordinance additionally reserved to the mayor discretion to impose "any
'other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable .... 24
As the Court stated, such a scheme is subject to challenge so long as it
416.
E.g., Appellee's Supplemental Excerpts of the Record, Ex. D at 29, Paulson, 294 F.3d
1124 (No. 00-55406); cf Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2001).
417. Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 384.
418.
Id. at 385.
419.
See, e.g., Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-59 (1988); Rosenbaum
v. City San Francisco, No. 00-15147, 2001 WL 406963, at *2-*3 (9th Cit. Apr. 19, 2001); United
States v. Linick, 195 F.3d 538, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1999); Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 384-86; Tokaji,
supra note 176, at 2441-44.
420.
See Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893; Appellants' Opening Brief, Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (No.
00-15261), available at 2000 WL 33986167; City Appellee's Brief, Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (No.
00-15261), available at 2000 WL 33986166.
421.
Kong,2001 WL 1020102, at*1-*2.
422. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893; Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 7 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 3, 2000).
The en banc panel that subsequently struck down the remedial sale did so on other grounds and thus
did not consider the question. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1133 n.7.
423.
Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
424.
City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 754 & n.2; see Plain Dealer Publ'g Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1141 (6th Cir. 1986) (text of ordinance).
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"gives a government official or agency substantialpower to discriminate
based on the content or viewpoint of speech. '' 25 The complete discretion
reserved by the bid solicitations in Kong and Paulson indisputably gave
the defendants such power.
The panel next excused the reserved discretion on grounds that it
appears in all of the government's bid invitations for the sale of real
property. 26 As discussed previously, however, remedial sales regulate
expressive activity as their primary, if not singular, objective, and thus
In such
are unlike nearly any other real estate transaction.42 7
circumstances, the foundational requirements of neutrality and clear rules
cannot be waived in favor of discretionary procedures used when selling
surplus lots. Likewise, the panel's suggestion that this fact demonstrated
government's non-censorial motivation fails to address the constitutional
428
is exercised in good faith,
whetheritsdiscretion
Irrespective
objection.
still of
prohibits
reservation.4 29
the First Amendment
Finally, the Paulson panel concluded that the reserved discretion
was justified by "the result of the process," which it claimed was
"consistent with the evaluated factors., '4 3 0 This analysis conflicts with
settled authority instructing that discretionary regulatory schemes should
be assessed without regard to outcome, precisely because "post hoc
rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to
determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression.",43 1 Thus the court in
American Jewish Congress struck down the regulatory decision at issue
without "determin[ing] the City's actual motivation in ruling on the
applications or the extent to which its determinations were based on
impermissible factors," because the discretionary scheme itself
condemned the outcome for purposes of the Establishment Clause.432
Justifications based on "the result of the process" also ignore the
potential chilling effect of retained discretion, which may deter other
bidders 3from even participating in a transaction and offering superior
terms.

425.

43

City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added).

426.
Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
427.
Supra notes 367-71 and accompanying text; see City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (requiring clear and definite standards where law has "a close enough nexus to expression ... to pose a

real and substantial threat of the identified censorship risks").
428. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
429. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757; Serv. Employee Int'l Union vs. City of Los Angeles,
114 F. Supp. 2d 966,974 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
430.
431.
432.

Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
City ofLakewood, 486 U.S. at 758; see Tokaji, supra note 176, at 2442.
Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 385-86.

433.
City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757 ("[Tlhe mere existence of the licensor's unfettered
discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own
speech .... ).
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It is exceedingly difficult in the typical case to determine whether
reserved discretion has chilled the involvement of other participants or
whether the defendant has utilized its power to select a purchaser based
on impermissible considerations. Precisely because objective judicial
review is nearly impossible, any sale containing such terms should be
struck down under the Free Speech Clause.4 34 With respect to the
endorsement inquiry, reserved discretion forecloses any objective
determination that religious preference played no role in the bid selection
and thus underscores the appearance that the sale was designed to
perpetuate endorsed religious speech.

The foregoing argument extends the logic of the endorsement
standard described in Part I to the remediation of the constitutional
violations discussed in Part II. The premise of the analysis is that the
objective observer not only must discern the constitutional violation but
also must arbitrate its remedy. Framing the remedial analysis from the
vantage of an essentially omniscient observer yields important insights.
Perceiving that government has subjectively endorsed a religious
message, the observer will skeptically assess any proposed remedy to
assure that it does not perpetuate government's established religious
preference. To survive such scrutiny and cure the disaffecting injury
inflicted on nonadherents by the display of sectarian symbols, a remedial
measure must accomplish two interrelated objectives: it must create
evident and substantial physical separation between government and the
display, either through removal of the symbol or sale of a sufficiently
substantial parcel of land underlying it; and it must do so through means
that are strictly neutral with respect to the religious message itself. As
set forth above, the courts that have considered this remedial question
have not yet developed a coherent jurisprudence that effectuates the
endorsement doctrine-and, in several instances, have sanctioned
remedies that directly conflict with its reasoning.
CONCLUSION

Describing a phenomenon that he calls the "remedial
substantiation ' 4353 of constitutional rights, Professor Levinson observes
that "the cash value of a right is often nothing more than what the courts
. . . will do if the right is violated. Consequently, rights can be
effectively enlarged, abridged, or eviscerated by expanding, contracting,
or eliminating remedies. ''436 By failing to reconcile the constitutional
proscription with its remedial consequences, the discordant analysis of
434.
stitutional
435.
436.

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (licensing scheme uncon"without narrow, objective, and definite standards").
Levinson, supra note 176, at 904-11.
Id. at 887.
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right and remedy described in this Article threatens to abridge the
constitutional prohibition against permanent religious displays on public
land and, in so doing, erode the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication
in this regard.
On one hand, application of the endorsement standard to the
question of constitutional liability has produced a coherent and welldeveloped body of decisional law that unambiguously condemns the
permanent display of religious imagery in all but a handful of
circumstances. These cases recognize the unremarkable fact that the
permanent integration of a religious message with the physical presence
of government itself will likely communicate to nonadherents that they
are political outsiders, in derogation of the core value protected by the
endorsement test.
By contrast, the remedial treatment of these violations is a
haphazard affair reflecting little or no effort to ground the inquiry in the
endorsement principles that define the right itself. Removal of an
offending symbol, which was the simple and indisputably effective
remedy in the typical case for many years, is increasingly bypassed in
favor of more elaborate proposals designed to avert the necessity of
displacing an unconstitutional display. These new remedies raise
important questions that the federal courts have yet to satisfactorily
address. The most troubling of the proposals-and the increasing
number of decisions sanctioning them-trivialize rather than substantiate
the constitutional right. By suggesting that litigation in this area is a
rhetorical exercise with scant consequences, these outcomes ironically
enhance the effect that the endorsement doctrine exists to preclude: the
political alienation of religious outsiders.
The framework proposed in this Article realigns the remedial
analysis with the judiciary's rigorous and consistent assessment of the
proscription itself. By tethering the inquiry to the perceptions of Justice
O'Connor's observer, the proposal seeks to vindicate the constitutional
right as a fully effectuated restraint on the use of civic space as a
permanent platform for symbolic religious expression.
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INTRODUCTION

The copyright axiom that creativity 2 is required for copyright validity is oft-times expressed, but has not been of great historic significance.
As a professor from the 1970s could have said, "Copyright requires creativity-it requires that the author create the work by the author's own
' 3
labor. Nothing more is required than not copying someone else's work.
Today, however, the copyright creativity standard is no longer as simple
as two complicating factors are evolving.4 From one side are questions
raised by new technology that can exercise, or at least simulate, creativity using artificial intelligence techniques negating the need for human
involvement in the work's creation. 5 For these works, although the
resulting work might be highly "creative," no human creative or
expressive acts were needed, thus raising the issue of whether a copyright subsists in the generated expression. 6 From the other side are questions raised by qualitatively insignificant, or at least legally insufficient,
human labors involved in the work's generation. In some cases, the invention of a new technology might have made the creation of a work
mechanical where formerly significant human creativity and labor would
have been required.7
2. As will become clear, a simple, appropriate definition of the word creativity does not
exist. See infra Section l1l.
3. See, e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN, JR., CASES ON COPYRIGHT 57-104 (3d
ed. 1978). See also Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and the Legislative
History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 549, 585 (1995) (discussing how the Supreme Court imposed a creativity standard that was not present in the 1976 Copyright Act).
4. The trends being discussed in this article were firmly recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). Before
Feist, several circuits recognized the "sweat of the brow" theory of creativity for the purposes of a
copyright. Jewelers' Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922); Leon
v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). This theory maintained that as long as the
author worked hard to produce the work, it contained sufficient creativity to be copyrighted. See
Jewelers' Circular,281 F. at 88; Leon, 91 F.2d at 486. Feistexpressly rejected this theory and held,
as a matter of constitutional law, that more creativity than that was required before a copyright
would subsist. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352.
5. See generally Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True CreatorPlease Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675 (1997) [hereinafter
Clifford, Creative Computer Program](discussing the copyrightability of expressive works created
using artificial intelligence techniques). Development of the computer techniques discussed in this
1997 article has continued apace. See John R. Koza, Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Streeter, Evolving Inventions, Sci. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52 (commenting that "computer programs that function via
Darwinian evolution are creating inventions that are novel and useful enough to be patented."). Cf
Lance Ulanoff, Cognitive Machines, P.C. MAG., July 2003, at 118 (describing progress in robotics
and self-aware machines).
6. See Clifford, Creative Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1695. Indeed, with a truly
creative computer program, the human cannot even claim to have originated the work. In many
ways, this serves to distinguish the topic of Clifford, Creative Computer Program,from the subject
of this paper. With a creative computer program, the human is not the author of the work, making
the issue of the quantum of creativity needed superfluous. In this paper, the concern is not with a
creative computer program that appears to be the author of a work; instead, the article will address
how to measure the characteristics of the work that the human created in order to establish whether
federal copyright protection is available.
7. See, e.g., Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 1-6
(S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998) (discussing computer generated bingo cards), affd, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th
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Consequently, although the resulting work might have once been
recognized as "creative," modem technology has made it seem unimaginative and potentially without a subsisting copyright. In other cases, the
work itself may have been produced without the expenditure of sufficient
creative effort even though significant physical labor may have been
exerted. 8 A copyright in these works no longer exists as they lack "creativity," as that copyright requirement was reinterpreted in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.9

This article explores the second type of expressive work, those
where there is a question if the author's contribution is qualitatively sufficient, to determine how much creativity and of what type is required to
sustain a copyright. 0 Initially, the historic standards of creativity used
before Feist was decided in 1991 will be presented. Then, after a brief
Cir. 1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831). Very typically, as was the case in Stuart, the generation of the work depends on a random number generator. A "random number generator" is a
computer program that can be used to generate a series of pseudorandom numbers. WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERsS 480 (5th ed. 1994).
These numbers are pseudorandom because it is generally impossible to establish that they
are "completely unpredictable" as would be the case for a true random number. Shawn Carlson,
Falling into Chaos, SC1. AM., Nov. 1999, at 120, 121. Further, the sequence of computer-generated
random numbers will repeat given a sufficiently long period of time. See George Marsaglia, Random
Number Generation in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1499 (Anthony Ralston et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2000) (describing random number generator algorithms and the difficulties in establishing
that they produce sufficiently random numbers).
8. These are the classic "sweat of the brow" cases where some circuits would have recognized a copyright. See Leon, 91 F.2d at 486; Jeweler's Circular,281 F. at 88. See also, Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1569 (1963); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990). The Supreme Court has now rejected the sweat of the
brow theory. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60 (finding white pages of a telephone book not protected by
copyright as they lack sufficient creativity).
Of course, historically, the quantity of human work necessary to produce the type of
alphabetized directory involved in Feist was very significant as it is extremely difficult for humans
to alphabetize a large list of names. It has only been the invention of the computer that makes the
creation of an ordered list seem insignificant and mundane. See generally, 3 DONALD E. KNUTH,
THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING (1973) (discussing the algorithmic complexity of placing
information into order). See infra Section Ml.A, discussing the consequences of increasing computerization on the copyrightability of works.
9. Compare Feist, 499 U.S. at 364 (disallowing a copyright in a directory) with Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("The least pretentious picture has more
originality in it than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted.") (emphasis added) (dictum). See also CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Canada, [20021 F.C. 187, 9I[ 44-48,
available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca187.html (describing the extra creativity
requirement under United States law and indicating that it is a departure from the English roots of
copyright law) (last visited Feb. 3, 2005), rev'd on other grounds, [2004] S.C.R. 339, available at
(last visited
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2004/voll/html/2004scrl_0339.html
Feb. 3, 2005).
Feist, itself, involved the copyrightability of the white pages in a telephone book. Feist,
499 U.S. at 342. Rural, the regulated telephone utility in the area, had produced its directory because
it was required to do so by law. Id. Feist had directly copied the list of names and phone numbers
contained in Rural's telephone book in order to produce its own, competing telephone book. Id. at
343. Both the district court and the court of appeals held the copyright valid and awarded judgment
to Rural. Id. at 344. The Supreme Court reversed on the issue of copyrightability. Id. at 364.
10. The author's analysis of the first type of work can be found in Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5.
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discussion of Feist, the scientific basis of creativity will be explored.
Next, the confusion regarding creativity that exists in the lower courts
will serve to expose the source of misapplication of the law-a disconnect between how courts perceive creativity and its physiological origins.
Finally, a new analytical approach of evaluating the presence of creativity will be suggested to refocus the Feistjurisprudence on its purpose and
to make it consistent with the reality of thought and ingenuity in the human brain.
I.

A.

THE HISTORIC COPYRIGHT CREATIVITY STANDARD

The Burrow-Giles Decision

The earliest important Supreme Court case to consider the question
of the needed creativity in a copyrighted work was Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. 11 In the case, Sarony alleged that the defendant
had infringed his copyright in a photograph he had produced of Oscar
Wilde by printing 85,000 lithographic copies.1 2 In response to the defendant's claim that photographs could not be copyrighted, the Court concluded that they were a writing of an author by holding:
An author in that sense is he to whom anything owes its origin; origi-

nator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature. So,
also, no one would now claim that the word "writing" in this clause
of the constitution, though the only word used as to subjects in regard
to which authors are to be secured, is limited to the actual script of
the author, and excludes books and all other printed matter. By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of those authors,
and congress very properly has declared these to include all forms of
writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by 13
which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression.
Contained within this early consideration of the nature of a copyrightable work are two key concepts. First, an author can be identified by
determining who was responsible for expressing the work in a physical
11.
111 U.S. 53 (1884). Although Burrow-Giles was the first case to consider copyright
creativity in depth, the Supreme Court had addressed the issue briefly five years earlier in The
Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). In those consolidated cases, the Court was requested to rule
on the constitutionality of the first trademark statute adopted by the Congress. See id. at 91-92. One
possible congressional power that had been exercised to adopt the statute was the Intellectual Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See id. at 93. [hereinafter I.P. Clause]. Concluding that
trademark legislation could not be sustained under the I.P. Clause, the Court held that "it is only
[writing] as are original,and are founded in the creative powers of the mind" that can be protected.
Id. at 94. The Court did not conclude that a trademark necessarily would not qualify under this
standard; instead, the Court pointed out that Congress had not required trademarks to be original in
order to qualify for a trademark. See id. Consequently, although indicating that there was a creativity standard associated with the I.P. Clause, the Court did little to explain it. A detailed consideration
of the case, therefore, does little to enhance an understanding of the copyright creativity standard.
12.
See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54.
13.
Id. at 57-58 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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form. 14 This aspect of copyright creativity will be termed "origin creativity." Second, an author can be identified as the individual who had at
least one idea that is expressed in the perceivable work.'" This process of
having a conception and reducing it to an articulation will be called "intellectual creativity."
This early standard of creativity expressed by the Court justifies the
conclusion that copyright law was far more concerned with origin creativity than with intellectual creativity. Although there must have been an
idea in the mind of the author, once this had been determined, no concern
was expressed about the mechanisms chosen by the author to reduce that
idea to expression. Additionally, once this idea is found, the Court
seemed unconcerned with the underlying ingenuity or complexity of the
idea. Consequently, the quantity of intellectual creativity needed, although existing, was clearly de minimis. If Burrow-Giles is applied to
the facts in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.16 for

example, one would conclude that the Feist directory was copyrightable.
First, all parties admitted that the white pages had been created by the
plaintiff, so the requirement of origin creativity is satisfied. 7 Similarly,
there was an idea in the minds of the corporate agents of the plaintiff,
producing an alphabetical directory of subscribers, which had been reduced to a physical expression.'" Therefore, these would satisfy the
minimal standards required by origin and intellectual creativity as defined by the Burrow-GilesCourt.
B.

The Bleistein Decision
The next important case for understanding the copyright creativity

standard, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., t 9 was decided in
14. See id. at 58 ("[Clongress very properly has declared [copyrightable writings] to include
all forms of writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression.").
15.
See id. ("[writings... include all forms of [expression] by which the ideas in the mind of
the author are given visible expression.").

16. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
17. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.
18. See id. at 363.
19.
188 U.S. 239 (1903). Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879) (denying a copyright to the
forms associated with a system of accounting) also could be considered to have addressed the
amount of creativity needed for a copyright. Certainly, that is how the Second Circuit used the case
in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). More accurately,

however, Baker should be seen as the Supreme Court's establishment of the idea-expression dichotomy and of the lack of copyrightability that results when the idea and the expression merge. The
Court stated:
There is no doubt that a work on the subject of book-keeping, though only explanatory of
well-known systems, may be the subject of a copyright; but, then, it is claimed only as a
book. Such a book may be explanatory either of old systems, or of an entirely new system; and, considered as a book, as the work of an author, conveying information on the

subject of book-keeping, and containing detailed explanations of the art, it may be a very
valuable acquisition to the practical knowledge of the community. But there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate. The mere
statement of the proposition is so evident, that it requires hardly any argument to support
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1903. In Bleistein, the Court again focused on the importance of origin
creativity and minimized the amount of intellectual creativity needed to
justify a copyright:
Others are free to copy the [source of a copyrighted picture]. They
are not free to copy the copy. The copy is the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man's alone. That something he20 may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.

The Court assumed that if a work has been produced by someone,
2
some aspect of that individual's personality would be reflected in it. 1
This minimal reflection of personality sufficiently evidences the intellectual creativity to support a copyright; indeed, the Court noted that even
the individual handwriting of the author would be enough.22 The Court
indicated that only a "modest grade of art' 23 was needed to satisfy the
intellectual creativity requirement of the Copyright Act with the mentioned examples indicating the extreme paltriness of the requisite.
Additionally, the Court was obviously concerned that allowing a
court or jury to evaluate the quantity or quality of intellectual creativity
contained in a work could defeat the primary purpose of the Copyright
Act to increase the amount of expression created.24 An evaluation of intellectual creativity could easily lead to a copyright system that encourages only expressions that appeal to those in the legal system. 25 In other
it. The same distinction may be predicated of every other art as well as that of bookkeeping. A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the
construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or chums; or on the mixture and application
of colors for painting or dyeing: or on the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect of
perspective, would be the subject of copyright; but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described
therein.
Baker, 101 U.S. at 101-02. Subsequently, triggering the development of the idea-expression merger
doctrine, the Court continued, "[the accounting system] is open and free to the use of the public.
And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as
incident to it." Id. at 104.
Now, the idea-expression dichotomy with its resulting merger doctrine have been codified. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal
system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.").
See generally Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality Standard
of Copyright, 33 ARtZ. ST. L.J. 791, 797-801 (2001) (discussing idea-expression dichotomy).
20. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
21.
ld. at 250.
22.
See id. ("[An author's work] expresses its singularity even in handwriting ....
23.
Id.
24. Id.
25.
See id. at 251-52.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
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words, the risk that the Court seemed to be avoiding was that allowing an
evaluation of the plenitude of intellectual creativity rather than only its
presence could too easily turn into an exercise in commercial or judicial
censorship.26
Consequently, the Court stressed that origin creativity was almost
sufficient in its own right to justify a copyright. Indeed, another's desire
to copy the work seemed to provide all of the evidence that intellectual
creativity was contained within the work, consequently sustaining its
copyright.2 7 Anything beyond origin creativity and extremely minimal
intellectual creativity was relegated to a role in determining the scope of
the copyright, not its validity.28
The lower courts appreciated the limited requirement of creativity
associated with a copyright:
Original in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular
work owes its origin to the author. No large measure of novelty is
necessary ....All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and
the statute is that the author contributed something more than a
merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own. Originality
in this context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.
No matter how
poor artistically the author's addition, it is enough if it
29
be his own.

So indeed, it is fair to conclude that the creativity requirement of the
Intellectual Property Clause 30 was perceived to require practically nothmost obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the
new language in which their author spoke ....At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value, it would be bold to
say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value, - and the taste of any public is
not to be treated with contempt.
Id.
The Court's concern is well founded. It is difficult to see how intellectual creativity can be
evaluated except in the context of the field the work addresses. See MIHALY CS1KSZENTMIHALYI,
CREATIVITY 27-29 (1996).
26. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252 ("That these pictures had their worth and their success is
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs' rights. We are of
opinion that there was evidence that the plaintiffs have rights entitled to the protection of the law.")
(citation omitted).
27. Compare id. (majority opinion) with id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
No evidence, aside from the deductions which are to be drawn from the prints themselves, was offered to show that these designs had any original artistic qualities. The jury
could not reasonably have found merit or value aside from the purely business object of
advertising a show, and the instruction to find for the defendant was not error.
Id.
28. See id. at 251 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The limited intellectual creativity] may be a
circumstance for the jury to consider in determining the extent of Mr. Wallace's rights, but it is not a
bar.").
29. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03 (quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
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ing in addition to origin creativity. Any variation that goes just beyond
the trivial was deemed sufficient to satisfy intellectual creativity.
I.

A.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STANDARD

Early Warning Signs

An early suggestion that the traditional, minimalist intellectual creativity requirement was no longer being blindly accepted by all of the
Justices occurred in Justice Douglas's dissent to the denial of certiorari in
Lee v. Runge31 in 1971. Justice Douglas examined the Intellectual Prop-

erty Clause of the Constitution 32 and expostulated that the requisite creativity required for a copyright should be at least as high as that required
for a patent.33 "No reason can be offered why we should depart from the
plain import of this grant of congressional power and apply more lenient
34
constitutional standards to copyrights than to patents." Indeed, Justice

Douglas's dissent suggested that the standard for copyright creativity
should be higher than that required of a patent,35 particularly when the
conflict he perceived between the copyright power and the First
Amendment was considered.36

Although this desire to reexamine the standard of copyrightability
appears to occur suddenly without any prior substantial judicial activity
in the area, its timing can be appreciated as reflecting the changes occurring in the societal importance of copyright at the time the Lee case was
presented to the Court in the early 1970s. 37 The original minimalist intel404 U.S. 887 (1971) (denying cert.) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31.
8.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
Lee, 404 U.S. at 889-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33.
34. Id. at 890 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Justice Douglas explained his understanding of the patent standards as follows:
35.
Patents which did not serve the broad goals of furthering scientific advancement and bettering the lot of mankind have been held invalid because they lacked utility, did no more
than combine existing inventions, were obvious to someone schooled in the art, or sought
to monopolize ideas within the public domain. It is not obvious that respondent's system
of facial exercises was patentable under these standards. It arguably amounted to nothing
more than an application of existing knowledge based upon sources available to all men.
We have repeatedly held that patents so devoid of novelty were invalid. To create a monopoly under the copyright power which would not be available under the patent power
would be to betray the common birthright of all men at the altar of hollow fomalisms.
Id. at 891 (Douglas, ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
36. See id. at 893 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The arena of public debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright his
speeches or a philosopher his treatises and thus obtain a monopoly on the ideas they contained. We should not construe the copyright laws to conflict so patently with the values
that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
Id.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright:A Study of Copyright in Books,
37.
Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970) (discussing a change in copyright materials, such as computer programs, and the change in copyrighted material reproduction
technology, such as copiers). Indeed, the Supreme Court would find itself deeply involved in the
debate over the proper intellectual property treatment of computer technology throughout the 1970s.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972); Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978).
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lectual creativity standard had developed when the primary work protected by copyright was a book or other expression created by placing
ink on a paper substrate. This technology made reproduction of the work
difficult. During this era, while it might be expensive, or at least labor
intensive, to create a copyrighted work, it was far more expensive to reproduce the work itself.3s By the 1970s, however, duplication costs had
started to decrease dramatically, first because of the photocopier but,
ultimately, and far more significantly, because of the computer.39 Consequently, where earlier the intellectual creativity expressed within a work
could be considered of comparatively minor import as it contributed less
significantly to the expense of generating the work than the difficulties of
reproduction did, by the time the Lee case was decided, the costs of reproduction were declining, 40 and would continue to decrease precipitously, 4' thus increasing the economic import of the intellectual creativity
in the work.
Further, without belittling the importance these earlier works had to
the development of society and intellection, they were not as pivotal to
the economy as many copyrighted expressions are today. It is hard to
imagine, now, how our society would be able to operate without the use
of massive computer systems, the software for which is within the ambit
of copyright. 42 For both of these reasons, the requirement of greater intellectual creativity for copyright, foreseen by Justice Douglas in Lee, ultimately became doctrine in Feist.

38. See Breyer, supra note 37, at 295 (approximately 85% of a publisher's costs of producing
a book come from non-royalty associated expenses).
39. Cf A.J. Meadows, Economic and Social Factors, in THE FUTURE OF THE PRINTED WORD
149, 151 (Philip Hills ed., 1980) (number of lines of type that could be set was fairly constant
through about 1950, but has "shot up" since then); Shirley Homer, About Books, N.Y. TIMES, July

23, 1989, § 12NJ, at 19.
40.
Photocopying was a significantly less expensive method of reproduction than typesetting.
The labor required by photocopying was comparatively insignificant in quantity and, as importantly,
could be performed by comparatively unskilled individuals. Once computer technology started
being used to reproduce copyrighted works, much of the cost of typesetting disappeared. See generally OLDRICH STANDERA, THE ELECTRONIC ERA OF PUBLISHING 235-37 (Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 1987) (describing the increasing role of and decreasing costs from computer technology).
41.
Once digitized, the cost of reproduction, often with the same quality as the original, becomes not much more than the cost of the medium upon which the work is recorded. Today, with the
Internet, the cost of the medium is, effectively, zero. See The Internet Society-A Fine Balance, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 2003, 2003 WL 6244750, at http://www.economist.comlopinion/
displayStory.cfmstory-id=1534271(last visited Feb. 5, 2005). Consequently, where formerly the
costs of reproduction were the most significant component of distributing a copyrighted work to the
public, today, the cost of intellectual creation transcends other expenses.

42.

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining computer program). See also RAYMOND T.

NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1:1 (3d ed. 2003) ("Since the 1980s, copyright
law has been a major form of protection and property rights for computer programs, databases,
software technology ... ").
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The Feist Decision

43
In Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. decided
45
4
in 1991, an effectively unanimous Supreme Court altered the amount
of intellectual creativity that must be found for a work to be copyrightable by determining that the white pages of a telephone book did not
qualify. 46 The Court stated:

To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the
author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no
matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be. Originality does
not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the re47
sult of copying.
The necessary quantum of intellectual creativity under Feist seems
significantly different than the Court's earlier elaboration of the standard
48
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. While all Bleistein required was that the work contain enough creative expression that someone else desired to copy it,4 9 now the work must "possess some creative
the Court provided no clear guidance on what a
spark. 50 Unfortunately,
"creative spark" is.5 ' How, then, are we to evaluate the quantity of intel43. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
44. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but did not write an opinion to explain why
he did not join the opinion of the Court signed by the other eight Justices. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 341.
45. See supra note 9.
46. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
47. Id. at 345 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
48.
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
See id. at 345-46. Professor Woodmansee argues the notion of a "creative spark" underly51.
ing a copyrighted expression is a "romantic" concept owing its origin to European culture of the
nineteenth century. Martha Woodmansee, Response to David Nimmer, 38 HoUS. L. REV. 231, 231
(2001). She argues:
The conclusion that my discipline has reached over the past thirty years is that the
distinction ["between 'sweat of the brow' and truly creative 'authorial' works"] is specious-that it is arbitrary and frequently a source of serious harm. Empirical research into
the nature of composition, and creative production generally, has shown that we are always already cutting and pasting; and historical research has shown that the inclination to
represent some creative productions as somehow more truly creative is rather recent. Not
until the end of the eighteenth century do we find poets, publishers, and parliamentarians
insisting on the originality of (some) creative work. The impetus for this Romantic
(mis)representation of creative activity was the expansion-the first big expansion-in
the market for printed books. In an effort to achieve visibility in a growing sea of printed
matter, creative producers began to insist on the originality of their work: "My work is
innovative; yours is merely hackwork."
Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted).
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lectual creativity contained within a work; indeed, how are we to recognize intellectual creativity when we see it?
Unfortunately, upon dissection, the Feist decision fails to answer
this basic question; indeed, the Court provides contradictory statements
about the nature of the creativity needed. The Court's description of the
intellectual creativity requisite indicated expressly that novelty was not
required. 52 Two works, identical by happenstance, were each to remain
copyrightable. Further, as long as there was at least a "crude, humble or
obvious" element of creativity within the work, a copyright would subsist. 53 The problem with this expression as guidance on the standard of
minimal copyright creativity is that the work before the Court in Feist,in
fact, had a humble and obvious element of creativity in it, at least under
the law as it was understood before Feist. The idea of listing customers
in alphabetic order, although not characterizable as brilliant, is touched
with some creativity of the most obvious kind. "Obvious," after all,
means something that is "easily seen, recognized, or understood; open to
view or knowledge; evident [or] lacking in subtlety. 5 4 Listing names in
alphabetical order unequivocally satisfies this definition. Consequently,
the Court must have meant something more than its stated "crude, humble or obvious" element analysis would suggest.
The confusion between the Court's expression of a new copyright
intellectual creativity standard and the application of it becomes even
more apparent later in the opinion. The Court indicated that the white
pages in question were uncopyrightable as they were "entirely typical. 55
Because being typical suggests lacking novelty,5 6 the Court therefore
implicitly rejected the copyright in the white pages because of its lack of
novelty.57 This conclusion directly contradicts the Court's earlier statements that expressly indicated that novelty was not required.58 This, then,

Those that see creativity as the Supreme Court did in Feisthave been termed "inspirationalists." Ben Shneiderman, Creating 7: User Interfaces for Supporting Innovation, 7 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUMAN INTERAcTION 114, 116 (Mar. 2000). Inspirationalists view
creativity as "a dramatic breakthrough [that] magically appears." Id. The Court seems to have a

history of seeing creativity as an inspirationalist. See Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (invention must be based on a "flash of creative genius").
52. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. "Novel" is defined as "of a new kind; different from anything
seen or known before." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1327 (2d ed. 1993).
53.
54.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1339 (2d ed. 1993).

55. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
56. Compare RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2046 (2d ed. 1993) ("Typical" is
defined as: "of the nature of or serving as a type or representative specimen") with id. at 1327
("Novel" is defined as: "of a new kind; different from anything seen or known before").
57. See Feist,499 U.S. at 362.
58.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The Court continued in this vein when it stated,

"[T]here is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course." Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. In other words, the white pages lack creativity because everyone else does it that way.
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raises the core question: What is "creativity" and how can the courts recognize it?
111.

WHAT IS CREATIVITY, ANYWAY?

As the Court has transformed the understanding of the term "creativity" in copyright law, using the term in such phrases as "creative
spark" 59 indicating that more than origin creativity is needed, an under6°
standing of human-based artistic or intellectual creativity becomes
mandatory. There is no singular definition of this type of creativity, however. 6 Therefore, before undertaking an analysis of the copyright requisite, it is necessary to examine the various meanings of creativity to determine what subset of them constitute the relevant group for copyright
law. As the Court's reference to creativity seems to demand a determination that there is sufficient human-based creativity associated with the
work,62 the two disciplines that are most apropos for deriving the Court's
As a practical matter, it is hard to imagine what the intellectual creativity requirement can
mean if novelty is not a significant factor to be examined in the analysis. See Robert J. Sternberg,
The Creativity Paradox: Why Everyone and No One Seems to Appreciate Creative Work, 30 APA
MONITOR ONLINE, Nov. 1999, at http://www.apa.org/monitor/nov99/scispeak.html ("A creative idea
is one that is novel and good.") (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
59. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
60. See 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 544 (1993) ("Having the quality
of creating; able to create; of or pertaining to creation, spec. inventive, imaginative, showing imagination as well as routine skill; intended to stimulate the imagination.").
See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI supra note 25, at 25 ("The problem is that the term 'creativity' as
61.
commonly used covers too much ground. It refers to very different entities, thus causing a great deal
of confusion."). See also DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, GENIUS AND CREATIVITY: SELECTED PAPERS 263
(1997) (discussing why some works are considered "more famous" than others); DAVID JONES,
CREATIVITY 1 (1984) ("There is little agreement amongst researchers about the nature of creativity;
the topic is approached from a wide range of differing psychological and philosophical perspectives.
There is not even agreement about how creativity can be identified"); JAMES FREEMAN ET AL.,
CREATIVITY-A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF RESEARCH 2 (2d ed. 1971) ("Current views on the nature of
creativity differ widely and cannot easily be separated from views on intelligence and intelligence
testing, the assessment of special aptitudes and abilities, learning theory, personality theory, and the
psychology of thinking.").
Even a dictionary lists multiple definitions that express different aspects of creativity.
Compare RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1993) (defining "creative" and
"creativity" as including the "state" of being creative, the ability to be creative, and the results of
having been creative), with 1THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 544 (1993) (defining "creative" as "1. Having the quality of creating; able to create; of or pertaining to creation, spec.
inventive, imaginative, showing imagination as well as routine skill; intended to stimulate the imagination. 2. Productive.").
Professor Shneiderman divides the description of creativity into three camps of scholars.
The first are the "inspirationalists" who see creativity as occurring dramatically and suddenly. See
Shneiderman supranote 51, at 116. Second are the "structuralists" who describe creativity as a more
iterative approach where the current body of thought is restructured into a new work. See id. at 11617. The final group are the "situationalists" who approach creativity as socially triggered and being
ultimately the result of a value judgment made by the idea's originator's peers. See id. at 117.
62. At this stage of the argument, it is necessary to assume that human creativity exists.
Whether this is true is subject to some scientific and philosophic debate. See DOUGLAS R.
HOFSTADTER & DANIEL C. DENNE'rr, THE MIND'S I 283"(Bantam ed. 1982).
Not only does our conscious minds activity create permanent side effects at the neural
level; the inverse holds too: Our conscious thoughts seem to come bubbling up from subterranean caverns of our mind, images flood into our minds eye without our having any
idea where they came from! Yet when we publish them, we expect that we-not our sub-
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meaning are human psychology and neurobiology,6 3 although some of
the work of computer scientists working with artificial intelligence adds
to the understanding. 64 Both primary fields have actively studied creativity, attempting to establish its scientific basis.
Indeed, the recent study of creativity by psychologists provides
highly compelling analytical tools with which to begin a cogent analysis
of copyright creativity. Researchers have split the consideration of creativity into four separate studies: "(1) the creative process, (2) the creative
product, (3) the creative person, and (4) the creative situation.",6' In addressing copyrights and whether sufficient intellectual creativity is con66
tained within the work, the primary focus should be on the product,
67
although the process used to produce the work is also relevant.' The
other two aspects of creativity are not relevant, as copyright law should
not care about how creative the individual who created the work was in
general as long as the copyrighted work was touched with sufficient intellectual creativity. After all, brilliant works have been produced by

conscious structures-will get credit for our thoughts. This dichotomy of the creative self
into a conscious part and an unconscious part is one of the most disturbing aspects of trying to understand the mind. If-as was just asserted-our best ideas come burbling up as
if from mysterious underground springs, then who really are we? Where does the creative
spirit really reside? Is it by an act of will that we create, or are we just automata made out
of biological hardware, from birth until death fooling ourselves through idle chatter into
thinking that we have 'free will'? If we are fooling ourselves about all these matters, then
whom-or what-are we fooling?
Id.

63.
A typical first source, legal opinions defining creativity, does not prove fruitful. As was
the case in Feist, the opinions either do not attempt to define the term, see Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am.
Games, Inc., No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 1-6 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1347
(8th Cir. 1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831), or define it on a "we will recognize it when we
see it" basis, see Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[creativity] simply
means a work independently created by its author, one not copied from pre-existing works, and a
work that comes from the exercise of the creative powers of the author's mind, in other words, the
fruits of the author's intellectual labor." (quotation marks and citations omitted)). The Boisson
court's definition of creativity is no more than saying, "creativity is creative."
64. See generally Deborah K. Smith, David B. Paradice, & Steven M. Smith, Prepare Your
Mindfor Creativity, 43 COMM. OF THE ACM 110, 111 (July 2000); Linda Candy & Ernest Edmonds,
Introducing Creativity to Cognition, CREATIVITY & COGNITION 3 (1999).
65.
Donald W. MacKinnon, Creativity: A Multi-faceted Phenomenon, in CREATIVITY: A
DIscUSSION AT THE NOBEL CONFERENCE 17, 19 (John D. Roslansky ed., 1970).

66. "Anything that is experienced or made by man... may be a creative product." Id. at 24.
67. The description of a creative process is more complicated than of a creative product,
containing a series of steps that lead from a perceived problem to a solution-"a complex set of
cognitive and motivational processes, and emotional processes too, that are involved in perceiving,
remembering, imagining, appreciating, thinking, planning, deciding, and the like." Id. at 20-21.
68. There is an indication in Feist that the Court was concerned with both of these aspects of
creativity:
[Burrow-Giles] described copyright as being limited to 'original intellectual conceptions
of the author,' and stressed the importance of requiring an author who accuses another of
infringement to prove 'the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception.' The originality requirement articulated in ...BurrowGiles remains the touchstone of copyright protection today.
Feist, 499 U.S. at346-47 (internal citations omitted).
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authors who never created any others.69 The law should be interested in
how the work was generated, not in any inherent characteristics of the
author's personality. Similarly, being in a creative situation is irrelevant
to evaluating whether an expression satisfies the intellectual creativity
requirement of the law as, again, it is the results that are important. For
example, although many institutions of higher education have established
highly creative environments in which to work, 0 this does not mean that
a telephone directory created at one of these institutions is copyrightable. 7 Accordingly, the analysis for copyright purposes should be focused on the product and the way it was produced.
A product can be creative in its own right. Most people who examine a painting by Monet, read a play by Shakespeare, or listen to a symphony by Beethoven would describe the work as creative without any
concern as to how the work was generated. Therefore, it would be possible for the law to only concern itself with the product. However, there is
a potential problem with so narrow an analysis. If only the product is
examined with no examination of methodology of production, it will
prove impossible to separate human-generated creative works from those
generated by sophisticated computer programs based on autonomous
artificial intelligence techniques.72 For these latter works, it would not
only be difficult to establish a requisite amount of intellectual creativity,
it would be impossible to establish origin creativity.73 Consequently, a
combination of techniques is needed: a creative product is apparently
in the product must be the result of a humanrequired, but the creativity
74
based creative process.

See, e.g., HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (winner of the Pulitzer Prize for
69.
Fiction in 1961). As far as anyone knows, Ms. Lee has not produced another work. See Other Work
by Harper Lee, available at http://mockingbird.chebucto.org/otherwork.htmI (last modified May 25,
2000). Of course, the same was thought of Mr. Toole's great work on New Orleans, A Confederacy
of Dunces. JOHN KENNEDY TOOLE, A CONFEDERACY OF DUNCES (1980). The book was published
posthumously after the author committed suicide at the age of thirty-one and also was a Pulitzer
Prize winning work. For years, this appeared to be Mr. Toole's only work, but in 1989 an additional
novel, THE NEON BIBLE, was published.
Simple measurements of this are the quantity and quality of the academic work done by
70.
the faculty of the institution and the degree of success alumni of the institution have.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
71.
Autonomous artificial intelligence requires the creation of a computer program that is
72.
"artificially intelligent" by being capable of producing new expressive works. Clifford, Creative
Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1677-80. Further, the program must be "autonomous" allowing
it to operate without requiring the programmer to specify, or even understand, how to generate the
new work. See id. at 1694 & n.124. For example, the program described in Creative Computer
Programwas able to generate novel musical compositions despite the fact that its creator could not.
Id.
See Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5, at 1694-95; See generally
73.
DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAtD 606-09 (1979)
(discussing philosophical rights to claim authorship between an "author" and a "meta-author" where
the author is the creative computer program and the meta-author is the creator of the computer
program).
This does not mean that the product must necessarily be completely created by human
74.
labor. The use of mechanical assistance to produce the work has long been acceptable. Writers have
their typewriters (or now computers); painters have their brushes (or now computers) and musicians
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In an examination of the creative process, Professor Csikszentmihalyi's description serves as a useful starting point:
The creative process has traditionally been described as taking five
steps. The first is a period of preparation, becoming immersed, consciously or not, in a set of problematic issues that are interesting and
arouse curiosity ....The second phase of the creative process is a
period of incubation, during which ideas churn around below the
threshold of consciousness ....The third component of the creative
process is insight, sometimes called the "Aha!" moment ...The
fourth component is evaluation, when the person must decide
whether the insight is valuable and worth pursuing ....The fifth and
last component of the process is elaboration ....[T]his classical analytic framework leading from preparation to elaboration gives a severely distorted picture of the creative process [as it] is less linear
than recursive. 75
Professor Csikszentmihalyi's conclusion that the process is not linear is important. The various steps of creativity occur simultaneously.
Specifically, "We often talk of our mental activities as being subdivided
among sensing, thinking, and acting phases. But trouble arises because
few things happen at one point in time and space. All of the interesting
actions in the brain involve spatiotemporal patterns of cellular activity
,,76

However, his description of the process as "recursive" is too limiting to be fully accurate. Recursive systems are comprised of a linear approach to a problem that is repeated multiple times on the same subject.77
For example, the process of writing often becomes recursive as it enters
the editing stage. What was written is examined and changed to more
accurately set forth the thoughts of the author. Then, the edited version is
re-edited recursively until the author is satisfied with the results. This
iterative approach of taking an object that is the result of a particular
process and reapplying the same process to it makes the approach recursive.

have their violins (or now computers), all without adversely affecting the copyrightability of the
work they produce. It is only where the computer replaces the human's creativity that the existence
of a copyright becomes questionable. See Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5, at
1686-87.
75. CsiKszENTMIHALyI, supra note 25, at 79-80. Professor Csikszentmihalyi's definitional
approach to a creative process is quite similar to the five part definition provided by Professor
MacKinnon. Compare id. with MacKinnon, supra note 65, at 20.
76. WLLIAM H. CALvIN, How BRAINS THINK 43 (1996) [hereinafter CALVIN I].
77. See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1614 (2d ed. 1993) ("pertaining to or
using a rule or procedure that can be applied repeatedly"). See generally John McCarthy, Recursion,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1507-09 (Anthony Ralston et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000)
(describing mathematical and computer-based recursive functions and how they work).
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While this recursive reworking of an expression is not irrelevant to
the ultimate work's creativity, it misses a very important aspect of it;
indeed, the aspect of it most associated with a "creative spark", Professor
Csikszentmihalyi's "Aha! moment." 79 It is becoming increasingly clear
that the moment of inspiration that underlies intellectual creativity cannot
be linear or even just recursive. 80 Think, for a moment, of the slang term
"couch potato" for someone who watches too much television.81 While
many individuals may sit on a couch to watch television, a direct connection to the word "potato" does not exist. When the term was coined 82 it
seems impossible that any formulaic and deterministic transformation
resulted in the two words being combined. Likewise, there does not seem
to be any process that could be applied and then reapplied to the words,
or the concepts, "couch" and "potato" that would transform them into the
modem slang term for an obsessive television watcher. Something more
is needed or, to be more accurate, something less is required.
There is increasing scientific evidence that chance is the primary
source for novel thoughts. 83 As Professor Calvin describes it,84 creative85
be generated in a process that starts with chance, noise,
thoughts can
or an error 86 within the brain.

78. As Willa Cather reportedly said, "It is not the writing but the rewriting that counts." Elsie
Goth Marshall, 1936: Red Cloud, THE NEBRASKA ALUMNUS (1936), available at
http://www.unl.edu/Catherlworks/nonfiction/bohlke/interviewsl1936.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
79.
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 25, at 79-80. Itis also important to recognize that the
"aha! moment" may be of very low significance. Many ideas recognized as creative by the scientific
community will be significantly less than a theory that unifies physics. See Lawrence W. Barsalou &
Jesse J. Prinz, Mundane Creativity in Perceptual Symbol Systems, in CREATIVE THOUGHT 267
(Thomas B. Ward et al., eds. 1997) (describing the type of creativity that underlies everyday activities); Smith, supra note 64, at 111-12 & figures I& 2 (providing descriptions and examples of the
continuum of creativity).
80. See CALVIN I, supra note 76, at 29 ("[Situdies of chaos and complexity have been teach").Cf JAMES H. AUSTIN, CHASE, CHANCE, AND
ing us [that] determinism is really a nonissue ....
CREATIVITY: THE LUCKY ART OF NOVELTY 69 (MIT Press ed. 2003) ("[Slerendipity [results from]
").
unexpected good luck, as the result of accident and sagacity ....
81. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 460 (2d ed. 1993). To understand why the
author chose this term as an example, cf Paul Thagard, Coherent and Creative Combinations, in
THOMAS B. WARD, ET AL., CREATIVE THOUGHT 138-39 (1997) (describing the author's first expo-

sure to the term "web potato"). Although Thagard's article addresses how we understand, rather than
create, novel expressions, itnevertheless provides an excellent example to consider the nondeterministic way our minds generate new thoughts.
82. The 1976 creation of the term is attributed to Robert Armstrong, a cartoonist, who also
illustrated. JACK MINGO, THE OFFICIAL COUCH POTATO HANDBOOK (1983). See
http://www.sjvls.orglcgi-binlbens_02/100455 (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
83. See WILLIAM H. CALVIN, THE CEREBRAL CODE 21 (1996) [hereinafter CALVIN 11]
(among the six "essential aspects" of creativity are that "[v]ariant patterns ... be produced by
chance.").
84. Id.
at 66 (the "pitter-patter of inputs" from outside of the brain can change the brain's
85. Cf id.
response). To a limited extent, taking advantage of noise to generate creative ideas has been con-

firmed. An artificial intelligence researcher named Stephen Thaler used noise to cause a neural
network of computers to produce novel designs for such things as automobiles. See Stephen Thaler,
Neural Nets that Createand Discover, PC AL May-June 1996, at16-18.
86. Cf CALVIN 1,supra note 83, at 100 (noting that creative thoughts require "relaxing error
correction" to ideas being formed).
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Our more intelligent mental states are sometimes said to flirt around
the "edge of chaos." This term is from complexity theory, which en-

visages an adaptive system that ranges between a rigid order and a
more flexible disorder, controlling the degree of permitted disorder.
We may range from satisfaction at getting something right (convergent thinking) to blue-sky divergent thinking; in those more creative
moments, some of our cortical systems may be poised near the edge
87
of chaos.

When described as being near the edge of chaos or chaotic, a reference is being made to the scientific and mathematic theory of chaos that

was first postulated in the late twentieth century. 88 The theory establishes
that complex deterministic systems, those labyrinthine systems where the
output is controlled by the input, 89 can generate patterns that appear random despite their deterministic nature. 9° To be considered complex under the theory, the system must be sensitive to the initial conditions affecting the system 9' and subject to feedback where the current status of
the system serves as one of the inputs that controls its next status. 92 For
example, consider an avalanche. The inputs for an avalanche include the
quantity of accumulated snow flakes, the topology of the particular
mountain slope, the vegetation on the mountain, the current weather pattern, and a perturbing event such as a loud sound, an extreme skier, or
even one more snow flake. 9 3 Avalanches are sensitive to these starting

conditions-without snow, for example, no avalanche will occur. The
primary feedback affecting the system is the quantity and quality of snow
already on the mountain. Although the inputs are understood, knowing
exactly when an avalanche will occur is impossible.) 4 Sometimes, one
extra snow flake will cause an avalanche while other times it will not,
even where all of the other initial conditions on the mountain appear to
be the same.95 Thus, avalanche occurrences can be described as chaotic.

87.

Id. at 67.

88.
Tony Crilly, The Roots of Chaos--a BriefGuide, in FRACrALS AND CHAOS 193, 193 (A.J.
Crilly et al. eds., 1991).
89.
See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 542 (2d ed. 1993) ("determinism" de-

scribes the theory that "all events.., have sufficient cause.").
90. Crilly, supra note 88, at 195. See Mike King, The New Metaphysics and the Deep Structure of Creativity and Cognition, in CREATIVITY & COGNITION 93, 95 (1999).
91.
Crilly, supra note 88, at 196-97.
An essential hallmark of chaos ... is the extreme sensitivity of the system to initial conditions .... [This] is popularly known as the 'butterfly effect,' because the single flap of

a butterfly's wings would theoretically alter the initial conditions of a ...
could thus give rise to drastically different... patterns at a later time.

system and

Id.
92.
JOHN BIGGS, FRACTALS: THE PATrERNS OF CHAOS 19 (1992).
93.
See National Snow & Ice Data Center, Avalanche Awareness
http://nsidc.org/snow/avalanche/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).

94.
95.

5 (Dec. 22, 2002),

Cf id. [ 9 (defining a sliding scale of input factors that increase the risk of avalanche).
See BIGGS, supra note 92, at 18 (Chaotic systems "exhibit[] an extreme sensitivity to their

initial conditions. The very slight difference in their starting points [make] a very large difference in

their fates.").
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While a fundamental characteristic of chaos is unpredictability, this
within a domain that is known as the system's
uncertainty will occur
"strange attractor." 96 Although a chaotic system is "unpredictable in de97
tail, one can predict the patterns and ranges of a system's movement.
For example, it may be unpredictable with any certainty when an avalanche will occur, but there is an outside boundary of conditions where
the probability of an avalanche becomes certain. If there is too much
snow and the mountain slope is too steep, an avalanche will occur although it may be impossible to predict exactly when. This pattern of
where the system's conditions will trigger the chaotic event is called its
strange attractor. 98 Understanding the strange attractor associated with a
chaotic system is highly advantageous as it sets forth the system's outermost limits and can be used to make predictions about the system's behavior. 99 In other words, the system's strange attractor makes it possible
to understand globally what is impossible to predict locally.
Suggesting that the brain's chaotic nature is a-or even the-source
of human creativity is increasingly common.t00 Like an avalanche, the
brain is a complex system that is sensitive to its environment and is subject to feedback. There are an estimated 100 billion neurons in a human
brain,' 0 ' each of which connects to between 1,000 and 10,000 others.' 0 2
This gives a total of approximately 1.0 x 1080 different paths for a signal
to follow though the brain.' 0 3 The brain perceives its environment
through the five systems of sensory apparatuses-hearing, taste, smell,
vision and touch--each of which is itself complex.1°4 The use of feedback within the brain has been recognized' 0 5 and is easily demonstrated.
Consider a person who is on a diet. His or her brain receives a signal
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

Crilly, supra note 88, at 200-02.
BIGGS, supra note 92, at 18, 21.
Crilly, supra note 88, at 200.
See id. at 202.
See, CALVIN 11,supra note 83, at 21 (the "six essential aspects of the creative darwinian

(sic) process [include that vlariant patterns must sometimes be produced by chance."). See also,
Henry Krystal & Andrew D. Krystal, Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience in Relationship to Dreams
and Creative, in CREATIVrITY AND AFFECr 185, 196 (Melvin P. Shaw & Mark A. Runco eds., 1994)

("One critical feature of any model of creativity is the ability to generate novel behavior. As we shall
see below, 'chaotic,' nonlinear systems are capable of generating novel, unpredictable behavior and
are, therefore, useful models of creativity."). Cf CALVIN I, supra note 76, at 29 ("[A]s studies of
chaos and complexity have been teaching us, determinism is really a nonissue.").
101.
Sci. Am. Frontiers, Changing Your Mind (Dec. 22, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org
/saf/ 110 /teachinglteaching2.htm [hereinafter Changing Your Mind] (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). If, as
current research indicates, the Glial cells also play an important role in the thought process, the

number of involved cells would grow to almost ten times this number. See R. Douglas Fields, The
Other Half of the Brain, SCI. AM., Apr. 2004, at 55.
Brain Facts & Figures (Dec. 22, 2002), available at http://faculty.washingon.eduichudler
102.
/facts.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Brain Facts & Figures].
Changing Your Mind, supra note 101.
103.
104.
See Brain Facts & Figures, supra note 102 (indicating that approximately 100,000,000
neurons are in the auditory cortex and about 538,000,000 neurons are in the visual cortex) (last

visited Feb. 5, 2005). Along with the external senses, the brain receives internal signals about the
body's condition, e.g., hunger.
See CALVIN I, supra note 76, at 126 (describing "round-trip[s]" of neural signals).
105.
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from the body indicating hunger.' °6 The brain's first response is to obtain
some food. This first thought, though, is reprocessed (if the diet is successful) and rejected, as satisfying the hunger will interfere with the diet.
The reprocessing is a form of feedback as one thought triggers another.
Given inputs, complexity, and feedback, chaos is the result.' 07 Thus,
understanding intellectual creativity requires it to be considered against
the background of chaos. Intellectual creativity may represent nothing
more than the brain taking advantage of its own static.
How the brain functions despite the environment of chaos requires
consideration of how a thought is generated within the brain. It is fairly
08
well established that different neurons within the brain are specialists. 1
The ones associated with thought, and presumably creativity, are located
in the cerebral cortex. 1°9 As a thought is being formed, "I am eating an
orange," for example, different groups of neurons are triggered to react.
For example, the neurons associated with an orange color, a round shape,
a juicy mouth-feel, a citrus smell, and a citrus taste may all fire.' 10 When
enough of these neurons discharge, the electrochemical signals generated
are described by a strange attractor in the brain that is associated with
orange-ness.1" Of course, as the brain deals with electrochemical signals,
if the neuron activation pattern in the brain occurs, the thought will be
formed even if the actual experience is not being had. One does not need
to be eating an orange to be able to savor the orange-ness of the experience.
To appreciate the next step, how these generated thoughts reach the
level of consciousness, it is important to remember that the brain generates a multitude of thoughts simultaneously." 2 While current science
cannot provide a definitive understanding of the details that underlie how
one thought becomes central over others,' 13 there is a basic conceptual
framework. Professor Calvin posits that there must be a yet unobserved
mechanism of copying that propagates a particular idea as represented in
a neuron in the brain, what he terms a "cerebral code," through more and
more neurons." 4 Eventually, a sufficient number of neurons adopt the
same cerebral code, establishing a "committee" of neurons to fully de106.
For example, the neurotransmitter known as neuropeptide Y appears to trigger hunger. See
Emory Researchers Find Hunger Regulated by Novel Neurotransmitter, available at

http://whsc.emory.edu/_releases/1998may/O50198yerkes.htn-l (last modified May 8, 1998).
107. See BIGcS, supra note 92, at 19.
108. See CALVIN 1,supra note 76, at 118-20.
109. See CALVIN IL supra note 83, at 52. But cf.James M. Bower & Lawrence M. Parsons,
Rethinking the "LesserBrain, " ScI. AM., Aug., 2003, at 51 (discussing recent research that is establishing a more important role for the cerebellum).
110.
111.

See CALVIN U, supra note 83, at 108.
See id.

112.

Cf.id. at 137 (describing how the brain processes multiple ideas).

113.

Cf.id. at 123.

114.

Seeid. at 121.
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velop the thought with its various associations."15 To explain how a particular thought reaches consciousness from all of the thoughts occurring
simultaneously, Professor Calvin proposes a Darwinian selection process. 116 The thought that recruits the largest number of additional neurons
to serve on its committee reaches cognizance." 7 Professor Calvin's theory has received increasing support from other researchers.118
The process described above does not seem capable of generating a
creative thought, however, as it appears only capable of regenerating
thoughts that have already occurred. Yet, several things can go "wrong"
in the process that can trigger new thoughts.
First, a pattern of neurons might fire that are a novel combination.
While the brain may attempt to force this new pattern to fit within one
already known, if different enough, it may keep it separate and start establishing a new attractor. 119 "Thinking outside of the box" demonstrates
this. In this process, people deliberately attempt to come up with novel
solutions to a problem. This is achieved by trying to force the brain to
create a new attractor for an existing pattern of thought. Of course, it
does not need to be intentional. Most of us have had the experience of
having two unrelated thoughts in juxtaposition lead to a novel conclusion.
Alternatively, although the neural pattern is the same, it may not
trigger the same attractor. As a result, the conscious mind will interpret
the pattern differently.120 For whatever reason, although an orange is
seen, the conscious mind thinks about rabbits.
Either of these methods will generate a novel thought. Sometimes
this is deliberate, but for many "aha"-type moments, the novel thought
appears to come from nowhere. In these cases, the chaos in the brain
provides a compelling explanation. Whether it was the random firing of
neurons or a random creation of a new attractor, a new thought is generated that successfully recruits sufficient neuron support to reach consciousness. However, whatever novelty is found only exists because of
the chaos in the brain and is, effectively, capricious. Consequently, crea115.
116.
117.
118.

See
See
See
See

id. at 127-28.
id. at 150-51.
id.
Michael Shermer, The Major Unsolved Problems in Biology, Sci. AM., Mar. 2004, at

103-04 (indicating that "a Darwinian fashion of neuronal variation and selection.., has considerable support from neuroscience research."). Professor Calvin's proposal has also obtained a support
from workers in artificial intelligence as a computer program using a similar technique has been able
to discover new inventions that are novel enough to be considered patentable. See John R. Koza,
Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Streeter, Evolving Inventions, SCI. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52.
119.
Professor Calvin describes the old thoughts as "cerebral ruts" which "predispose [the

cerebral cortex] to produce a repertoire of spatiotemporal patterns [already known)." CALviN 1,
supra note 76, at 109. He indicates, however, that new patterns can be created, even at the expense
of those already established. Id.
120. The source of puns, perhaps?
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tivity, far from being the brain's highest form of thought, may indeed be
its lowest. If it were not for the randomness generated by our physically
complex electrochemical brains, our ability to engender novel thoughts
might be no greater than that of an earthworm.
IV.

121
WE'VE GOT TROUBLE RIGHT HERE IN COPYRIGHT CITY

The increased focus on the "creative" effort necessary to produce a
work for which a22copyright is claimed (particularly the use of the term
"creative spark")1 in FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service

Co. 123 has introduced significant difficulties for courts trying to determine the scope of copyright. Courts often declare that the plaintiff's
work is insufficiently creative, consequently lacking a subsisting copyright. 124 Unfortunately, the decisions do not follow any uniform theory,125 stating only that the work lacks "creativity," thus failing to articu121.
With apologies to MEREDITH WILSON, Ya Got Trouble, from THE MUSIC MAN (Angel
1957) ("Oh, we've got trouble right here in River City .
122. Feist,499 U.S. at 345.
123. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
124. See, e.g., Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (photographs of art works in the public domain lack sufficient creativity for copyright); Stuart Entre't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19,
1998) (computer-generated bingo cards lack sufficient creativity for copyright), aft'd, 205 F.3d 1347
(8th Cir. 1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831); Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d
276, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Bible code" lacks sufficient creativity for copyright).
125. To be clear, it is not the author's position that the courts have failed totally in applying
Feist's intellectual creativity requirement. When dealing with a database-a "clearly identified
collection of data, such as a telephone book . .. " WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcIONARY OF
COMPUTER TERMS 145 (5th ed. 1994)-the courts have done a better job, at least at the appellate
level. Compare Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 190 F. Supp. 2d 652, 659 (D. Vt. 2002) (finding that
a database was not sufficiently creative as awhole), rev'd, 45 Fed. App. 68, 2002 WL 31007386 (2d
Cir. 2002) with Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. App. 68, 71, 2002 WL 31007386 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding that the database was sufficiently creative when its component parts were examined).
Of course, the work litigated in Feist was a database, see Feist,499 U.S. at 342-44, which may have
eased the difficulty for the lower courts of applying intellectual creativity standards.
As was the case in Feist, most databases are collections of facts which, in themselves, are
not copyrightable. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 681 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999). The only protectable aspect of a factual database,
therefore, comes from the selection of the facts, see Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863
(2d Cir. 1984) (database resulting from the selection of the "best" baseball cards was copyrightable),
the way the facts are expressed, see Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. App. 68, 71, 2002 WL
31007386 at *3 (2d Cir. 2002) (written description of tree species may qualify for copyright protection), Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804,
810 (D. Md. 1995) ("marketing puffery" contained in database is copyrightable), affd 91 F.3d 132
(4th Cir. 1996) (table), or in the way the database is organized, cf.Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d
262, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2001) (the arrangement of the letters of the alphabet on a quilt was a sufficiently creative arrangement to warrant copyright protection). Even with these protections, as many
commentators have argued, copyright provides limited protection for a factual database, particularly
one seeking to be comprehensive rather than selective. See, e.g., Henry Beck, Copyright Protection
for Compilationsand Databases after Feist, 8 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 1 (1991) (Feist "may have
set the stage for a veritable 'gold rush' of information reorganization, reconstruction and redistribution by persons other than those who have collected and compiled the information in the first instance."); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat?" Copyright and Other Protection of Works ofInformation
after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 339 (1992) ("The Court thus stripped away
or sharply reduced the copyright protection afforded a variety of 'information products,' from directories and mailing lists to computerized databases."); Susan H. Nycum, Protection of Electronic
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late a workable definition of creativity, in particular, one that incorporates an understanding of creativity's physiological sources. This leaves
the declared law incapable of being reconciled and of little help in predicting future results. A few examples will establish this premise.
A.

Works Based on Nature

Satava v. Lowry 12 6 is a remarkable case. The plaintiff Satava was an
artist in glass. 127 He created a glass sculpture of a jellyfish floating in a
larger glass envelope. 128 The defendant Lowry made a very similar sculpture. 129 In proceedings under the Copyright Act seeking a preliminary
injunction, the district court determined that Satava was likely to succeed
in the action and enjoined Lowry from making sculptures that were substantially similar to Satava's. 30 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the trial court used an improper legal standard. 13 ' To justify its decision,
the court stated two obvious propositions: that to qualify for a copyright,
a work must contain creative expression, and that the copyright obtained
did not extend to any ideas, facts, or public domain material contained
within the work. 132 The court then examined Satava's sculpture and determined that effectively everything in the work of art lacked creativity
as it was an idea or something else that was in the public domain. 133 As
examples, the court discounted any creativity in a glass-in-glass jellyfish
'1
as that design "naturally follow[s] from the idea of such a sculpture."'
The court also disallowed Satava from claiming "aspects of his sculptures resulting from either jellyfish
physiology or from their depiction in
' 35
the glass-in-glass medium."'
Satava's combination of elements that made up his sculpture fared
no better with the court. While acknowledging "that a combination of

Databases, 14 No. 8 COMPUTER LAW. 12, 14 (1997) ("Because many databases consist of content
like
that
inthe Feistcase, they do not qualify forcopyright protection.").
Of course, not all databases collect facts. If the database is comprised of non-factual data,
its copyright is much broader. See CCC Info. Serv. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44
F.3d 61, 64-68 (2d Cir. 1994) (database of used car prices copyrightable as the prices were the
author's opinion, not facts), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995); CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256,
1260 (9th Cir. 1999) (same for database of coin prices).
126.
323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 983 (2003).
127.
Satava, 323 F.3d at 807.
128.
Id. A photoreproduction of the sculpture can be seen in the opinion on page 808 and can
be viewed online at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/
FE4764BC4E4D78A788256CEE00814B67/$file/0216347.pdf?openelement

(last visited Dec. 7,

2003).
129.
Satava, 323 F.3d at 808-09. Mr. Lowry's sculpture is likewise reproduced in the court's
opinion on page 809 and can be found on the Ninth Circuit's web page.
130.
Id. at 809 n.2.
131.

Id.at810.

132.

Id.

133.

Seeid. at810-1l.

134.

Id.at810.

135.

Id.
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unprotectable elements may qualify for copyright protection,"1' 36 the
court determined that Satava's jellyfish statue failed to meet the Feist
creativity standard. 37 Specifically, "The selection of the clear glass, oblong shroud, bright colors, proportion, vertical orientation, and stereotyped jellyfish form, considered together, ' lacked
the quantum of original38
ity needed to merit copyright protection."'
To appreciate the difficulties that the rule established in Satava will
cause, consider the following hypothetical judicial opinion:
Both parties have created statues of men that are remarkably similar
to each other. Despite the defendant's apparent copying of the plaintiff's work, the plaintiff's claim of copyright infringement must fail.
The individual elements of plaintiffs statue are completely dictated
by the fact that a life-like sculpture of a man was made. As a result,
such elements as the legs, arms, torso, and head of the sculpture are
not included within the plaintiffs copyright, nor can the actual look
or position of any of these items be claimed in so far as they are dictated by the physiological shape and movement of a human male.
Further, the sculpture is not qualified for a copyright as a combination as "[tihe selection of the [marble], [pedestal], [white] color[],
proportion, vertical orientation, and stereotyped [human] form, considered together, lacks the quantum of originality needed to merit
copyright protection." Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 472 (2003). Consequently, the statue entitled,
"Michelangelo's David"'139 is not sufficiently creative to be protected
by copyright.
Through the hypothetical, the consequences of Satava become
clear. Under it, all realistic art seems to be excluded from the ambit of
copyright protection. The court interpreted the Feist intellectual creativity requirement without also giving credit to the copyright doctrine of
preventing copying. 40 While there may have been a question in Satava

of whether the defendant's jellyfish sculpture was a substantially similar

136.
137.
138.

Id. at 811 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.

139.
A photograph of this well-known statue is available at http://pharaohs.addr.com/david.jpg
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005). This statue is generally acknowledged to be one of Michelangelo's best
works and one of the most important sculptures of the Renaissance. See H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF

ART 425 (2d ed. 1977). Obviously, for the sake of the hypothetical, it must be assumed that Michelangelo produced the statue contemporaneously.
140. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) ("Others are free
to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy."). See also Superior Form Builders, Inc. v.
Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir.) (holding that realistic animal sculptures are copyrightable), cert. denied 519 U.S. 809 (1996); Masquerade Novelty, Inc., v. Unique

Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 671 (3d Cir. 1990); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193
F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir. 1951), affd 344 U.S. 228 (1952) (only addressing damages); Prestige Floral,
S.A. v. Cal. Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that realistic
flower sculptures are copyrightable).
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copy of the plaintiff's work, 141 there should have been no question that
the plaintiff's sculpture was sufficiently creative for a copyright to subsist. 142

The Satava court made three fundamental mistakes in its decision.
First, it misconstrued the origin creativity requirement by necessitating
that the work not be modeled on anything,143 not just on a pre-existing
work.inn Second, the Satava court seemed to ignore the full consequences
of the plaintiff having obtained certificates of registration from the Copyright Office. 145 Once obtained, the plaintiff's works are presumed to be
copyrightable,' 46 including that sufficient originality was demonstrated in
their creation. 47 Finally, and most importantly, the Satava court improperly imported a patent-like novelty requirement into copyright. After all,
both the plaintiffs and defendant's works can be copyrighted even
though they depict
jellyfish as long as the defendant did not copy the
48
plaintiffs work.

B.

Works Based on Random Numbers andAlgorithms

Another area of extraordinary difficulty for the courts results from
works created using computer technology, particularly when the computer software is responsible for making choices as to the final expressive elements which will appear in the work. Two cases merit consideration:
1.

The Stuart EntertainmentDecision

In Stuart Entertainment,Inc. v. American Games, Inc.,' 49 the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant from copying a series of bingo cards
it had developed.150 To generate the series, a computer program was used
141.

Satava, 323 F.3d at 807, 809 (photoreproduction of plaintiff's work and defendant's

work).
142.

Cf. Satava, 323 F.3d at 807, 809, with Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc.,

18 F.3d 502, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing impact of life-like elements on the evaluation of
whether there is infringement, but not questioning the creativity of the plaintiffs work).
143.
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810.
144.
See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 268 (originality includes that it is "not copied from pre-existing
works") (emphasis added); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th
Cir. 2003) ("[Copyright] requires only enough originality to enable a work to be distinguished from
similar works that are in the public domain, since without some discernible distinction it would be

impossible to determine whether a subsequent work was copying a copyrighted work or a publicdomain work.") (citations omitted, emphasis added). Cf Bridgeman Art Library, 36 F. Supp. 2d at

195-97 (holding that exact copies of preexisting works of art have no subsisting copyright).
145.
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 807.
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000).
147. See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 269.
148. See id. at 270 ("Absent evidence of copying, an author is entitled to copyright protection
for an independently produced original work despite its identical nature to a prior work, because it is
independent creation, and not novelty that is required.").

149. No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir.
1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831).
150. Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 1-2.

2004]

MINIMAL CREATIVITY STANDARD

that combined a random number generator with selection algorithms to
insure that each bingo card and the series as a whole would be optimally
playable.15 1 The series of cards that was generated represented a mere
9,000 cards 152 out of a universe of more than 11l quadrillion possible
cards. 153 The defendant's series of bingo cards was "an exact, verbatim
copy of the number sequences found in [the plaintiff's] series."' 154 Despite this apparent highly selective choice of bingo cards that made up
the series, however, the court determined that no copyright subsisted as
no "'intellectual labor' was put forth in the creation .. of [the] bingo
cards."1 55 The court held that because the author of the bingo cards had
chosen to "mechanical ly] generat[e]" them, there was no creativity
used. 156
The court's rejection of the mechanical generation of a copyrightable work is inconsistent with Feist.15 7 Assume that the bingo card had
been generated by hand. As the Feist decision indicated, one indicator of
sufficient intellectual creativity for a compilation is whether the author
selected items to be included within the compilation from a larger universe of choices. 158 Stuart satisfied this selection as a minuscule percentSee id., slip op. at 2-3. Among the selection algorithms used were that each card gener151.
ated had to be unique within the series, that each of the numbers on a bingo card (from 1 to 75)
would occur approximately an equal number of times within the series, and that each row and column within the series would be unique. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-13, Stuart Entertainment, Inc. v. American Games, Inc., 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1336).
152.
See Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 4.
153.
See Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., 205 F.3d
1347 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1336).
154.
Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 4.
Id., slip. op. at 15.
155.
156.
Id., slip. op. at 16.
157.
Indeed, the district court seemed to have much difficulty with many basic copyright
concepts, not just the creativity requirement. In its penultimate paragraph, for example, the court
expressed concern that if one of the plaintiffs series of bingo cards was considered copyrightable,
this would allow the plaintiff to preemptively protect all other series of bingo cards. See Stuart, No.
1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 18 ("If the Court, today, were to grant protection to Champion C, Stuart
would be in this or some other federal court next week . . . to protect its many other Champion
series.").
While it is tre that Stuart may have sought to protect its other series of bingo cards, it
could only protect them against the statutorily designated types of infringing conduct such as copying. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). American Games, or anyone else, would, of course, be free to
independently generate its own sequence of bingo cards, even if this newly created sequence was
identical to the original Stuart sequence. See Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d
275, 275 (2d Cir. 1936) ("independent reproduction of a copyrighted... work is not infringement").
All that would be prohibited by Stuart's copyright would be copying its sequence of cards. See
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249 ("Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the
copy."). Indeed, American Games would have been free to attempt to reverse engineer the cards to
derive the algorithms that Stuart had established for a playable series of cards and used them to build
its own series, as the ideas expressed within the algorithms are not within the scope of copyright
protections. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Cf Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (reverse engineering copyrighted software to develop competing
software is fair use). Had American Games done this, they would have a resulting set of bingo cards
that are just as playable as Stuart's, but would not have been a copy.
158.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
Where the compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the facts speak
for themselves, the expressive element is more elusive. The only conceivable expression
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age of the possible bingo cards were chosen, 159 and, significantly, the
selection was based on the author's opinion of what defined a highly
playable series of bingo cards.160 Rather than being a random sequence of
bingo cards as the court seemed to conclude,' 61 they were a carefully
crafted set of cards to maximize bingo players' enjoyment of the game.
Thus, as was the case with the baseball cards in Eckes v. Card Prices
Update,162 the bingo card series represented an expression of Stuart's
opinion of what constituted a highly playable group of cards, clearly
meeting Feist'sintellectual creativity requirement.
Therefore, the district court's rejection of the cards must have been
based on the use of technology to generate the cards. 163 Where there
would be intellectual creativity if the work was generated by manual
labor, however, the use of technology to achieve the more mechanical
aspects of a work should not lead to a deprivation of copyright protection. 64 The modest amount of intellectual creativity demonstrated by
Stuart when it defined the algorithms to be used to choose a limited subset of bingo cards for its compilation satisfies the Feist test, and the use
of a random number generator as part of the technology to express Stuis the manner in which the compiler has selected and arranged the facts. Thus, if the selection and arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright
protection.
Id.
159. Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 4. (Stuart's 9,000 cards represented approximately
0.0000000000008% of the possible bingo cards).
160. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., 205 F.3d
1347 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1336) ("a number of optional criteria [were] chosen to increase the
market appeal of the [cards]"); Id. at 17 ("Stuart Entertainment ... remove[d] this feature ... to
meet perceived consumer demand.").
161.
See Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 16. (the bingo cards are chosen by a "randomizer").
162. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 861 (database resulting from the selection of the "best" baseball cards
was copyrightable). See supra note 125 (discussing Eckes and the copyrightability of collections of
facts and opinions).
163.
See Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 16 ("In this mechanical generation of the
bingo cards, the Court finds that there is no originality or creativity expounded by [Stuart].") (emphasis added).
164. See H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible
to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The bill does not intend
either to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion
into areas completely outside the present congressional intent.
Id.
Again, it is important to distinguish between the kind of technology Stuart used and artificially intelligent software. The software used by Stuart did not exercise any creativity; instead,
following the instructions specified by the programmer, it randomly generated possibilities and then
mechanically culled them based on the creative choices previously made by Stuart. With artificially
intelligent software, on the other hand, the human using the software does not exercise any creativity
as the choices of what should be included in the expressive work is "delegated" strictly to the computer. See generally, Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5 (discussing intellectual
property issues associated with works generated by artificial intelligence). Confusing artificial intelligence with a random number generator will result in a fallacious conclusion about the copyrightability of a work. See David Nirmner & Eaton S. Drone, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls:
Authorship and Originality,38 Hous. L. REv. 1, 31, n. 119 (2001).
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art's compilation is, simply, irrelevant to the copyrightability of the collection of cards.
2.

The Torah Soft Decision

Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin165 involved the copyrightability of Bible

code matrixes that were generated by a computer program developed by
the plaintiff. 166 These matrixes are derived from the Hebrew Bible by
selecting letters that are equally spaced throughout the text; for example,
each sixtieth letter, as some believe that the resulting words and phrases
predict the future. 167 The defendant had reproduced about one hundred of
the matrixes, which were generated by the defendant's computer program, in his book on the Bible code.' 68 The district court, in a decision
that relied on several grounds, 169 determined that the matrixes were not
copyrightable. 170 While the ultimate decision that there was not an infringement of copyright seems correct, 17 1 the parts of the opinion that

rely on a lack of intellectual creativity in the work to justify a lack of
copyrightability do not have much strength.
165.
136 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
166. Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
See id. at 280. In fact, the Bible code has no ability to predict the future. See Michael
167.
Shermer, Codified Claptrap, Sa. AM., June 2003, at 35 ("Just like the prophecies of soothsayers
past and present, all such predictions are actually postdictions .... To be tested scientifically, Bible
codes would need to predict events before they happen. They won't, because they can't .... ")
(emphasis added). Indeed, in 1997, Drosnin indicated that the Bible code foretold that the world
would end in the year 2000, which obviously did not occur. See id. See generally, David E. Thomas,
Hidden Messages and The Bible Code, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Nov./Dec. 1997, available at
http://www.csicop.org/si/97 1/bible-code.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
168.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
169. See id. at 284-86 (originality, functional elements, merger doctrine, scenes a faire, and
public domain).
at 292.
170.
See id.
Two, alternate theories justify the court's ultimate conclusion. The defendant only repro171.
duced 100 of the possible matrixes that could be generated by the plaintiff's database and program.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281. As such, any copying would have been de minimus as no
argument was made that the particular codes reproduced in the defendant's book extracted the essence of the plaintiff's database. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d
Cir. 1983); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 542 (3d Cir. 1986). Consequently, although copying occurred, it was not actionable.
Alternately, the defendant had a fairly strong argument that the use of the work was fair
under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Three of the fair use factors strongly favor the defendant: the nature
of the copyrighted work, the amount copied, and the effect on the author's marketplace. See id. §
107(2)-(4). The copyrighted work was, effectively, a work of nonfiction (and one that contained a
significant quantity of public domain material), which suggests a narrower copyright and greater fair
use rights. See Eng'g Dynamics, Inc., v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir.
1994). Only a small portion of the copyrighted work was used. See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at
281. The effect on the defendant's market is likely to be accretive as a book about the Bible code
would more likely cause individuals to acquire computer software to be able to do their own analysis
and could not reasonably be expected to decrease the plaintiffs market.
Only the purpose of the defendant's work-a commercial book-factors against a fair use
finding. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). However, commercial uses do not mandate a finding of a
lack of fair use, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-85 (1994), particularly
when the scope of the transformation of the two works is considered, see id. at 578-79. There is very
little similarity between a computer program and database that can generate Bible codes and a book
written to explain the Bible code.
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The matrixes are comprised of predominately public domain materials found in the Hebrew Bible. 72 There was a minimum of selection
and arrangement performed on the material from the Bible as the plaintiff created his work, however, in the transformation of Hebrew letters
from their final forms into their non-final forms, 17 3 the selection of a version of the Prophets and the Writings to include, 174 and the changes made
75
to the database to comply with 31'l)n (sheimot) requirements.1
The court's conclusion that the substitution of non-final form letters
was insufficiently creative for inclusion within a copyright is clearly correct. 176 As no intellectual effort was needed to make the substitution, the
simplistic, mechanical
alteration is appropriately excluded from the am77
bit of copyright. 1

172. Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 286 ("Plaintiff wisely admits that the Hebrew Bible, which
is the backbone of the Database, is in the public domain ....
").
173. Id. Five Hebrew letters, : (chaph), 3 (mem), I (nun), 0 (pe), and N(tzadhe) have a different form when they appear at the end of a word, 1, 0, 1,c1,
and ', respectively. See POCKET
HEBREW-ENGLISH DICTIONARY iii (Ehud Ben-Yehuda, ed. 1961). These letters in their final form
are called V!0'iV (sophit)as in 3T!. '3 11(nun sophit). See id.
174.
Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 286. Cf. THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY OF AMERICA,
THE HOLY SCRIPTURES vi-ix (1955) (describing the difficulties of translation caused by multiple

versions and versions with marginal corrections and indicating which versions of Prophets and
Writings were chosen for this translation); Interviews with Rabbi Howard L. Jaffe, Temple Isaiah,
Lexington, Massachusetts (May-July, 2003).
175.
TorahSoft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 286. 31))3g, transliterated as sheimot, means a tattered piece
of paper upon which one of the seven Hebrew names of God is written. Joseph Lowin, Naming the
Name, available at httpJ/www.ivrit.org/html /words-roots/pdf/wr 6-7-97.pdf (last visited Dec. 7,
2003). fn'iD=p refers to the tradition among observant Jews to treat any document that has one of the
names of God in Hebrew on it as an object deserving special respect, see id., in recognition of the
command in the Torah "not take the name of Adonai your God in vain," Exodus 20:7, and "you shall
not do so to the Lord, your God," Deuteronomy 12:4. As a consequence, the documents cannot
simply be discarded; instead, they must be disposed of in a way that shows respect. See Rabbi
Joshua Heller, Ekev 5760, available at http://learn.jtsa.edultopics/parashah/5760/ekev.shtml (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005). Further, a name of God should not be written on something where there is an
expectation that the name will be subsequently erased. See Central Conference of American Rabbis,
The Name of God, CCAR RESPONSA § 145, available at http://www.ccarnet.org/cgibin/respdisp.pl?file=145&year=narr (last visited Dec. 1990). This would include the output from the
plaintiffs computer program. See Complaint 16, Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00-Civ-5650(SAS)), available at http://www.thedavidandgoliathshow.com/
Complaint2.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
For an excellent description of the Sheimot rules and their modern consequences, see
Jacob Schneider, "Sheimot" and Their Disposal, J. OF HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y, Fall 1991, at
31.
176.
Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 288-89. At the same time, the Court's reliance on Grove
Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publ'n, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967), was hardly appropriate at
least as far as Grove Press suggests that work that can be done by a high school student lacks creativity. See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (quoting Grove Press v. Collectors Publ'n, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 603,605 (C.D. Cal. 1967)). Nothing in the Feist test, or in reality, suggests that creativity is
necessarily something that is limited to adults. See, e.g., DONALD JAY GROUT, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN MUSIC 499-500 (rev. ed. 1973) (Mozart's "masterwork" Symphony in G minor, K. 183,
was written in 1773 when he was seventeen). Mozart's opera buffa, La Finta Semplice, was written
in 1768 when he was twelve. Id. at 498,
177. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 ("It is equally true, however, that the selection and arrangement
of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.").
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The selection of which version of the Prophets and the Writings to
78
include is more complicated than the court seemed to acknowledge.
While the order of the books within the Torah, the Prophets and the Writings is established, 79 the actual text that makes up these versions does
not appear to be as firmly settled. 180 If there are as few as a handful of
choices, it might be necessary to acknowledge the creativity used in selecting among them. 18 1 Such selection could only represent the author's
opinion about which version is "authentic" and, as an opinion, would
apparently represent intellectual creativity. 82 Further, the court's dismissal of the quantity of work done by the plaintiff to choose which version of the books to use is disingenuous. 183 While the plaintiff's "sweat
of the brow" alone cannot sustain a copyright, just because sweat was
needed to produce the work does not negate the presence of intellectual

creativity. That the plaintiff extensively studied Jewish law and consulted
with scholars of Jewish law shows the intellectual endeavor in which he
was involved to choose the most authentic version of each book. Consequently, if these choices were established by the author at trial,184 sufficient intellectual creativity should have been found by the court.
The alterations made by the plaintiff that most clearly demonstrate
creativity are in the sheimot changes. 85 Rather than using the typical
system used to comply with the sheimot rules, inserting hyphens between
178.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 288. Cf THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY OF
AMERICA, THE HOLY SCRIPTURES vi-ix (1955) (describing the process of translation including the
difficulties caused by such things as marginal corrections to the original text) [hereinafter HOLY
SCRI TURES].
179.
See HOLY SCRIPTURES, supra note 178, at viii.
180.
See id. at viii-ix; David E. Thomas, Follow-up: Bible-Code Developments, SKEPTICAL
INQUIRER, Mar./Apr. 1998, available at http:l/www.csicop.org/si/9803/bible-code.htmil.
[A]ny serious student of the Talmud knows that there are many citations of the Hebrew
Bible which indicate a differing text from the one we have .... One of the oldest complete texts of the Bible, the Leningrad codex (from 1009) (also available electronically)
differs from the Koren version... in forty-one places in Deuteronomy alone. In fact, the
spelling in the Hebrew Bible did not become uniformized until the sixteenth century with
the advent of a printed version that could provide an identical standard text available at
diverse geographical locations.
Id. (quoting Harvard mathematics professor (and Orthodox rabbi) Shlomo Sternberg).
For a list of the principal ancient Hebrew texts of Prophets and Writings, see Ancient Hebrew Manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible, available at http://www.ancient-hebrew.orgl17-manuscripts.html
(2002) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
181.
Cf Boisson, 273 F.3d at 262 (recognizing creativity in placement of the alphabet on a
quilt).
182.
See Eckes, 736 F.2d at 859 (database resulting from the selection of the "best" baseball
cards was copyrightable); Superchips, Inc. v. Street & Performance Elecs., Inc., No.
6:OOCV896ORL31KRS, 2001 WL 697948, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2001) ("Superchips' act of
changing numerical values in Ford's data table to achieve optimum engine performance is [creative]").
183.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 288 ("[lit is clearly established that such 'sweat of the
brow' does not confer copyright protection.").
184.
The plaintiff may have failed to prove the existence of multiple choices. See Torah Soft,
136 F. Supp. 2d at 288 ("[Pjlaintiff [has] failed to identify precisely how Spielberg altered the text
185.

See id. at 280-81.
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some or all of the letters comprising a name of God, the plaintiff changed
the letters into other typographic symbols such as asterisks and pound
signs. 186 In this way, the Hebrew names of God would not be included
within the database but, at the same time, the number of characters
within the Bible would not change, making the extraction of the proper
characters of Bible code number possible. Although the court announced
two reasons why the sheimot changes were not creative, that they were
"functional' ' 81 7 and that they were "required by the end-users,"'' 88 both
reasons are nonsensical.
Without a doubt, the sheimot changes implemented by the plaintiff
t89
were incorporated into a functional database and computer program.
But to discount all functional alterations as lacking creativity seriously
misstates the intellectual creativity requirement. It confuses what are
unprotectable functional elements with protectable expressions.1 9 While
a method of operation is appropriately excluded from copyright,192 the
sheimot changes are not used to operate the Bible code program; instead,
the changes serve as the plaintiff's means to express the idea underlying
the sheimot rules.' 93 As a consequence, the sheimot changes are not functional; indeed, the Bible code program would operate just as well, though
offending much of its customer base, without the sheimot changes being
made.
Further, the changes made by the plaintiff were not specifically required by the end-users of the program. Clearly, to appeal to the market,
the plaintiff had to comply with the sheimot rules, but that market would
not care how these rules were implemented. Thus, by selecting one option out of many choices for expressing the sheimot rules, particularly

186.

See id.

187.
188.

Jd. at 287.
Id.

189.
190.

See id. at 278.
See id. at 287 ("As a functional, as opposed to a creative, alteration, the sheimot changes

arc not protectable.").
191.

Indeed, if being functional negates creativity, it is hard to see how any computer program

would qualify for copyright protection despite the clear congressional intent that such protection be
available. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of computer program); H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
116 (1976) ("With respect to the copyrightability of computer programs.... the [1976 Copyright
Act] would apply."); see generally BRIAN W. KERNIGHAN & P.J. PLAUGER, THE ELEMENTS OF
PROGRAMMING STYLE (2d ed. 1978) (discussing how to craft well written programs).

192.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
193. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995).
We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable 'method of operation.' The Lotus menu command hierarchy provides the means by which users control
and operate Lotus 1-2-3 .... Users must use the command terms to tell the computer
what to do. Without the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to access and
control, or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities. The Lotus menu
command hierarchy does not merely explain and present Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities to the user; it also serves as the method by which the program is operated and

controlled.
Id., affd by equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).

2004]

MINIMAL CREATIVITY STANDARD

where that choice was novel in itself, sufficiently intellectual creativity
was demonstrated.194
C.

Trouble, Trouble, Trouble

As these example cases indicate, works that should qualify for
copyright protection are being denied as the courts misconstrue the Feist
decision. Rather than expecting a work to contain a "minimal degree of
creativity,'' 95 a significantly higher quantum of intellectual creativity is
expected. What could be lost by this unrealistic expectation is that many
of the average, mundane works that constitute a significant percentage of
the expressive works developed and marketed will no longer be protected, making them economically unviable. Whether it is a typical computer program, a statue to be sold to a tourist, a dime-store novel, or a
series of bingo cards, the way that the intellectual creativity requirement
is being formulated in the lower courts is problematic for insuring that
sufficient incentives are available for the authors of these types of
works. 196

The source of the problem may be some unfortunate language in
Feist that requires a work to "possess some creative spark" to be copyrightable t 97 Many courts have seized upon this language' 98 d are expecting a level of creativity worthy of Beethoven before the work will
pass intellectual creativity muster instead of recognizing that the empha-

194. Even the court acknowledges a degree of novelty in the plaintiff's expression of the sheimot rules. See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (the plaintiff "departed from the traditional method
of complying with the sheimot rules ....").This creativity is further reinforced as the plaintiff's
choice of characters to use in substituting the letters in a Hebrew name of God are arbitrary and were
not required; indeed, any non-Hebrew character would have worked. Cf id. at 280-81.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
195.
196. As an example, in part because of the loss of its intellectual property protection for its
bingo cards, Stuart Entertainment was forced into bankruptcy under Chapter 11. In re Stuart Entm't,
Inc., No. 99-02847-MFW (Bankr. D. Del. filed Aug. 13, 1999).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citation & quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
197.
198. See Matthew Bender & Co.,158 F.3d at 682 (recognizing Nat'l Reporter page numbers,
etc. lack creative spark); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding part numbers lack creative spark); J. Thomas Distribs., Inc., v. Greenline Distribs, Inc., 100 F.3d
956 at *1 (6th Cir. 1996) (table, opinion at 1996 WL 636138) (reasoning drawing of part lacks
creative spark); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding title commitment lacks creative spark), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 990 (1995); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d
1366, 1373 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting command codes lack creative spark); Bridgeman Art Library, 36
F. Supp. 2d at 196-97 (finding photographs reproducing public domain art lack creative spark).
But see Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir.
2002) (finding doll contains sufficient creative spark); O'Well Novelty Co. v. Offenbacher, Inc.. 225
F.3d 655 at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (table, opinion at 2000 WL 1055108) (recognizing porcelain houses
contain sufficient creative spark); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir.
2000) (reasoning photograph of vodka bottle contains sufficient creative spark); Atari Games Corp.
v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cit. 1992) (finding video game contains sufficient creative spark).
The most interesting transformation of the Supreme Court's language may have occurred in Spilman
v. Mosby-Yearbook, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D. Mass. 2000). The Spilman court was not interested in a "creative spark;" rather, it was interested in a "creative twinkle." Id. at 155.
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sis in the decision is to find a minimal level of intellectual creativity. It is
the mundane that is needed, not the profound. 99
However, as the scientific evidence discussed above demonstrates,2oo creativity does not usually represent a startling break-through
of new thoughts as, more often, it results from the reworking of preexisting ideas and facts as part of a new strange attractor within the author's brain. Even where a revolutionary conception is made, the brain
process behind it lacks any "spark" unless the spark results from a misfiring of the brain. The lower courts' expectations of intellectual brilliance
to justify a copyright are consequently unrealistic and damaging and do
not implement Feist'sjurisprudence. To get the courts out of their troubled waters, an analytical approach that restores intellectual creativity to
its proper place is needed.
V. PUTTING CREATIVITY IN ITS PLACE-A REALISTIC ANALYTIC
TECHNIQUE TO IDENTIFY THE PRESENCE OF INTELLECTUAL CREATIVITY

To determine if the minimal intellectual creativity required is present, an analytical approach is needed that will avoid people's natural
inclination to judge the appeal of the creativity rather than its mere presence.20 1 It is much easier, after all, to declare a Monet painting creative
than someone else's toddler's scrawl, but, from a copyright perspective,
both are creative and both should be eligible for protection. °2 To avoid
denying an unappealing work its copyright, a more rigorous analysis is
needed. Fortunately, one does not need to be invented from whole cloth;
instead, Computer Associates International,Inc. v. Altai, Inc.20 3 provides

a good framework for constructing an intellectual creativity analysis.
Computer Associates instructs that a three-part "abstractionfiltration-comparison" test should be used to determine if one computer
program infringes another. 204 This test was created by the Second Circuit
to remove the "metaphysical distinctions" that were distracting courts in
199.

See Feist,499 U.S. at 345.

200. See supra Part 111
201.
Cf Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (recognizing
judges cannot be trusted to be the arbiters of the worth of visual images).
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "); Cf Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[T]he courts have not undertaken to assume the
functions of critics, or to measure carefully the degree of originality, or literary skill or training
involved." (quotation marks omitted)).

203.
See generally 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (concerning the scope of a copyright in a
computer program), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998).
204.
ComputerAssociates, 982 F.2d at 706. The "abstraction" step in the Computer Associates
test requires that the court "dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and isolate each level of

abstraction contained within it." Id. at 707. The "filtration" procedure is used to screen from the
abstractions anything that is not protectable by copyright such as ideas, items from the public do-

main, etc. Id. at 707-10. Finally, "comparison" is used to match the surviving items against similar
expressions in the original computer program to determine if there was infringement. Id. at 710-11.
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evaluating whether two computer programs were copies of one another,
and focused the analytical attention on the "practical considerations" that
should drive the decision making. 20 5 As the same problem of focusing on
practical considerations exists in the evaluation of creativity, a new
three-part test based on the structure of the one established in Computer
"abstraction-confirmationbeneficial-the
proves
Associates
examination" test. 206 Although derived from the Computer Associates
test, each of the elements in this new test differs from the original in order to implement the different purpose of the test. 207 The operation of
each component part of the test will be discussed in turn.
A.

Abstraction: Findingthe "Expressive Constituents" within the Work

The ultimate test of intellectual creativity for copyright is whether
the author has expressed a work with the necessary minimum ingenuity
such that it qualifies for a copyright. 20 8 Consequently, the first step in the
analysis is determining what the author has expressed. In other words,
what are the "expressive constituents" contained within the work. Determining what qualifies as an expressive constituent has never been
easy. It requires the court to distinguish between the expression itself and
what is being expressed in the work.209 As Judge Learned Hand stated in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. 2 10 when attempting to make this distinction:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.
The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the [work] is about, and at times might consist only of its title;
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use
which, apart from their expression, his property is
of his "ideas," to
2 11
never extended.

Of course, when doing the analysis for the determination of creativity, the Nichols approach would be used with the opposite purpose. Specifically, it is not important to identify and exclude ideas; instead, the
goal is to identify expressions that do qualify for copyright. The Nichols
205.

Id. at 706.

206.
Although the proposed test is more important in the evaluation of whether there is sufficient intellectual creativity underlying the work in question, the test also is sufficiently powerful to
confirm the presence of origin creativity.

207. As will become clear in the subsequent discussion, it is very important that the courts
distinguish between establishing if creativity is present from whether infringement occurred. See
infra Section V.C.
208. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
209. This is commonly known as the "idea-expression dichotomy." See Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977).
210. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
211. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
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test is not a one-way street, however. As soon as the series of abstractions under Nichols become general enough that they must be considered
as ideas, all that was identified earlier will be the expressive constituents
being sought. The purpose of Nichols, after all, is to find the dividing line
between ideas and expressions so, once it is found, the identified material
on either side of the line can be used.
As occurs when examining infringement, the quantity of expressive
constituents that can be found in different types of works will differ.
Generalizations can be made, however, based on the type of work involved.
If one is dealing with a work of literary fiction, a novel, for example, the expressive constituents include the specific language used, 212 the
overall treatment of the subject including the details emphasized,
the
uniquely defined characters,214 and at least some level of the details of
the plot.21 5 As many of the elements contained within a work of fiction
are fanciful, finding numerous expressive constituents normally is not a
216
problem.
For non-fiction works, the expressive constituents are more limited
than for a work of fiction as any facts contained within the work are outside the ambit of copyright. 17 For these works, the expressive constituents will be found in how the facts are described, not in the facts them218
selves.
Visual works can prove more challenging in attempts to derive the
expressive constituents.2 19 Part of the difficulty with visual works is that
they, as a class, tend to be more abstract than a written work, putting
them closer to the idea end of the idea-expression dichotomy. As impor212. See CRA Mktg., Inc. v. Brandow's Fairway Chrysler-Plymouth-Jeep-Eagle, Inc., No.
Civ.A.98-CV-6485, 1999 WL 562755, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1999) (marketing materials); log,
Inc. v. Bell Logic, LLC, 181 F. Supp. 2d 3 at *6 (D. Mass. 2002) (computer programs).
213.
See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
214. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cit. 1983) (holding a copyright
protects Superman character).
215.
See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. Of course, if the work of fiction makes reference to facts in
establishing its setting, the scene afaire doctrine prevents treating items that are necessary to create
the scene from being considered an expressive element, see Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1403-04 (N.D. Cal. 1995), dismissed by agreement, 57 F.3d
1083 (Fed. Cir. 1995), although how the setting is described may very well be an expressive element
even though the scene itself is not.
216.
Cf Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (recognizing that works of fiction gain a broader copyright protection than non-fiction works). The author has
been unable to find any reported cases where the court determines that a work of fiction is insufficiently creative to obtain a copyright. As of today, none of the works that were generated by an
autonomously creative computer program have been involved in a litigation so the validity of the
claimed copyright has not been tested.
217.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
218.
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57.
219. See Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992(WHP), 2002 WL 485730, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2002).
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tantly, lawyers, judges, and the other participants in the judicial system
do not tend to be trained in the visual arts 2 2 0 rendering them less able to
understand the subtleties of visual languages. 221 Despite this, visual
works are capable of various levels of abstraction, from examining the
work as a whole, by scrutinizing individual picture elements, and even
through the expressive contribution made by the selection and use of the
media in which the work is done, 222 allowing the courts to derive the
various expressive constituents contained within the visual work.
Factual compilations have understandably been the focal point of
intellectual creativity litigation. As the facts themselves are not expressive, 223 the court must determine if the facts are articulated in a way that
makes them an expressive constituent, 2 4 are selected by the author from
a larger superset of possibilities,225 or are arranged by the author in a
226
sufficiently ingenious way. 6 In each of these cases, however, the ex-

pressive element is limited to articulation, selection, or arrangement, the
facts alone are still not expressive constituents.

227

At the end of the first part of the tripartite test, therefore, the expressive constituents contained within the work will have been identified.
Obviously, if no expressive constituents are identified, the work has insufficient intellectual creativity for a copyright to subsist. However, if as
220. The Law School Admission Council maintains statistics of the undergraduate majors of all
individuals who use its service as they apply for admission to law school. Over the last five admission cycles (1997-1998 to 2001-2002), a total of 2,069 applicants listed their first majors as being in
the visual arts (Art/Design, Art History, Fine Art, or Visual Arts/Graphics). See Letter from Robert
Carr, Senior Statistician, Law School Admission Council, to the Author 3 (July 15, 2003) (on file
with author). For the same periods, a total of 388,744 applicants participated in the Service. See id. at
5. Consequently, for the last five admission cycles, only 0.53% of applicants to law school have
undergraduate degrees in the visual arts. Although this number does represent a maximum as some
candidates for admission will participate in more than one admission cycle, the numbers on an
annual basis are consistent: from 0.50% in 1997-1998; through 0.49%, 0.55%, and 0.52%; to 0.59%
in 2001-2002. Id. at 3, 5.
221.

See H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 9-10 (2d ed. 1977).

222. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1167-68 (noting that the complexity of artist's expression of nude will affect the scope of the copyright in the resulting statue as
the court affirmed that the defendant's McDonaldlandcommercials infringed on plaintiff's H.R.
Pufnstuf TV show). While the method of expression can constitute an expressive constituent when
combined with an analysis of the overall expression contained in the work, the method, standing
alone, generally should not be an expressive constituent in its own right. See Stillman v. Leo Burnett
Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (N.D. 111.1989) ("In the same vein, when the similarity between two
works arises exclusively from the use of the same process or technique-for example, the similar
'concept and feel' of two impressionist paintings-it cannot form the basis for a copyright claim.").
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
224. See Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. App. 68, 71, 2002 WL 31007386 at *3 (2d
Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (reasoning written description of tree species may qualify for copyright protection); Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804,
810 (D. Md. 1995) (finding "marketing puffery" contained in database is copyrightable), aff'd 91
F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996) (table).
225. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding database resulting
from the selection of the "best" baseball cards was copyrightable).
226. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing creativity in
placement of the alphabet on a quilt).
227. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

little as one expressive element was found, the next step, confirmation,
must be performed.
B. Confirmation: Insuring that Some of the Expressive Constituents
Originatedfrom a Human
Confirmation is the simplest of the three steps as its purpose is primarily to determine if origin creativity is present. Although simple, it is
nevertheless critical to exclude a pretender, whether the work was copied
from another human's work or from an artificially intelligent computer
program's work. If, for example, the author simply copied another's expression, the confirmation fails, and the work is not creative. 228 What is
critical for this analysis is that another's work was reproduced,22 9 as basing a work on something existing in the world, a mountain, for example,
does nothing to diminish contained creativity.23 °
Just as copying another human's work prevents creativity, so too
does claiming credit for a work generated by an autonomously creative,
artificially intelligent computer program. 231 If a computer is responsible
for the generation of the work, a human cannot claim a copyright in the
work as origin creativity is nonexistent. 232 In applying this standard,
however, it is important that the nature of the computer. program be considered carefully. Many works today are created using computer technology as a tool to assist the author in expressing his or her ideas.233 For
example, a computer word processor is being used to ease the process of
writing this paper. Some of the techniques provided by the program are
merely mechanized versions of the scissors and stapler formerly used to
cut and paste text. Other techniques are more complex, as when a computerized thesaurus is used, making a choice of words available that
might not have otherwise been considered, or the Web is used to perform
instantaneous research. These types of computer techniques do not affect
the presence of creativity, however, as the technology is being used as an
adjunct to a human author.234 The computer eases the author's job, even

228. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In the
copyright context, originality means the work was independently created by its author, and not
copied from someone else's work."); NBC v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524, 532 (D. Conn. 1985)
("Independent creation cannot be actual copying.").
229. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(disallowing copyright to photographic reproductions of existing works that "duplicate exactly" the
originals).
230. See supra Section W.A.
231.

Clifford, Creative Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1698.

232.

Id.

233.

See,

e.g.,

Jessica

K. Hodgins

& James

F. O'Brien,

Computer Animation, in

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 301 (Anthony Ralston et al eds., 4th ed. 2000); Barry
Flachsbart, et al, Computer-Aided Design/Computer-AidedManufacturing(CAD/CAM) in id. at 268.
234. In many ways, the contribution to the work that is made by the computer can be analogized to the contributions made by a human editor as both are responsible for suggesting words and
other changes that can make the resulting work better. Just as an editor's contributions do not change
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when it "suggests" expressive elements, but control of the process remains with the author.
In contrast, where the computer effectively has replaced the human
author, there is insufficient creativity in a work to substantiate a copyright. In the computer program discussed in the author's Creative Computer Programsarticle, the program, rather than the human operator, was
responsible for generating the expressions.2 35 As the human no longer
controlled the expressive process, the human could not claim the resulting works for copyright.2 To draw the parallel, the computer was no
longer easing the author's job; it was supplanting it.
Once expressive constituents are extracted and their origin has been
confirmed, the final step of the analysis is needed. The examination process will address the ultimate question: are the expressive constituents
intellectually creative?
C. Examination:Did the Author DeliberatelyDecide to Do It That Way?

Once the expressive constituents are identified and confirmed, they
237
must be examined to determine if there is the "modicum of creativity
necessary to support copyrightability. Although the Feist case described
the requisite as the need for a "creative spark," 238 this portrayal of creativity is inaccurate 239 and, worse, destructive to the process of evaluating
actual works. Fortunately, the Court's use of the phrase seems more descriptive than mandatory, allowing a more valid methodology to be used
that will achieve the purpose desired by the Court.
In most ways, Feist's creativity requirement is concerned with
choice.24° The Court seems to require two things in order for intellectual
creativity to be found: (1) multiple ways that an expression can be made,
and (2) that the author made a selection from these choices. 241 Accordingly, from these two requisites, a basic test of creativity can be derived:
did the author, having a choice, decide to express the work in the way it
the author's right to his or her copyright, see Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991),
normal uses of computer technology are likewise immaterial.
235.
See Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5, at 1677, 1703 nn.5, 6. See also

John R. Koza, Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Streeter, Evolving Inventions, Sci. AM., Feb. 2003, at
52 (describing a computer program that can invent).
236. See Clifford, Creative Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1698.
237. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
238.
Id. at 345.
239. See supra Section m11.
240. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place
them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original
that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws.

It.
241.

See id.
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was done? In other words, did the author "make a judgment ... determine a preference; [or] come to a conclusion ' 242 about the expression
used?
Only minimal creativity is needed under this test; 243 indeed, even a
single word can demonstrate creativity. When Tennessee Williams
named one of his characters in A Streetcar Named Desire "Stella,' '244 he
was making a creative choice 245 that, standing alone, should be considered sufficiently creative to justify protecting the play with a copyright.
Intellectual creativity is binary - either it is there or it is not. Once it is
determined to be there, the work is creative and can be protected by
copyright. This does not mean, of course, that only copying the name
"Stella" would be sufficient to establish that copyright infringement had
occurred, as copying the name alone would most certainly be considered
de minimus and non-infringing. 246 In other words, the presence of intellectual creativity is a threshold that must be crossed for a work to be protectable, but once the copyright doorway is entered, a new analysis is
needed concerning the quantity and quality of the infringing conduct to
determine if any of the section 106 rights 247 were violated.
D. Applying the Abstraction-Confirmation-ExaminationTest
To be valid, the abstraction-confirmation-examination test must
achieve the proper result when applied to known cases. A succinct examination of four cases, all of which were presented above, will establish
this: Satava v. Lowry, 248 Stuart Entertainment, Inc. v. American Games,
Inc.,249 Torah Soft, Ltd. v. Drosnin 250 and, finally, Feist.25I
When the abstraction-confirmation-examination test is applied to
the facts in Satava,25 2 the court's conclusion of noncopyrightability is
shown to be incorrect. The expressive constituents are numerous, including the orientation of the jellyfish, the specific colors chosen, the positioning of the tendrils, the shape of the body, the overall shape of the
sculpture, as well as the interplay among these elements and the glass
242.
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 517 (2d ed. 1993).
243.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (recognizing work must "possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity ....
for copyrightability) (emphasis added).
244. TENNESSEE WLLIAMs, A STREETCAR NAMED DEsIRE 12 (New Am. Library ed. 1947).

245.
He could have chosen any woman's name as the character is fanciful - not based on a real
character.
246.

See Domsalla v. Stephens, No. CIV.A.300CV2763, 2001 WL 493157, at *1 (N.D. Tex.

May 4, 2001) ("In general, short phrases ... do not exhibit the minimal creativity required for copyright protection.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
247. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
248. 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 983 (2003).
249. No. 1-96-CV-90036 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), aff'd 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1999)
(table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831).
250.
136 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
251.
499 U.S. 340(1991).
252. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 805.
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medium chosen for the artist's expression.25 3 The defendant admitted that
all of these were created by the plaintiff, 25 4 satisfying confirmation. Finally, the choices made by the artist are clear; for example, he could have
moved each tendril into a slightly different position or chosen a different
color in which to depict the jellyfish. Consequently, the examination test
is satisfied, concluding the three-part analysis. As each part of the test
was satisfied, there is sufficient creativity to substantiate the copyright.
The Stuart Entertainment case likewise satisfies the test. 255 Each
bingo card and the sequence of cards found in one of the plaintiffs series
were expressive constituents. 56 Although Stuart did not create the series
of cards itself, it succeeded in interest to the party who did,257 thus satisfying confirmation. Finally, although not as clear as was the case in Satava, choices were exercised in the creation of the bingo cards. The
plaintiff would not accept all bingo cards, as some were considered to be
unplayable, while others were rejected because they did not satisfy the
conditions established for the sequence of cards. 258 As a consequence, the
cards were sufficiently creative and the court's opposite holding was
fallacious.
The analysis in Torah Soft is a much closer call.259 The three possible expressive constituents are the final letter transformations, the choice
of which version of the Prophets and Writings to use, and the Sheimot
changes. 260 All three of these elements pass the confirmation test, 26 1 but
one fails the examination criterion outright, while the other two do not
satisfy it unequivocally.
The final letter transformations clearly fail the final examination requirement as there was, as a practical matter, no choice. If a letter was to
be substituted for a final nun, for example, no other letter could be used
except a regular nun without altering the language in the Bible and, thus,
defeating the program's ability to generate accurate Bible codes. The
version selection for Prophets and Writings only weakly complies with
the test because all of the choices that could be made were from among a
fairly limited universe of possible choices, potentially insufficient to substantiate that the plaintiff made any type of intellectual decision. The
sheimot changes also reside on the borderline of acceptable expressive
constituents under the examination test. The particular typographical
253. See id at 807-08.
254. See id. at 807.
255. Stuart Entm't, slip op. at 1.
256. See id., slip op. at 3. See also Superchips, Inc. v. Street & Performance Elecs., Inc., No.
6:OOCV896ORL31KRS, 2001 WL 697948, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2001) (engine performance
numbers placed in a table are copyrightable).
257.
258.

See Stuart Entre't,slip op. at 3-4.
See id., slip op. at 2-3.

259.
260.
261.

Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
See id. at 286.
See id. at 281.
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symbols chosen to substitute for the Hebrew characters were arbitrarily
selected from a very large universe of possibilities,26 2 demonstrating at
least a minimal amount of decision-making by the author. Strongly mitigating against finding the sheimot changes to be creative, however, is the
inherent meaninglessness of the choices made. Did the author select specific typographical symbols, or did he substitute them without thought?
If the latter is true, the examination test directs that the sheimot changes
263
be found lacking.
Finally, applying the test to Feist confirms the test's compliance
with the intellectual creativity rules established by the Supreme Court. 26
The abstraction stage leads to the identification of only two ossible expressive constituents: the selection of the names to appear26 and the order in which the phone listings were placed in the directory. 2 66 Although

these expressive elements survive the confirmation test, the phone company's agents produced the directory,

267

they fail the examination test.

The selection of names was not the company's subjective choice as the
law required the company to include all of its subscribers.268 As a practical matter, the company had no choice about the order in which the listings were given because, to be functional, the listings had to be placed in
alphabetical order by subscriber's name.2 69 Thus, the abstractionconfirmation-examination test fails and the directory is not sufficiently
creative to be copyrighted.
CONCLUSION

Evaluating expressive works to insure that there is sufficient incorporated creativity, both origin and intellectual, requires careful
consideration of the expressions contained within a work. If the
evaluation is too exacting, the incentives to produce ordinary, run-of-themill works will disappear. On the other hand, if the evaluation is too
lenient, a purported author will be able to monopolize expressions that
were not generated by that author, leaving the public domain depleted as
a result.
262.
Even if the choice was limited to those typographical characters available on a standard
computer keyboard, there were twenty-five choices, "-!@#$%^&*0-++l ][{/,>. In a modern

word processor, many hundreds of additional choices exist. See, e.g., WordPerfect (9th ed. 2000)
(listing 101 "Typographic," 254 "Iconic," and 237 "Math/Science" special characters).
263. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
264.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.

265. See id. at 362.
266. See id. at 361-62.
267. See id at 342.
268. See id. at 363. Compare id. with Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863 (finding that database resulting
from the selection of the "best" baseball cards was copyrightable).
269.

See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. Compare id. (noting the author had no choice but to alphabet-

ize its directory) with Boisson, 273 F.3d at 262 (finding that author had sufficient choices in the
layout of the alphabet on a quilt for it to be considered creative).
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To avoid misconstruing creativity requirements in either direction,
the courts should adopt a method of analysis such as the proposed abstraction-confirmation-examination test that focuses attention on how the
work was generated and avoids cloaking creativity with any romantic or
mystical aspects, as these are not substantiated by the scientific evidence
on the sources of human creativity. Not only will this type of dissection
ensure that the courts implement the jurisprudence of Feist, but it will
also alleviate any concerns, as expressed in Bleistein, that evaluations of
intellectual creativity will transmogrify into exercises of judicial censorship.270 Without a test that concentrates attention on the essence of Feist
and the nature of human inventiveness-choice making by a human author-too many works that are incomprehensible or unappreciated by the
court will be denied copyright protection.

270.

See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.

TOWARD A PURE ARBITRAL PARADIGM OF CLASSWIDE
ARBITRATION: ARBITRAL POWER AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION

CAROLE

J.

BUCKNER t

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent disparate legal developments have transformed the law regarding classwide arbitration. These developments swept away the longstanding prohibition against classwide arbitration (a remnant of the historic mistrust of the arbitral process) and eliminated the "hybrid" model
of classwide arbitration (another remnant, in which the courts remained
involved in the arbitral process). Classwide arbitration is evolving toward a "pure" arbitral paradigm' permitting only the minimal court involvement authorized under the Federal Arbitration Act.2 This article
discusses the developing trend toward a pure arbitral paradigm of classwide arbitration that is evident from the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding classwide arbitration and federal preemption and
considers its potential far-reaching implications.
Arbitration has collided with consumer and employment class actions. The use of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution continues
to increase in a wide variety of contexts. 3 At the same time, the majority
of class action cases are damages class actions 4 against business defen-6
dants. 5 About one-third of these cases arise in either the consumer,
commercial or employment contexts, where arbitration remains most
t

Associate Professor, Western State University College of Law. J, D. Hastings College of

the Law; B. A., University of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to thank Susan E. Keller and
Greg Sergienko for their insights regarding this article, and to thank students Lakesha Wilson and

Aneeta Marheswari for their assistance with research for this article.
1. By a "pure" arbitral paradigm, I mean a model permitting the arbitration of class actions,
or "classwide arbitration" that sanctions the involvement of the judicial system only very narrowly,
as contemplated by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).

2.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).

3.
Gabriel Herrmann, Discovering Policy Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 779, 781 (2003); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-5 (2000) (American Arbitration Association requests increased 21% between 1994 and 1998); DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION
OF CORPORATE DISPUTES, A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 5

(1998) ("One of the foremost trends in corporate America in the 1990s has been the shift from traditional litigation and government agency resolution of disputes toward the use of alternative dispute

resolution (ADR).").
4.
PRIVATE
5.
6.

DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
GAIN 52 (2000).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53-54.
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popular.7 Most "first generation" arbitration clauses8 common in commercial and employment contracts 9 are silent regarding the availability of
class action relief in the arbitral setting. 10 Most federal courts 1 and
many state courts l2 interpreted these silent arbitration clauses to preclude
classwide or consolidated arbitration. One federal circuit court 13 and
some state courts interpreted these silent arbitration clauses to permit
classwide or consolidated arbitration.14 Some courts permitting classwide
arbitration required ongoing "judicial5 supervision"-the so-called "hybrid" model of classwide arbitration.
With its decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 16 the United
States Supreme Court implicitly reversed the course of both federal and
state law prohibiting classwide arbitration and significantly expanded
arbitral power to adjudicate class actions.17 In Bazzle, the Supreme Court

held that an arbitrator, not the court, should determine the availability of
classwide arbitration where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on
the issue,' 8 and further indicated that arbitrators need not necessarily
interpret arbitration agreements that are silent regarding classwide arbi7.
LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 3, at 14.
8. 1 refer to the "first generation" of arbitration clauses to include clauses that are silent
regarding classwide arbitration. The "second generation" of arbitration clauses address classwide
arbitration specifically, and preclude classwide arbitration expressly. What I describe as "third
generation" clauses address classwide arbitration in a manner far more sophisticated than earlier
generations of clauses, in order to overcome unconscionability considerations. For the most part,
this article addresses the first generation of arbitration clauses that are silent regarding classwide
arbitration.
9. Steven J. Ware, Symposium: Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer ArbitrationAgreements, 2001 J. DIsp. RESOL. 89, 90 (2001) [hereinafter Ware I]; LIPSKY &
SEEBER, supra note 3, at 11.
10. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common (and
Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 82 (2002) [hereinafter Drahozal I].
11.
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1995); Gov't of U.K. v. Boeing
Co., 998 F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107,
108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective
Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb
Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas
Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977
F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424
(M.D. Ala. 1997); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993).
12. Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 94-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Med
Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); cf, Unif. Arbitration Act § 10(c) (2000) ("The
court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits consolidation.").
13. New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1 st Cir. 1988).
14. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 481 A.2d 553, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984);
Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208, 220 (Md. 1981); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v.
Fed, Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451, 452 (S.C. 1979); Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Ga.
1978); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. 1977).
15.
Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 175 Cal. App. 3d 935, 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Izzi
v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see STEPHEN J. WARE,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 74 (2001) [hereinafter WARE II].

16.
17.
18.

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-54.
Id. at 453.
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tration to prohibit the arbitration of class claims.' 9 In turn, Bazzle
spawned the promulgation of classwide arbitration procedural rules by
two of the three major arbitration providers,20 making classwide arbitration a new, if still largely uncharted, reality.
As classwide arbitration increases, 2' reexamination of the appropriate procedures for classwide arbitration, including the hybrid model of
classwide arbitration, is appropriate. Expansion of the preemptive scope
22
of federal arbitration law under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
and the Supreme Court's persistent pro-arbitration agenda 23 have narrowed the opportunities for state experimentation with classwide arbitral
models such as the hybrid model, where ongoing judicial involvement is
mandated. 24
This Article makes three major points. First, I assert that Bazzle
implicitly overruled case law in the majority of federal circuits and in
some state courts that effectively prohibited classwide arbitration in
many federal circuits and state venues. These federal and state decisions
prohibiting classwide arbitration rested primarily upon two rationales.
First, the "contract interpretation rationale" resulted in courts interpreting
contracts that are silent regarding classwide arbitration to preclude
classwide arbitration. Second, the "lack of power rationale" held that
courts lacked the power and authority to send class action litigation to
arbitration.25 I argue that Bazzle (which does not explicitly discuss the
prior federal or state authority prohibiting classwide arbitration) implicitly undermines both rationales, and effectively overrules both the state
and federal authority prohibiting classwide arbitration, setting the stage
for a significant expansion of arbitral power.

19. See id. at 451 (indicating that the language of the contract is not clear and that the answer
to the contract interpretation question is "not completely obvious").
20.
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPsrc=uploadLIVESITE\.RulesProcedures\Topi
cs_InterestkAAAClassaction.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (supplementary rules became effective
on October 8, 2003); Notes from Carole J. Buckner, Author, American Bar Association, Ultimate

Arbitration Update CLE (August 8, 2004) (on file with author) (JAMS/Endispute announced at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting in August 2004 that it has established its policies and
will publish them shortly. In contrast, the third major arbitration provider, the National Arbitration
Forum, has decided not to publish rules specifically pertaining to class action arbitration.).
21. At the recent ABA Annual Meeting in August, 2004, Atlanta, Eric Tuchmann, General
Counsel for the American Arbitration Association, reported that approximately 48 cases had been
filed with the AAA in the last month. Notes from Carole J. Buckner, Author, American Bar Asso-

ciation, Ultimate Arbitration Update CLE (August 8, 2004) (on file with author). JAMS/Endispute
reported it is now accepting classwide arbitration cases and announced the adoption of rules regarding classwide arbitration procedure. Id.
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).
23. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25 (1983).
24.

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (discussing the preservation of states'

rights under our federalist system).
25.
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1995); Dominium Austin
Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001).
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Secondly, given the expansion of the preemptive scope of federal
arbitration law, combined with Bazzle and its progeny, I assert that the
hybrid model of classwide arbitration, in which the court continues adjudicating certain aspects of classwide arbitration (including, for example,
class certification, notice and settlement approval), is no longer legally
viable. While a handful of state courts have approved the hybrid model,
which mandates ongoing judicial supervision of the class action-related
aspects of class arbitration, 26 and the recently promulgated AAA Rules
contemplate the ongoing availability of this model,27 I assert that the
hybrid model of classwide arbitration conflicts with federal arbitration
law, including Bazzle, and that courts should determine that federal arbitration law preempts the hybrid model of classwide arbitration. Additionally, I assert that the hybrid model of classwide arbitration is implicitly disapproved by the Bazzle plurality opinion.
I conclude from these premises that a pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration is mandated by the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law. Further, I conclude that Bazzle and its progeny endorse a pure
arbitral model of classwide arbitration in which the arbitrator first determines whether the arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration, and
then determines all class action-related issues. Issues of class certification, notice, discovery and approval of settlement, reserved under the
hybrid model for the courts, are now appropriately determined purely
within the arbitral proceeding. Judicial involvement in the arbitral process is appropriate only as expressly permitted by the FAA.
To place this analysis in context, Part H of this Article generally
discusses the history of judicial hostility toward arbitration and the national policy favoring arbitration. This Part provides an important understanding of the context in which both federal and state authority prohibited courts from sending class action cases to arbitration and informs the
underlying rationale for the hybrid system of classwide arbitration. Part
26. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. C1. 1991); Lewis
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Izzi v. Mesquite Country
Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc.,
481 A.2d 553, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437
A.2d 208, 220 (Md. 1981); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451,452 (S.C. 1979);
Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106-07 (Ga. 1978); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185,

186-87 (Ga. 1977); See WARE II, supra note 15.
The AAA Rules provide that "[w]henever a court has, by order, addressed and resolved
27.
any matter that would otherwise be decided by an arbitrator under these Supplementary Rules, the
arbitrator shall follow the order of the court." Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, Rule 1 (c), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPsrc=upload
(last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
\LIVESITE\RulesProcedures\TopicsInterestkAAAClassaction.htm

The AAA Rules also permit judicial review of the arbitrator's decisions regarding the interpretation
of whether the arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration and regarding the certification of the
class. Id. at Rule 3, 5(d). A representative of the AAA reported to the author that the AAA prefers
the hybrid model. See Notes from Carole J. Buckner, Author, American Bar Association, Ultimate
Arbitration Update CLE (August 8, 2004) (on file with author). In contrast, the rules announced by
JAMS will not contemplate ongoing court involvement in classwide arbitration. See id.
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II also describes the United States Supreme Court's reversal of this historic hostility by declaring a national policy favoring arbitration, and
issuing a series of pro-arbitration decisions. The Bazzle decision, with its
pro-arbitration bent, followed a well-established pattern in which the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the anti-arbitration decisions of lower
courts and substituted pro-arbitration case law. Bazzle indicates that the
FAA's purpose of eliminating animosity toward arbitration is still very
much a mission in progress rather than a goal accomplished.
Part III describes pre-Bazzle federal law regarding classwide arbitration, beginning with the rather minimal jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court addressing classwide arbitration. Part III then discusses in
detail federal and state court authority generally prohibiting classwide
arbitration, exploring the extent to which pre-Bazzle law continued to
reflect hostility to classwide arbitration, despite the national policy favoring arbitration. This Part also discusses the decision in Southland Corp.
v. Keating,28 the case that both expanded the scope of FAA preemption
and, at the California Supreme Court level, established the hybrid model
of classwide arbitration. This Part further explores strategies utilized by
corporate drafters to leverage the federal authority to eliminate corporate
exposure to class actions entirely in many forums, and the resulting unconscionability backlash pursuant to which some state courts are finding
such strategies ineffective. I propose that the Bazzle opinion may implicitly signal the U.S. Supreme Court's disapproval of the corporate strategy
of avoiding class actions by using arbitration clauses.
Part IV discusses in detail the state experimentation with classwide
arbitration under the "hybrid" approach, beginning with the California
Supreme Court's decision in Keating v. Superior Court,29 which gave
birth to the "hybrid" system of classwide arbitration. 30 This Part then
describes the evolution of the hybrid model through the development of
the law in California and several other jurisdictions, both state and federal, that adopted the hybrid model, as well as the scope of judicial involvement in classwide arbitrations established by these decisions.
Part V discusses the Bazzle decision, including the North Carolina
Supreme Court's opinion endorsing classwide arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court plurality opinion, and subsequent cases interpreting Bazzle.
In Bazzle, five Justices permitted the arbitrator to decide whether class
arbitration should proceed, and, importantly, indicated that when an arbitration clause is silent regarding classwide arbitration, it is not clear that
such silence must be interpreted to prohibit classwide arbitration. 3 This
Part also discusses the handful of cases following Bazzle that are part of
28.
29.

465 U.S. 1 (1984).
645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).

30.
31.

See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1984).
See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.
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the slowly evolving trend toward a pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration. Finally, this Part describes and critiques the procedural rules for
classwide arbitration announced by arbitration providers.
Part VI discusses the scope of federal preemption of state law regarding arbitration and describes the extent to which courts have determined that state-created laws contradicting federal arbitration law are
preempted. This Part explores the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding federal preemption of state law in the area of arbitration, and describes Professor Christopher Drahozal's analytical model for
determining whether a particular state law is preempted by federal arbitration law.
Part VII describes the pure arbitral paradigm of classwide arbitration. First, this Part explains why the Bazzle decision implicitly overrules the line of authority prohibiting classwide arbitration by undermining both the lack of power rationale and the contract interpretation rationale. Secondly, this Part demonstrates why a pure arbitral model of
classwide arbitration is viable under federal preemption law and why that
model is implicitly endorsed by the Bazzle decision. In this Part, I argue
that, after Bazzle, arbitrators can determine that a silent arbitration clause
permits classwide arbitration and I conclude that under the applicable
law regarding judicial review of arbitral decisions, it is not likely that
courts will vacate such rulings. Finally, this Part concludes that federal
arbitration law preempts the hybrid model of classwide arbitration and
indicates how the Bazzle decision implicitly rejects the hybrid model in
favor of a pure arbitral model. Consideration of all of these developments leads to the conclusion that only a pure arbitral model of classwide
arbitration remains legally viable.
II. THE SCHIZOPHRENIC CONTEXT: HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY YIELDS TO A
NATIONAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION

A. JudicialAntipathy Toward Arbitration
32
The common law regarded arbitration agreements with "hostility.
At common law, parties could revoke or repudiate an arbitration agreebefore an award was rendered under either a doctrine of
ment at any time
"revocability ' 33 or "voidability. ''34 Alternatively, courts "flatly denied
any remedy for the failure to honor an arbitration agreement." 35 Nineteenth century judges disfavored private arbitration 36 because it was said

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Southland, 465 U.S. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 10 (2002).
Southland, 465 U.S. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to "oust the jurisdiction of the courts. 37 Echoing a rationale repeatedly
expressed in anti-arbitration jurisprudence, 38 and implied by the hybrid
model of classwide arbitration, 39 early arbitration statutes provided 40 and
early court decisions held that arbitrators were 'not ordinarily well
enough acquainted 41with the principles of law or equity' to administer
justice effectively.,
Although the FAA was enacted to reverse the historical animosity
against arbitration, 42 judicial hostility continued as courts placed certain
subject matters beyond the reach of arbitration by declaring them "inappropriate" for arbitral adjudication.
A pattern emerged. First, either
the Supreme Court, or lower courts, declared certain substantive legal
matters inappropriate for arbitration. 44 The Supreme Court questioned
the competence of arbitrators to resolve complex claims, holding, for
example, that "the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, '"" and
precluding the arbitration of antitrust claims. 46 But over time, the Supreme Court rejected these limitations, 7 overruling the majority of cir-

37.
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)
(internal citations omitted).
38.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (expressing concern that arbitration permits
decisions by arbitrators lacking judicial instruction on the law). At various times, courts have declared a variety of substantive areas of law off limits to arbitration, including antitrust, usury, patent,
securities law, ERISA and others, only later to permit such matters to be arbitrated. IAN R.
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW,
REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATIONINTERNATIONALIZATION 64 (1992).
39.
Classwide arbitration will either require continual judicial intrusion or make lay arbitrators inappropriate. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
40.
See MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 21. MacNeil indicates that reformers wanted the elimination of the rule of revocability, while courts tried to preserve that rule. Id. at 28, 31.
41.
BENNETT, supra note 34, at 10 (citing Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845)). MacNeil points out that early anti-arbitration statutes including the English
Arbitration Act of 1889, early drafts of the Uniform Arbitration Act by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, approved by the ABA in 1924, and early Illinois law allowed submission of questions of law for determination by the courts rather than by arbitrators. See MACNEIL,
supra note 38, at 32-33, 37, 48-49, 54. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE-WISE
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN MANAGING
BUSINESS CONFLICTS 6 (2003) ("Both arbitrators and mediators are perceived to be better qualified
today than they were in the 1998 study [by Lipsky & Seeber].").
42.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); WARE H1,supra note 15, at 22.
43.
BENNETT, supra note 34, at 21; MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 64.
44.
BENNETT, supra note 34, at 11 (discussing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437-38, overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (overruling Wilko
and enforcing pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate as to securities claims)).
45.
BENNETT, supra note 34, at 11 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437).
46.
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (enforcing
agreement to arbitrate as to antitrust claims).
47.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 632 (rejecting four rationales for limiting the reach
of arbitration, including the assertions that "antitrust issues.., require sophisticated legal and economic analysis, and thus are 'ill-adapted to strengths of the arbitral process ... [and that] decisions
as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in arbitrators chosen from the
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cuits following its earlier decisions 48 and rejecting the concept that antitrust, securities and RICO claims were "too complex" for arbitrators.49
B. The NationalPolicy FavoringArbitration

Congress enacted the FAA50 with the express purpose of reversing
"the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts."'', Congress intended the FAA to overcome early attitudes 52 and
to establish a strong national policy in favor of arbitration.53 The FAA's
provisions manifest a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. 54 The FAA provides an expeditious technique of dispute resolution intended to reduce the burden on precious judicial resources, 55 as
well as to address the costliness and delays of litigation.56
The presumption in favor of arbitration is "a powerful one."5 7 The
courts are directed by precedent to move cases out of the court system
and into arbitration "as quickly and easily as possible." 58 At the same
time, the legislative history reflects a clear intent to assure the institutional competency of the arbitration system. 59 Congress intended to create a system of arbitration in which the parties "need not resort to the
courts at all."60

Questions of arbitrability should be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. 61 In its decisions, the Supreme
Court repeatedly rejected attacks on arbitration that are premised upon
"suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants. 62
business community..."') (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F.2d

155, 162 (lst Cir. 1983)).
48. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (overruling the majority of
circuits holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act were not arbitrable).
49. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485 (holding Securities Act claims are arbitrable);
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242 (holding Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims are arbitrable);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 640 (enforcing agreement to arbitrate as to antitrust claims).

50. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004).
51.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); WARE II, supra note 15, at 22.
52. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
53. Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2001).
54. Moses H. Cone Mem 'lHosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (1983).
dissentBarrentine v. Ark. Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 753 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
55.
ing).
56. Herrmann, supra note 3, at 787.
57.
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000).
58. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22.
59. See Herrmann, supra note 3, at 787 (the procedure set forth in the FAA "safeguard[ed] the
rights of the parties").
60.

Id. at 788.

61.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
62. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000) (quoting Rodriguez de
Quias, 490 U.S. at 481).
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In fact, arbitration strikes a balance between the two competing
policies of efficiency and competency.63 On one hand, arbitration is defined and uniquely characterized by its efficiency, 64 including cost reduction resulting from a more limited scope of review and the reduction of
discovery. 65 On the other hand, the competing interest in "competency,"
the quality of justice, weighs against taking the efficiency measures of
arbitration to an extreme.

][I.
A.

PRE-BAZZLE FEDERAL LAW REGARDING CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION

Southland Corp. v. Keating

One case, Southland Corp. v. Keating,67 established both the preemptive scope of the FAA,68 and, because the U. S. Supreme Court did
not address the issue, also coincidentally launched the most experimental
state program regarding the combination of class actions and arbitration,
the so-called "hybrid" system of classwide arbitration. 69 This Part discusses the preemption holdings and the class action aspects of the U. S.
Supreme Court's Southland decision and the due process issues raised.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Keating v. Superior Court7
is discussed in further detail in Part IV below concerning the "hybrid"
system of classwide arbitration.
In Southland, approximately eight hundred 7-Eleven franchisees
filed a state court class action against the owner and franchisor of 7Eleven convenience stores. 7 1 The parties' agreement provided that "any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. 7 2 The franchisor moved to
compel arbitration, and the franchisees requested that the court certify a
class. 73 The trial court compelled arbitration of all claims except those
arising from California franchise law and did not rule on the class certification motion. 74 Regarding the issue of conducting the arbitration on a
classwide basis, the California Court of Appeals determined that "there
was no 'insurmountable obstacle"' to doing so and directed "the trial
63.
64.

See Herrmann, supra note 3, at 782.
Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Ware I, supra note 9, at 90.
See id.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).

69.
Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613 (1982) (permitting classwide arbitration
while acknowledging that classwide arbitration procedure would "entail a greater degree of judicial
involvement than is normally associated with arbitration"), rev'd on other grounds in Southland, 465
U.S. at 16.
70.
31 Cal. 3d 584 (1982).
71.
Southland, 465 U.S. at 3-4.
72.
Id. at 4.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
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court to conduct a class certification proceeding., 75 The California Supreme Court determined that the claims under California franchise law
were not arbitrable. 76 The U.S. Supreme Court in Southland determined
that federal arbitration law preempted the California franchise law and
held the claims should be arbitrated.77
While the FAA does not fully preempt state law regarding arbitration, under the preemption doctrine first announced in Southland, the
FAA preempts state laws that undermine arbitration by "requiring a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration. 78 In Southland, the Court considered
whether a statute requiring "judicial consideration" of the franchisee's
claims in direct conflict with Section 2 of the FAA violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 79 The Court held that Congress, by enacting Section 2 of the FAA, "withdrew the power of the states to require
a judicialforum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration. 80
The Court explained that the FAA permitted "only two limitations
on the enforceability" of arbitration agreements: (1) the contract is not
part of a transaction involving commerce or a maritime transaction; or
(2) the limitation arises from "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 8' Nothing in the FAA permits "any additional limitations under State law.",82 Examining legislative history, the
Court declared that the purpose of Congress in enacting the FAA was to
foreclose state attempts to "undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements ' 83 and held that the FAA "preempts a84state law that withdraws the power to enforce arbitration agreements."
The Southland Court then scrutinized the California statute to determine whether it fit within the savings clause of Section 2 of the FAA
and determined that the California law was "not a ground that exist[ed] at
law or in equity 'for the revocation of any contract,' but merely a ground
that exist[ed] for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts
'
Noting the potential for state laws to
subject to the California [law].' 85
"wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements
'upon the same footing as other contracts,"' the Court indicated that the

75.
76.

Id.at5.
Id.

77.
78.

Id.at 17.
Id.at 10.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.at1o-11.
Id.
at11.

83.
84.

Id.at 16.
Id.at 16 n.10.

85.

Id.
at16 n.l
1.
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California law conflicted
with the FAA and therefore violated the Su86
premacy Clause.
Describing the issue as "the propriety of superimposing class action
procedures on a contract arbitration," 7 the U.S. Supreme Court left intact
the California Supreme Court's ruling remanding the case to the trial
court for determination of whether classwide arbitration was appropriate
because the franchisor did not assert the claim that if state law required
class action procedures, state law would conflict with the FAA in violation of the Supremacy Clause.88
The franchisor did argue that state law did not permit arbitrations to
proceed as class actions. 89 As discussed below, the California Supreme
Court had rejected this argument, holding that because state arbitration
law authorized consolidation, it was not likely that the California Legislature "intended to preclude a court from ordering classwide arbitration
in an appropriate case." 90 Because the franchisor had not opposed class
procedures on 'federal grounds," and the California Supreme Court in
Keating had not "passed upon the question whether superimposing class
action procedures on a contract arbitration was contrary to the [FAA],"
the U.S. Supreme Court in Southland held that91it lacked "jurisdiction to
resolve the question as a matter of federal law."
The Southland Court also left the issue of due process in classwide
arbitration unaddressed. The defendant had argued that "requiring arbitrations to proceed as class actions 'could well violate the [federal] constitutional guaranty of procedural due process.', 92 In its determination
that the California Supreme Court did not pass on the preemption issue,
so that the U.S. Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address the class
action arbitration issue, the Southland Court seems to have overlooked
the fact that the due process argument could have provided it with such
jurisdiction, since it did not expressly address the issue beyond acknowledging that Southland raised the argument below.
After Southland, the U.S. Supreme Court said little about classwide93
arbitration, until Bazzle. In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,
the plaintiff sought to defeat an agreement to arbitrate claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act by arguing the inferiority of
arbitration to litigation, since arbitration procedures did not permit class
actions. 94 In response, the Court acknowledged that "NYSE rules also
86.

Id. at 16.

87.
88.

Id. at8.
Id.

89.
90.

Id.
Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 613 (emphasis added).

91.
92.
93.
94.

Southland, 465 U.S. at9.
Id.at8.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

provide for collective proceedings," implicitly approving classwide arbitration.95
B. FederalAuthority ProhibitingClasswide Arbitration
Against this backdrop of uncertain guidance from the U.S. Supreme
Court, despite the national policy favoring arbitration and perhaps reflecting continued judicial ambivalence toward arbitration, particularly
classwide arbitration, an extensive body of federal law developed prohibiting the adjudication of class action disputes in arbitration. This Section
discusses that federal law and its dual rationales for prohibiting class
actions in arbitration.
Prior to Bazzle, most federal courts concluded that absent a provision in the parties' arbitration agreement expressly allowing the parties'
arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis (in other words, where the
parties' agreement was silent regarding classwide arbitration), the arbitration could not proceed on a classwide or consolidated basis. 96 This
line of authority reveals two rationales for this prohibition. The first
rationale, which I describe as the "lack of power" rationale, holds that the
court lacks the authority to certify an individual plaintiff as a class representative for other parties whose claims are subject to arbitration,97 lacks
express authority to consolidate arbitration proceedings, 98 and lacks authority to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in class arbitration."
The second rationale, which I describe as the "contract interpretation"
rationale, posits that as a matter of contract interpretation, courts cannot
"read into" an otherwise silent agreement a provision expressly allowing
classwide arbitration.1°°
One of the key decisions describing these two rationales as the basis
for prohibiting classwide arbitration is Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,

95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
96. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1995); Randolph v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1423-1424 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828
F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993); Gov't of U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993);
Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Protective Life Ins.
Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (1lth Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb Constr. v.
Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d
1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Weyerhauser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th

Cir. 1984).
97.

Champ, 55 F.3d at 271.

98. Id. at 274-77; Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720,728-729 (8th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not err in compelling arbitration of the dispute as individuals rather than as a class, because "district court was without power to consolidate arbitration
proceedings when arbitration agreements were silent on the issue").
99. Champ, 55 F.3d at 276-77 (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not
applicable in proceedings before arbitrators which are regulated by the rules of the arbitration association).
100.

Id. at 277.
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Inc.10 1 In Champ, the plaintiff sought class certification from the court
after the court ordered that the matter be arbitrated.10 2 Reversing its own
prior ruling, 10 3 the trial court held that it lacked the authority to certify a
class arbitration where the parties had not agreed to such a procedure in
their arbitration agreement.'0 4 Although the claimant initially seeking
class certification settled her matter, two other claimants received permission to intervene and appealed the court's determination. 0 5 The intervenors claimed that the court had authority under FRCP Rule 23, as
incorporated through Rule 81(a)(3), 1°6 to order classwide arbitration,' °7
and that FAA Section 4 did not preclude classwide arbitration because
the contract did not expressly preclude it.' 08
In the absence of authority directly on point, Champ relied heavily
upon cases holding that district courts lacked the power to consolidate
arbitration °9 and determined that Section 4 of the FAA precluded the
court from reading into the parties' agreement a term allowing classwide
arbitration, which might disrupt the negotiated risk/benefit allocation and
direct the parties to proceed with an arbitration different in nature from
14
°
Fifth,"' Sixth,"' Seventh,'
The Second,'
that agreed upon."

Eighth," 5 Ninth' 1 6 and Eleventh Circuits" 7 held that courts lacked the
power to order consolidated arbitration. Treatises, commentators, and
cases reasoned that, if the courts lacked power to order consolidation,

101. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
102. Champ, 55 F.3d at 271.
The court initially adopted the hybrid approach permitting the combination of the class
103.
action and arbitration, with court supervision, and directed that the court determine the issue of class
certification. See Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Symposium: Achieving Justice
in Arbitration,Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15C2-2, Fraud,Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1547, 1588 (1991).
104. Champ, 55 F.3d at 271.
105. Id. at 274.
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) (providing that in arbitration proceedings under the FAA, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the extent that matters of procedure are not otherwise
provided for under the FAA).
107. Champ, 55 F.3d at 274.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 274-75.
110. Id. at 275.
111. Gov't of the U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993).
112. Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987).
113. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991).
114. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275 (finding no basis to distinguish between classwide arbitration and
consolidation); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 774
(7th Cir. 2000) (Judge Posner acknowledges the general rule that courts cannot consolidate arbitration in defiance of parties' contractual agreement, but finds the agreement in questions permits
consolidation).
115. Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (D. Minn. 1993),
overruled on other grounds in Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88 (2000);
Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990).
116. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F. 2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l. Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281,282 (1 th Cir.
1989).
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then by analogy they also lacked authority to order classwide arbitration."'
The Champ court also determined that it could not fill the procedural gap regarding classwide arbitration procedure with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 because no procedural gap existed." 9 Because the
FAA required enforcement of the parties' arbitration agreement according to its terms, and the agreement was silent regarding class arbitration,
the Champ court reasoned that the parties themselves had provided for
non-class action arbitration. 120 The Champ court further explained that
Rule 81 allowed procedural gap-filling only in judicial proceedings pertaining to arbitration 121 and, importantly, acknowledged that Rule 81 did
not authorize application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to proceedings on the merits before arbitrators, who are regulated by the rules
of the arbitration provider. 122 The Champ court concluded that parties
relinquished their rights to pursue a class action under
Federal Rule of
123
Civil Procedure 23 when they agreed to arbitration.
Other pre-Bazzle decisions following Champ similarly held that the
district court's lack of power to consolidate arbitration proceedings precluded the court from ordering classwide arbitration, often without reference to the contract interpretation rationale. 124 The rationale of some
federal decisions prohibiting classwide arbitration, such as Gammaro v.
Thorp Consumer
Discount Co., 125 rested expressly on the court's lack of
26
1
power.
In Champ, the intervenors also argued that the proper interpretation
of the contract supported their request that the court should order class
arbitration because an order compelling class arbitration did not contradict the terms of the parties' agreement, which was silent regarding
classwide arbitration. 127 But the Champ court rejected this argument,
holding that the court may not read into an arbitration agreement that is
118.

ALAN S. KAPLINSKY, ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS:

A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS,

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 244 (2003)
(citing FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, § 18.9.1, at 18:91).

119.
It is interesting to note that one of the major private arbitration providers has chosen to
"fill the procedural gap" by implementing a rule similar in many respects to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.
See AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936.
120.
Champ, 55 F.3d at 276.
121.
Id. (noting that such judicial proceedings include petitions for orders compelling arbitration, confirmation of arbitration awards, motions for vacatur of awards and applications for modifying or correcting arbitration awards).
122. Id.
123.
Id. at 276-77.
124. See e.g., Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir.
2001).
125.
828 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993), overruled on other grounds in Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88 (2000).

126.

Gammaro,828 F. Supp. at 674-75.

127.

Champ, 55 F.3d at 274.
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silent regarding classwide arbitration a provision permitting such a procedure. 28 The Champ court refused "to substitute our own notion of
fairness in place of the explicit terms of [the parties'] agreement."'' 29 The
Champ court referenced its obligation under the FAA to "enforce the
as they wrote it," even when doing so might create
parties' agreement
130
inefficiency.
Judge Rovner concurred with the result in Champ based upon the
premise that the courts lacked authority to order classwide arbitration,
but made some interesting assertions regarding the contract interpretation
issue that are consistent with the Bazzle court's interpretation of arbitration agreements that are silent regarding class action arbitration.
Judge
Rovner stated:
I attach less significance than the majority to the fact that the parties
have not spoken to this subject in the arbitration agreement they
signed. Class certification is a matter that parties rarely, if ever,
speak to in their contracts, even when they have made other provisions for the resolution of potential disputes. And, practically speaking, I doubt that class certification is something that corporate defendants who draft these agreements for their clients to sign would ever
consent to in writing; they typically have far more to gain by forcing
unhappy customers to bear the expense of arbitrating individually.
[Citations omitted.] Thus, I do not view silence in the arbitration
agreement as a bar to class certification. 132
Even prior to Bazzle, one commentator agreed with Judge Rovner's
construed siobservations, and found it striking that courts so readily
13 3
lence to preclude class arbitration rather than to permit it.
Several state courts followed these precedents, refusing to order the
consolidation of arbitration proceedings134 or to allow classwide arbitra128.
129.

Id. at 277.
Id. at 275 (citing Universal Reinsurance Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16 F.3d 125, 130 (7th

Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 277 (citations omitted).
131.
Id. at 277-78 (Rovner, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133.
Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 84, 86-87 (2000) (noting that such an approach
would involve "considerably less intrusion upon the contractual aspects of the relationship) [herein-

after Stemlight 1].
134. See e.g., Consol. Pac. Eng'g., Inc. v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 563 P.2d 252, 255
(Alaska 1977) (holding that court lacks power to order consolidation of arbitration proceedings
where arbitration agreement is silent regarding consolidation); Bateman Constr., Inc. v. Haitsuka
Bros., Ltd., 889 P.2d 58, 64 (Haw. 1995) (holding that court cannot consolidate arbitrations where
the arbitration agreement is silent regarding consolidation of arbitration); Pueblo of Laguna v. Cillessen & Son, Inc.. 682 P.2d 197, 199-200 (N.M. 1984); In re Cullman Ventures, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d

391, 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that court cannot consolidate arbitrations); Bay County
Bldg. Auth. v. Spence Bros., 362 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (noting trial court erred in
ordering consolidation of arbitrations where arbitration agreement was silent regarding
consolidation); S.K. Barnes, Inc. v. Valiquette, 597 P.2d 941, 943-44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (deny-
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tion, based on similar analyses.' 35 A notable exception is the First Circuit, which permits courts to consolidate arbitrations. In New England
Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 136 the First Circuit rejected the
contract interpretation rationale relied upon by Champ and cases following Champ.137 The Keystone court stated "We disagree that ordering
consolidation ... improperly modifies the agreement [especially] when
the language of the arbitration clause is broad, and in no way suggests
limits on the subjects or parties to the agreed-upon arbitration," and concluded "arbitration is still arbitration even if it is consolidated arbitration."' 138 The Keystone court held that where arbitration contracts are
silent regarding consolidation, "[u]nquestionably, there is no intent manifested against consolidation,"' 139 and concluded that the lower court had
not abused its discretion by consolidating the matters.1t4 As discussed
below, after examining the language of an arbitration agreement similar
to that construed by these federal and state authorities, 41 and without
discussion of these precedents, the Bazzle plurality concluded that the
contract interpretation issue was not so obvious. 142

ing consolidation of arbitration proceedings based upon both the lack of court power and the silence
of the arbitration clause regarding consolidation); I DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION § 32:3
(2003).
135. See e.g., Med. Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (denying class wide
arbitration based upon the contract interpretation rationale, citing Champ); Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 94-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (ordering individual arbitration and
rejecting class arbitration based upon a silent arbitration clause premised upon the rationale that
interests in enforcing arbitration prevail over those favoring class actions, and also based upon
contract interpretation rationale).
136. 855 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1988).
137. New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5.
138. New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 5.
139. Id.at 7.
140. Id. at 8.
141.
The arbitration provision in Champ is not quoted in the Seventh Circuit's decision, but is
referenced in an earlier superseded decision as broad as the agreement in Bazzle. Champ v. Siegel
Trading Co., Inc. 132 F.R.D. 51, n. I (N.D. Ill. 1990), vacated on reconsideration in Perera v. Siegel
Trading Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1992). The provision in Gammaro is arguably as broad as
the agreement in Bazzle. The Gammaro arbitration clause provided that:
You and ITT Financial Services agree that, other than judicial foreclosures and cancellations regarding real estate security, any dispute, past, present, or future, between us or
claim by either against the other or any agent or affiliate of the other, whether related to
your loan, products you purchase from or through 1fr Financial Services, or otherwise
shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the National Arbitration Forum, Minneapolis, Minnesota ....
Gammaro, 15 F.3d at 94.
The arbitration provision in Johnson was equally broad, providing:
You and we agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy between us ... and any claim
arising from or relating to this Note, no matter by whom or against whom... including
the validity of this Note and of this agreement to arbitrate disputes as well as claims alleging fraud or misrepresentation shall be resolved by binding arbitration by and under
the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000).
142.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Bazzle indicated that the
court should construe the arbitration provision that is silent regarding class wide arbitration against
the drafter. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (2002), vacated and remanded by
Bazzle, 539 U.S 444 (2003).
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C. CorporateDraftersLeveraged the Authority ProhibitingClasswide
Arbitration, Provoking an UnconscionabilityBacklash

Businesses seeking to prevent class actions relied upon the Champ
line of authority prohibiting class actions in arbitration and implemented
a strategy of utilizing arbitration clauses to eliminate corporate exposure
to class action litigation. 143 Where plaintiffs alleged a class action, and
the corporate defendant sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement containing an arbitration clause silent regarding classwide arbitration, despite the general policies favoring both
class actions and arbitration, courts frequently ordered plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims individually and dismissed the class action claims. 144 In
doing so, these courts often rejected the argument that the arbitration
clause was invalid because it effectively precluded class arbitration and
ordered the non-class arbitration of the claims. 145 Because the arbitration
piece of the agreement remained enforceable, these courts relied upon
the strong policy favoring arbitration according to the agreement of the
parties. 14 Plaintiffs found the prospect of pursuing small dollar amount
claims in arbitration uneconomical. 147 Accordingly, corporate defendants
relying upon arbitration clauses that were silent regarding classwide arbitration could often escape liability entirely. One rationale expressed for
enforcing individual arbitration of claims was that a consumer could otherwise circumvent an agreement to arbitrate by bringing her claim on
behalf of the general public. 148 Such an exception would plainly undermine Congress's policy to promote the enforceability of such agreements. 14 9 Thus, the ability to avoid class actions
became a prime motiva50
tion for some businesses to utilize arbitration.
A second generation of arbitration clauses, referred to as "class action waivers" or "no-class action clauses," avoided the risk of a finding
143.
KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220; Hans Smit, Arbitral & Judicial Decision: Class
Actions in Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 175, 175-76 (2003); BENNETT, supra note 34, at

162-63.
144.
KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp.
77, 80 (D. Conn. 1996); Coleman v. Nat'l Movie-Dine, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (E. D. Pa.
1978).
145.

KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220.

146. Id. at 221-22 (discussing Champ, 55 F.3d 269 and Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione
S.p.A. v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999).
147. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (Spring 1997).
148.
KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 220.

149.

Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, Inc., 1993 WL 307747 *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993).

150.

Carroll E. Neesemann, Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the Class Action? Yes:

Permitting Courts to Strike Bar on Class Actions in Otherwise Clean Clause Would Discourage Use
of Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 15 (Spring 2002); Jean R. Stemlight, Should an Arbitration
Provision Trump the Class Action? No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions Through
Mandatory Arbitration Would be Dangerousand Unwise, DiSP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 18 (Spring 2002)
[hereinafter Stemlight i]; Ware I, supra note 9, at 94; Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th

1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (describing the strategy of using prohibitions on class actions combined with arbitration clauses as creating "virtual immunity" from small claims regardless of merit).
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that silent arbitration clauses might be construed as ambiguous regarding
classwide arbitration by expressly excluding class actions from arbitration.'15 Bazzle did not address such clauses, but many lower courts enforce them. Furthermore, some commentators predict that arbitration
clauses including express prohibitions of classwide arbitration will remain enforceable, particularly where such clauses are not combined with
additional factors rendering the arbitration clause vulnerable to an unconscionability determination.152 Other commentators suggest that drafting an enforceable class action waiver
is the best remedy for businesses
53
to counteract the effect of Bazzle.

But the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the enforceability of class

action waivers or no-class action clauses. 54 In addition, the practice of
including such clauses in arbitration agreements increases the risk that
the class action waiver will not be enforced given recent decisions find155
public policy, 56
ing such provisions unconscionable, or void as against
57
particularly in the context of consumer arbitration.
Most federal courts, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, 158 reject the proposition that clauses expressly precluding class arbitration are
unconscionable on the grounds that the courts are "obliged to enforce the
type of arbitration to which [the] parties agreed."1 59 Some state courts

151.
These clauses are often referred to as "no-class action" clauses or "class action waivers."
152.
Neesemann, supra note 150, at 15.
153.
Smit, supra note 143, at 176; Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Arbitration Update:
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle-Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners,59 Bus.
LAW. 1265, 1272 (May, 2004).
154.
Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at 1272 (arguing that at least three Justices believe
that the FAA would preempt a determination that a class action waiver is unconscionable and that
four Justices would enforce a class action waiver).
155.
Kevin M. Kennedy & Bethany Appleby, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: A New
Day for Class Arbitrations?, 23 FRANCHISE L.J. 84, 86 (2003); See, e.g., Lytle v. Citifinancial
Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 665-66 (Pa. 2002) (rejecting the argument that the severable no-class
action provisions in the parties' arbitration agreement were unconscionable and violated public
policy, due to lack of evidence indicating plaintiffs would be precluded from effectively vindicating
their claims without a class arbitration, but allowing trial court to consider evidence on remand
regarding the costs of arbitration).
156.
IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITrRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 18.9.2 (Supp. 1994) ("There is much to
commend" courts holding that arbitration agreements prohibiting class actions are void as against
public policy, because "such provisions certainly thwart the broad pro-arbitration policies of the
FAA.").
"4
157.
Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure
Plaintiffs' Lawyers (but Undermine Federal Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce "No-Class
Action '"Clauses in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW. 1289 (May 2003).
158.
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to enforce an express noclass action clause in an arbitration agreement on the grounds that doing so would leave consumers
without any effective method of vindicating certain categories of claims).
159.
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc. 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002). See also Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note
153, at 1270 (noting all federal courts except the Ninth Circuit enforce clauses expressly waiving
class actions).
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160
take the position that an express class action waiver is enforceable.
Other state courts have voided or refused to enforce arbitration clauses
denying arbitrators the right to hear a class action claim, finding the provision unconscionable, 161 often because the inability to pursue class actions in arbitration effectively eliminates the ability of consumers to enforce their rights.' 62 Recent decisions holding a prohibition on classwide
arbitration unconscionable often arise in the consumer context. Arguably, because of the small dollar amounts in controversy, a class action is
the only practical means of vindicating the consumers' rights, therefore
denying classwide arbitration is unconscionable. 163 Some commentators
have proposed declaring binding arbitration clauses prima facie unconscionable.' 64 Reflecting the uncertainty of the law in this area, JAMS, a
major arbitration provider, announced that it would not enforce class
action waivers in consumer
arbitration agreements; shortly thereafter,
165
JAMS reversed its policy.

Although the majority of federal and state authority prior to Bazzle
prohibited classwide arbitration, some states and the First Circuit permitted consolidated or classwide arbitrations. 166 Now that Bazzle has
opened the door for classwide arbitration as discussed in Part VI below,
it is appropriate to reconsider the minority state and federal authority
160. Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Lozano v.
AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076-77 (C.D. Cal. 2002); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy,
105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App. 2003); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 896
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), Edelist v.
MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1261 (Del, Super. Ct. 2001); Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp.,
786 A.2d 886, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.
App. 4th 42, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding class arbitration is available only in "the absence of an
express agreement not to proceed to arbitration on a classwide basis").
161.
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 4th 326, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert.
granted, 65 P.3d 1285 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the FAA preempts state court from applying state
substantive law to strike class action waivers from arbitration agreements); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l
Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087,
1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.) Nat'l Assoc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380,
386 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 65 P.3d 1284 (Cal. 2003) (holding that term prohibiting
class action in arbitration was unconscionable); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576-77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. CL App.
2002); West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W. Va. 2002).
162. BENNETr, supra note 34, at 163; In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 828-29 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
163.
Kennedy & Appleby, supra note 155, at 86; See Szetela, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1101; BellSouth Mobility LLC v. Christopher, 819 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
contract precluding class action relief held substantively unconscionable on its face).
164. Paul D. Carington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361, 379 (2002);
Marissa Dawn Lawson, Judicial Economy at What Cost? An Argument for Finding Binding Arbitration Clauses Prima Facie Unconscionable,23 REv. LmG. 463, 486 (2004).
165.
Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to Ensure Fairness in Consumer Arbitrations
(November 12, 2004) (announcing policy not to enforce class action waivers in consumer arbitration
agreements); Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms Commitment to Neutrality Through Withdrawal of Class Action Arbitration Waiver Policy (March 10, 2005) (announcing withdrawal of the
policy due to the suggestion that JAMS "had deviated from its core value of neutrality").
166. New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988); Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Ga. 1978); Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613
(Cal. 1982); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. 1977); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. 1991).
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permitting classwide arbitration, particularly the hybrid model used in
California and several other jurisdictions. Now that classwide arbitration
is a reality, should arbitrators and arbitration providers adopt or accommodate the hybrid model of classwide arbitration as the AAA Rules do?
Or, does Bazzle also implicitly negate the hybrid model of classwide
arbitration? Moreover, given the vast scope of preemption of federal
arbitration law, is the hybrid model still legally viable? Or, must it be
abandoned? The next Part describes the history of the hybrid model, and
succeeding Parts consider these questions.
IV.

STATE EXPERIMENTATION WITH CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION: THE

"HYBRID" MODEL

This Part discusses one form of state experimentation with classwide arbitration, the "hybrid" model, which originated with the California Supreme Court's decision in Keating v. Superior Court.167 Under the
hybrid system, courts have discretion to decide whether a case is appropriate for classwide arbitration, and they retain jurisdiction over the dispute while the merits are arbitrated, allowing courts to remain involved
in the class-related aspects of the case. 168 In Keating, the court explained
that classwide arbitration would entail a greater degree of judicial involvement than normally associated with arbitration, which is ideally "a
complete proceeding, without resort to court facilities. 169 Instead, the
Keating court indicated that in classwide arbitration, the trial court
should make the initial determinations regarding certain class-related
issues such as class certification, notice to the class, and exercise external
safeguard the absent class
supervision over the litigation, in order to
17
members' right to adequate representation. 0
Other courts 17 following Keating v2 indicated that, in the hybrid
model, courts (not arbitrators) should handle issues involving class certification, proper notice, review of proposed settlements, and conflicts
among class representatives as to the selection of arbitrators. 173 For example, Lewis v. Prudential-BacheSecurities'" approved class arbitra-

tion in a securities fraud case, but reserved for the court the determina75
tions regarding certification of the class and notice to class members.
Echoing the historic concern regarding arbitrator qualifications to handle
167. 31 Cal. 3d 584 (Cal. 1982).
168. Sternlight I, supra note 133, at 39-40.
169. Id. at 40 (citing Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209).
170. Id.
171.
Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Lewis
v. Prudential Bache Sec., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
172. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 613.
Sternlight I, supra note 133, at 40; Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d
173.
860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
174.
179 Cal. App. 3d 935 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
175. Lewis, 179 Cal. App. at 945-46.
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complex substantive matters, the defendant in Lewis argued that the
"procedural complexities" associated with a class action would under176
Given
mine the benefits that are typically derived from arbitration.
that the alternative to class arbitration was to force each Prudential customer to arbitrate their claims individually, and the fact that the claims
were modest in amount, the court concluded that the "case appears to
offer no great difficulty in adapting arbitration to fit the class action
mold, with adequatejudicial supervision over the class aspects. "177 The
court characterized the possibility of forcing individual Prudential customers to arbitrate their claims individually as "so grossly unfair as to
justify structuring arbitration on a class basis in spite of the difficulty it
may present."' 178 Without extensive analysis or authority beyond citation
to Keating, Lewis concluded that "[tihere appear to be no factors hindering class arbitration of this dispute" and appointed the AAA to arbitrate
the matter, reserving for the court's determination the issues of notice
and class certification. 179 Notably, the court stated that Prudential "does
not suggest how the court's supervision over the class aspects will render
the arbitration unmanageable or impractical."'' 80 The court also retained
jurisdiction to supervise the case "as is necessary to safeguard the interests of the absent class members."' 81
Subsequent California cases, such as Izzi v. Mesquite Country
Club, 82 also followed the hybrid model, carving out in classwide arbitration a variety of continuing roles for the court and allowing courts to stay
the arbitration in order to determine "class action issues, including certification of the class, provision of notice and any discovery problems involved therein."' 83 Alternatively, one California court indicated that
courts may, in their discretion, order arbitration and reserve jurisdiction
over class action-related issues, and could "at least in the first instance"
184
In Izzi, the Court oborder such issues determined by the arbitrator.
served that "arbitrators are authorized by law" to determine such issues
and speculated that the court could "delegate" the class action issues to
the arbitrator, allowing the arbitrator to rule upon certification and notice
"subject to due process review by the court" in order to "enhance the
185
The court acknowlintegrity and autonomy of classwide arbitration."'
edged that the "due process review" of the arbitrator's decisions could
result in the disruption of the proceedings. Thus, "judicial determination
of the class action problems would seem preferable" to delegation of the
176.

Id.

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
186 Cal. App. 3d 1309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Izzi, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1322.
Id. at 1322 n.6.
Id.
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class action aspects of the litigation to the arbitrator,
"at least until
186
greater experience with these problems has been had."
More recently, in Sanders v. Kinko's, Inc.,187 an appellate court affirmed the order of a trial court staying arbitration in order to permit the
court to address the class action-related issues, including the certification
of the class, prior to sending the case to arbitration.' 88 In Cruz v. Pacificare Health Systems, Inc.,189 the California Supreme Court carved out yet
another role for courts in class actions, anticipating in dicta "that courts
may find it appropriate to become involved in supervising the equitable
distribution of assets resulting from a class recovery." 190 However, the
opinion further stated that courts should "do so without becoming in'1 9
volved in the merits of the underlying dispute." '
California is not alone in its experimentation with the hybrid model
of classwide arbitration. In one of the early decisions permitting classwide arbitration, a Pennsylvania court held that classwide arbitration was
not precluded by virtue of an arbitration clause that did not contain an
express provision precluding classwide arbitration.' 92 In Dickler v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 93 the Pennsylvania Superior Court followed the California model. The Dickler court held that the device of
classwide arbitration best addressed two important interests. From the
defense's perspective, Dickler held that classwide arbitration resulted in
the enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes. 194
Balancing this, from the plaintiffs perspective, classwide arbitration
provided an economically viable alternative that preserved the deterrent
effects and leverage available to plaintiffs from utilization of the class
action device. 195 Dickler also required that the trial court handle the class
certification issues and supervise the notice, but did not expressly adopt
the due process rationale of Keating and its progeny. 96 Instead, again
echoing historic concerns, Dickler indicated that arbitrators were "probably not equipped nor appropriate for the task of class certification" be-

186.
187.

Id.
99 Cal. App. 4th 1106 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

188.
189.

Sanders, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 110.
30 Cal. 4th 303 (Cal. 2003). This case was decided with Bazzle pending. Id. at 319 n.5.

190.
Id. at 319. The court distinguished judicial supervision and continuing enforcement of a
public injunction, which it held was inarbitrable. (citation omitted).
191.
Id.

192.
Coleman v. Nat'l Movie-Dine, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 945, 948 (E.D. Pa 1978). Since this
decision, both the NYSE and the NASD have added provisions to their rules providing that claims
submitted for arbitration as class actions are not eligible for arbitration. IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL.,
supra note 156, § 18.9.2.
193.
194.
195.

596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 867.
Id.

196.

Id.
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323

cause their orders are unreviewable 9rior to a final award and because
they lacked broad subpoena powers.'
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the hybrid
model of classwide arbitration. However, an inherent tension exists between the lack of confidence in the arbitral process underlying the hybrid
model and the Supreme Court's preference for arbitration, as is discussed
further below.
V. THE BAZZLE DECISION

A. FactualBackground
The facts involved two separate contracts entered into by Bazzle,
Lackey and the Buggses with Green Tree Financial Corp. 198 As in
Southland/Keating, the respondents filed separate state court actions
against Green Tree, and the plaintiff, Bazzle, moved for class certification. 199 Meanwhile, "Green Tree sought to stay the court proceedings
and compel arbitration." 2 ° In the case brought by Bazzle, the state trial
court certified the class and compelled arbitration,(a procedure similar
to what one might expect under the hybrid model of classwide arbitration) and the arbitrator eventually awarded the class damages and attorneys' fees (later confirmed by the trial court).20 '
The Lackeys and the Buggses also sought class certification, and
"Green Tree moved to compel arbitration. 2 °2 The trial court initially
found the parties' agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.20 3 The state appeals court reversed that decision, however, and the parties selected the
same arbitrator later chosen to arbitrate the Bazzle dispute.2 ° In the
05
Lackey/Buggs action, the arbitrator, not the court, certified the class.2
The arbitrator then proceeded to approve a class notice that was sent to
class members, define the membership of the Lackey/Buggs class, 2°6 and
and attorneys' fees 207 (ultimately confirmed
eventually award 20damages
by the trial court). 8
Thus, while the trial court issued the order in the Bazzle matter
granting class certification, and the arbitrator then conducted the class
arbitration proceedings "without further involvement of the trial
197.

Id. at 866 n.5.

198.

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448-49 (2003).

199.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 449.

200.

Id.

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

205.

Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E. 2d 349, 354 (S.C. 2002).

206.
207.
208.

Green Tree, 569 S.E. 2d at 354.
Id.
Id.
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court," 2°9 the arbitrator in the Lackey/Buggs matter determined that a
class action should proceed within the arbitration, and handled the notice
and certification issues, after interpreting the arbitration clause drafted by
Green Tree. 210 Thus, in the Lackey/Buggs action, the trial court operated
consistently with the pure (non-hybrid) model of classwide arbitration,
while in the Bazzle action, the trial court operated more consistently with
the hybrid model in which the court resolves the class-related issues before sending the matter to arbitration on the merits.
B. The South CarolinaSupreme Court's Decision

The South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both cases from the
appeals court, assumed jurisdiction, and held that the parties' contractual
silence regarding class arbitration permitted classwide arbitration, in the
discretion of the trial court, where such a procedure would serve efficiency and not result in prejudice to the parties.21 The South Carolina
Supreme Court also held that the trial court acted appropriately in ordering classwide arbitration where the parties' agreement was silent regarding classwide arbitration. 212 Lacking United States Supreme Court
precedent regarding classwide arbitration, the South Carolina Supreme
Court examined both the Champ213approach and the California (hybrid)
approach to classwide arbitration.
On the contract interpretation issue, the South Carolina Supreme
Court cited the strong policy favoring arbitration and the principle that
contracts are construed against the drafter. 1 4 The court found that the
contract was silent regarding classwide arbitration and that language
relied upon by Green Tree as precluding classwide arbitration215 at most
created an ambiguity.2 16 Construing the ambiguity against the drafter,217
the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the Champ approach and
instead followed the approach taken by the California courts in21 9Keating
21s
and the Blue Cross of Californiav. Superior Court

decisions.

The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the arbitrator did not
act with manifest disregard of the law when certifying the class because
the issue of classwide arbitration was unsettled at the time the arbitrator
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 352.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453-54.
Id.; Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 360.

212.
213.
214.

Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 358.

215.

Id. at 359. Green Tree relied upon the language providing for arbitration of "disputes,

claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract, or the relationships which result
from this contract"as creating a limitation on classwide arbitration. Id.
216. Id.
217.
Id. at 360.
218.
Keating, 31 Cal. 3d 584 (Cal. 1982); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.App.
4th 42, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
219.
Green Tree, 569 S.E. 2d at 360.
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ruled.2'0 Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the claim
arbitration violated the due process rights
by Green Tree that classwide
22
of absent class members.

The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision made no explicit distinction between the hybrid model employed in the Bazzle action and the
pure arbitral model employed in the Lackey/Buggs action. The decision
affirmed both procedures, and implicitly endorsed the California model,
without specifically adopting the hybrid aspects of that model.222 As
discussed below, the United States Supreme Court's decision offered no
explicit discussion regarding whether a hybrid or pure model of classwide arbitration is appropriate, but implicitly rejected the hybrid model.
C. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the case to the arbitrator.223 In doing
so, the Court indicated that the issue of contract interpretation, to wit,
whether the parties' arbitration agreement was silent regarding classwide
arbitration or whether the agreement, as Green Tree argued, precluded
22 4
classwide arbitration, was "a matter for the arbitrator to decide."
Although the Court did not address the distinction between the hybrid model of classwide arbitration used in Bazzle and the pure model of
classwide arbitration used in Lackey/Buggs, the Court's decision implicitly endorsed a pure model of arbitration by reserving the decision for the
arbitrator.225 At the same time, the determination implicitly rejected the
hybrid model that would have reserved the issue of the contract interpretation along with other issues concerning the class-related aspects of the
matter, including certification and notice, for the trial courts.
Similar to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Keating,
the Bazzle decision did not address the subject of due process in classwide arbitration, leaving the issue for another day.226 Nor did the deciId. at 361-62.
220.
Id. at 362 (holding that Green Tree had failed to preserve the issue for appeal, but opining
221.
that at any rate, "Green Tree has not articulated precisely how it believes the class members' due
process rights have been violated[,]" and opining in dicta that "the class members' rights appear to
have been properly protected by the notice given to all of them[,]" noting that Green Tree had the
opportunity to object to the notice and failed to do so).
Id. at 360.
222.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.
223.
Id. at 447.
224.
Id. at 453.
225.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution prohibit the government from
226.
depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Outside of the classwide arbitration context, because there is no

state action involved in arbitration, due process is not required. Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 119091 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that confirmation of arbitration award does not constitute state action
sufficient to trigger constitutional protections); Judge Lawrence Waddington, FederalizingArbitra-
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sion expressly address whether the arbitrator's decision to permit classwide arbitration would exceed the bounds of the arbitrator's power. 227
However, the plurality's determination that the arbitrator must make the
initial determination regarding whether classwide arbitration is proper
implicitly permits the arbitrator to find classwide arbitration appropriate.228

As to the contract interpretation issue, the plurality opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter, Scalia and Ginsburg, sided with
the South Carolina Supreme Court rather than the Champ line of authority. 22 9 Justice Breyer's opinion indicated that, because the parties agreed
to submit for arbitration "[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to [their] contract or the relationships which result from
[the] contract," the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate permits or
prohibits classwide arbitration (as opposed to an individual arbitration)
was a matter for the arbitrator, not a judge, to decide. 230 This is so, he
reasoned, because "the parties seem to have agreed that an arbitrator, not
a judge, would answer the relevant question. ' 23 1 Agreeing with the
South Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Breyer relied upon the longstanding principle that courts should resolve 232
doubts concerning the scope of
'
arbitrable issues "in favor of arbitration."
Although the dissent agreed with Green Tree that the contract itself
precluded classwide arbitration, Justice Breyer did not agree that the
contract was as clear as the dissenters believed. 233 Despite the plurality's
tion-The Development of ArbitrationLaw Offers a Classic Example of the Clash between Federal

Supremacy and State Sovereignty, Los Angeles Lawyer, 26 Sep L.A. Law. 30, 31-32, 35 (Sept.
2003); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 369, 393 (2004) (citing Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
1460, 1468 (N.D. I11. 1997) and Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc. 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Commentators assert that due process is required in arbitration. Harding, at 394-95; Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 577, 590 (1997); Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof the Supreme Court's

Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due ProcessConcerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 40-47 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight IM].
227.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451 (indicating by plurality only that the contract's language is not as
clear as Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggests and that the contract interpretation is not completely
obvious). As discussed below, these determinations leave open the possibility that arbitrators will

interpret such agreements as permitting classwide arbitration.
228.
Id. at 451-53. This conclusion follows from the premise that the arbitrator must make the
decision regarding whether classwide arbitration is permitted under the parties' agreement, and the
premise that the interpretation of an arbitration agreement silent regarding classwide arbitration is
"not completely obvious." Id. at 451.
229.
Although the plurality did not discuss the Champ line of authority, the determination that
the interpretation of the language of an arbitration agreement that is silent regarding classwide arbi-

tration is "not completely obvious," Id. at 451, directly contradicts the holding in Champ that an
arbitration clause that is silent regarding classwide arbitration must be interpreted not to permit
classwide arbitration. Champ v. Seigel Trading Co. Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995).
230.
231.
232.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
Id.
Id. at 452 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.

614, 626 (1985)).
233.

Id. at 450-51.
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ultimate conclusion that the contract interpretation question was a matter
to be determined by the arbitrator, the plurality offers its own take regarding an alternate interpretation of the arbitration clause.234 Here it is
important to examine the express language of the contract, which provided that disputes "shall be resolved . . . by one arbitrator selected by
235
... [Green Tree] with [the] consent of... [Green Tree's customer].
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the dissenters interpreted the contract provision to preclude classwide arbitration because to do otherwise would
ignore the terms of the parties' contract to the extent that classwide arbitration would preclude the parties, specifically here Green Tree, from
selecting the arbitrator in each case. 6
Writing for the plurality, Justice Breyer disagreed that the contract's
language was quite so clear and found that "the answer to this question is
not completely obvious. 237 He noted that Green Tree in fact did select
the class arbitrator with the consent of its customers, and that "insofar as
the other class members agreed to proceed in class arbitration, they consented as well. 238 Justice Breyer observed that "[t]he contracts do not
say 'selected by ... [Green Tree] to arbitrate this dispute and no other
(even identical) dispute with another customer. ' '239 In other words, consistent with the South Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Breyer's opinion
the arbitration clause did not explicitly nerelies heavily on the fact that
24
gate classwide arbitration. 0
Justice Breyer also relied upon the "broad authority the contracts
elsewhere bestow upon the arbitrator," including "'all powers,' including
certain equitable powers 'provided by the law and the contract,"' in support of the conclusion that one cannot directly infer from the silence of
the parties regarding classwide arbitration the conclusion that the parties
24 1
intended to preclude the arbitrator from ordering classwide arbitration.
The negative implication of these comments regarding the issue of con234.
235.

Id.
Id. at 450 (first, third, and sixth alterations in original).

236.
237.
238.

Id. at 458-459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 451.
Id.

239.
Id.
240.
Contracts explicitly negating classwide arbitration have been upheld as enforceable by a
number of courts. KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 219-20; Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at

1270. But other courts find such provisions are unconscionable, Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126,
1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002)); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002); West Virginia ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W. Va. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. 91 F.
Supp. 2d 1087, 1104-05 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.), Nat'l Ass'n., 129
Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted65 P.3d 1284 (Cal. 2003) (holding that
term prohibiting class action in arbitration was unconscionable); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d

570, 576-577 (Fla. Dist.
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); cf.,
App. 2003) (holding that
class action waivers from
241.

Ct. App. 1999); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 408-09 (Cal. Ct.
the FAA preempts state court from applying state substantive law to strike
arbitration agreements), cert. granted 65 P.3d 1285 (Cal. 2003).

Bazzle. 539 U.S. at 451.
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tract interpretation is that a clause that does not expressly negate classwide arbitration implicitly allows for the possible imposition of such a
procedure by the arbitrator. Corporate drafters who previously put stock
in this more subtle contract interpretation argument must now resort to
drafting express no-class action provisions in order to continue to preserve arbitration while avoiding class actions within arbitration. 242 This
is so even though such language creates some risk that the entire arbitration provision will be deemed unconscionable in some jurisdictions, as
discussed above. 4 3

Distinguishing the question of classwide arbitration from "gateway
issues" typically decided by a court, the Bazzle plurality decided that an
arbitrator should rule on the appropriateness of classwide arbitration. 244
The Court in Bazzle arguably made the initial determination that the
agreement did not clearly prohibit classwide arbitration.245 Under the
Bazzle opinion's ultimate holding, this issue is for the arbitrator, not the
court to determine.2 46 Accordingly, if the arbitration agreement did
clearly prohibit classwide arbitration, this determination would still be
for the arbitrator, not the court.247 However, the ambiguity created by the

opinion leaves open for argument the scope of the court's jurisdiction. If
the court, and not the arbitrator, should make the initial determination
regarding whether the agreement clearly prohibits classwide arbitration, 248 perhaps other 249
issues pertaining to the arbitration should also be
addressed by the court.
Additional language in Justice Breyer's opinion creates limitations
on the role of the courts and expands the role of the arbitrator, moving
the law toward a pure arbitral model for classwide arbitration. Bazzle
reserves the role of the courts in addressing certain gateway matters including whether a valid arbitration agreement exists at all and whether an
arbitration clause applies to a particular controversy. 250 However, Justice
Breyer distinguishes this power of the courts from the instant matter
which he characterizes as "what kind of arbitrationproceeding the parties agreed to," a matter he indicates "concerns contract interpretation
242.

See supra Part II, C.

243. See supra Part III, C.
244. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
245. Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355,
359 (5th Cir. 2003).
246.

Pedcor,343 F.3d at 360 (observing the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's plurality opin-

ion in Bazzle, and concluding that, even if the arbitration agreement on its face precluded arbitration,
under the reasoning of the plurality opinion, "arbitrators could ... make [that] call [regarding enforceability] without... prior analysis by a court.").
247. Id.
248.
KAPLINSKY, supra note 118, at 251.
249.
Lender's counsel Alan Kaplinsky raises the question of whether, after Bazzle, only an
arbitrator can determine the unconscionability of an arbitration clause, whether based upon prohibi-

tion of class action suits or for other reasons. Id. The Pedcor interpretation of the Bazzle plurality
opinion would support such a procedure.
250. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452.
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and arbitration procedures" that "[a]rbitrators are well situated" to handle. 251 Thus, Bazzle allocates to the arbitrator a broad range of procedural matters involving what type of arbitration should occur.25 2
The comments of the plurality regarding the contract interpretation
issue are significant because, as discussed below, they validate an alternate contract interpretation that would allow for an arbitrator to interpret
a similar clause to permit classwide arbitration. The plurality's contract
interpretation is arguably dicta, given that the decision delegates the responsibility for the contract interpretation to the arbitrator.253 But, as
discussed further below, the dicta may effectively preclude challenge to
decisions by arbitrators ordering classwide arbitration by providing support for the argument that an arbitrator's award permitting classwide
arbitration does not manifestly disregard the law, is not arbitrary or capricious, and does not violate public policy, and therefore, should not be
vacated.254
Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the arbitrator, since the court had made the determination regarding classwide arbitration in the underlying Bazzle case, and because, although the arbitrator
did make the determination regarding the appropriateness of class arbitration in the underlying Lackey/Buggs matter, the Supreme Court believed that the Bazzle court's determination certifying a class may have
influenced the Lackey/Buggs arbitrator's determination that classwide
arbitration was appropriate.2 55 Accordingly, the Court remanded the
matter for a determination by the arbitrator (independent of the Court) to
determine whether classwide arbitration is appropriate.256
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the South
Carolina Supreme Court that under South Carolina state law, class action
arbitrations were permissible where the parties' arbitration agreement
was silent.257 Justice Stevens' opinion also acknowledges that there is
nothing in the FAA that would preclude a decision by the South Carolina
Supreme Court permitting classwide arbitration. 258 Justice Stevens characterizes the decision to conduct a class action arbitration as "correct as a
251. Id. at 452-53.
252. Peter J. Kreher and Pat D. Robertson Ill, Case Comment, Substance, Process and the
Future of Class Arbitration, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 409, 414 (2004). As mentioned above, following Bazzle, two of the three major arbitration providers adopted specific procedures for classwide
arbitration.
253.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.

254. Review of arbitrators' decisions is limited as provided under section 10 and 11 of the
FAA, and to a narrow scope of judicial review under certain court created exceptions, as discussed
further below.
255.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53. The Court observed that the Lackey plaintiffs argued that the
arbitrator should impose classwide arbitration because the state trial court had done so earlier in the
Bazzle matter.

256.
257.

Id. at 454.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).

258.

Id. at 454-55.
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matter of law;" accordingly he voted to affirm the judgment, providing a
fifth vote endorsing classwide arbitration. 259 Justice Stevens' opinion
provided further support for an arbitrator's decision permitting classwide
arbitration by helping to establish that such a determination did not violate public policy per se, is not arbitrary or capricious, and did not manifestly disregard the law.26°

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
dissented on the grounds that the decision regarding whether classwide
arbitration was appropriate was one for the Court and not the arbitrator.26 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning hinges on the provision of the
arbitration agreement that disputes would be resolved "by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us [Green Tree] with consent of
you. ' 262 He asserts that the determination by the South Carolina Supreme Court allowing a class action within arbitration ignored the terms
of the parties' contract to the extent that classwide arbitration would preclude one of the parties, specifically Green Tree, from selecting a separate and different arbitrator for each individual arbitration with each consumer. 263 Therefore, the dissenting Justices concluded that the FAA provisions requiring enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate preempted any classwide arbitration where the result would be to deny
Green Tree's contractual right to select a separate arbitrator for each dispute .2
Justice Thomas provided a sixth vote for leaving undisturbed the
South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion permitting classwide arbitration
265
on the grounds that the FAA is not applicable to the states.
D. Beyond Bazzle
Several cases following Bazzle implicitly acknowledge and directly
advance the trend toward a pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration
by directing cases to the arbitrator for decisions regarding not only
whether a class action is permissible pursuant to the parties' agreement,
but also for decisions implementing classwide arbitration, such as class
certification. These decisions signal the forthcoming widespread adoption of a pure model of classwide arbitration, and the demise of the hybrid model.
In Pedcor Management Company, Inc. v. Nations Personnel of
Texas, Inc.,216 the Fifth Circuit, applying Bazzle, interpreted an arbitra259.
260.
261.

Id. at 455.
See infra Part VI, B, 1.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

262.
263.
264.

Id. at 458.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 459-60.

265.

Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tion clause silent regarding classwide arbitration to require that the matter be submitted to the arbitrator to determine the appropriateness of
classwide arbitration. 267 At the trial court level, the court certified the
class in preparation for arbitration. 68 Pedcor interpreted the plurality
decision in Bazzle by closely examining the bases for the fifth vote, as
expressed in Justice Stevens' opinion, and found several points critical. 269 First, Justice Stevens would have permitted the class arbitration in
Bazzle to stand.27 ° Secondly, Justice Stevens also stated that the decision
regarding "the interpretation of the parties' agreement should have been
made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court."2 7 '
Thus, Pedcor read Justice Stevens' opinion
in Bazzle as providing the
272
fifth vote favoring classwide arbitration.
Pedcor interpreted Bazzle's contract interpretation analysis broadly.
Pedcor reads Bazzle to hold that the contract provision "reflected the
parties' intent to commit a broad scope of questions to arbitration, including the class arbitration question because that issue 'relat[ed] to the
contract.' 273 In contrast to some who have decried the Bazzle decision
as muddled, the Pedcor opinion cites "[t]he clarity" of the Bazzle holding.274 In line with the reasoning in Bazzle, the Pedcor court concluded
that it was "'not 275completely obvious' whether the agreement forbids
class arbitration."
Pedcor questioned the language in the Bazzle decision, stating that
the Court "must deal . . . at the outset" with the possibility that the contracts expressly prohibit classwide arbitration.276 Instead, Pedcor indi-

cated this determination should, according to the holding in Bazzle, be
made by the arbitrator, not the court.277 Pedcor holds that "it should not

be necessary for a court to decide initially whether an arbitration agreement clearly forbids class arbitration., 27 8 Given this definition of the
arbitrator's role, arguably even a clause prohibiting classwide arbitration
should be sent to an arbitrator for a determination regarding the unconscionability of such a prohibition.
The Supreme Court of Texas in In re Wood 2 79 also broadly con-

strued the Bazzle decision when it ordered arbitration and "authorized the
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

272.
273.
274.
275.

276.
277.
278.
279.

343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
Pedcor,343 F.3d at 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 360 (citation omitted).
Id. at 359-60 (citation omitted).
Id. at 363.
Id. at 360.
140 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2004).
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arbitrator to decide the class action issue.''28° Initially, prior to the Bazzle
decision, the trial court in Wood directed the case to arbitration without
28
deciding the issue of class certification. ' The appellate court, implementing the hybrid approach, determined that the court should decide
whether the parties' arbitration agreement (which was silent regarding
282
The Texas Supreme
class certification) permitted class arbitration.
Court construed Bazzle as holding that "issues of class arbitration are for
the arbitrator to decide" and concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in
28 3
Recognizing
directing the trial court to determine class certification.
no distinction between the contract interpretation issue addressed in Bazzle, i.e., whether the contract permits classwide arbitration, and the distinct issue of whether the court or arbitrator determines class certification, the Texas Supreme Court construed Bazzle broadly as holding that
"arbitrators make class arbitration decisions" and "the arbitrator deter284
This intermines what the rules in effect governing arbitration are.
Bazitself.
Bazzle
than
further
a
step
holding
Bazzle
the
pretation takes
is
arbitration
classwide
whether
determine
arbitrator
zle requires that the
2 85
the
that
requires
further
Wood
permitted under the parties' agreement.
2 86
Wood is
arbitrator make the decision regarding class certification.
I expect
shift
the
consistent with the underlying rationale of Bazzle, and
classof
model
the law to take following Bazzle toward a pure arbitral
wide arbitration.
After over twenty years of exercising court discretion under the hybrid model of classwide arbitration, California case law is also yielding,
287
less readily, to Bazzle. In Garcia v. DirectTV, Inc. the California appellate court announced that until last year, California law permitted
courts to determine whether classwide arbitration was appropriate in any
particular case--"but no longer., 288 Garcia construes Bazzle more narrowly than either Pedcor or Wood. Garcia construes Bazzle to require
only that "the foundational issue-whether a particular arbitration
agreement prohibits class arbitrations-must (in FAA cases) henceforth
be decided by arbitrators. 289 Prior to the Bazzle decision, the trial court
in Garcia had determined that the court, and not the arbitrator, should
address the class action issues, including whether the agreement prohibited class arbitration. 290 The California Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Garcia, vacated the judgment in the case affirming the trial court's
280.
281.
282.
283.

In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368, 370.

284.
285.

Id. at 369-70.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.

286.
287.
288.

In re Wood, 140 S.w.3d at 369-70.
9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Garcia,9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191.

289.
290.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 192.
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order that the court would address the class action issues, stayed the case
pending Bazzle, and then remanded for further consideration.29' Following Bazzle, the Garcia court decided that the contract interpretation issue
must be determined by the arbitrator.292 On one issue, the Garcia court
reserved judgment, indicating that "[i]mplicit in Bazzle is the notion that,
absent a class action waiver, classwide arbitration is,2 roper under the
FAA-but the Supreme Court has yet to say that is so.
Because the Pedcor and Wood decisions are more consistent with a
pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration, as discussed below, I
anticipate that the law will continue moving in that direction. However,
in much the same way that the courts such as Garcia exhibit hesitation
regarding the adoption of a pure arbitral paradigm, the arbitration providers are responding to Bazzle in a variety of ways, as discussed in the
next section.
E. Arbitral Procedure:The ProvidersRespond
The reactions of the three major arbitration providers to classwide
arbitration have varied. This section discusses the response of the
American Arbitration Association (the "AAA"), the issuance of rules by
JAMS, and the decision of the National Arbitral Forum to proceed under
its existing rules which do not specifically address classwide arbitration.
The AAA promulgated the first set of classwide arbitration rules in
October 2003, following the Bazzle decision.294 The AAA rules mirror
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in many respects.2 95 At the same
time, the AAA rules accommodate the fact that adjudication will occur in
the arbitral setting in a variety of respects by providing, for example, that
notice to the class include the identity of the arbitrator. 296 The AAA will
not accept cases for arbitration where the arbitration clause expressly
prohibits classwide arbitration, unless a court so orders.297 The provisions of the AAA rules are designed to accommodate the hybrid model
of classwide arbitration by expressly permitting the arbitrator to take
direction from the court on class certification and other class-related is291.
292.

Id.
Id. at 196.

293.

Id. at 196 n.4.

294.
American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, available
at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
295.
The AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations provide requirements for class
certification similar to those set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), requirements for
the maintenance of a classwide arbitration that are similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(3), and authority for the arbitrator to approve settlements that is similar to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 23(e). Other provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 were omitted,
including the provision requiring the court to approve counsel.
296.
American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule
6(b)(7), availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
297.
American Arbitration Association, Policy on Class Arbitration, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21944.
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sues. 298 The AAA rules also allow for interim review of certain arbitral

rulings beyond the request for vacatur of a final award available under
the FAA, including review of the Clause Construction Award and the
299
Under the FAA, there is no authority to
Class Determination Award.
300 however, under the hybrid model, a court
conduct these reviews;
maintaining its jurisdiction over the class action-related aspects301 of the
arbitration could exercise its discretion to conduct such a review.
Arbitration provider JAMS also promulgated its rules for class action arbitrations. 3°2 These rules differ significantly from the AAA approach, in that, the JAMS Procedures allow the arbitration to proceed
under a pure arbitral paradigm, with the arbitrator interpreting the contract as authorized by Bazzle, as well as the class certification and all
class-related issues, including notice, through a final award, without requiring the interim reviews embedded in the AAA rules.30 3 Unlike the
AAA, JAMS will accept cases in which there is a class action waiver in
the arbitration clause, and will interpret the clause and rule upon its enforceability or unconscionability.3 4 Under the JAMS rules, courts will
review issues regarding the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the
arbitrator's handling of the class-related issues only if the arbitrator, in
his or her discretion, decides to set forth such determinations in a partial
final award subject to immediate court review.30 5 On the front end of the
process, the JAMS rules will permit the arbitrator to act in the broadest
possible manner, consistent with Bazzle, even including construing arbitration clauses that prohibit classwide arbitration. 3° Compared with the
298.

American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 1(c),

availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.

299.

In issuing the Class Determination Award, the arbitrator will determine whether to certify

a class for classwide arbitration. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitration, Rule 5(d), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
As discussed below, the review permitted under the FAA is limited to a motion to vacate a
300.

final arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).
See infra PartIV.
301.
302. JAMS Class Action Procedures, (Feb. 2005) available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/
classaction-print.asp.
Id. Under JAMS Class Action Procedures, (Feb. 2005), in the discretion of the Arbitrator,
303.
the Arbitrator's determinations regarding the construction of the arbitration clause and the certification of the class may be set forth in partial final awards subject to immediate court review. JAMS

Class Action Procedures, (Feb. 2005), Rule 2 and 3(c).
304. Id. at Rule 2. JAMS announced on November 12, 2004, that in consumer cases, JAMS
will not enforce clauses that waive consumer's rights to arbitrate their claims in a class action arbitration. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to Ensure Fairness in Consumer Arbitrations
(November 12, 2004). JAMS later reversed this position. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms
Commitment to Neutrality Through Withdrawal of Class Action Arbitration Waiver Policy (Mar. 10,

2005).
305.

Id.

306. At the ABA Annual Meeting Ultimate Arbitration Update session in August 2004, several
panelists and audience members expressed concern that an arbitrator would have a conflict of interest in deciding both clause construction and unconscionability issues, since the arbitrator's continued
employment in the matter in question depended upon the arbitrator's determination that a clause
silent regarding classwide arbitration in fact permitted the procedure or, in the case of an arbitration
provision prohibiting classwide arbitration, an arbitrator's ruling that a class action waiver was

unconscionable or violated public policy. Others speculated that arbitrators ruling that arbitration
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AAA rules, the JAMS procedures accommodate a narrower range of
court intrusion into the arbitral process.
Finally, the National Arbitral Forum arbitrators continue to proceed
under their own Code of Procedure, which at the present time does not
specifically address classwide arbitration.3 °7
VI.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION

In this Part, I examine the preemptive scope of federal arbitration
law as applied to classwide arbitration. After considering general principles of preemption and prior jurisprudence regarding the scope of FAA
preemption, I discuss several models of preemption analysis. In the following Part, I evaluate the continuing persuasiveness of the case law
prohibiting classwide arbitration, and the viability of both the pure and
hybrid models of classwide arbitration in light of these principles. 3 8
A. The Scope of Preemptionof FederalArbitrationLaw

Since the FAA provides no procedure regarding classwide arbitration, the question of whether classwide arbitration is preempted depends
upon the extent to which state arbitration law is preempted by federal
arbitration law; and this in turn involves balancing preemption principles
with federalism concerns. 3° Where federal and state laws conflict, under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 0 federal law preempts state
law; this is also true, to a certain extent, with the FAA. 3 ' The FAA does
not expressly preempt the entirety of state law regarding arbitration.3" 2
As to many aspects of arbitration, including classwide arbitration, the
FAA offers only "minimalist" guidance, leaving a "large penumbra" for
state law. 3 13 It is also well established that state arbitration provisions
clauses permitted classwide arbitration would find such a ruling a career ending determination, since
such arbitrators would never again be selected by businesses to arbitrate. Author's notes of presentation by Robert Davidson, Executive Director of JAMS Arbitration Practice at the August 2004 ABA
Annual Meeting Ultimate Arbitration Update (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with the author).
307.
The National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure can be located at http://www.arbforum.com/programs/code-new/. At the most recent ABA Annual Meeting session on the Ultimate

Arbitration Update, Edward C. Anderson, Managing Director for the National Arbitration Forum,
indicated that arbitrators with the NAF proceed under Rule 20 regarding classwide arbitration. Rule
20 provides that "[a]rbitrators have the powers provided by this Code, by the agreement of the Parties, and the applicable substantive law." Mr. Anderson advised the author that the NAF is considering whether to provide new rules regarding arbitration. Author's notes of presentation by Robert
Davidson, Executive Director of JAMS Arbitration Practice at the August 2004 ABA Annual Meeting Ultimate Arbitration Update (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with the author).
308.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397

(2004) [hereinafter Drahozal 11]; Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, ArbitrationFederalism: A
State Role in CommercialArbitration,54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002).

309.

Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 178.

310.
311.
312.
313.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
WARE I, supra note 15 at 38-39.
Drahozal nI, supra note 308, at 397-98.
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 178-79.
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can address "procedural" considerations involved in arbitration,31 4 but
only "subject to the general pro-arbitration policies articulated in the
FAA" and the "gravitational pull of the FAA's pro-arbitration imperative."3'15

The Supreme Court established the "preemptive core" 316 of the federal arbitration law in Southland Corp. v. Keating,3 17 where the Court
held that the language of Section 2, specifically the phrase "involving
commerce," reflected congressional intent to regulate beyond the scope
of federal procedural law and to "foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.38 In Southland,
the Court stated that by enacting Section 2 of the FAA, Congress "withdrew the power of the states to require ajudicialforum for the resolution
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

319

Where the FAA conflicts with state law, state law is preempted, except to the extent permitted by Section 2 of the FAA, which permits arbitration clauses to be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. 3 20 Southland found that nothing in
the FAA allowed the creation of any additional limitations under state
law. 32 1 Thus, even though Congress did not intend to fully preempt state
law in the area of arbitration, state law is preempted to the extent that it
"conflicts with federal law" or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish322
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
If the application of state arbitration law results in less "'validity, enforceability, or irrevocability' of arbitration agreements," then that law is
323
From this authority it is evident that the issue of preemppreempted.

314.

While class action law generally is viewed as more of a matter of "procedure," the "sub-

stantive implications of the class action remedy have been widely recognized." David S. Schwartz,
Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 99-100 (2003).

315.

Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 178.

316.
317.
318.

Id. at 194.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Drahozal n, supra note 308, at 399-400 (citation omitted); IAN R. MACNEtL, AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

LAW:

REFORMATION,

NATIONALIZATION,

INTERNATIONALIZATION

145

(1992).

MacNeil disagrees with Chief Justice Burger's interpretation of the legislative history underlying the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Southland. Other commentators suggest that, while the Southland opinion incorrectly construes the FAA's legislative history, the Court's conclusion regarding
the scope of FAA preemption is correct. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Preemption Under the
FAA-Revisiting Southland-Supreme Court's Reasoning Weak, but Conclusion Correct, DISP.

RESOL. MAO. 23 (Spring 2004) [hereinafter Drahozal 1ml].
319.

320.
321.
322.
(1989).
323.

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (emphasis added).

WARE II, supra note 15, at 31-32 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (citation omitted).
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
1 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:

AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND

REMEDtES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 10.8.1 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (citation omitted).
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tion hinges upon whether the state law undermines the enforceability of
the agreement to arbitrate.
The FAA applies in both state and federal courts 324 and, despite extensive scholarly criticism, 325 as the law now stands, federal arbitration
law preempts state law 326 to the extent that state law places arbitration
agreements on "unequal footing" as compared with other contracts.327
Thus, while state law governing an arbitration agreement may apply if
the law does not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA," 328 a
state law that renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable or requires
a judicial forum for disputes that the parties agreed to arbitrate is preempted by federal law, 329 as is any state law that undermines the enforce330
ability of arbitration clauses with respect to certain types of claims.
The displacement of state arbitration law by federal arbitration law
can result from conflict between the state law and a particular FAA provision or a conflict between the state law and general arbitration law.33'
For example, a New York law requiring a higher standard of proof for
arbitration contracts than that required for non-arbitration contracts was
held preempted by federal law. 332 A state law creating a preference for a
judicial forum is also preempted because such a preference is inconsistent with the FAA.333

Section 2 of the FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitration in any contract involving interstate commerce shall be valid and
enforceable, except on "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract., 334 Section 2 is applicable in both state and federal courts, so that a procedural statute or rule that frustrates the effectiveness of the FAA is preempted by federal law, 335 while state statutes
or rules that serve to further, rather than to undermine, the enforcement
of arbitration agreements are followed in state court proceedings.3 36 To
the extent that the parties choose in their agreement to have state law
324. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.395,404-05 (1967).
325. Drahozal 1U, supra note 318, at 27 (citing academic commentators who have "lined up
behind Justice O'Connor['s]" dissent in Southland in which she expressed the opinion that "history
establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable
only in federal courts.").
326. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
327. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
328.

Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.

329. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281.
330. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996);
Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc. 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001).
331.
1 MACNEIL, supra note 323, at § 10.8.3.
332.

Id. at § 10.8.1 (citing Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Vene-

zuela, 991 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993)).
333.
Id. at § 10.8.1.2 (Supp. 1999) (citing Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 968
F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1992)).
334. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
335.
WARE II, supra note 15, at 32-33; Southland,465 U.S. at 16; Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281.
336. Blue Cross of Cal. v. Sup. Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 42, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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apply, courts will enforce that choice as long as the state laws in question
do not conflict with the FAA.337 Laws that effectively deny enforcement
exclusive to arbitration are
of arbitration agreements on grounds that are 338
preempted by the FAA and are unenforceable.
Because the FAA does not address classwide arbitration, and state
statutes do not address the subject of classwide arbitration, all of the law
governing the subject derives from either federal or state case law. The
scope of federal preemption extends to preclude state law whether created judicially or by statute.339 Just as federal arbitration law preempts

statutes enacted by states that have the effect of precluding or limiting
arbitration, judicial doctrines that have the effect of precluding or limiting arbitration are also preempted by federal arbitration law. 340
According to these general principles of FAA preemption, courts
have determined that federal arbitration law preempts state laws declaring pre-dispute arbitration agreements "void, ' 341 state laws making arbitration agreements unenforceable as to certain types of claims,342 and
state laws precluding enforcement of agreements to arbitrate specific
types of claims.343 Federal arbitration law also preempts state laws making arbitration unenforceable in certain types of transactions 344 and state
laws raising the standard for assent to arbitration agreements. 345 Courts
of
have also held that state public policy defenses to the enforceability
346
arbitration agreements are preempted by federal arbitration law.
Professor Drahozal proposes a four step analytical framework for
determining whether the FAA preempts a state law governing arbitration.347 The first step is to analyze whether the state law subject to preemption applies to contracts generally, or singles out arbitration contracts
for special treatment.348 State laws that apply only to arbitration agreements will not survive federal preemption. 349 Under this step of the
analysis, if the law applies exclusively to arbitration, it is preempted.35 °

337.
338.
339.
340.

Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
WARE II, supra note 15, at35-36.
Blue Cross, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 59 n.6 (citation omitted).
David S.Schwartz, FederalPreemption Under the FAA: FAA Preemption: Does it Wipe

Out State ContractLaw?, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2004, at 23.
341.
Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281; WARE II, supra note 15, at 33.

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Southland,465 U.S. at 16.
WARE II, supra note 15, at 32; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-491 (1987).
WARE H, supra note 15, at 36.
Id. at 37-38; Casarotto,517 U.S. at 684-87.
WARE 1H,
supra note 15, at 36 (citing 2 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION

LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 16.6.1

(1994 & Supp. 1999)).
Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 407-08.
347.
348.
Id. at 407-11. This step in the analytical framework derives from Section 2 of the FAA.
349.
Id. at 408.

350.

Id. at 407-08.
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The second step in Professor Drahozal's analytical framework involves determining whether the parties expressly contracted for the application of state law to the arbitration proceeding. 35' This step in the
analysis is intended to accommodate the holding in Volt Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,352 as modified by the Mastrobuono
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.35 3 decision.354
The third step in Professor Drahozal's analytical framework evaluates whether the state law in question "invalidate[s], the parties' arbitration agreement, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally (i.e.,
does application of the state law result in the parties going to court even
though they have agreed to arbitrate their dispute)? If so, the law is preempted., 355 In evaluating whether state law invalidates the parties' contract, some courts have held that certain cases are not appropriate for
arbitration,35 6 while others (the better view) hold that "state rule[s] excluding claims from arbitration because arbitration is 'inappropriate'
[are] preempted by the FAA.

357

The fourth factor under Professor Drahozal's test requires the evaluation of the state law under one of several "alternative preemption theories"-the Keystone Theory; the RUAA Theory; the Anti-FAA Theory,
the Pro-Contract Theory or the FAA Exclusivity Theory. 358 The Keystone Theory provides that a state law is not preempted when it does not
"nullif[y] either party's obligation to arbitrate their dispute." 359 The
RUAA Theory encompasses "the view of FAA preemption used by the
drafters of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act." 360 Under this theory,
state laws dealing with "front-end" issues (arbitrability and the agreement to arbitrate) are most likely preempted, particularly those that "go
to the essence of the agreement to arbitrate." 361 Under this theory, the

FAA preempts state laws that alter the terms of the parties' agreements
such that the procedure being enforced is no longer "arbitration." 362 Professor Drahozal indicates that a "state law providing that all arbitration
proceedings shall be presided over by a state court judge would be preempted under this theory, even though the parties proceeded to 'arbitration' .,,363

351.
352.
353.

Id.at408.
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
514 U.S. 52 (1995).

354.

Drahozal I1,
supra note 308, at412.

355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
at408.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id.
at408.

359.

Id. at417 (citing Keystone Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998)).

360.

Id.

361.

Id.

362.
363.

Id. at 418.
Id.
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Professor Drahozal's "Pro-Contract Theory" of preemption holds
that "[a] state law that does not invalidate the parties' arbitration agree'364
ment is preempted if it conflicts with a provision in that agreement.
Professor Drahozal describes the Pro-Contract Theory as "broader" than
the RUAA Theory in that "any state law that conflicts with a term in the
parties' arbitration agreement (by singling out arbitration) is preempted., 365 Finally, Professor Drahozal describes the "FAA Exclusivity
Theory" as perhaps the broadest theory of all, in that, under this theory,
"[a]ll state laws that single out arbitration are preempted. 36 6
The role of state arbitrationlaw is narrower under the FAA than the
role of state contract law.367 The FAA does not preempt state arbitration
law "[s]o long as state law seeks to promote commercial arbitration and
to give effect to the parties' contractual choices." 368 The federal policy
favoring arbitration does not give preference to any particular set of procedural rules. 369 Accordingly, states may utilize their own procedures in
arbitration to the extent they are not inconsistent with the FAA.
While courts determining the scope of the FAA's preemption of
state law can turn to contract law under Section 2 of the FAA to determine the applicability of state contract law, whether in FAA cases (involving interstate commerce) the courts should ever turn to state arbitration law is a markedly different question from whether they should turn
to state general contract law. In the case of arbitration law, the courts do
not have to turn anywhere; they can treat370the FAA and its penumbra of
general federal arbitration law as plenary.
Plainly, state law relating to arbitration(as opposed to state contract
law) does not fall within the savings clause of FAA Section 2. State
law principles, whether legislative or judicial, that take their meaning
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue, do not fall within the
ambit of the Section 2 savings clause.372 Because of this, state arbitration
law cannot restrict or contradict federal arbitration law, but may supplement it in a manner that is not in conflict with the FAA.373 Wherever

364.
365.

Id. at 419.
Id.

Id. (pointing out that, while this theory does not reflect present case law, it provides a
366.
useful comparison).

Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 176-77 (describing the Supreme Court's jurispru367.
dence as sending "mixed signals" regarding the role of state law: on one hand, leaving no latitude for
state regulation through laws that negate arbitration, while on the other hand leaving no room for
federal regulation of arbitration in the area of contract law).
Id. at 193-94.
368.
369.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 n.5.
1 MACNEIL, supra note 323, at § 10.6.2.
370.
Id. at § 10.8.1.
371.
372. Perry,482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
373.
1 MACNEIL, supra note 323, at § 10.8.1.
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state arbitration law falls afoul either of a particular FAA provision or of
federal general arbitration law, it is preempted by the FAA.374
A corollary to this general precept is that because the cardinal purpose of the FAA is contract enforcement, parties to an arbitration agreement can sometimes avoid preemption by agreeing that a particular state
law rather than federal law will apply.375 Because arbitration under the
FAA is most importantly a contract matter, the parties may agree to incorporate state law 376 "to displace FAA silence," but only where state
procedure
is "manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral pro377
cess."

This corollary is further limited, however, by the proviso that, while
the parties may agree to incorporate a state law by expressly referencing
it in their contract, a general choice of law clause will be held to incorporate only state contract law, not state arbitrationlaw.37 8 Further, the
corollary "dissolves .

.

. when a generic choice of law clause refers to

state law that is hostile to arbitration." 379 Harmonizing Volt and Mastrobuono clarifies the scope of permissible state arbitrationlaw: state experimentation with arbitration procedure will survive preemption as long
as the state arbitration law does not limit arbitration or conflict with the
purposes of the FAA.380
Although Bazzle does not discuss federal preemption per se, the
specific facts in Bazzle inform the Court's most recent pronouncement
regarding the role of state law in arbitration. In Bazzle, the parties agreed
that South Carolina law would govern their agreement, 381 so the scope of
the Bazzle holding is not limited to contracts exclusively controlled by
the FAA, but also governs contracts electing state law. 382 One court recently limited the role of state law even further by holding that the parties' selection of the "law of a state" in their contract constitutes a selection to apply the FAA (which generally does apply to states) as well as a
selection of state-specific law, where the choice of law clause does not
exclude the application of federal law.383

374.
375.

Id. at § 10.8.2.
WARE nI, supra note 15, at 38-39; Volt, 489 U.S. at 479; cf. Mastrobuono v. Shearson

Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding where the parties did not contract out of FAA
preemption effectively, arbitrator could award punitive damages otherwise prohibited by New York

law).
376.
377.
378.
379.

Drahozal I1,supra note 308, at 413.
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 197 (citation omitted).
Drahozal HI,supra note 308, at 413 (comparing Volt and Mastrobuono).
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 308, at 198.

380.
Id. at 199.
381. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
382. Pedcor,343 F.3d at 361.
383. Id. at 361-62 n.30 (expressing "no opinion on whether arbitration agreements governed
exclusively by state arbitration law would be controlled by the Court's holding in Green Tree.").
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Following Bazzle, the Pedcor court recognized that "the FAA preempts state laws that contradict the purpose of the FAA by 'requiring a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration.' 384 Pedcor continued, in dicta, to indicate that "even if Texas law contained a rule contrary to [Bazzle], i.e.,
that courts may decide the class arbitration question, the simultaneous
applicability of the FAA to this case would appear to preempt any contrary state law.

385

The California court in Garcia acknowledged that given the preemptive scope of the FAA, it is "immaterial that, under California law,
the class arbitration issues would be decided by the court rather than the
arbitrator., 386 These cases recognize that Bazzle and preemption cases
limit the role of state courts in creating arbitral procedure.
VII. TOWARD

A PURE ARBITRAL PARADIGM FOR CLASSWIDE
ARBITRATION

Because the FAA is silent regarding classwide arbitration, 387 one
must examine federal arbitration law and apply principles of preemption
to determine which models of classwide arbitration are preempted and
which are permissible. Applying these principles to classwide arbitration
leads to three important conclusions. First, laws prohibiting classwide
arbitration, whether federal or state, judicial or statutory, are implicitly
overruled by Bazzle and its progeny, and are preempted by federal arbitration law because such prohibitions are now inconsistent with federal
arbitration law. 388 Second, laws permitting a pure arbitral model of
classwide arbitration, whether federal or state, whether judicial or statutory, particularly when the parties' agreement is silent regarding classwide arbitration, are not preempted by federal arbitration law, 389 because
such laws are generally consistent with federal arbitration law. 390 Third,
laws creating a hybrid model of classwide arbitration requiring or permitting ongoing involvement of the courts during classwide arbitration are
preempted by federal arbitration law because such procedures are inconsistent with federal arbitration law. 3 9 ' Thus, federal arbitration law, including Bazzle, endorses the holding of Keating and its progeny permit-

384.
385.

Id. at 362 (citing Southland, 465 U. S. at 10).
Id.

386.
387.
388.

Garcia v. DirecTV, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 297, 303 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 422.
Whether contracts prohibiting classwide arbitration are enforceable, unconscionable or

violate public policy remains an open question. See discussion Part
389.
Blue Cross, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 785, 794.

n1supra.

390. Drahozal I, supra note 308, at 422; but see Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 458-59 (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting).
391. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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ting classwide arbitration but preempts the hybrid model of classwide
arbitration.
A. Bazzle Implicitly Overrules PriorLaw ProhibitingClasswide Arbitration
Although Bazzle does not address much of the prior case law prohibiting classwide arbitration, some commentators assert that Bazzle
overruled the Champ line of authority. 392 This issue is critical to determining whether an arbitrator's decision interpreting an arbitration
agreement to allow classwide arbitration will survive judicial review on a
motion to vacate such a ruling. Certainly Bazzle has limited dramatically, if not eliminated, the opportunity of parties drafting arbitration
agreements to leverage arbitration to defeat class actions, particularly
where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent regarding classwide
arbitration. 393 This Part examines the extent to which the Bazzle decision
has dramatically altered the landscape regarding classwide arbitration
and implicitly given birth to a pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration by addressing two questions not expressly addressed by Bazzle.
Below, I address the legal viability of the Champ line of federal authority and similar state cases prohibiting classwide arbitration and explain that Bazzle has implicitly overruled Champ's dual rationales by
rendering the lack of power rationale moot and by rejecting the contract
interpretation rationale.
Later I examine whether the hybrid model of classwide arbitration
remains viable, given the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law and
describe how the Bazzle opinion generally endorses the concept of
classwide arbitration and implicitly rejects the hybrid model in favor of a
pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration. I assert that the demise of
the hybrid model of classwide arbitration is compelled not only by Bazzle, but also by virtue of the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Bazzle did not expressly address the
line of authority and did not discuss or even allude to any of the prior
federal appellate level decisions restricting classwide arbitration. 394 Because of this, an analysis of the rationales for the Champ line of cases
must be juxtaposed against the premises of the Bazzle decision to determine whether Bazzle overrules the long line of cases precluding classwide arbitration under an arbitration agreement that is silent regarding
392.
Smit, supra note 143, at 175-76 ("The Supreme Court properly ruled these decisions to be
erroneous ... "); Peter J. Kreher & Pat D. Robertson 1II, Case Comment: Substance, Processand the
Future of Class Arbitration,9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 409, 421-422 (2004) ("The Bazzle decision
overrules this line of cases by allowing an arbitrator to certify a class when an agreement is silent or

ambiguous on that issue.").
393.
Kennedy & Appleby, supra note 155 at 85.
394. Id. at 86.
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classwide arbitration. Below, I analyze the continuing viability of each
rationale after Bazzle.
1. Bazzle Renders the "Lack of Authority" Rationale Moot
After Bazzle, and following promulgation of the AAA's classwide
arbitration rules and the JAMS class action procedures, the lack of a
court's authority to order classwide arbitration is a moot point. Under
the lack of power rationale, courts posited that they possessed no authority to send class action matters to arbitration. 395 After Bazzle, the court's
role is limited to sending the case to the arbitrator if it determines that the
parties agreed to arbitrate the controversy.396 After Bazzle, an arbitration
claimant's motion to the court for class certification is arguably inappropriate. 39 According to Bazzle, after the court sends the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator, not the court, must decide the appropriateness of
classwide arbitration. 398 Although the Champ line of authority constrains
the court from ordering classwide arbitration, as the Champ court itself
acknowledges, the lack of court authority does not constrain the arbitrator from ordering classwide arbitration because the arbitrator must operof the parties and pursuant to the rules of
ate according to the agreement
399
the arbitration provider.
A related premise for the lack of authority rationale was that the
court lacked the authority to consolidate arbitrations. After Bazzle, the
court's lack of power to consolidate arbitration is meaningless because it
is the arbitrator, not the court, who must decide whether class arbitration
is appropriate. 400 Thus, the Bazzle ruling bypasses the obstacle of the
lack of power, rendering one of the primary rationales for the Champ line
of authority impotent to prevent classwide arbitration. Certainly, the lack
of a court's power to order classwide arbitration cannot serve as a constraint on the arbitrator, since the arbitrator's conduct is regulated by the
agreement of the parties and the rules of the arbitration provider. If the
arbitrator determines that the parties' agreement permits classwide arbitration and the arbitration provider's rules authorize the arbitrator to conduct classwide arbitration, the lack of power on the part of the court to
consolidate arbitration or order classwide arbitration creates no impediment to the arbitrator doing so.

395.

See discussion Part m, B, supra.

396.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.

397.

Id. at 453-54; Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 370.

398.
399.
400.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53.
Champ, 55 F.3d at 276-77.
Bazzle. 539 U.S. at 452-53.
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2. Bazzle Also Undermines the "Contract Interpretation Rationale"
The contract interpretation rationale of the line of federal and state
authority prohibiting classwide arbitration under a clause silent regarding
classwide arbitration is also significantly undermined by the Bazzle decision. The Champ line of authority and related cases held that an arbitration clause that is silent regarding classwide arbitration could not be interpreted, as a matter of contract interpretation, to permit classwide arbitration because such a provision could not be "read into" the contract.40 1
While Bazzle did not discuss this line of authority, the decision implicitly defeats its logic. Bazzle addresses the contract interpretation
4 2
issue by examining the breadth of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. 0
If the parties intended their disputes to be resolved by the arbitrator, the
court should send the matters to arbitration without resolving the class
action issue. 4 3 In view of the broad language of the arbitration clause,
Bazzle describes the contract interpretation as "not completely obvious." 4 04 This conclusion overrules the determination by lower courts that
a broad arbitration clause could not be interpreted to permit classwide
arbitration.
The determination that an arbitrator must decide whether the
arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration also undermines the
contract interpretation rationale of the prior lower court decisions. If an
arbitrator must decide the question, implicit in that determination is the
possibility that the arbitrator may find that the clause permits classwide
arbitration. Because Bazzle implicitly undermines the dual rationales of
the prior authority, even though it does not discuss that authority, Bazzle
implicitly overrules the prior case law prohibiting classwide arbitration
under a "silent" arbitration clause, requiring arbitrators to make such
decisions and permitting arbitrators to interpret "silent" contracts to
permit classwide arbitration.
B. Laws Permittinga PureArbitralModel of ClasswideArbitrationare
Viable
The language of the Bazzle plurality opinion and the expansive preemptive scope of federal arbitration law 4°5 assures the ongoing viability
and likely expansion of classwide arbitration under a pure arbitral model
in which judicial involvement is limited to the narrow role circumscribed
by the Federal Arbitration Act4°6 rather than the more intrusive judicial
401.

See Part II, B, supra.

402.
403.
404.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
Id.
Id. at 451.

405.

See Part VI, supra; Drahozal II, supranote 308, at 409.

406. 9 U.S.C. § 2-4 (2004) (compelling arbitration and staying litigation); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004)
(motions to vacate arbitration awards).
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role preserved by the hybrid model of classwide arbitration. °7 By deciding that an arbitrator can determine whether to adjudicate a matter the
parties agreed to arbitrate through classwide arbitration, 408 the Bazzle
Court implicitly endorsed the implementation of classwide arbitration,
particularly where the arbitration clause involved is silent regarding
whether the parties contemplated classwide arbitration. 4°9 By its implicit
rejection of the line of authority prohibiting classwide arbitration, the
Bazzle opinion implicitly endorses the analysis in Keating41° and its
progeny 4 holding that class actions and arbitrations are not inherently
incompatible4 12 and that the combination of the two is preferable to the
option of eliminating plaintiffs' rights to proceed via class adjudication
when they agree to arbitration. 1 3
The Bazzle plurality does not address the issue of federal preemption.4t4 But the Bazzle decision is consistent with the Court's prior preemption analysis. Clearly classwide arbitration does not derive from
state contract law, and therefore the savings clause 41 5 is inapplicable to
bring state or federal procedures permitting classwide arbitration within
the penumbra of federal arbitration law. The law permitting classwide
arbitration is judicially created.41 6 Because states may supplement federal arbitration law with procedural law pertaining to arbitration, as long
as such procedures do not restrict or contradict federal arbitration law,41 7
permitting classwide arbitration is conceptually consistent with the proarbitration imperative of the FAA and the national policy favoring arbitration of disputes. Permitting classwide arbitration also places arbitration agreements on an "equal footing" with other contracts not permitting
arbitration by preserving the right of claimants to pursue a class action
whether they choose an arbitral or judicial forum.
Applying Professor Drahozal's analytical model of federal preemption also strongly suggests that federal arbitration law does not preempt
the pure arbitral paradigm of classwide arbitration. 418 The first step in
Professor Drahozal's analysis yields the conclusion that state laws per407.

See Part IV, supra.

408.
409.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
Undoubtedly a new wave of arbitration agreements expressly precluding classwide arbi-

tration will follow.
410.
Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.

411.
Cross, 67
412.
413.

Lewis, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76; Izzi, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 322; Dickler, 596 A2d at 867; Blue
Cal. App. 4th at 64.
Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
Id.

414.
The dissent in Bazzle would have held that federal arbitration law preempted state law
permitting classwide arbitration because such law contradicted the intentions of the parties as stated

in their agreement. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
415. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
416. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208 (noting that there is an "absence of direct authority either
supporting or rejecting [the classwide arbitration] procedure").
417.
418.

See supra Part lV.
Drahozal 11,supra note 308, at 407-412.
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mitting classwide arbitration do not "single out" arbitration contracts for
special treatment. 41 9 State laws generally permit class actions in the judicial system.42 ° While a state law precluding classwide arbitration would
single out arbitration situations for special treatment, state case law that
permits class actions within arbitration provides treatment for arbitrated
matters that is no different than that accorded to cases remaining in the
judicial system.
The second step in Professor Drahozal's analysis requires an
evaluation of whether the parties expressly agreed that state law should
apply to their agreement. 42 1 Assuming that the parties did so, and that
state law such as Keating, Bazzle and their progeny permitted classwide
arbitration, then the application of state law to permit classwide arbitration would not result in any preemption problem.
The third step in Professor Drahozal's analysis addresses whether
the state law invalidates the parties' agreement to arbitrate, in whole or in
part; if so, the law is preempted.4 22 If the state law permits classwide
arbitration (assuming a non-hybrid model, which is discussed in the next
section), then the application of such a law would not impermissibly result in the parties going to court, rather than resolving their dispute
through arbitration. Applying state law permitting classwide arbitration
is consistent with the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes. Application of the Keystone Theory would not invalidate the law because a
state law permitting classwide arbitration does not nullify the agreement
of either party to arbitrate the dispute.423 Under the RUAA Theory, because the state law permitting classwide arbitration does not vitiate the
agreement to arbitrate, it should not be preempted. 424 According to the
FAA-Exclusivity Theory, classwide arbitration would not be preempted
since it gives effect to the parties' contractual choices insofar as the parties selected arbitration.425
As the dissent in Bazzle points out, the contractual choice of the
corporate party to use a separate arbitrator for each individual arbitration
is not honored by the imposition of the class action device.42 6 This anticontractual intent side-effect does not vitiate classwide arbitration because, in the view of the plurality and Justice Stevens, the parties' fundamental contractual choice to arbitrate their disputes is honored through

419.

Id. at 409.

420.
ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13.1-13.4,
13.12-13.13 (4th ed. 2003).

421.

Drahozal H, supra note 308, at 408.

422.

Id.

423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 417.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459.
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classwide arbitration.4 7 To the extent that contractual language requires
the selection of an individual arbitrator for each arbitrable dispute, with
the intention of eliminating the claimants' right to file a class action by
virtue of their agreement to arbitrate, arbitrators may find such provisions unconscionable or violative of public policy. 428 Arbitrators might
also construe such language as ambiguous when juxtaposed with a broad
arbitration clause directing all of the parties' disputes to arbitration,429
and construe such ambiguous contract language against the drafter 430 to
permit classwide arbitration in view of such ambiguity, 43' consistent with
the plurality and Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bazzle.
The Pro-Contract Theory raises the same issue.432 The Pro-Contract
Theory holds that state laws not invalidating the parties' agreement are
preempted if such laws contradict the terms of the parties' arbitration
agreement.433 While the dissenters in Bazzle asserted that state law permitting classwide arbitration is preempted because such a procedure conflicted with the parties' contractual rights to select individual arbitrators
for each individual dispute,4 4 this assertion failed to carry the day in
Bazzle and additional arguments could defeat it in subsequent cases.435
As a matter of federal preemption, the key conceptual issue is
whether classwide arbitration is inconsistent with the purposes of the
FAA, with federal arbitration law, and with the national policy favoring
arbitration. Bazzle's implicit endorsement of classwide arbitration rests
on the premise that classwide arbitration is fundamentally consistent with
the purposes of federal arbitration law in the broadest sense.
427.
Id. at 451-52 (as Justice Breyer points out, the contracts in question did not say that the
arbitrator must be selected by Green Tree "to arbitrate this dispute and no other (even identical)
dispute with another customer."); see e.g., Cole v. Long John Silver's Rests., Inc., Clause Construction Award of Arbitrator, 7, available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1659 ("The use of personal

pronouns cannot by inference achieve the deprivation of significant rights.").
428.
Such contract drafting would have the same effect as an arbitration clause requiring arbitration, but precluding classwide arbitration, a provision that some court have already found unconscionable. See supra Part I. At least some courts have found such clauses both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
clauses prohibiting class arbitration are intended to prevent plaintiffs from seeking redress for small
claims in a collective action, and to create virtual immunity from class or representative actions,

despite their potential merit); Ting, 319 F.3d at 1150.
429. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451 (The plurality states, "We do not believe, however, that the contracts' language is as clear as The Chief Justice believes," and "Do the contracts forbid class arbitration? Given the broad authority the contracts elsewhere bestow on the arbitrator ... the answer is
not completely obvious.").
430.
Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 358; see, e.g., Stemlight I, supra note 133, at 90; Cole v. Long
John Silver's Rests., Inc., Clause Construction Award of Arbitrator, 4, available at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1659 (construing the language of the clause as creating an ambiguity to

be construed against the drafter).
431.
Sternlight I, supranote 133 at 90; see, e.g., Cole v. Long John Silver's Rests., Inc., Clause
Construction Award of Arbitrator, 4, availableat http://www.adr.org/si.aspid=1659.
432.
433.
434.

Drahozal 1, supranote 308, at 419.
Id.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

435.

See supra notes 426-30.
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In addition to the theoretical justifications for the pure arbitral
model, practical considerations also suggest that the pure arbitral model
is superior to a model precluding classwide arbitration because it restores
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants in arbitration so
that it resembles that existing in litigation by permitting plaintiffs to join
collectively to seek redress. This is especially significant where the
claims involve small dollar amounts, rendering it uneconomical for consumers or employees to pursue individual arbitrations. The aggressiveness of corporate drafters leveraging arbitration to insulate companies
from class actions altogether has resulted in a nascent unconscionability
backlash certain to continue. 436 Fundamentally, the decisions finding noclass action clauses unconscionable43 7 are consistent with the spirit of the
analysis of the Keating court that classwide arbitration is superior to the
elimination of plaintiffs' rights to sue collectively altogether.43 8 Adoption of a pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration can provide the
substantial benefits of arbitration 439 without sacrificing the important
benefits of the class action device.
1. Courts are Unlikely to Vacate Arbitrators' Decisions Permitting
Classwide Arbitration
Following Bazzle, arbitrators, and not courts, will determine
whether a classwide arbitration is appropriate under any given contract.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle gives little guidance as to how
the arbitrator should decide the contract interpretation issue, other than to
say it is "not completely obvious" how arbitrators should interpret an
agreement that is silent regarding classwide arbitration. 44 This is because the Bazzle Court explicitly determined that the matter is one that
the arbitrator, not a court, must address. 441 An arbitrator interpreting a
silent arbitration clause after the Bazzle decision can plausibly decide
that classwide arbitration is appropriate. 44' Under the FAA, such a deci436.
437.

See supra, Part III, C.
See supra, Part 111,C and notes 144-146.

438. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1206-07 (class actions provide an important mechanism for "vindicating rights [of] large groups of persons [with claims] too small to warrant individual litigation.
[Prohibiting class actions regarding such claims allows the] unscrupulous wrongdoer to retain the
benefits of its misconduct.") (citations omitted).
439.

LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 3, at 7, 17-18 (69% of survey respondents use arbitration

because it saves time and money; 60.5 % of survey respondents find arbitration has a more satisfactory process. One respondent indicated "Arbitration is cheaper [than litigation], faster, confidential,
final, and binding. What more can I say?").
440.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
441.
Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at 1270.
442.
Lawrence J. Bracken 11& Caroline H. Dixon, AAA Releases Rules on the Administration
of Class Actions, FRANCHISE L.J. 215, 216 (2004); Eric Tuchmann, General Counsel for the Ameri-

can Arbitration Association, announced at the ABA Annual Convention Ultimate Arbitration Update
in August 2004 that in the majority of claims for classwide arbitration, arbitrators had made rulings
allowing classwide arbitration. Robert Davidson, Executive Director of JAMS Arbitration Practice
predicted that arbitrators could also find clauses precluding classwide arbitration unconscionable and
permit classwide arbitrations to proceed. JAMS recently announced that it will not enforce class
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sion is subject only to the narrow review circumscribed by the vacatur
provisions. 443 This raises the question whether courts will uphold a determination by an arbitrator that classwide arbitration is appropriate or
whether parties opposed to arbitration can persuade courts upon review
of the arbitrator's determination that a ruling in favor of classwide arbitration demonstrates a "manifest disregard of the law."444 This section
discusses the scope of the court's review of arbitrator decisions in the
context of classwide arbitration and concludes that courts are unlikely to
vacate an arbitrator's decision permitting classwide arbitration. 445
A determination by an arbitrator that classwide arbitration is permissible will be reviewed upon completion of the arbitration under FAA
Section 10, which provides only narrow grounds for vacating an arbitrator's decision.446 The limited scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards reflects a "strong policy supporting finality of arbitration awards
and minimal judicial interference with the judgments of arbitrators.
Arbitration awards are "significantly more 'bulletproof than court judgments" and most courts "tend to confirm and enforce awards."" 8 The
statutory and judicial principles allowing review "operate on a presumption of correctness for arbitration awards, or at least an unwillingness
on
449
the part of courts to engage in searching review of such awards."
The FAA does not permit review upon the bases of erroneous findings of fact or misinterpretation of law. 450 Instead, the standards of reaction waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to
Ensure Fairness in Consumer Arbitrations (November 12, 2004). As of the date of publication of this
article, AAA is not accepting classwide arbitration claims where the arbitration clause precludes
classwide arbitration. American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitrations, available at
http://www adr.org.ArbitrationPolicy.
443. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).
444.
445.

WARE I, supra note 15, at 94.
Bracken & Dixon, supra note 442, at 216; Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 153, at 1270

("defendant could face a more difficult appeal than if a court had made such rulings.").
446. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). The procedural grounds for vacating an arbitration award are
similar under the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. BENNETr,
supra note 34, at 38. Under rules pending promulgation by JAMS, arbitrator's rulings will be reviewed consistent with the provisions of the FAA. Under the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, interim review of arbitrator decisions is permitted. American Arbitration Association, SupplernentaryRules for Class Arbitration, Rule 1(c), Rule 3 (permitting interim judicial review of the
Clause Construction Award, pursuant to which the arbitrator determines whether classwide arbitra-

tion is appropriate, given the substance of the parties arbitration agreement), Rule 5(d) (permitting
judicial review of the Class Determination Award, pursuant to which the arbitrator determines
whether to certify the putative class) available at http://www.adr.orgsp.asp?id=2136; See e.g.,
American Arbitration Association, Clause Construction Award of Arbitration: Cole Rests. v. Long
John Silver's., Inc. 10 (2004) (finding the arbitration clause does not prohibit classwide arbitration,

and staying further proceedings for 30 days to allow "any party an opportunity to appeal this
award.") available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1659.
447.
THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH ED., AM. BAR ASs'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST:
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 282 (2001).
448. Id.
449.
BENNETT, supranote 34, at 26.
450.
Booth v. Hume Publ'g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932-33 (lIth Cir. 1990); Amicizia Societa
Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960);
STIPANOWICH, supra note 447, at 282.
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view are directed at ensuring fair process, to maximize finality, and minimize "second-guessing by courts. 4 51 There are four statutory grounds
for vacatur of an arbitration award. First, the award is subject to vacatur
if "procured by corruption, fraud or undue means[.], ' 452 A court may
also vacate an award where "evident partiality or corruption" by the arbitrator exists. 453 Vacatur is also available for misconduct on the part of
the arbitrator, including "refusing to postpone the hearing" or in "refusing to hear" relevant evidence, or "any other misbehavior" prejudicial
to a party's rights.454 Finally, vacatur is possible where "the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them" that a true
' 455
award on the matter "was not made.
The grounds for review of an arbitration award under the Uniform
Arbitration Act ("UAA"), adopted by many states, are similarly very
limited.4 56 Under the UAA, the court is empowered to vacate an arbitration award only under the following circumstances: (1) the award was
procured by fraud, corruption or other undue means; (2) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers; (3) an arbitrator was biased or corrupt; (4) the
arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing where due cause therefore was
shown; (5) the arbitrators refused to consider material evidence; or (6)
there was no valid agreement to arbitrate.457 The UAA further provides
that the fact that a court would not have granted the relief requested is
not a valid basis for vacatur of an arbitrator's award.458
Under federal law, the judicially created grounds for review of arbitrator's awards include (1) the award violates public policy; (2) the
award is arbitrary or capricious; and (3) the award manifestly disregards
the law.4 59 These judicially created bases are sometimes described as
independent grounds, and are used as examples of the statutory standard
for vacatur based on arbitrators exceeding their powers.4 ° Judicial review based on an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law is extremely
narrow 46 ' and requires that the arbitrator (1) know the applicable law and
(2) intentionally disregarded applicable law in rendering the award. 62
Manifest disregard "can be established only where a governing legal
451.
452.
453.
454.

STIPANOWICH, supra note 447, at 283.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 10(a)(2).
Id. § 10(a)(3).

455.
456.
457.
458.

Id. § 10(a)(4).
Bracken & Dixon, supra note 442, at 215-16.
UNIFORM ARBrrRATION ACT § 12 (amended 1956), 7 U.L.A. 280-81 (1997).
Id. at 280.

459.

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez

de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). Some commentators suggest
that these judicially created bases for review are simply "re-articulation[s] of § 10(d)'s bar on arbitrators exceeding their powers." Herrmann, supra note 3, at n.164.
460.

STIPANOWICH, supra note 447, at 283.

461.
462.

Id. at 283-84.
See Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002).
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principle is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case, and
where the arbitrator ignored it after it was brought to the arbitrator's attention in a way that assures that the arbitrator knew its controlling nature.'A63 Where conflicting authority exists regarding a particular issue,
the arbitrator's disregard of one branch of the law in favor of another is
less likely to be vacated by the courts. 464 "The term 'disregard' implies
that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly465governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."
Given these standards, the vacatur of an arbitrator's decision to
permit classwide arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause that is silent
466

regarding classwide arbitration is unlikely.
First, review of the issue
could occur only after a final award.467 Given the strong policy of final-

ity and minimal judicial interference, a court should be reluctant to set
aside an arbitrator's decision either permitting or denying classwide arbitration. The argument that such an award manifestly disregards the law
will no longer survive, given the manner in which the decision in Bazzle
undermines the prior contract interpretation rationale and given the existence of the law supporting the proposition that contractually precluding
classwide arbitration is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. No longer is there "controlling law" prohibiting classwide arbitration.
One might argue that the "governing law" only directs the arbitrator
to decide whether classwide arbitration is proper, i.e., a rather narrow
interpretation of the Bazzle holding. However, the counter propositionthat Bazzle permits an arbitrator to determine that a silent arbitration
clause permits classwide arbitration - seems far more compelling in view
of the language in the Bazzle plurality opinion that explicitly undermines
Champ's contract interpretation rationale.468 If it is "not completely
clear" that a broad, silent arbitration clause prohibits classwide arbitration, then it is plausible that such a clause permits such a procedure.
One might also argue that Bazzle is a plurality decision, and that the
significance of the decision is limited accordingly. However, given the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Bazzle holding in Pedcor-thatclasswide arbitration is permissible-it cannot be argued that there is a clear
governing legal principle contrary to classwide arbitration. More likely,

463.

GMS Group L.L.C. v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Goldman, 306

F.3d at 1216).
464.
BENNETT, supra note 34, at 124.

465. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,933 (2d Cir. 1986).
466. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
467. Cf. American Arbiration Association, Supplementary Class Arbitration Rules 3 and 6
(permitting interim reviews of arbitrator's rulings), availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
468.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
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a reviewing court evaluating an arbitrator's final award in a classwide
arbitration under FAA Section 10 will find that a determination allowing
classwide arbitration is within the arbitrator's authority.
C. The Hybrid Model of ClasswideArbitrationRequiring Ongoing Judicial Involvement is Implicitly Rejected by Bazzle and Preemptedby
FederalLaw
In the world of classwide arbitration, at least one defendant has objected to the hybrid procedure of classwide arbitration on the grounds
that the court's order compelling hybrid classwide arbitration was inconsistent with the intentions of the parties who agreed to arbitrationrather
46 9
than the "hybrid" procedure mandating continuing court involvement.

That court declined to address the matter, finding it premature, since
class arbitration had not yet been ordered to occur. 470 This Part answers
that question and concludes that the hybrid model for classwide arbitration fails to withstand scrutiny under federal preemption analysis and is
rejected implicitly by Bazzle.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Bazzle signals that the
Court will not tolerate the degree of interference with arbitration authorized by the hybrid model. The plurality opinion in Bazzle required remand of the matter to an arbitrator to decide whether the arbitrator
should handle the arbitration on a classwide basis. 47 1 While the arbitrator
had already made that determination, answering in the affirmative in one
of the two companion cases, the Supreme Court questioned whether the
court's ruling might have influenced the arbitrator's decision.472 Finding
that the matter was one that the parties agreed an arbitrator would decide,
the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the matter to permit the arbitrator to
decide, uninfluenced by the court.473 Certainly if the arbitrator should

render this threshold decision regarding classwide arbitration, the exercise of discretion of courts to permit classwide arbitration under the hymodel cannot survive. The Garcia court seems to acknowledge
brid 474
this.
Taking the analysis suggested by Bazzle to the next logical step, one
must infer that a court no longer retains authority to decide class actionrelated issues previously addressed by courts using the hybrid model,
including class certification, notice, discovery and settlement. 475 The
rationale for the Bazzle plurality's opinion is that the parties agreed to
469.
470.

Blue Cross, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 64.
Id. The issue in Blue Cross officially before the court was the prospect of discovery

regarding class certification. Id. at 47.

471.
472.
473.
474.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
Id. at 454.
Id.
See Garcia, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 303 n.2.

475.

See supra Part IV.
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have an arbitrator, and not a court, decide all of their disputes and to limit
the aspects of those disputes that would come before the court to "certain
' 76
gateway matters.A
This reasoning is equally applicable to restrict the
court's ability to decide all class action-related issues previously addressed by courts operating under the hybrid model. Such an inference is
consistent with Pedcor, Garcia and Wood. Under the reasoning of Bazzle and its progeny, there is no rationale for continued court involvement
in the class-related aspects of a classwide arbitration proceeding.
Nor does the hybrid model survive scrutiny under preemption
analysis. The hybrid model of classwide arbitration grafts an antiarbitration aspect onto the arbitral process, by requiring or permitting
courts to handle certain aspects of class claims during arbitration.47 7
Such an approach contradicts the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA and
the national policy favoring arbitration 4 78 by restricting the arbitrator
from handling certain aspects of a classwide arbitration,479 even though
the parties agreed generally to arbitrate all of their disputes. The hybrid
model of classwide arbitration also violates the spirit of the FAA and
federal arbitration law by requiring or permitting a judicial forum for the
resolution of certain aspects of the parties' disputes, 48 in violation of the
rule announced in Southland.4 8'
Because the hybrid model of classwide arbitration negates the
parties' agreement, the law creating it "stands as an obstacle" to the purposes of the FAA in that the hybrid model renders the parties' agreement
to arbitrate their disputes less than fully enforceable. By undermining
the enforceability of the arbitration clause with respect to class claims,
the hybrid model of classwide arbitration places agreements to arbitrate
class actions (which are not fully enforceable under the hybrid model) on
unequal footing with other agreements to arbitrate disputes (which, under
federal arbitration law, are fully enforceable).
Just as courts have invalidated numerous other state laws requiring
more "protection" or "process" than arbitration provides, so too should
courts determine that the hybrid model singles out the arbitration of class
actions for specialized treatment, and therefore is preempted by federal
arbitration law.
The hybrid model undercuts both major principles underlying the
FAA and federal arbitration law. First, the hybrid model undermines the
fundamental policy underlying the FAA to enforce the parties' agree-

476.
477.

478.
479.
480.
1321-22;
481.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52.
See supra, Part IV.

Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2001).
Stemlight I, supra note 133, at 39.
Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 613; Lewis, 179 Cal. App. 3d. at 940-41; Izzi, 186 Cal. App. 3d at
Dickler, 596 A.2d at 866-67.
Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
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ments to arbitrate by negating the parties' agreement to an arbitral forum,
and instead imposing ongoing judicial involvement to the extent deemed
appropriate by a court with continuing jurisdiction. Second, as I have
shown above, the hybrid system of classwide arbitration does not conquer, but more likely derives from and perpetuates the distrust of arbitration.
Analysis under Professor Drahozal's preemption model yields the
same unqualified result.4 82 Applying the first test,483 the state law creating the hybrid model of classwide arbitration fails because it does not
apply to contracts generally, but singles out arbitration contracts for special treatment. Because the hybrid procedure for classwide arbitration
applies only to arbitration, it is preempted.
Applying the second test, 484 even the selection of state law will not
save the hybrid model from preemption. First, courts construe the parties' option to select state law narrowly, so that arguably a generic choice
of law provision incorporates only state contract law, and not state arbitration law. 485 Other courts, including Pedcor, construe the standard
choice of state law to includefederal arbitration law, which applies to the
states.486 Finally, as Pedcor recognizes, where parties select state law
that conflicts with federal arbitration law, for example, by requiring a
judicial forum for the resolution of a dispute that the parties agreed to
arbitrate, that state law is preempted.4 87
Applying the third test under Professor Drahozal's model,48 s the hybrid model invalidates, at least in part, the parties' arbitration agreement,
by requiring or permitting a judicial determination regarding class action-related issues. The restriction of these class action aspects of the
parties' disputes from arbitration is premised on the rationale that arbitral
resolution of such matters is inappropriate. Under the better view, the
hybrid model is preempted under this test as well.
Under the alternative preemption theories, the hybrid model fares
no better. Under the Keystone Theory, the hybrid model is preempted
48 9
because it nullifies the parties' agreement to arbitrate, at least partially.
Under the RUAA Theory, because the hybrid model of classwide arbitration negates the essence of the agreement to arbitrate, to the extent that

482.

See discussion supra, Part VI, A (outlining Professor Drahozal's analytical framework).

483.
484.

Drahozal II, supra note 308, at 407-08.
Id. at 411-13.

485.
486.

Id. at 413.
Pedcor,343 F.3d at 361-62.

487.
488.

Id.
Drahozal I, supra note 308, at 408.

489.

Id. at 417.
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the procedure enforced no longer consists purely of "arbitration," the
hybrid is preempted.490
Under the Pro-Contract Theory, the hybrid model is preempted because it conflicts with the parties' fundamental agreement to arbitrate
their disputes. 491 Under Professor Drahozal's Anti-FAA Theory, the
hybrid fails because it is inconsistent with the FAA.492 And under the
FAA Exclusivity Theory, the hybrid model fails because it is a statecreated law that singles out arbitration. 49
The AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration accommodate the hybrid model by providing that arbitrators will follow court orders on certain of the class action-related matters designated for decision
by arbitrators.494 The AAA's Rules also provide for judicial involvement

in classwide arbitration after the order compelling arbitration and prior to
the final award which courts are authorized to review on a motion to
vacate. 49-5 While these rules are consistent with the hybrid model pursuant to which courts retain ongoing jurisdiction to supervise classwide
arbitrations, such procedures are inconsistent with Bazzle and the FAA,
which do not authorize interim review or appeal of arbitrators' decisions. 496 Allowing such judicial involvement is not only inconsistent
with the FAA and with the spirit of federal arbitration law, but also undermines some of the fundamental benefits of arbitration such as avoiding the expense and delays inherent in litigation, including the lengthy
appellate process.497

Despite the conceptual desirability of state experimentation with
classwide arbitration procedure where the FAA is silent, federal arbitration law preempts the hybrid model and the Bazzle decision implicitly
negates continuing court involvement in classwide arbitration. Together
these developments sound a death knell for classwide arbitration under
490.
491.
492.

Id.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 418-19.

493.

Id. at 419-20.

494.
American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 1(c),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=2136.
495.
Id., Rule 3 (permitting interim judicial review of the Clause Construction Award, pursuant
to which the arbitrator determines whether classwide arbitration is appropriate, given the substance
of the parties arbitration agreement); Rule 5(d) (permitting judicial review of the Class Determination Award, pursuant to which the arbitrator determines whether to certify the putative class). See
also, American Arbitration Association, Clause Construction Award of Arbitration: Cole v. Long

John Silver's Rests., Inc. 10 (June 15, 2004) (finding the arbitration clause does not prohibit classwide arbitration, and staying further proceedings for 30 days to allow "any party an opportunity to
appeal this award.") available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id= 1659.
496. Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to the grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.
497.

LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 3, at 7, 17-18 (68% of survey respondents use arbitration

because it saves time and money; 60.5% of survey respondents find arbitration has a more satisfactory process. One respondent indicated "Arbitration is cheaper [than litigation] faster, confidential,
final and binding. What more can I say?"); DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, supra note 41,
at 7 (69% of survey respondents use arbitration because it saves time and money; 61% of survey
respondents find arbitration provides a more satisfactory process).
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the hybrid model and bring the pure arbitral model of classwide arbitration closer to fruition.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The continuing expansion of both arbitration and class actions, the
Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle, the promulgation of class action
arbitration rules by arbitration providers, the expansion of the preemptive
scope of federal arbitration law, and the growing chorus of cases finding
that class action waivers violate public policy and are unenforceable or
unconscionable, all foreshadow the impending expansion of classwide
arbitration under a pure arbitral model. The dual rationales of the case
law prohibiting classwide arbitration are undermined fatally by Bazzle. In
addition, the hybrid model of classwide arbitration is no longer viable
because it violates the spirit of the FAA to the extent the hybrid model
requires ongoing judicial involvement in the class action aspects of an
arbitration proceeding. To the extent that the AAA's new classwide arbitration rules facilitate the hybrid model, they too are flawed.
The reluctance of courts to cede the arbitration of class actions entirely to the arbitration process is a vestige of the historic animosity of
the legal community toward private arbitration that violates the spirit of
the Bazzle decision and the preemptive scope of federal arbitration law.
Adoption of a pure arbitral paradigm for classwide arbitration will eliminate the hybrid approach and align classwide arbitration most closely
with the FAA and with Bazzle and its progeny. Such an approach restores to the arbitral forum the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants existing in the judicial setting, and offers the most equitable
solution for preserving the benefits of arbitration.

STEPPING OUT OF THE COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS CONUNDRUM: A COMPARATIVE HARM ANALYSIS

TIFFANI LENNON
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has not developed a way to identify and balance competing constitutional rights.' Instead, the Court 2 has
relied upon three-part tests, tiers of scrutiny and levels of review, along
with unreasoned morality rhetoric in upholding or rejecting competing
interests. 3 These tests or levels of review attempt to create a neutral
Court, blind to differentiating characteristics such as race, gender and
socio-economic status. Neutrality or objectivity is intended to eliminate
personal interpretations and biases in the name of justice. The Court's
neutrality tests have become doctrine, yet none of them have actually
removed or minimized biases and inequities-a crucial flaw.4 In fact,
these tests have created further inequities because they fail to address and
explore the underlining problem, and they have not provided meaningful
guidance and direction to the lower federal courts.5 This need for bias
t
J.D., M.A.-International Studies and Intercultural Communication; University of Denver,
2004. Attorney specializing in individual constitutional rights. Special thanks to Professors Julie A.
Nice and Ann Scales.
1. E.g., Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1317 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out
that competing claims were not identified).
I will refer primarily to the cases of the United States Supreme Court, yet when I suggest
2.
employing a comparative harm analysis I am speaking more broadly to the federal judiciary. I expand the conversation more broadly because the federal courts are usually the only federal expertise
reviewing constitutional rights cases. Whereas it is preferred that the Court sets the national standards for constitutional review, lower federal courts review most constitutional cases thus the discussion cannot be limited to the Supreme Court. See Edward Purcell, Reconsidering the Frankfurterian
Paradigm:Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 682
(1999) (critiquing Justice Frankfurter, who posited that the lower federal courts serve as an in-take
office for the U.S. Supreme Court thereby indirectly regulating the types of cases that will be heard),
Purcell, and many others, criticizes Frankfurter for misunderstanding the role of the lower federal
courts and for overemphasizing the role of the Court. Id. at 688. I will also embark on the same
"misunderstood" journey placing too much emphasis on the Court, yet I do so for the purpose of
arguing for a national standard of review that would be best established by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing a three-part test to balance
3.
First Amendment and community interests); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications); Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (applying rationality review to disabled persons because such persons neither fell
into a racial classification, which receives strict scrutiny, nor did such persons fall into the gender
classification, which receives intermediate scrutiny); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(arguing that upholding dominant societal mores is sufficient to withhold constitutional protection).
4. See Purcell, supra note 2. Purcell claims that this desired neutrality and objectivity failed.
Id. at 686.
5. See id. at 724.
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minimization is essential in order to overcome systematic inequities. This
article sets forth the notion that only through discourse 6 will judges act as
fair arbiters. The elimination or minimization of personal biases is
important particularly when competing claims arise.
Systematic inequities are most visible when constitutional claims
compete because the Court is able to reach a decision without explicitly
identifying the competition, thereby glossing over the tension. As a resuit, the Court is faced with a conundrum when opposing parties bring
valid yet competing rights claims. One party's claim is often ignored and
not adequately articulated, usually7the claim from a person who is marginalized or from a disliked group.
Competing claims arise because law and society are intimately interwoven. 8 When an individual exercises his or her liberties, there exists
a possibility that the exercise of liberty will result in a deprivation to
another. Individuals and groups seek to remedy the harm inflicted upon
them by an opposing party. When a law or party adversely affects a person or group, that person or group claims harm. Harm is a ubiquitous
claim placing responsibility on someone or something. The Court has
attempted to use the notion of harm to resolve constitutional claims although it has not provided insight into what harm is or when it is permissible to trump constitutional rights.
This notion of harm is seen in various constitutional contexts from
commerce and morality to the First Amendment. An understanding of
harm is particularly important in equality claims where the impact of the
discriminatory action is not overtly visible. The most common legal scenario involves a member of a marginalized group who attempts to gain9
an equal share of constitutional pie at the perceived expense of another.
This creates a challenge for the courts because each party claims harm.
The courts must determine whose claim will prevail. As the Court articulated in Lawrence v. Texas, 1° a just society cannot allow the majority's
6.
This is often referred to as ethical or moral discourse but it is not intended to refer to
societal norms or personal mores. Instead, ethical discourse is the process in which judges engage in
dialogue about the constitutional values at issue and challenge their own internal biases. Through
this discourse, reasoned, non-discriminatory analysis emerges, i.e. ethical and moral dialogue. See
17, 30,
84 (Ciaran R. Cronin, trans., The MIT Press 1993) (1990).
7. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (upholding the exclusion of gays and lesbians from participating in a St. Patrick's Day
parade); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (rejecting that equality of the laws
would trump an organization's right to freely associate with non-gays).
JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS,

8.

See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985)

(discussing how the intention of law is to impact society). Indeed, the legal system was created in
this country for societal purposes, particularly to distribute property for economic vitalization and to
maintain the class stratification of society. Id. at 177-88, 488-93 (referring to laws that limited
women's and African-Americans' access to power).
9. Constitutional pie is used here as in pieces, which make up a bundle of rights within the
"pie" and not finite pieces intended to be shared by all.
10.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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values to infringe upon the rights of a minority group." The Court must
strike an adequate balance between competing rights in order to uphold
the Constitution. Generally, two types of competing claims arise.
The first type surfaces when one's liberty claim trumps another's
equality claim, or when two liberty claims collide.1 2 An example of this
first type includes free speech versus equal protection claims between
private actors. 13 The second type occurs when governmental actions are
at issue. This conflict is more accurately described as a competition between constitutional principles.' 4 Implicit and explicit principles include
those that can be found based upon the structure and text of the Constitution. 15 For example, courts give great deference to military policymaking. Courts and those supporting deference argue that the structure of
the Constitution limits judicial review of military action because it is
essential to national security. 16 They claim that the federal and state gov-

ernments possess a compelling interest that should withstand intrusion

11.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (reaffirming that the law cannot be used to suppress a
minority group and impose the dominating group's values on them). The terms majority and minority are used to refer to the quantity of individuals belonging to each group, i.e. the number of heterosexuals is larger than the number of gays and lesbians.
12. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (denying equal protection of the laws where equality
would trump the First Amendment); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding equality
over First Amendment rights). The idea that a liberty claim, in particular the First Amendment, must
trump other amendments in order to preserve equality is erroneous. Equality and liberty are interchangeable, and without one, the other fails to exist effectively. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
To illustrate, those involved in the civil rights movement of the 1960's had to violate segregation
laws in order to protest segregation. Tsahai Tafari, The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow, Public Broadcast
Station, at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/strugglecourt.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005). The
First Amendment protection did not apply to African-Americans, who were deemed second-class
citizens, because they were not afforded full equality. Id.
13.
Private equality claims will not be addressed as something distinct and separate from
public claims because private deprivations are no less severe or injurious than governmental infringement of equality. See Charles R. Lawrence lfl, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444-49. Further, the Court has applied constitutional principles to both private and public actors somewhat consistently. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. 609
(1984); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding private actions were subjected to constitutional scrutiny).
14. Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants judicial review of competing constitutional
claims because such claims are of national concern and incorporate the values of the Constitution.
"Article H is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing one value
that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. This
Court retains the final word on how that balance is to be struck." N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (referring to the competing and
implicit structural principles of the Constitution). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
407-08 (holding that issues involving national concerns are appropriate for federal courts).
15. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 407-08. See also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-13 (1999) (explaining that thick constitutional principles involve structural arguments such as federalism and comity).
16. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 926-27 (1996) (finding that Article I of the Constitution
grants Congress military power, and thus, military deference is consistent with constitutional principles). But see Ann Scales, Militarization: The Jurisprudence of the Military-industrialComplex, 1
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 541, 551-52 (2003) [hereinafter Militarization].
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from the courts.' 7 As a result, military deference and national security
have trumped individual rights and protections. 18
In both types of claims, the Court has failed to identify competing
tensions, and has not developed a sufficient analytical framework for
balancing them.' 9 It is essential to acknowledge that both harms exist in
order to bring to light the constitutional rights at issue. The Court, as
supreme arbiter of the Constitution, must determine which claim will
prevail. This article seeks to begin the discussion to resolve the competing tensions, and in doing so, suggests a comparative harm analysis. A
comparative harm analysis should be applied across the spectrum whenever constitutional interests compete; however, for illustrative purposes
this article will focus on the conflict between equality and liberty.
This article will first explore the reluctance to equally distribute
constitutional rights. Second, this article will outline the Court's harm
analyses and the rationale behind them in various constitutional contexts
including the Dormant Commerce Clause and First Amendment cases. In
exploring the harm analyses used by the Court, it was discovered that the
Court often relied on unreasoned morality rhetoric, which the Court ultimately rejected, and eventually grew to adopt and accept causative factors directly linking the harm to action at issue. Third, a comparative
harm analysis will be suggested to resolve competing constitutional
claims. A comparative harm analysis seeks to identify valid constitutional infringements. This article argues for the implementation of reasoned, practical discourse in evaluating and balancing competing claims,
and rejects the Court's implicit notion of proving causative harms. This
Clause and the Due
article also presumes that both the Equal Protection 20
Process Clause establish a non-discriminatory policy.
17.
18.

Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 926-27.
See id.; see also Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Club v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549

(1987).
The rationale behind military or congressional deference is to prevent unwarranted judi19.
cial interference. U.S. Americans have historically been skeptical about any form of governmental
encroachment since our early inception, and understandably so. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8.
"[Fireedom of expression has greater value in a political context ... and therefore more conducive to
finding a fair and just compromise between the two competing values..." Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
at 737. However, we seem to allow government interference when we need to prevent intrusion
most. For example, military and congressional deference allows governmental intrusion into our
fundamental liberties. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Thomasson, 80 F.3d 915. Yet, the Court and the Third Circuit
failed to review the competing rights claims in the cases cited above because it believed the Executive and Legislature have exclusive, non-reviewable authority to act. Id. The separation of powers
doctrine requires the Court to review competing constitutional claims that involve explicit rights and
implicit principles. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
20.
See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal ProtectionJurisprudence:Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (suggesting that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause favor non-discrimination in both the intent
and/or effects of legislation and private actions) [hereinafter The Emerging Third Strand]. This
presumption is made despite Justice Scalia's claim that the Equal Protection Clause has reached "full
maturity" or complete stagnation. lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-89.
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UNDERSTANDING THE RESISTANCE TO SHARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL

PIE
A. Power and Security Theory in Legal Discourse
Political economic scholars employ comparative analysis theories in
understanding conflicting interests and power structures. For example,
Kenneth Waltz explores one state's need to discriminate against another.21 Usually the discriminating state possesses more power or dominance. 22 The powerful seek to impose their value system on the less
powerful, while the less powerful resist those values.23 Waltz concludes
that the powerful seek to maintain their existing status and perceive the
opposing state as a threat.24 Therefore, the dominant ones reason that the
opposition must be eliminated or suppressed in order for the powerful to
prevail, according to Waltz.25 Waltz criticizes these discriminating states
for failing to understand how diversity can produce greater (economic)
gains.

26

Whereas Waltz uses this theory to understand nation states and their
economic structure, this is also the scenario usually played out when
constitutional claims conflict. I posit that this same theory can transcend
political economic discourse and apply to law and society. The discriminating or dominating group perceives the opposition as harmful and
threatening. 27 The group will often achieve societal concurrence by fueling an irrational fear. 28 In some scenarios, the fear is valid, while in others, the fear is irrational. For instance, dominant groups fear their fall
from power, while the subordinate ones fear domination. 29 A group's
success in maintaining
or overcoming dominance relies largely upon
societal consent.30 Thus, either group must have ideological buy-in or

21.

See generally KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1959);

KENNETH WALTZ, LAWS AND THEORIES 27-46 (Koehane ed., 1986).
22.
KENNETH WALTZ, LAWS AND THEORIES 27-46 (Koehane ed., 1986).

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 35-40.

25.

Id.

26.
27.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 27-46.

28.

Id.

29.
Interestingly, many political economists through examining history conclude that dominating others in an effort to resist perceived vulnerabilities will ironically lead to that exact result,
i.e. loss of power and a weak state because as a group grows larger and more powerful others begin
to question the legitimacy of the dominant, and the less powerful seek to weaken them. BENJAMIN J.
COHEN, THE QUESTION OF IMPERIALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DOMINANCE AND
DEPENDENCE 229-57 (1973); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRUCrURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD

AGAINST GLOBAL LIBERALISM 32-58 (1985); David A. Lake, Power and the Third World: Toward a
Realist PoliticalEconomy of North South Relations, 31 INT'L STUDIES Q. 217 (1987).
30. See generally Stephen R. Gill & David Law, GlobalHegemony and the StructuralPower
of Capital,33 INT'L STUDIES Q. 475 (1989); Stephen Gill & David Law, Global Hegemony and the
Structural Power of Capital, in GRAMSCI, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS 93-124 (Stephen Gill ed., 1993).
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consent from society, or at least key members of society, in order to receive credibility, legitimacy and security.
The legal discourse between the gay rights and anti-gay movements
exemplifies the power and security theory. In Romer v. Evans,31 the proponents of Amendment 2 sought to restrict gays and lesbians from accessing the political process in an effort to conserve the resources of the
state for more valued groups. 32 The proponents informed voterspredominantly heterosexuals, people of color and the religious-that
queers threatened their legal and societal status. 33 They sought concurrence by perpetuating a perceived harm and explained that Amendment 2
would preserve the voters' legal rights. 34 The voters responded and authorized the State of Colorado to legally discriminate against gays, lesbiprotection of
ans and bisexuals. The voters believed the harm-political
35
queers-not only existed but also threatened them.
B. Survival Theory and Discrimination

The survival theory explains a related yet distinct reason private actors and the government seek to distribute burdens in an onerous way.
Unlike the power and security theory where dominant groups and individuals seek to uphold and maintain power, the survival theory seeks to
maintain sameness. The survival theory posits that a discriminating
group seeks to preserve its own existence by preventing those who possess different belief systems from affecting change. 36 Those who discriminate believe they need to maintain homogeneity in order for their
ideals to survive. The survival theory is often at the crux of most competing claims, and it explains why some groups advance arguments insufficiently grounded in constitutional law. As a result, this theory will be
examined further in several contexts below.
In examining religious and cultural survival, Professor Thomas
Giegerich explains that the United States government historically used
37
both religion and property to discriminate and promote homogeneity.
He argues that the promotion of religion and culture directly conflict
with liberty and equality. 38 This conflict exists because the promotion of
sameness is in opposition with individuality. Giegerich also concludes
that homogeneity does more than merely perpetuate survival of the most
31.
32,
33.
34.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
Evans, 882 P.2d at 1340.

35.
See id.
See S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARLz.
36.
L. REV. 1259, 1283-86, 1298-1300 (1997) (arguing that the survival theory erroneously presumes
that minority groups will corrupt the majority).
Thomas Giegerich, Freedom of Religion as a Source of Claims to Equality and Problems
37.
for Equality, 34 ISR. L REV. 211, 212 (2000).

38.

Id. at 214.
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powerful groups. Homogeneity, Giegerich opines, fosters authoritative
and totalitarian regimes. 39 Whereas homogeneity is essential for perpetuating survival of the most powerful, pluralism
is essential for perpetuat4
ing equality, liberty, and thus individualism. 0
In offering his explanation of why the United States relies upon
homogeneity, Professor John S. Baker 4' references Plato and Socrates,
like many conservative pundits, in making his argument.42 Believing
James Madison interpreted Greek philosophy similarly when Madison
helped structure the Constitution, Baker referenced FederalistTen as his
evidence to support his belief that the U.S. federalist structure allows for
the delicate balance between giving the minority a voice while giving
power to the majority.43
Baker explains that the majority holds the key to morality and virtuous conduct. 44 The U.S. government permits some individualism in order
to allow limited expression and to prevent civil uprisings and cultural
wars from occurring.45 Baker also states that the minority is not meant to
46
have power. According to Baker, minority power would promote rampant individualism, and consequently, the downfall of society, whereas
giving power to the majority preserves the virtue and mores of society.47
This, he says, is "brilliant" because society needs homogeneity of ideals
and morals in order to survive.48 Homogeneity will allow the United
States to continue its economic and cultural superiority.4 9 In other words,
Baker posits that the federal government needs to protect moral majoritarism, but should do so quietly in order not to cause a minority uprising. 5°

39.

Id. at 219.

40.
Id.
41.
John S. Baker, Louisiana State University law professor, Lecture to the University of
Denver College of Law (Oct. 9, 2003).
42.
Strong, supra note 36, at 1268-80 (explaining that conservatives rely upon Plato and
Aristotle in arguing for moral majoritarism). In his reference to Greek philosophers, I posit that
Baker and others ignore the 6th Century B.C.E. founder of Greek philosophy and culture. By ignoring the founder, Sappho of Lesvos, Baker neglects the very foundation of Greek philosophy beginning some 300 years before Socrates and Plato. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2512-13 (6th ed. 2000).

Sappho, in the midst of tragedy, calls for humanity. She foreshadows that survival depends upon the
love and tolerance of humankind, which furthers the advancement of civility by engaging in natural
"law" instead of resisting it. Natural law refers to the innate propensity to pursue physical, emotional
and spiritual desires. History erroneously refers to Sappho as only a poet. Perhaps this erroneous
reference can be best explained by Baker's contention that majoritarism must prevail in order to
"preserve" society.
43.
John S. Baker, Louisiana State University law professor, Lecture to the University of

Denver College of Law (Oct. 9, 2003).
44. Id.
45.
Id.
46. Id.
47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Baker explains his position against same sex relations by proclaiming that only small communities can foster virtue. The family unit, defined as man, woman and child, populates the type of small community
in danger most often. 51 When minorities threaten significant and essential
morals, such as upholding the values of the traditional family, the federal
government needs to proclaim and define acceptable conduct.5 2 Yet, in
less severe circumstances, Baker suggests that the federal government
and the judiciary should
should refrain from engaging in cultural wars,
53
questions.
political
in
engaging
from
refrain
Despite Baker's support for homogeneity and oppression, he possesses a worthwhile suggestion: balance. Unfortunately, Baker would
favor implicit religious and cultural dominance in order to strike the
"balance." 54 Giegerich also favors balance, yet cautions against religious
and cultural dominance since such dominance leads to authoritarian reof equality and liberty for
gimes.55 Giegerich encourages the balancing
56
competitors.'
and
"partners
both
are
they
Professor Julie Nice, much like Giegerich, argues that the tensions
articulated above serve as partners as well as competitors. Professor Nice
best captures the current tension by describing ten antinomies, or contradictions, that result from the Court's two-strand, equal protection analysis. 57 Nice also emphasizes that the first antinomy, assimilation and subordination, ultimately explains the remaining nine antinomies, in that the
struggle for power causes legal discourse.58 As a result of the discourse,
contradicting legal theories or antinomies emerge. The contradicting
theories either will perpetuate subordination by encouraging assimilation
or disrupt subordination by welcoming heterogeneity. Nice illustrates
that assimilation promotes homogeneity and thus perpetuates subordination."
The power and survival theories are, in their most definitive translation, the rationale for maintaining dominant, homogenous legal structures

51.

Id. As an aside, from a global perspective, the United States is a "small" community

within a much larger conmmunity.
52.

Id.

53.
54.

Id.
Id.

Giegerich, supra note 37, at 219.
55.
Id. at 212.
56.
57.
Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection'sAntinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1394-96 (2000). The Court relies on a two-strand test to deter-

mine whether the Equal Protection Clause applies: fundamental right and suspect class. Id. at 141920.
58.
Id. at 1394.
ld. at 1413. Nice argues for the disruption of hierarchical power relations and suggests the
59.
implementation of the third strand: the co-constitutive approach. The third strand resolves the Equal

Protection Clause's antinomies by examining the relationship between the class and the right, and
the effects of the discriminatory law on society. Id. at 1421-22.
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designed to keep power vested in the hands of a few. 6 0 The law, from its
very inception in the United States, has been used consistently to maintain and distribute power (and wealth) in society. 61 By so doing, the
powerful individuals are able to survive or maintain their positions by
structuring the laws in a way that prohibit the disruption of that power
scheme.62 This article seeks to overcome the inherent dominant power
structure, and preserve liberty and equality in their unadulterated form.
Yet, the Court must first overtly acknowledge and identify valid competing liberty and equality claims.
III. THE

SUPREME COURT'S USE OF HARM ANALYSES

The Court's historical and modem harm analyses involve the First
Amendment, equal protection, political participation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Before a comparative harm analysis is proposed, an
assessment of the Court's use of harm will be analyzed. The Court attempts to employ objective tests and rationales that fail to consistently
acknowledge and balance competing claims. In attempting to achieve
neutrality, the Court requires a causative demonstration of harm in many
cases. The Court's attempt at objectivity and neutrality falls, and the tension between competing claims remains. Only when the Court employs
reason and discourse does it succeed in balancing interests.
A. Harm and the FirstAmendment: Illegal Advocacy, Fighting Words,
the DilutedMessage and Societal Effects
1. Illegal Advocacy and Fighting Words
63

In Dennis v. United States, the Court conclusively reasoned that
Dennis's actions caused the risk of overthrowing the government. 64 Dennis organized a Communist organization during the McCarthy Era.65 The
government dismantled Dennis's organization for violating the Smith
Act.66 Dennis's First Amendment claim failed because the Court ruled
that the government possessed sufficient justification in prohibiting
speech that elicited violence, terrorism, and a "clear and present dan60.
See Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudenceas Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 49 (1989) (referring to H.L.A. Hart that the obvious purpose

of law is survival).
61.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 115-20 (referring to the problems associated with apportionment and suffrage, and the debate about reallocating political power before and during the drafting
of the U.S. Constitution).
62.

Id.

63.

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

64.
65.

Dennis,341 U.S. 494.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 983 (Aspen Publishers 2001) [hereinafter

Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505. The timing of this case can not be ignored since communism was a perceived threat to the U.S. government in the 1950s.
66. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505. Perhaps the most troubling part is that the government chose to
restrict speech in the most important context, political participation. See supra note 19.
CHEMERINSKY];
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ger. , 6 7 The extent of the Court's analysis involved the determination of
whether the government's "fear of being overthrown [was] reasonable?". 68 The Court answered affirmatively because the fear of commu69
nism threatened U.S. security, and the Court deferred to Congress. Justice Vinson for the majority exclaimed that "no proof is necessary to
overthrow the government., 70 The 1951 clear and present danger test was
criticized and replaced by the illegal advocacy and fighting words doc-

trine.71

In Beauharnais v. Illinois,72 the Court decided its first modern hate
73
speech case involving illegal advocacy. The Court found the Chicago
statute prohibiting conduct that "is productive of breach of the peace or
riots" constitutional. 74 "'The danger in these times from the coercive
activities of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would
incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of
their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized [sic] by
events familiar to all."' 7 5 The Court's well-documented advancement that
the right
racial tension and violence were a significant problem affirmed
76
of the legislature to pass a law trying to curtail such acts.
As a result, the Court found Beauharnais's derogatory and aggres77
sive expressions targeted at African Americans unprotected speech.
The Court favored equality over liberty and held that hate speech is not
afforded constitutional protection because it perpetuates inequality. The
Court reasoned that it is "precluded from saying that speech concededly
punishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be outlawed
in society the affiliif directed at groups with whose position and 7esteem
8
involved.
inextricably
be
may
ated individual

Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508.
67.
id.
68.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 505. Justice Vinson "rejects the contention that success or probability of success is
the criterion" for determining the likelihood of overthrowing the government, hence, a reasonable
fear is all that is necessary to trump First Amendment protection. Id
concurring) (criticizing the clear and present danger test);
Id. at 525-26 (Frankfurter, J.,
71.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 983.
72. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 250.
73.
Id. at 251 (citing 1Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, c. 38, Div. 1, § 471).
74.
Id. at 261 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
75.
76. See id. at 267 (disagreeing with the rationale of the state legislature, but the Court upheld
the statute because it could not find anything unconstitutional about it. The dissent described the
conduct of Beauharnais as constitutional because he was petitioning the legislature for policy reform
regarding the segregation of blacks and whites, and noted that this type of political representation is
precisely what the Constitution is set to uphold. 1d (Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting). See
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 580 (applying the same rationale which found that the conduct of the defendant
is expressly what the Constitution is set to uphold).
Id.
77.
78. Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 262-63 (citing American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257
U.S. 184 (1921)).
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Almost two decades later, the Court favored liberty and overlooked
an equal protection claim. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,79 the State of Ohio
passed a law prohibiting advocacy of lawless activity, arguing that such
advocacy harmed societal welfare and security. The leader of a Ku
Klux Klan rally was convicted under the Ohio statute for encouraging
criminal activities.81 The Klan leader advocated for "bury[ing] the nig82
ger; that is what we are going to do to the niggers; freedom for whites."
He claimed that the Ohio law infringed on his First Amendment right to
advocate such statements. 83 The Court found the Ohio statute
unconstitutional.
The Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. The Act

punishes persons who advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety of violence as a means of accomplishing industrial or political

reform; or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing such advocacy; or who justify the commission of violent acts

with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; or who voluntarily assemble with a

group84 formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.
Implicit in the Court's rationale is that Ohio intended to impermissibly punish political advocates by opining that the act unduly punishes
those "advocat[ing] or teach [ing] ... as a means of accomplishingdvo"
political reform" 8 To conclude that the Klan leader was a political advocate who intended to generate reform, is to ignore that the leader used
threats and the promotion of violence to accomplish the goal of inequality. The Court missed the competing harm claim, and as a result, its "balancing" test did not weigh nor did it in fact balance constitutional interests.
The Court established a three-part test to determine when the government
restrictoffree speech .86 The Court evaluated: 1) imminent
harm; 2) can
likelihood
producing illegal activity; and 3) intent to cause

79. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The progress of the civil rights movement at
this point in history advanced considerably compared to the lack of progress in the early 1950s when
Beauharnais was decided. It is interesting that the Court sought to limit equality just as the civil
rights movement was gaining momentum. This suggests that dominant society was seeking to maintain security and survival.
80.

Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 445.

81.
Id. at 444-45.
82.
Id. at 446 n.I (noting that some of the comments were inaudible although it was clear that
the Klan leader was making violent threats against African-Americans).
83.
Id.
84. Id. at 448.
85.
See id. at 448-49.
86. See generally id. at 447 (discussing three factors which must be considered when making
determinations of whether speech incites imminent lawless action); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at
989-90.
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imminent illegality. 87 The Court found that the Ohio statute was overbroad and did "not distinguish [sic] from incitement to imminent lawless
action." 88 In short, the Court did not believe that the Klan leader's recriminal actions and there was no evidence of his
marks would incite
89
so.
do
to
intent
Virginia v. Black9° illustrates the Court's recent application of the
fighting words doctrine. 9' This case involved two separate cross-burning93
rally.
incidences. 92 The first petitioner burned a cross at a Ku Klux Klan
The second case involved two petitioners who burned a cross at the home
of an African-American family.94 The Virginia legislature passed a law
95
seeking to prohibit cross-burning both in a private and public setting.
The Virginia statute deemed the act of cross-burning prima facie evidence that parties intended to intimidate. 96 As a result, the Virginia Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional.9 7
Justice O'Connor, speaking for a plurality, examined the history of
cross-burning extensively concluding that it has been used as symbolic
speech and for the purposes of racial intimidation. 98 Because crossburning had been used for symbolic speech, O'Connor found the Virginia statute unconstitutional on its face: 99

Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar
as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate. Unlike the statute at

issue in R.A. V., the Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward 'one of the specified disfa-

vored topics.'1°°
Justice O'Connor would have found the statute constitutionally
permissible had the Virginia legislature sought to ban cross-burning that
was used to intimidate without concluding that all cross-burning causes
intimidation. 10' Black's case was vacated, and Elliott's and O'Mara's

87.

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 448.
Id. at 451.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
See generally Black, 538 U.S. at 343 (discussing the recent application of the fighting

words doctrine).

Id. at 348-50.
92.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 348.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 350-51.
98. See id. at 353-58.
99. See id. at 363 (disagreeing with the Virginia Supreme Court, which held that contentbased prohibition is always unconstitutional on its face).
100. Id. at 362 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 307, 391 (1992)).
101. Id. at 361 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391, "[w]e did not hold in RAY. that the First
Amendment prohibits all forms of content-based discrimination within a proscribable area of speech.
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case was remanded
to determine whether their cross-burning was used to
02
1
intimidate.
The Court acknowledged that content-based prohibition is permissi03
ble when the message or conduct seeks to elicit anger, resent or alarm.'
This prohibition sets forth the goal of "keeping the peace," not for purposes of perpetuating equality.104 Here again, possible riots or violence is
the harm, and not the equality of blacks or other targeted groups.0 5 Although the Court did not explicitly indicate that parties must prove the
alleged harm, the Court implied it by stating that
it is necessary to dem10 6
onstrate that respondents intended to intimidate.
The Court was unwilling to trump a constitutional right when the
respondent did not directly intend harmful consequences and declined to
hold that all those who burned crosses intended to cause intimidation and
perpetuated the inequality of African-Americans and other targeted
groups. 07 Black argued that his cross-burning was not intended to cause
intimidation. 10 8 In relying upon the historical, celebratory use of cross
burning, the Court rationalized that since cross-burning was not always
used to intimidate, it is unconstitutional for a state to prohibit all crossburning.' 0 9 Because the statute did not account for celebratory purposes,
the Court held that a prima facie evidence provision, therefore, violated
the Constitution."10
Black's cross-burning was intended to send a message of racial inequality and intimidation."' Black targeted African-Americans, Mexicans, and those who support their equality. 112 Yet, the Court found that
Black's conduct did not create a "true threat" because Black did not possess the requisite intent to directly intimidate."13 The Court argued that
Black's burning took place on a private road thereby minimizing the
intimidation that could arise. 114 Not only did a police officer stop to
Rather, we specifically stated that some types of content discrimination did not violate the First
Amendment").
102. See id.
at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dismissing the idea that cross-burning could ever
be used in a modern day application as expressive speech due to its absolute link to racial intimidation).
103.
104.

Id. at 360.
See id.

105.
106.
107.

See id.
See id. at 361.
Id. at 364.

108.
109.

Id. at 356.
See id.

110.
See generally id. at 390 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that cross-burning is rarely, if
ever, used as a non-racial celebratory expression in the present day).
111.
Id. at 349-51. Black concedes that his conduct targeted those racially diverse and those
who supported their equality, and his derogatory and inciting comments were meant to mobilize his
base to take action in support of racial denigration.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at 349.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 351.
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watch the burning but so did those passing by. 115 The road was not very
private after all. Black may not have known that his cross-burning would
directly intimidate or harm specific individuals since only whites were
presumably present at the rally. However, his actions perpetuated intimidation and inequality. The Court's distinction would have been less
flawed had Black's conduct been irrelevant to the intimidation often associated with cross burning and celebratory for reasons other than racial
denigration.
In the second scenario, the Court remanded O'Mara and Elliott's
case because it found that their cross-burning specifically targeted African-Americans at their home. 16 Elliott and O'Mara burned a cross in the
yard of an African-American man "'to get back' at" him. ' 7 The Court18
found that respondents possessed the required intent to cause harm."
Yet, in both scenarios, cross burning was used to denounce racial equality and proclaim white supremacy either through physical threats or promotion of Klan ideals and actions." 9 For this reason, the Court's rationale is flawed.
2. Diluted Message
Roberts v. United States Jaycees 20 illustrates a second type of First

Amendment harm: the diluted message.' 2' The Jaycees prohibited
women from joining the organization claiming that the presence of
women diluted the organization's message promoting young men. 122 The
Court found that claimant's equal protection claim trumped the Jaycees'
First Amendment claim. 123 The Court reasoned that the presence of
women would not dilute the Jaycees' message promoting men. 24 The
Court balanced the25restrictions on the First Amendment with the Equal
Protection Clause.
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, abso-

lute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppres115. Id. at 348 (noting that passing drivers observed the cross burning and stopped to inquire).
116. See id. at 350-51.
Id. at 350 (quoting the trial court).
117.
118. Id. at 351.
119. See generally id. at 367-68 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing that the intent to intimidate is in the history of cross-burning).
120. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
121.
See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (discussing the First Amendment harm of the
"diluted message").
122. Id. at 613-16 (also discussing the private versus public accommodations debate finding
the Jaycees fell under both since it used public venues, and therefore, found the Minnesota's public
accommodation statute applicable).
123. See id. at 630.
124. Id. at 630.
Id. at 622.
125.
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sion of ideas, that cannot be achieved through
means significantly
26

less restrictive of associational freedoms.'

The Court concluded that the Jaycees message has not been and will
not be unduly burdened by the presence of women. 27 The Court held
that the state's compelling interest to prevent gender discrimination is a
warrantable restriction on free speech, particularly when it is done in the
least restrictive manner possible.128 The Court reasoned that the Jaycees's
alleged First Amendment violation was invalid or unsubstantiated:
It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the Jaycees is organized to
promote the views of young men whatever those views happen to be,

admission of women as voting members will change the message
communicated by the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported by the record. In claiming that women might have a different
attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting
rights, and foreign relations, or that the organization's public positions would have a different effect if the group were not "a purely
young men's association," the Jaycees relies solely on unsupported
generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men
and women. Although such generalizations may or may not have a
statistical basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking
29

that relies uncritically on such assumptions.1

The Court held that excluding women perpetuated the subordination
and oppression of women in society.' 30 Creating equality under the law
"reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy
and of the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing
the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration
that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including
women."131

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 32 the Court faced a very similar
situation as in the Jaycees case. The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) alleged that Dale, a scout leader who was gay, diluted the organization's
message promoting traditional family values. 133 They argued that the
mere presence of Dale diluted the BSA's message. 134 The BSA claimed
that to continue its message promoting traditional families, the organiza126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 623.
See id. at 627-28.
See id. at 630-31.
Id. at 627-28 (citations omitted).
See id. at 628.
Id. at 626.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
Id. at 653.
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tion had to exclude Dale from its association.' 35 Dale argued the State of
New Jersey possessed a compelling state interest in prohibiting the discrimination in public accommodations.' 36 The high court of New Jersey
found that the Boy Scouts were, in effect, a public organization that enjoyed great access to public places and resources.1 37 Implicit in this argument is the right to equal protection as an active member of the gay
community. 3s The tension between the two claims is obvious. The BSA
wanted to exercise free association with non-gays, and the state and Dale
sought a non-discrimination policy. The Court found the BSA's argument persuasive39and agreed Dale's presence would dilute the organization's message.
However, the Court failed to adequately balance Dale's competing
claim as it did in Roberts v. Jaycees.'4 The Court also failed to draw a
reasonable distinction between the Jaycees and Boy Scouts cases. Instead, it concluded that gays would dilute BSA's message promoting
heterosexuality, even though the BSA had a policy not to discuss sexuality at all. 14 1 Instead, the Court held that although "homosexuality has
gained greater societal acceptance

. . .

this is scarcely an argument for

denying
First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these
'' 4
views.
VeS,,142

3. Harmful Societal Effects: Obscenity, Pornography and the First
Amendment
a. Obscenity
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held that Georgia's obscenity definition impeded individual thought because the law extended to activities
occurring in one's own home.' 43 The Court found that viewing obscene
material privately was a victimless act, and not even society or morality
was harmed. 144
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he

135.
136.

See id. at 652.
See id. at 645.

137. Id. at 646.
138. See id. at 645. The Court did not address Dale's claim, nor did it address New Jersey's
compelling state interest in promoting equality under its public accommodations law. Id.
139. Id. at 656.
140. See id. at 660.
141.
142.

Id. at 654-55.
Id. at 660 (citation omitted). The Court held that "public orjudicial disapproval of a tenet

of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to
accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expressive message." Id. at 661.
143.
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
144. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67.
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may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at 1the
thought of giving government the power to control
45

men's minds.

The Court also rejected the state's argument that obscene material
causes anti-social behavior 46 because it found a lack of evidence proving
that private viewing harmed society. 147 A formidable competing claim
was not made other than to say the government has an interest in
preventing anti-social behavior. The anti-social behavior may include
rape and violence to women, and if so, the equal protection doctrine
could have been summoned.
Four years later when the Court was faced with the commercial distribution of obscene materials it found that harm to morality, and thus
harm to society, was evident. In Miller v. California,148 the Court would
not extend constitutional protection to sexually explicit material lacking
in social value. 149 The appellant mailed sexually explicit materials to
unsolicited or unsuspecting individuals in violation of a California statute. 5 ° The Court found that the state was within its constitutional parameters when it sought to prohibit unsolicited, obscene material.' 5' The
Court recognized that the state sought to protect society at large, and
particularly, the recipients of obscene material. 152 The Court also recognized the importance of protecting material that contains "serious" literary, artistic, scientific and educational value so not to silence valuable
speech. 153 Again, an adequate competing claim was not made although
arguably one could have been made. The harm to society claim would
have been more adequate had it been rooted in constitutional law. For
example, if the obscene material harmed a particular group in a way that
prevented access to rights or privileges, then an adequate constitutional
claim would have been made. 154
In an attempt to balance competing interests, 5 5 the Court established an obscenity rule protecting unsuspecting adults from receiving
pornographic material, otherwise understood as time, place and manner
145.

Id. at 565.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 566-67.
See id. at 566.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Miller,413 U.S. at 36-37.
Id. at 17-18.

151.

See id. at 30-31.

152. See id. at 24 (seeking to restrict distribution of material that is 'patently offensive' in order
to protect society).
153. ld. at 24.
154. Further, the Court's rationale is contradictory because it concludes that offending community standards warrants a constitutional trump. This contradicts Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
571 (2003), where the Court held that imposing the majority's views on the minority is impermissible. See supra note 11. The Court's holdings would possess greater effectiveness if constitutional
values complemented instead of contradicted each other.
155.
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 19-20. Here, the Court stated that the competing interests were the
state's right to protect public morals and the pornographers' right to produce obscene material.
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restrictions on First Amendment speech. 156 Obscenity has been defined
as:

(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the

prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct .. .; and (c) whether the work,
taken as57 a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 1

Finding that harm existed when society's sexual mores were
58 offended, the Court placed another restriction the First Amendment.1
b. Child Pornography
The New York v. Ferber Court found that photographs and films
depicting minors engaged in sexual activity harmed children. 159 The
Court reasoned that the "distribution network for child pornography must
be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled." 160 The Court made this
determination because congressional data indicated that child pornography harms children's psychology and physical well-being, and because
pedophiles use pornographic images to entice children to have sex with
them. 161 Relying on the data, the Court concluded that the government
possessed a compelling interest to ban child pornography. The Court
again held that sexually explicit images should be taken as a whole in
order to avoid 1criminalizing
images with social, educational, artistic or
62
political value.

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court found congressional
evidence insufficient to prove that virtual child pornography harms actual children. 163 Without actual harm, the Court could not justify the
overreach of the Child Pornography Protection Act ("CPPA") which

156.

See id. at 24. However, the appellant's First Amendment claim received little attention

because the Court was focused on qualifying the ambiguous Roth obscenity test in order to help
resolve the many obscenity cases that sat before federal and state courts. See idat 29.
157. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). It is important to note that the average person may not apply
community standards from a gender neutral viewpoint. In other words, such definitions may not take
into account the oppression of females in pornography if evaluated by male standards of sexuality.
See Catherine A. Mackinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 169-175 (Dru-

cilia Cornell ed., 2000) [hereinafter Not a Moral Issue]. Further, even if community standards reflect
the objectification and consequently the harm of women, the Court may find the material protected
speech because itcontains some value, probably a male value. See id. at 176.
158. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
159. See Ferber,458 U.S. at 758.
160. Id. at 759.
See id. at 758 n.9 (referring to congressional findings).
161.
162. See id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
163.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
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banned virtual child pomography.' 64 As a result, the Court found that the
CPPA "chill[ed]"' 165 protected speech because Congress had overstepped
constitutional boundaries by prohibiting speech, not otherwise considered criminal, in an attempt to stop the crimes of pedophiles.166 "The
mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
168
' 67
reason for banning it."' The Court referred extensively to Ferber.
Concluding that Ferberpermitted restrictions on free speech when actual
children were harmed, the Ashcroft Court held that Ferber only intended
to reach pornography made with real children. 169170Thus, virtual porn did
not directly harm minors, according to the Court.
Congress compiled a report outlining findings that virtual porn
harmed children. 171 Congressional findings indicated that perpetrators
use virtual child porn as an instrument to encourage children to engage in
sexual conduct. 172 The congressional report also indicated that virtual
children are indistinguishable from actual children. 173 Indistinguishable
photos pose a serious problem when trying to prosecute pornographers
using real children.' 74 Finally, Congress sought to 75deter the making of
virtual pornography to curb the child porn industry.1
The government argued that the use of virtual photos perpetuates
the abuse of children and the desires of child molesters, which justifies a
compelling government interest to stop virtual child pornography. 76 The
government also argued that the Court should not protect sexually explicit material whose only focus portrays hard pornographic images of
children. 177 Specifically, the government claimed that it sought to elimiadvertising images depicting individuals that
nate material promoting' or
"appear to be a minor."' 78 The government explained that Congress intended to protect children.' 79 In order to protect children, the government
needed to criminalize virtual child pornography that is indistinguishable

See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
See id. at 244.
Id. at 253.
Id.
See id. at 239-56.
169.
See id.; see also JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., ET. AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 110 (Aspen
Press 5th ed., 1999) [hereinafter HENDERSON] (explaining that direct causation is found where
evidence demonstrates a direct link between respondent's actions and the alleged injury).
170. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
171. Id. at 270.
172. Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 254-55.
176. Id. at 252.
177. Id. at 250.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

178.

id. at 254.

179.

Id.
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from actual child pornography claiming 80that it endangers the physical
and psychological well being of children.'
Congressional findings and deterrence theory did not convince the
Court that a sufficient harm existed. 18 1 Yet, similar findings in Ferberdid
convince the Court of a sufficient harm. 182 The Court rejected the statute
when the connection between virtual porn and the harm to actual children became attenuated. 83 The Court did not find a causal relationship
between virtual child pornography and harm to actual children.
The Court refused to protect pornography made with actual children
because it found the material directly harmful to children's psychological
and physical well-being."&The fact that child porn was also used by
sexual perpetrators to entice and abuse their victims was an additional
reason to restrict speech; 185 yet, this alone would not warrant a constitutional trump because virtual child porn did not directly harm children.186
The Court is inconsistent when balancing harm and the First Amendment.
In summation, there exists a lack of discourse in the Court's rationale because, in part, it required a direct, causal showing of harm reflecting the Court's fluid, changing understanding of direct injury. For example, in the child pornography cases, the Court required a demonstration
that specific children were harmed by the making and distribution of
pornographic images. Yet, Miller did not require a demonstration of
harm other than to say that when a community is offended then society is
harmed, which is circular and conclusive in reason. Miller also does not
help to address an equal protection harm resulting from the production
and distribution of pornography.' 87 In addition, whereas the Court favored gender equality over First Amendment rights, queer equality took
a back-seat to the First Amendment. Arguably, the Court employs a harm
analysis in order to apply an objective standard although this standard
achieves anything but neutrality. Perhaps neutral on its face, in effect the
Court's holdings allow for the perpetuation of inequality and denial of
liberty in most cases. t 88

180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 249-50.

182. Id. The Court also considered whether those accused under the CPPA would otherwise be
convicted of criminal activity. See id. at 254. Because the Court answered this question negatively, it
found the
183.
184.
185.

CPPA overreaching. See id. at 258.
Id. at 261.
See supra notes 158-162.
Id.

186.

See Ashcroft, 525 U.S. at 250.

187.

See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW

32-45 (1987).
188.
See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157
(1976) (asserting that laws should not "aggravate" or "perpetuate" the subordinate status of a "spe-

cially disadvantaged group").
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B. Harmful Societal Effects: PoliticalParticipationand Morality
Whereas Georgia, in Bowers v. Hardwick,189 sought to explicitly
maintain the criminality of homosexuality,' 90 other states like Colorado
sought a more systematic approach in keeping queers suppressed in society. In Romer v. Evans, 19 1 Colorado amended its constitution, forbidding
queers from gaining political and legal protection. 192 The Court recognized the societal effects of Amendment 2, noting that the amendment
would severely curtail queers from advancing in a democratic forum and
from seeking any legal relief.1 93 The Court implicitly recognized the interrelationship of law and society. 194 The Court also rejected the state's
claim that the amendment did nothing more than restrict "special
rights."' 195 The Court found that extending political protection to queers
would not harm others, and concluded that the only
victims of Amend196
ment Two were the lesbians and gays of Colorado.
In Lawrence v. Texas, 197 the Court overturned Bowers and held that
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause protect queers
from government intrusion.198 The Court employed both clauses to explain that the State of Texas cannot discriminate against queers in order
to suppress them in society.199 The Court did not explicitly find same sex
sodomy constitutional; instead, it opined further and stressed that queers
are entitled to the same liberties as heterosexuals. 200 The Court again
recognized the detrimental effects of sodomy statutes on queer equality
and acceptance in society as it did in Romer.2 0 1 It also found that Texas's
rationale to protect society was illegitimate and implausible.2 2 As a result, the Court again held that the only victims were queers. 203
The Court concluded queers cannot be denied individual rights because Texas and Colorado failed to demonstrate that queers caused socie-

189.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
190.
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-92 (asserting that queers are not afforded constitutional
protection because gays harm society and morality).

191.
192.
193.
194.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
See id. (holding that Amendment 2 imposes special disability upon queers).
See id. (finding that the protections withheld by Amendment 2 are taken for granted by

most people because they are the protections that constitute ordinary civic fife in free society).
195.
Id.

196. Id. at 626-28 (holding that Amendment 2 withholds from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protections caused by discrimination).
197. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
198.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (holding that Justice Steven's dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick should have been controlling).
199.
Id. at 563-64.
200.
See id. at 567 (acknowledging that the Constitution grants queers the right to engage in

intimate conduct in the same manner it allows heterosexual couples to do so).
201.
See id. at 581-82 (holding that sodomy laws brand queers as criminals, creating automatic
stigmatization).
202.
Id. at 578.
203.
Id.
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tal harm. 204 2In°5Lawrence and Romer, the Court valued equality over cornity of states.

C. Harmful Effects on Commerce: DormantCommerce Clause
The Dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC") gives the Court power to
limit state regulation that would otherwise burden interstate commerce.20 6 In determining whether state laws impede interstate commerce,
the Court evaluates whether a state may discriminate against out-ofstaters by balancing the benefits of the law against the burdens imposed
on out-of-staters 0 7 In other words, the Court first identified the harms;
then, finding that a reasonable harm existed, the Court determined
whether the discriminatory law would remedy the injury.
Professor Chemerinsky best articulates the harm found in DCC
cases. In justifying the need for the DCC, Chemerinsky argues that "protectionist legislation" obstructs the free flow of commerce across state
borders and impedes the economic sufficiency of states, which ultimately
affects the sufficiency of individuals. 20 8 Those trying to compete in the
interstate market are harmed by states that attempt to obstruct the free
flow of commerce. Generally speaking, in all DCC cases, the obstruction
of interstate commerce is the harm.
To illustrate, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,2°9 New Jersey faced
excessive pollution and waste problems. 210 Disposing of excessive refuse
resulted in increased environmental and health hazards.2 1 In an attempt
to remedy these problems, the state prohibited non-New Jersey companies from using its landfills.1 2 New Jersey argued that the discriminatory
law would improve the state's environmental and health concerns.2 13 The
state of Pennsylvania argued that the discriminatory law burdened interstate commerce because Pennsylvanians would no longer be able to dispose of their trash in New Jersey. The Court evaluated and
balanced New
214
Jersey's harm against the harm imposed on other states.

204.
See id. (holding that the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest). See also
Romer, 517 U.S. at 626 (holding that Amendment 2 withdraws from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection discrimination).
205.
But see MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 91 (2003). Tushnet argues
that these cases reflect a cultural change on the Court more so than a finding that queer equality
trumped state interests. Id.
206.
CHEMERNSKY, supra note 65, at 317.
207.
Id. at 318.
208.
Id. at 321 (referring to the positions of Professor Regan and Justice Jackson).

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.

214.
Id. at 625-26. Assuming, as in Philadelphia, that the Court found both alleged harms
present, the Court then weighed the derived benefits. Id. at 626-27. By doing so, the Court consid-

ered the relevancy of the discriminatory law to the problem presented. Id at 628-29. In Philadel-
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The following cases are examples of the Court's requirement that
parties prove direct harm. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission,215 Washington Apples was stripped of its ability to compete
in the North Carolina apple market.2 16 The Court held that North Carolina failed to demonstrate how the discriminatory law ameliorated the
state's apple market.2 t7 The discriminatory law may have been permissible, according to the Court, had it provided a meaningful benefit to North
Carolinians. 2 18 Where meaningful benefits are derived, the Court will
sometimes permit discrimination if it does not unduly burden interstate
commerce. 219 North Carolina restricted Washington Apples from
competing in its apple market in an effort to benefit in-state companies,
not to remedy a compelling state problem. 220 Washington Apples was
it was no
directly affected by the discriminatory law, and as a result,
longer able to compete in the North Carolina apple market.22'
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,22 2 the

Court concluded that the State's scientific data was unsubstantiated and
insufficient to outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce, and found
the Iowa law unconstitutional. 223 In fact, the Court found that the state
"remedy" could 11create added expenses and danger to in-staters. 224 The
Court held that a direct, causative link was necessary to conclude that
benefits outweighed and remedied the injury.225 The Court found that the
state had failed to prove that the discriminatory law would benefit instaters .226

phia, the Court did not find that the state's environmental and health problems would improve as a
result of the prohibition of non-resident dumping. Id. at 629.
215.
432 U.S. 333 (1977).
216. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 340 (explaining that the North Carolina apple market was suffering as a
result of Washington Apples' success).
217.
The North Carolina law discriminated in both its purpose and effect against Washington
Apples. Id. In determining whether the law is discriminatory, the Court finds whether the law is
facially neutral or facially discriminatory. Id. at 350-52. The Court found laws facially discriminatory when the law overtly retaliates against other states, or when the discriminating state seeks to
protect itself. Id. Facially discriminating laws are unconstitutional. Id. at 352-53. The Court determined a law unconstitutional when the purpose and/or effects of the law discriminate. See, e.g.,
C & A Carbon, Inc. v. Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994).
218.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 349-51 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761, 766 (1945)).
219. Id. at 350.
220. Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 351-52.
221.
222. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
223.
Id. at 671 (finding that "the State failed to present any persuasive evidence" that sixty-five
foot double-length trucks are less safe than fifty-five foot single-length trucks).
224. Id. at 674-75.
225.
See id. at 670-71 (citing Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441
(1978)); see e.g. HENDERSON, supra note 169, at 110.
226. Id. at 671. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., the Court also did not find a link between
the alleged harm and the state benefits derived from the discriminatory law. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978). The Court upheld the Maryland law since the law did not
discriminatorily benefit in-state companies. Id. at 127-28. The law also did not impede interstate
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The Dormant Commerce Clause supports the argument for a comparative harm analysis in two ways. First, the Court explicitly identifies
competing harms. 227 Second, the DCC provides support for judicial
activism because Congress cannot effectively ensure constitutional
protections at all local and state levels. 228 Opponents of the DCC rarely,
if ever, question the regulation of commerce at the federal level because
the Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to regulate commerce via
the Commerce Clause. 229 Thus, where Congress can act, the judiciary can
review those actions.230 The DCC allows the judiciary to serve as an appropriate check on state actions impeding interstate commerce.2 31 The
Court is more consistent in this application than in other harm contexts
because interstate commerce is a clearly defined area of constitutional
law where the harm is easily identifiable, generally speaking.
There is also the implication that the Court requires a causal
harm. 232 It is tempting to argue that a showing of a causal harm should be
necessary to trump constitutional principles. Harm found in commerce is
probably the best example of where requiring a causal showing works in
a constitutional context. Yet, it is unlikely that sociological data proving
a causal connection in other harm contexts will consistently get the Court
out of a constitutional conundrum. 23 3 Because causation cannot truly be
demonstrated in most contexts, this article argues for discourse that encourages dialogue from the perspective of the "victim" and transcends
personal biases in uncovering discrimination.
D. Conclusions Based on the Court's Harm Analyses
First, what is meant by "harm" is not adequately explained by the
Court's use of the word. The Court has used harm in various contexts
without identifying the injury or its consequence, thus, failing to apply
consistent reason. The exception to this is found in the Dormant Commerce Clause cases where the Court identified the competing harms and
commerce. Id. at 127. The Court did not find the law discriminatory nor did it hold that interstate

commerce suffered. Thus, no harm existed and Exxon's claim failed. Id. at 128-29.
227. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 673-75. The Court used strict scrutiny when examining the discriminatory effects on the law because the freedom to participate in interstate commerce is a fundamental
right.
228.

See id. at 675-76.

229. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl.
3.
230. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
231.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 317.
232.
The Court also finds an inverse causal relationship by determining whether the means fit
the ends. In other words, the Court determines whether the "remedy"--often a discriminatory action
or legislation-will actually resolve the harm. A direct link between the harm and the remedy therefore exists.

233.
See Deborah Cameron & Elizabeth Frazer, On the Question of Pornographyand Sexual
Violence: Moving Beyond Cause and Effect, in Feminism and Pornography 240-53, 241 (Drucilla
Cornell ed., 2000) (asserting that true causation is not possible because intervening variables affect a
causal relationship and encouraging development of the discussion beyond cause and effect).
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balanced them in a reasoned manner-most of the time. Second, the
Court attempted to resolve tensions by implementing "objective" tests in
order to achieve neutrality in some scenarios, yet it fell short of resolving
the actual tension. These objective tests also fail to identify a competing
claim. The Miller test, for example, does not account for harm to equality-a potential competing claim where degrading pornographic images
portray women as submissive creatures who want to be dominated and
raped. Third, the Court's harm analyses usually rely on causative injury,
an unrealistic venture. 234 Requiring a showing of causation does not resolve the uncertainty of knowing whether the harm arose out of the said
conduct or law.235 It may decrease a subjective uncertainty, but it will not
significantly eliminate it due to intervening variables that are often immeasurable. 236 Requiring causation is also self-defeating when seeking to
transcend the inherent inequalities in the legal system, and it just continues to perpetuate law in a non-transformative way.

237

E. Canada'sUse of Harm in Resolving Competing Claims

Professor Vivian Curran posits that a greater understanding of international legal systems lends greater insight into the legal system of one's

234. The federal standing requirement prescribes the notion that a causative injury must be
established in order to bring and win a lawsuit. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1; FED. R. CIv. P. 17.
As Prof. Chemerinsky explains, "The Supreme Court has declared that both causation and redressability are constitutional requirements for standing." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION
74 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL JURISDICTION].
235.
See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 20-21
(1992) [hereinafter Scales].
236.
Several problems arise with a causal requirement. There is no definitive link which will
unquestionably account for the harm. For example, Professor Judith Butler posits that antipornographers fail to draw a causal link between pornography and the subordination of women.
Judith Butler, The Force of Fantasy: Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and DiscursiveExcess, in Feminism
and Pornography 497 (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000). Butler suggests, in a much more comprehensive
manner than I explain here, that there is no ontological proof that pornography causes harm to
women and people of color. See id. at 488. She posits that radical feminists such as Professor Catherine MacKinnon, whom Butler describes as anti-pornographers, are actually disempowering women
instead of protecting them because the very act of trying to protect women actually disempowers
them. Id. at 496-97. Butler argues that women are victims as a result of the anti-pornography
movement. See id. 503-04. Finally, she suggests that the real harm is restricting speech protected by
the First Amendment. See id. at 504.
Others argue that submissive, degrading portrayals of women perpetuate the epidemic of
sexual assault including rape, sexual molestation, incest and domestic violence, and therefore, the
deprivation of equality. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 37 (1993); see Mar Matsuda,
Progressive Civil Liberties, 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 9, 16-17 (1993) (articulating the
ways in which hate speech affects targeted groups); see Militarization,supra note 16, at 551-52.
Obviously, a legal struggle exists between the radical feminists and Butler. This struggle will not be
resolved by the Miller test. The Miller obscenity test guides the Court in determining when material
is considered obscene, yet it falls short when guiding the Court to determine the true question presented-the identification and resolution of the competing harms. For example, assume women
brought an equal protection claim against pornographers arguing that pornography caused inequality.
Pornographers could argue that the First Amendment protects their material because it contains
expressive, valuable content. Under the Miller obscenity definition, the pornographic material could
be considered protected speech because it contains expressive content.
237. See Militarization,supra note 16, at 551-52.
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native country.238 Curran discusses the importance of conducting comparative legal analysis with other systems, especially when their approach is different from the U.S. approach.239 In so doing, I will address
the Canadian approach to competing claims below.
The Canadian Charter grants the Supreme Court of Canada explicit
authority to analyze competing claims. 240 The Supreme Court of Canada
understands that where constitutional claims conflict, harm is at the core
of the tension. 241 Rather than employing levels or tiers of scrutiny to resolve the tension, the Supreme Court of Canada uses a balancing ap242
proach.
The two cases discussed below illustrate Canada's express
identification and balance of harm in competing claims.
The first case involved freedom of expression and racial equality. In
R. v. Keegstra, a teacher brought a freedom of expression claim because
he was convicted of violating a hate speech statute.243 The teacher made
anti-Semitic statements in his classroom and expected his students to
repeat these "facts" on examination answers. 244 Alberta prosecutors argued that hate speech causes violence and fosters inequality. 245 The Ca246
nadian Supreme Court held that hate speech is not protected speech,
and found that the statute banning hate speech is constitutional because,
in part, the Canadian Charter seeks to nurture equality and multiculturalism. The Canadian Court reasoned
that equality is more valuable than
247
promoting derogatory ideas.
The second case involved tensions between gender equality and
freedom of expression. In R. v. Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada
reinterpreted the definition of obscenity to include harmful depictions of
women, finding that Section 163 of the Code is aimed at preventing harm
2 48
to society, "a moral objective that is valid under s. 1 of the Charter.
The prosecution a49 argued that the material depicted harmful and exploitive images of women, and as a result, the defendant's freedom of speech
claim should fail. 25 0 The Supreme Court of Canada created workable
238.
See VIvAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 7-8 (Carolina
Acad. Press 2002).
239.
Id. at 10.
240.
Frank lacobucci, The Supreme Court of Canada: Its History, Power and Responsibilities,
4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 27, 31 (2002).
241.
Id.

242.

Id.

243.
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 2.
244.
Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 2.
245.
Id. at 3.
246.
Id. at 2 (referring to Parliament's legislative findings defined in the Criminal Code and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms).

247.
Id. at 3-4.
248.
R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 4.
249.
In Canada, the selling and possession of obscene material falls under criminal conduct.
See Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 8.
250.
Id.; see also Ann Scales, Avoiding ConstitutionalDepression:Bad Attitudes and the Fate
of Butler, in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 322-23 (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000).
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a risk of substantial
tests to determine whether the images 25advanced
1
tolerate.
to
unwilling
is
society
that
harm
The Canadian Court did not assert that the harm must be measurable, or that the prosecution had to demonstrate the harm. Instead, the
Canadian Court stated that "[i]f the community cannot tolerate this risk
of harm, then ...these materials, even though they may offer a non-

violent, non-degrading, non-dehumanizing content, will constitute undue
exploitation of sex and fall under the definition of obscenity" (emphasis
added).252 Canada, in balancing competing rights, found that equality
253
trumps free expression.
I do not suggest that the Canadian system is without flaws or without impermissible infringements. The Canadian Court required first that
claimants demonstrate a causative harm. 254 In Keegstra, the Canadian
Court concluded that "the harm caused by hate propaganda represents a
'255
pressing and substantial concern in a free and democratic society.
Requiring a causal demonstration is problematic for the same reasons
briefly articulated above. A demonstration of causal harm creates a feint,
and consequently, perpetuates inequalities by allowing the Court to believe it is implementing an objective standard while failing to address the
actual harm that underlies the conflict.
The Court then concluded that a causal showing of injury is not
necessary. In Butler, the Court held that "a risk of harm" can trump free
speech,256 which could allow for a great many impermissible infringements. A risk of harm is unnecessary in most scenarios where there are
25
valid injuries. For example, in Dennis v. United States, the Court
trumped First Amendment rights because Dennis's speech advocating
communism created a risk of overthrowing the government. The Court
found that this potential risk was sufficient to outweigh liberty interests.25 8
IV. A COMPARATIVE HARM ANALYSIS
Professor Richard Pildes opines that the Court needs a new strand of
constitutional analysis to resolve competing claims. 259 The new strand,
Professor Pildes argues, should incorporate and truly balance societal
251.
252.
253.

Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R.452, at 3, 16.
Id. at 37.
See id. at 9.

254.
255.
256.

Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R.697 at 48.
Id. at 34.
Butler, [19921 1 S.C.R. 452, at 26.

Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505.
257.
The Court will not find a potential injury sufficient when private parties argue for preven258.
tative action to curtail harm. See, e.g., FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 234, at 74 (discussing the

causation requirement upheld in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
259. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism,27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 726 (1998).
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complexities. 26 The current conception of rights weighs individual rights
versus the good of the community where one interest trumps the other,
according to Pildes. 26' He argues that the current conception is a misnomer because it really allows the Court to screen for impermissible governmental regulation and infringements, and does not weigh competing
interests. 262 In some incidences, infringement will be necessary. Where
the infringement of individual or community rights is necessary, the infringement must comply with the principles of the Constitution. 63
Professor Pildes's postulation supports the comparative harm analysis for two reasons. One, Pildes acknowledges that the Court's balance
test is a "rote exercise" only.264 He explains that the Court really does not
weigh competing interests. 265 Instead, the Court considers the cause of
action within the relevant structural conception of the constitutional principle at issue.266 The structural conception presumes that all individuals
and groups already enjoy constitutional protection. The Court fails to
identify competing interests, and reviewing claims based on a structural
conception, which ignores systematic inequalities.267 Two, Pildes posits
that individual rights exist and have meaning due to their social context.268 The goal of a comparative harm analysis is to identify the harm,
and then as Pildes suggests, determine its constitutional value and its
effects in society. 269 By identifying competing harms, the Court acknowledges both claims, and must decide which constitutional principle
prevails.270
An elementary comparative law principle supports a competing
harm analysis. Comparative law professors recognize that the identification of both similar and differentiating elements is essential in trying to
understand various legal systems. 271 When trying to compare, one must
identify what is at issue, and often, it is the differences or polarities that
cause legal tension. 272 As Professor Curran explains: '"To deny difference
is to deny recognition to the particulars that constitute [identification]

260.

Id.

261.
Id. at 727-28 (referring to Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously).
262. Id. at 731. The current conception refers to the two strands of constitutional analysis:
suspect class and fundamental right. Id. As an aside, screening for impermissible infringements is a
worthwhile and needed objective.
263. ld_
264. Id.
265.

Id. I also note that the Court balanced competing interests in Jaycees v. Roberts and the

Dormant Commerce Clause cases. Supra notes 120-31, 206-233.
266.
Pildes, supra note 259, at 731.
267. Id.
268.
Id.
269. Id.
270. However, one constitutional right does not work independently of another. Rights are
interwoven, and without one, the others fail to exist. See TUSHNET, supra note 15.
271.

E.g., COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 8 (Vivian Grosswald Curran ed., 2002).

272.

Id.
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itself; in that sense, it is to camouflage and erase identity.",21' Thus, to
compare is to identify, and to fail to identify erases that which is at issue.
This comparative law principle applies to competing constitutional
claims because, like the tension between countries, tensions exist between parties. 274 In order to get at the root of the tension, one must identify the polarity, hence, identify the competing harm.
Like Professor Nice's co-constitutive approach, the comparative
harm analysis seeks to address the 'immediate, continuing, and real injuries,' as they relate to competing claims. 275 The remainder of this section
seeks to explore the types of harms that are legally permissible using
queer equality, pornography and hate speech as illustrations.
A. Harm to Self
Two assertions usually exist when gay opponents claim that queers
are harmful to themselves. First, queers harm themselves because they
deny the primary purpose of their body: procreation.27 6 This assertion of
harm possesses little or no value because its rationale would then find
impotent men, sterile couples, and those choosing not to parent, unlawful
in their actions or inactions. Second, immoral conduct harms one's abil7
ity to live up to his or her potential and fulfill his or her dreams.27 Here
again, this assertion is valueless for many reasons including that this
claim is based entirely upon the belief system of a few dominant forces
in society. Even among the dominant members of society, one will find
subjective and varied understandings of what "ability" and "liv[ing] up to
[one's] potential" means.278 The Court cannot evaluate either assertion
without drawing upon personal experiences. Moreover, the Constitution
establishes the principle of individual autonomy and privacy, which prohibits governmental interference with private conduct that does not injury others.
B. Harm to Society andMorality

The harm to society notion posits that the actor benefits from his or
her actions while observers are harmed. In examining competing claims
involving queers and proponents of traditional families, Professor Thomas Clark articulates three ways in which society and courts have used
Id. (acknowledging that most modern theorists recognize similarities between the systems;
273.
however, Professor Curran calls for identification of the differences between various legal systems).
See id. (discussing the importance of identifying both the similarities and differences
274.
between countries).
The Emerging Third Strand, supra note 20, at 1231 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
275.

(1996)).
Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 102 (1996) (referring
276.
to arguments made by gay opponents).
Strong, supra note 36, at 1287.
277.
Id.
278.
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popular prejudice disguised as moral harm2 79 to withhold constitutional
rights for gays. 280 One, natural behavior dictates natural law, i.e. procreation. 8 Two, the preservation of heterosexual relationships is the primary
objective of society. 2 Three, queers are just outside the norm and undeserving of the benefits traditionally afforded to heterosexuals.28 3 These
reasons had been sufficient to deny queers constitutional protections such
as privacy, equality and due process.
The Court has favored subjective, moral harms over actual constitutional harms when examining competing interests of unpopular groups,
with no critique of reason. 285 Moral debates based in personal interpretations will detract from the actual harm. 286 Such personal interpretations
are often based in ecclesiastical doctrine. 287 Moreover, the Court has historically failed to acknowledge the harmful consequences of anti-gay
policy in the workplace, the family, the military and school-key societal
institutions.
Subjective moral harms are rarely, if ever, a plausible argu288
ment.
Finally, in making her argument that queers harm society, Professor
Anita Allen cautions the courts against reducing individual accountability for the sake of privacy.289 She encourages accountability in order to
uphold traditional family values and societal mores. 290 A similar argument was made in Baker v. Vermont.291 Vermont argued that the state
entitled a few privileged individuals to marry because those individuals
279.
Morality used here is a very different morality from that described by the moral-practical
discourse.
280.
See Thomas Clark, Secularism and Sexuality, the Casefor Gay Equality,THE HUMANIST,

May-June 1994, 23, 26. This article was published before the Court's Lawrence decision. Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
281. Clark, supra note 280 at 24-25.
282. Id. at 28.
283.
284.

Id. at 27.
Id. at 23.

285. Id. at 27. "Recent court decisions ... have recognized that indeed it is bias, not a rational
interest, that motivates unequal treatment of gays." Id. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039
(1986); see also Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 647 (2000).
286. Clark, supra note 280, at 26. Clark suggests that courts have been influenced by "the

traditional assumption that something is wrong or immoral about [homosexuality]. .. this assump-

tion has no foundation in any objective harm constituted by gay sex." Id.
287.
Id. at 23. Clark explains: "[P]ublic policy codifying this [anti-gay] bias verges on a govemnment establishment of religion." Id.
288.
See generally id. In addition, Professor Nancy Knauer offers the "pro-family" explanation
as to how queers harm society. Nancy. J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Constructionof the Gay
PoliticalNarrative, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 78 (2003). According to the opposition, queers engage
in sexually deviant behavior, molest children, and cause the breakdown of the family and society.
See id. The victims of queer conduct include children, heterosexual marriages, and ultimately,
society. Knauer concludes that these arguments are unsubstantiated, particularly because they are
centered on subjective moral views. Id. at 85.

289. See generally Anita Allen, Privacy Isn't Everything: Accountability as a Personaland
Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375 (2003).
290. Id.
291.
See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that denying same sex marriage
rights is a violation of the Vermont Constitution).
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have the natural capacity to procreate. 92 The government has an interest
in extending the marital privilege to protect those most likely to beget
children.293 The government reasoned that marriage protects children,
and ultimately society, by making parents legally accountable as husband
295 marand wife.294 Yet, .this rationale fails to demonstrate how
•
. extending
The
children.
their
and
couples
heterosexual
riage to queers harms
constituin
grounded
harm to personal morality is also not sufficiently
tional doctrine, and therefore, it is not a sufficient reason to trump rights.
296
The Court supports this proposition as evidenced by Romer v. Evans
and Lawrence v. Texas.297 The Court rejected the use of subjective
298
morality as evidence that queers harm society.
C. Harm to Others and the PracticalDiscourse Model

Harm to others is the only incidence where the Court should abridge
a constitutional right. The Court should consider trumping a constitutional right when it causes injury that is detrimental to the integrity and
principles of the Constitution. Where no negative and harmful externalities exist, no victims or injury exist. 299 Put simply, negative injury that
adversely affects individuals or groups and their access to constitutional
rights and privileges must exist. Without this, the alleged harm is insufficient to trump another's constitutional right.
Permitting constitutional trumps when claimants establish a "harm
to others" claim is a more reasoned approach. Harms should be measured
300
by the implementation of "ethical" and "moral-practical discourse.' 30 1
Some scholars debate whether practical discourse can be achieved.
Professor Jurgen Habermas posits that it can be done without employing
the erroneous and fated "theoretical objectification., 30 2 Before discussing
how moral-practical discourse can be done, it is important to be clear
about what moral-practical discourse is. Habermas explains: "The moral
point of view ...

compels the participants to transcend the social and

historical context of their particular form of life and particular commu-

Id. at 881.
292.
Id.
293.
Id.
294.
Id.
295.
296.
Romer, 517 U.S. 620. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Romer.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text for a discussion
297.
of Lawrence.
See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
298.
See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundationfor
299.
Gay Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73 (2002).
HABERMAS, supranote 6,at 15.
300.
E.g., THOMAS MCCARTHY, IDEALS AND ILLUSIONS: ON RECONSTRUCTION AND
301.
DECONSTRUCTrION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY 140 (1993) (arguing that Habermas ignores the cultural differences which could create different "ethical" conclusions).
HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 22-23.
302.
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nity and adopt the perspective of all those possibly affected."3 °3 This
approach enables judges to consider not only their biases and the biases
of the legal and social system but also enables them to consider the lives
of those adversely affected. The "ought to" rationales are not part of the
moral-practical discourse.
To act immorally or unethically is to deny someone personhood. °5
Judges must respect persons' rights to act autonomously. Implicit in this
notion is that when an injury has occurred, reason needs to be applied.
To evaluate when injury has occurred, judges must overcome their assigned social memberships. 3 6 It is often difficult to respect the personhood of others when entrenched in one's own social membership. Such
memberships create privileged status.30 7 Where there are individual selfunderstandings that cannot be overcome, these differences must be given
full access in discourse, creating argumentation of a "maximally exhaustive interpretation" and thereby minimizing the differences. 30 8 Argumentation and discourse provide the "procedure for the exchange and assessment of information, reasons, and terminologies. ' 3 9 Discourse must
be void of "impartial judgment of interpersonal practical conflicts" in
order to minimize inequities.3 10
Inequities are perpetuated by the implementation of objective reasoning, empirical proof and justifications. 311 Habermas explains: "Moral
practical discourse detaches itself from the orientation to personal success and one's own life to which both pragmatic and ethical reflection
remain tied. 312 In other words, morality and ethics embody the process,
through discourse, where rational ideas are played out and separated
from personally-motivated applications. The morals discussed by
Habermas entail the belief that society and the government seek to employ a non-discriminatory policy. In addition, ethical discourse should be
applied on an individual, legal basis because each problem "follow[s] a
unique logic of its own that had nothing to do with the logic of the next
problem." 313 Also, trying to implement logic that would be applied in
other scenarios creates a new problem of diversion. This is an interesting
premise that should be considered, yet I would add that the judiciary is

303. Id. at 24.
304. Id. at 40 (discussing that morals are not part of religious and metaphysical contexts, and
thus avoiding irrational justifications).
305. See id.
at 58.
306. Id. at 45.
307.
Id. at 46.
308.

Id. at 58.

309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Id. at25.
Id. at 17, 30, 84 (arguing that "problems are always rooted in something objective").
Id. at 15 (rejecting the use of the word "ethics" in legal discourse to denote personal,

religious-based beliefs).
313.
Id.at 17.
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working from the same legal basis that flows from the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clause.
Critics argue that judges, for example, are not motivated to use ethical discourse. Even if they did, Habermas fails to account for the crosscultural differences that result in no right answer. 1 4 Yet, due to the nature of discourse, these cross-cultural differences will be minimized and
ethical decisions will be achieved. Further, the alternative is to normalize
315
norm-conformity, which guises the objectification of the problem.
This norm-conforming fuels inequities. Objectifying the problems also
creates "weak transcendental proof .

[which] can only be placed in

[personal] interpretations.' 316 Therefore, to objectify is to employ irrational, personal beliefs-precisely what critics fear by Habermas's approach.
A practical discourse model should be employed when judges
evaluate competing claims. Professor Ann Scales advances a similar ar317
gument supporting the transcendence of inequalities. In order to overcome personal conflicts that objectify the problem, a judge needs to become more aware that neutrality is not possible.31 8 As Scales explains:
"Consciousness-raising exposes the points of view implicit in the objective norm, liberates participants in the process of consciousness raising
...and transforms what is meant by 'reality."' 31 9 In so doing, a judge
must also be particularly aware of the principle of equality and become
conscious of the oppressed persons' points of view. 320 This consciousness is moral and ethical, and constitutionally permissible. Professor
Scales also supports the proposition that discourse needs to be applied on
a case-by-case basis. 321 In this way, transformation occurs, steadily having the best strategic answers unfold as society begins to adopt and accept322the new realities, making the legal reality a first step to social reality.
D. JudicialActivism and Review of Fact Finding
There are many discussions taking place in the United States surrounding judicial review, or as pundits seeking to maintain the status quo
like to argue-judicial activism. Whereas other countries struggle to
some extent with this topic, it has not become the political hot bed as in
314.

See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 301, at 135-40.

315.

See id. at 135.

316.

HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 84.

See generally Scales, supra note 235, at 10.
317.
Id. "Better to relinquish neutrality as a surrogate fore justice, because the ideal of neutral318.
ity obscures more than enhances the debate." Id.
319. Id. at 25 (citing Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1988)).
320. Id. at 29.
321.
Id.
322.
See id. at 29-3 1.
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the United States. Some argue that the judiciary should just apply the
law as it stands, as if the law has but one interpretation. Others acknowledge that there can be more than one interpretation. Therefore, the judiciary needs to achieve neutrality so not to render an unfair judgment.
Some argue that society, and particularly the judiciary, cannot arrive
at the "right" answer. These opponents argue for objectivity. Yet,
"[o]bjectivity is the epistemological stance of which objectification is the
social process.- 32 3 In other words, no one is truly objective, and the act of
judging "objectively" objectifies that which is judged. The United States
has placed such a tremendous emphasis on this notion of a neutral arbiter. In early cases, neutrality served us well since discrimination was
more overt. Now that prejudice and discrimination have found hiding
places in dark comers, the judiciary needs the tools to locate those biases,
and we should encourage their use. After all, the judicial role is to review
claims and redress harms.324

1. Judicial Review and Activism
I hesitate to rehash the judicial review discussions in great length,
so I offer just a few key points. The judge's role as interpreter will not be
effectively democratic unless she incorporates social, economic and political factors in understanding and interpreting the law. 325 A judge must
be willing to examine the law within the context of the environmental
conditions surrounding the circumstances in which the law was made,
and who the law affects. 6 Legal precedence has a shelf life, and a judge
must actively overrule laws that no longer serve societal and constitutional needs.327
The understanding that law is not made in a vacuum and must be
reviewed in light of its interrelationship with society has been apparent
since the very beginning of the U.S. legal system. 328 Professor Lawrence
Friedman sets forth a legal history that uncovers both local and national
intent to make law that fosters economic and social policy. 329 As economic and social needs changed, legislative and judicial functions
changed.330 Old ideas were abandoned for a new or qualified approach
323.

Not a Moral Issue, supra note 157, at 175 (referring to the objectification of women in

pornography and explaining that pornography cannot be judged objectively).
324.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 234, at 74 (explaining that the role of the judiciary is to redress

constitutional harms).
325.
See generally BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR 6 (2003).

326. Id. (citing Roger Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Guistizie: or Hard Cases Make Good
Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (1962)).
327. See FIELD, supra note 325, at 6-7.
328.

See generallyFRIEDMAN, supra note 8.

329. See generally id. at 76-163.
330. See id. at 148-49 (explaining that legislation such as the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified the
judicial power of review and noting the controversy surrounding judicial review during the implementation of the Judiciary Act).
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that effectively met societal needs. 331 The judicial role is to review and
uphold constitutional ideals as those ideals become more apparent to a
changing society. 3 32 As a result, the law is not a fixed and immutable
concept between principles and fact-it is reactive.333 The law is a set of
workable rules that should stand334only as long as they functionally fulfill
societal and constitutional goals.
The role of the judiciary is also reactive.335 Justice Traynor combines a pragmatic, realist approach with judicial innovation to preserve
democracy. 336 In his approach, Traynor advocates for the use of "policy
analysis" and review of the "most current and available sociological
data." 337 The Post-New Deal Era illustrates this reactive judicial role,
when constitutional ideology prevailed.338 Traynor examines the legal
harms affecting consumers, women and political participants, 339 and concludes that the judge must determine a rational and objective outcome in
favor of the public interest in order to foster democratic ideals.?
Often, constitutional principles conflict with public sentiment.341
Racial tensions epitomize this conflict between popular opinion and
equality. In 1947, Traynor opposed antimiscegenation laws, illustrating
judicial protection of constitutional principles despite strong contrary
public opinion.342 During the period from 1865 to 1970, a reported 1% of
couples were interracially married.343 Yet many U.S. Americans claimed
that interracial marriage would become commonplace and undermine the

331.

See generally id. at76-163.

332. See generally id. Sometimes those new ideas violated democratic ideals, and they were
eventually abandoned. Id. (referring to undemocratic legislation such as the Alien Act and Sedition
Act). The argument for separation of powers cuts both ways in that the legislative actions are subject
to review by the judiciary to effectively reconcile unnecessary restrictions on equality and liberty. It
is not that the judiciary must kowtow to the legislative branch because they are given explicit law
making powers. The very nature of judicial review is an active process which affects and alters
existing law. FIELD, supra note 325, at 121. (explaining how through interpreting the law, the judge

is an active oracle) (citing Roger Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1,2
(1977)). See also Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism:The Federal Courts and the
Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 816 (2004) (explaining that life tenure for judges
is "a necessary feature of a federal judiciary entrusted with the power and duty to invalidate legislative acts at variance with the Constitution (i.e., the power of judicial review))."
333.
FIELD, supra note 325, at 7.

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 7-8.
See id.
Id. Unlike Traynor, most realists reject the notion that any judge can be objective.
Id. at 8.
See generally id.at 16-18.
Id. at 17 (referring to Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948); DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.

2d. 711 (1948); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d. 434 (1955); Escola v. Coca Cola, 24 Cal. 2d. 453

(1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d. 57 (1963)).
340. See FIELD, supra note 325 at 6-7.
341.
Id. at 21.
342. Id. at 20-21. Traynor sat on the California Supreme Court when the state's antimiscegenation statute was invalidated. See generallyPerez, 32 Cal. 2d 711.
343.

FIELD, supra note 325, at 21.
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privileges associated with the white race, and particularly white men.
In fact, ninety-two percent of western whites surveyed in a 1958 Gallup
poll opposed interracial marriage, sending a clear message that the public
did not support the legalization of marriage between blacks and
whites. 345 Public sentiment should not be upheld when such sentiment
contradicts the principles of the Constitution.

Under a comparative harm analysis, a judge would have, in theory,
discovered that white males' alleged harm was a potential loss of power
and survival of his race whereas blacks claimed harm through the inequitable distribution of rights and privileges. 346 The sociological data would
suggest that the white men's claim was unreasonable, because only 1%
of the population was interracially married. This minute percentage underscored the fact that the white race was not in jeopardy. Therefore,
inconsistency between alleged harm and fact existed.
Given that only 1% of marriages were interracial at the time, it
would be wholly unforeseeable that the remaining 99% of marriages
would somehow be jeopardized along with the white race. Even assuming this harm was somehow legitimate, its resolution directly conflicts
with the constitutional notion of equality.347 The resolution of the harm
was inconsistent with equality principles, and therefore, the constitutional rights of African-Americans were directly violated. By permitting
interracial marriage, whites are not suffering any constitutional deprivation. Thus, their harm does not amount to a constitutional violation. Interracial marriage is a straightforward example where the harms are easily distinguishable, not only because hindsight permits clarity but also
because only one valid constitutional issue is presented.
Active judicial review also has its problems. One, legal instability
and "false, inconsistent legal patterns" could emerge when judges consistently change the laws and reinterpret societal needs. 348 This is more of a
fear than a reality, particularly if using Traynor's limitation on judicial
policy making. 349 Traynor argues for policy change when precedence is
outdated and no longer meeting society's needs, thus minimizing legal
instability. 350 During times of great societal change, the law will consequently move through a period of change and instability. Some legal
344.
Id. White men are distinguished here because most antimiscegenation laws said that black
men could not marry white women; thereby, protecting the white man's interest only.
345.
Id.

346. The constitutional principles at issue are white men's First Amendment freedom of association and African-Americans' and females' interests in equality and also freedom of association.
347.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
348.

FELD, supra note 325, at 126-27.

349.
Id. at 126.
350. Id. at 126-27. This proposition also seems plausible considering there is little evidence to
suggest the Framers had a fixed idea of the role of precedence. Norman R. Williams, The Failingsof
Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 805

(2004).
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instability and change is evitable with legal interpretation and common
law. 35' The facts of each case are not fixed or predetermined, and thus,
are expected to change constantly. To illustrate, equal protection of the
laws first applied to gender and racial disparities, and now to gays and
lesbians. 352 As a result, courts will not alter legal principles; they will
apply the fixed principles to the changing societal needs and fact patterns. It is also unrealistic to expect Congress to always foresee and resolve constitutional problems through law-making.
The second problematic aspect of progressive judicial interpretation
concerns the separation of federal powers. Opponents of active judicial
review evoke a separation of powers argument, claiming that judges are
engaging in lawmaking by expanding laws to protect additional groups.
Opponents argue that the judiciary is not an elected body, and therefore,
it should not give unpopular or underrepresented groups constitutional
access because doing so expands the law.353 Historically, courts have
been the one check in the system that does protect unpopular groups because it does not sway with the masses, as most politicians do in seeking
reelection.354 Courts are not making law by declaring that an unpopular
or underrepresented group is entitled to constitutional access; instead, it
is reviewing the actions of state and federal legislatures and private actors for constitutional infringements. 355 Moreover, once competing
claims arise, the legislative and executive branches have already acted,
and the courts are attempting to bring clarity to or evaluate such actions
in a constitutional framework.

351.
See generally id. at 805-15.
352. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 609 (holding that exclusive, all-male club
membership was unconstitutionally discriminatory, despite the male members' First and Fourteenth
amendment rights); Virginia v. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's law against interracial marriage); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (invalidating a Texas anti-sodomy law as unconstitu-

tionally violative of the right to privacy).
353.
See MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-6 (1988) (critiquing judicial review from the perspective of liberal and
republican traditions).

354. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (discussing the extreme public sentiment against interracial marriage); see supra notes 341-45 and accompanying text; United States Dep't Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (allowing non-traditional "families" access to state benefits); Romer,
517 U.S. at 620 (protecting homosexuals despite voter support for Colorado's Amendment 2); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (further protecting homosexuals' rights to privacy and certain intimate contact).
355. A historical analysis of early American laws would establish that the interests of the
"smallholders," that is middle class property owners who were a "politically potent class" had a
great deal of influence over how the laws affected them as evidenced by the homestead exception.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 244-45. The middle class property owners, usually farmers, served an
important economic interest. Id. It was later evident that those without a political voice needed to be
protected by a federal system so that state and local laws did not unduly burden and punish those

without the power to advance within the legal system. Id. It was discovered that the politically weak
members of society were bad for the nation's economic and democratic interests, and laws emerged
to protect women, the poor and African-Americans. See id. at 391-488. The U.S. Supreme Court
either enforced or established many of these protectionist laws that are now commonplace. Id.
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On the one hand, the Constitution grants judicial power to review
legislative abuses that infringe on constitutional principles.1 6 On the
other hand, the judiciary is limited from creating law since the Constitution explicitly gives that power to the legislature. 357 Opponents of active
judicial review implore the use of the political question doctrine to prevent the courts from deciding controversial issues. 358 When the courts do
decide issues that are deemed controversial, opponents claim that this is
law-making.359
In section two of this article, I explored reasons why some resist expanding constitutional rights for groups who do not enjoy and benefit
from such rights. For example, in examining the political question doctrine, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Baker v. Carr,created a
set of criteria that attempted to recast the political doctrine question so
not to prevent a number of disenfranchised groups from accessing the
constitutional pie.360 Justice Brennan's recast positioned the political

question doctrine as one decided almost exclusively as a separation of
powers matter.361 The Court sought to permit constitutional review particularly where the matter involved important constitutional rights. 362 His
recast has been interpreted to maintain the status quo when the Court
finds an unusual need for adhering to the public policy so not to reverse
societal direction. 363 Those who seek to maintain the status quo are attempting to prevent access to the Constitution, which is viewed as finite.
I concede that federalism and separation of powers are essential to the
U.S. republic. I just question when these principles are employed as limiof the constitutional pie with
tations in cases that involve the sharing
364
access.
full
enjoy
not
do
who
those

356.
See supra note 6.
357.
See infra note 364.
See supra note 53.
358.
359.
See Daniel Levin, Federalistsin the Attic: OriginalIntent, the Heritage Movement, and
Democratic Theory, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 105, 114-15 (2004).

360.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962).

361.

PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURT AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-

STATE RELATIONS 434 (4th ed. Foundation Press 1998) (the political question doctrine has been
applied primarily in Guaranty Clause cases).
362.

See id.

363.

Id.

364.

The Court is not the only one with limitations. The Constitution limits Congress from

reviewing constitutional claims. See generallyU.S. CONST. art. I; U.S. CONST. art. 111.This is true
with one exception; Congress indirectly hears and reviews cases in its administrative courts. See
supra note 348. As the complexity of the U.S. legal system grew so did the need to develop a more
complex legislative and judicial body. FRtEDMAN, supra note 8, at 439-41. Congress's administrative courts deal with finite legislative issues that require expertise in specific subject areas. Id. To
learn the subject matter every time a new issue presented itself would be an inefficient use of judicial
resources. See Levin, supra note 359.

2004]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM

2. Review of Fact Finding
The Court is the expert on constitutional law.365 The judiciary has
and must continue to review findings of fact to determine whether infringements are necessary on redress. The Court must do so in order to
determine whether the facts amount to a constitutional harm. Professor
Paul 0. Carrese explores why judicial power must include the authority
to evaluate findings.366 In reviewing the work of Montesquieu, Carrese
explores judicial power while discussing the importance of cloaking such
power under the guise of moderation. 367 I use the word "guise" to articulate that Carrese, by discussing Alexander Hamilton's critique of Montesquieu, supports active judicial review but believes judicial review
must be "cloaked" by moderation to address potential fears that will inevitably arise. 368 Individuals become fearful of judicial activism because
they fear that politicking would encumber judging, according to Carrese. 369 Those that fear active judicial review are concerned that they will
lose security and power in our finite constitutional scheme. 370 Arguing on
behalf of Montesquieu, Carrese posits that the judiciary should reform
the laws quietly yet steadily. 371 This approach seems to suggest that tolerance and equality of the laws should be done behind closed doors 372
so
not to upset the masses who do not want to share the constitutional pie.
Whereas Professor Carrese's postulation supports judicial power, 73 his
approach does not foster sound societal ideals and in many ways perpetuates inequality of the laws.
To review findings of fact requires a shift in power authorizing the
judiciary to evaluate sociological data and other "evidence. '

374

The judi-

ciary must determine what is a "natural right" and "natural law" particularly because "'the [modem] Supreme Court presides over the priority of
right.' ' 375 In order to determine what natural laws and rights are, the
Court must evaluate the prevailing sociological conditions. 37 6 It is per365.
U.S. CONST. art. m. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174-75 (1803).
366.
See PAUL 0. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND
THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 6 (2003).

367.
See id. at 2.
368.
See id. at 7.
369.
See id. at 17.
370.
Id.
371.
See id. This approach would probably have been possible during Hamilton's era although
it now seems impossible to address legal reform quietly, particularly when equal protection of the
law is at issue. Equal protection issues are often at the forefront of political campaigns which are
launched through television, radio and the Internet.

372.

See id.

373.

See id. at 258.

374.

See id. at 240-41.

375.
Id. at 258 (quoting MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 28 (2000)). Sandel challenges the new liberal reconstruction of judicial
review which claims that it is both natural and reasonable for there to be incompatible and pluralistic
constitutional doctrines. Sandel is correct insofar that his proposition supports the notion that the

Court must decide when certain rights will trump based on a case by case basis.
376.
See id. at 240-41.
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fectly reasonable for the judiciary to determine whether the findings support a constitutional trump since the Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution. 377 This does not prohibit Congress from collecting evidence
to prepare legislation. The Court should nonetheless be free to review the
findings and determine whether they support a constitutional limitation
for particular individuals or groups. 378 The Court independently evaluated the findings of fact to make its own determination in the Dormant
Commerce Clause 379 and pornography cases, to name just a few. 380 The
Court is responsible for ensuring that the findings are relevant to and
bring forth the alleged harm, protecting constitutional rights. 381 This must
continue, and can be effectively furthered by a comparative harm analysis.
V. CONCLUSION

The Court has not explicitly acknowledged when competing claims
exist, and has not developed a sufficient guideline for balancing them.
Instead, the Court relied upon feint causal demonstrations and morality
rhetoric to trump rights. The Court's harm analyses have failed to resolve
constitutional tensions. When the Court did not use conclusive reasoning
or require a demonstration of causative injury to step out of the constitutional conundrum, it used "objective" tests to balance interests. This was
the Court's attempt to achieve neutrality so not to incorporate biases and
consequently perpetuate inequities.
To recapture the Court's flaws, in Virginia v. Black, the Court was
unable to identify and evaluate the harm with cross-burning. The plurality was able to identify that possible riots or violence were harmful, but it
did not explicitly identify African-Americans or other targeted groups as
victims. The Court ignored the competing claims, and failed to resolve
the legal tension. Instead, the Court favored claims allegedly demonstrating a direct injury.
The Dormant Commerce Clause cases serve as an exception because the Court adequately identified and balanced competing claims.
The harm in commerce is more clearly identifiable and definitive unlike
the notion of harm to others. With harm to others, individuals and groups
seek to share the constitutional pie creating a backlash from those already enjoying the pie. In other words, there is more resistance when
377. Id. at 258 (explaining that "[t]he more realistic, progressive conception" of the judiciary
acknowledges: "Judges actually make new law, in large or small doses, case by case"). See also
supra notes 143-233 and accompanying text, emphasizing that the Court already determines constitutional trumps as the Constitution's ultimate arbiter.
378.
379.
380.

See CARRESE, supranote 366, at 241.
See also supra notes 206-37 and accompanying text.
See also supra note 377 and accompanying text.

381.
The Justices of the Court possess the ultimate authority on the interpretation of the Constitution, and the Court must check for constitutional infractions. See Marbury, 5U.S. at 178.
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individuals and groups seek constitutional protection. There is little societal interest and bias when states compete in the interstate market.
Therefore, the greater 'alleged' clarity that exists in the Dormant Commerce Clause cases should be of no surprise.
A comparative harm analysis offers a way for the Court to more explicitly identify competing claims because it requires the explicit identification of harm. By explicitly identifying competing interests, the Court
ensures that valid constitutional claims are advanced. In pornography
cases implicating free speech, for example, the competing claim is harm
to women due to the objectification and oppression of females in pornographic images. Pornographers are injured by being denied the right to
express a certain form of sexuality, arguably male sexuality. Once the
harm is identified, then the Court must determine which harm is more
important to guard against, and which remedy is more consistent with
constitutional principles. The Miller test does not account for competing
interests, nor does it balance them in a meaningful way.
I concede that social and political science data should be incorporated cautiously in helping the judiciary to reach a fair decision since
there are often inherent biases with such data. Sociological data will assist the judiciary in determining whether the alleged harm is valid. For
example, sociological data was used to debunk the notion that interracial
marriage, if accepted, would become commonplace. Moreover, even if
interracial marriage did become commonplace, the resulting harm was
unclear other than potentially disrupting the status quo of whites.
When competing claims conflict, the alleged harm must be constitutionally valid before the judiciary attempts to balance interests. Arguments such as "interracial marriage will become commonplace" are not
constitutionally sound, and therefore, should not survive and abridge the
rights and liberties of others. By comparing harms, the judiciary will find
that often there are not two valid constitutional claims and will rarely be
faced with balancing legitimate, competing interests. A comparative
harm analysis will, and should, focus on whether the claims brought
forth are actual constitutional claims; thereby, eliminating the need for
so-called objective, causative analyses in the majority of cases. Where
legitimate competing claims exist, the courts must balance constitutional
interests. In these few incidences where two constitutional claims are
presented, some rights will be trumped in favor of other rights. How to
evaluate and trump certain rights is left for another conversation. Yet, in
striking this balance, the legislature need not be precluded from entering
the competing rights discussion so long as it does not attempt to encroach
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upon the judicial role and amass enough constitutional authority to effectively destroy the integrity of the separation of powers doctrine. 382
The judiciary should evaluate and balance competing harms by engaging in practical discourse. Discourse, in theory, will enable the courts
to transcend personal biases and employ well-grounded reason. Further,
practical discourse requires the judiciary to view the injury from the victim's perspective. The courts should also ensure that the "remedy" will
resolve the harm in a meaningful way and will not contradict constitutional principles. This responsibility rests with the federal courts, and
particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, because it is the supreme arbiter of
constitutional law. Because the courts review constitutional rights, the
courts should also review limitations on those rights. Discourse is essential in order to overcome inequities and the propensity to deny liberties
for less powerful groups.
However, discourse does not guarantee that the courts will reach an
unbiased decision in every incidence. In other words, the courts will
reach the wrong conclusions occasionally and will need to remedy these
wrongs when more information becomes available. Error cannot and
perhaps should not be avoided. Neutrality pretends misjudgment does not
exist whereas discourse examines the opportunity for misjudgment. It is
also important to emphasize that litigation is just one of the first steps in
the long uphill struggle for equality and liberty; yet, litigation is an important step for it sets standards to address the constitutional conflict that
was overlooked or encouraged by the other branches of government, and
rights the immediate wrong.

382. It is unlikely that the legislature will attempt to amass the necessary authority for constitutional review since in a survey administered to congressional members asking whether they believe
they are in a better position to interpret the Constitution than the judiciary, they overwhelmingly
agreed that the judiciary is better equipped for constitutional interpretation. See Bruce G. Peabody,
CongressionalConstitutionalInterpretation and the Courts: A PreliminaryInquiry into Legislative
Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 127, 165, 168 (2004) (discussing the survey results

indicating that the majority of Congress members and/or their staff believe that the courts are in a
better position to interpret the Constitution.).

FREE EXERCISE: NEUTRALITY, ANIMUS AND A BREATH OF
LIFE INTO SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to Locke v. Davey,' modem Free Exercise jurisprudence consisted of two contextual poles. At one pole, a neutral criminal statute
prohibiting the use of peyote that incidentally affected religion was upheld under a rational-basis review in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.2 Conversely, at the other pole,
a reactionary prohibition of animal sacrifices, directed toward the religious practices of a specific group, was invalidated under strict scrutiny
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.3 The doctrine left uncertain the appropriate standard of review-rational-basis or
strict scrutiny-for a contextual middle-ground between the two poles.
Davey rid Free Exercise jurisprudence of this uncertainty and elucidated
an appropriate standard of review for a non-neutral provision that is less
hostile to religion than the challenged law in Lukumi.4
Ostensibly, Davey split the distance between the existing contextual
poles by introducing an animus distinction, distinguishing benign discriminatory intent from animus. 5 Having created this new category,
Davey applied a rational-basis review to a non-neutral law because the
law evinced no animus toward religion. 6 Yet, there appears to be a subsurface battleground in Davey that reintroduces an erstwhile doctrine to
the forefront of modem Free Exercise jurisprudence.7 This Comment
argues that: (1) Davey represents a resuscitation of a substantial burden
test that, combined with the modem intent test of Smith and Lukumi, provides a comprehensive Free Exercise doctrine; (2) the animus distinction
introduced in Davey may be problematic as a doctrinal tool; and (3) the
animus distinction is unnecessary because the outcome of Davey hinges
on a substantial burden consideration.
Part H of this Comment provides a background and explanation of
Washington's challenged Promise Scholarship Program, along with its
effect on Joshua Davey. Part El reviews the development of Free Exercise jurisprudence prior to Davey, first surveying the historic substantial
1.
2.
3.
4.
(1993)).
5.
6.
7.
Davey).

124
494
508
See

S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990).
U.S. 520, 545-46 (1993).
Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314-15 (2004) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520

See id. at 1315.
See id.
See id. at 1312-13 (discussing the effect of the Promise Scholarship Program on Joshua
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burden inquiry and then surveying the modem intent approach. In Part
IV, this Comment discusses the procedural history of Davey in the federal courts. This discussion reviews arguments made by the parties and
rationales used by both the majority and dissenting opinions in federal
court.

Part V of this Comment provides a comprehensive analysis of the
Davey decision and its contribution to Free Exercise jurisprudence. First,
the analysis outlines six conceptual categories of Free Exercise challenges and discusses the appropriate standard of review for each category. This discussion demonstrates that the "effect" inquiry reintroduced
in Davey is necessary, combined with an "intent" inquiry, to account for
all Free Exercise circumstances. Next, the analysis argues that there are
potential pitfalls associated with an animus distinction. Finally, the
analysis proposes an approach to Free Exercise challenges called the
"intent/effect" test that considers both the intent and effect of a challenged law. The proposed approach achieves the doctrinal goals of
Davey while circumventing the precarious distinction between animus
and non-animus discrimination.
II. FACTS

In 1999, the Washington State Legislature found that students who
were successful in their high school pursuits may not have the financial
means to obtain higher education because of difficulty in securing finan8
cial aid and the potential insufficiency of that financial aid. Because the
legislature found that "increasingly, an individual's economic viability is
contingent on postsecondary educational opportunities," it sought to develop a state program that would assist higher education students. 9 To
achieve that goal, the legislature enacted the Promise Scholarship Program, available to students who met the "academic, income, and enrollThe Promise Scholarship provided an eligible
ment requirements."'
student a once-renewable scholarship to attend Washington higher education institutions accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting organization.'" The scholarship neither distinguished between public and
private nor secular and religious institutions; rather, the scholarship was

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B. 119.005 (West 2004).
9. id.
10. Davey, 124 S.Ct. at 1307, 1310 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(a)-(g)
(2003)). To be eligible for the Promise Scholarship, a student must meet the following requirements: (1) graduate from a Washington high school, and (a) graduate in the top 15% of her class, or
(b) attain a cumulative score of 1200 or better on her first attempt on the Scholastic Assessment Test
I, or (c) attain a cumulative score of 27 or better on her first attempt on the American College Test;
8.

and (2) have a family income less than 135% of the state's median; and (3) enroll in an eligible
postsecondary institution in the state of Washington pursuing any degree other than a degree in
theology. Id. Joshua Davey met these requirements and, thus, was eligible for the Promise Scholarship. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.

11.

Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(13) (2003)).
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designed to be used at any
accredited higher education institution within
2
the state of Washington.'
Joshua Davey graduated from high school in May 1999 and was notified in August 1999 of his eligibility to receive $1,125 from the Promise Scholarship Program for the upcoming school year.' 3 Davey enrolled
at Northwest College, a private Christian college, to pursue a double
14
major in pastoral ministries and business management/administration.
Required classes for a pastoral ministries major at Northwest College are
taught from the viewpoint that the Bible is foundational and represents
truth, rather than merely a historical and scholarly point of view. 15
Moreover, the pastoral ministries major at Northwest College is "de16
signed to prepare students for a career as a Christian minister.,'
In October 1999, Washington's Higher Education Coordinating
Board (HECB) informed financial aid administrators at institutions
throughout the state that students pursuing a degree in theology were not
eligible for the Promise Scholarship.' 7 Each college or university is responsible for the classification of its programs, and Northwest College
determined that its pastoral ministries major was a degree in theology.18
Thus, the institution could not certify Davey's eligibility as required by
the HECB.19 Davey, faced with a choice of either accepting the scholarship or pursuing the pastoral ministries major,
decided to forego the
20
scholarship to pursue his chosen field of study.
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.",2 To provide context to the development of Free Exercise jurisprudence, this Comment analyzes the circumstances and rationale of
four often discussed cases that shaped the structure of Free Exercise in-

12.

Id.

13.
Katie Axtell, Note, Public Funding for Theological Training Under the Free Exercise
Clause: PragmaticImplications and Theoretical Questions Posed to the Supreme Court in Locke v.

Davey, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 585, 589 (2003).
14. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
15.
16.
17.

Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
Locke, 299 F.3d at 751.
Id. "A 'degree in theology' is not defined in the statute, but, as both parties concede, the

statute simply codifies the State's constitutional prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue
degrees that are 'devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith."' Davey, 124 S. Ct. at
1310; see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (prohibiting the use of State funds to devotional education). "There is no dispute that the pastoral ministries degree is devotional and therefore excluded
under the Promise Scholarship Program." Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310-11.
18.
Locke, 299 F.3d at 751; see also Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.

19.
20.
21.

Locke, 299 F.3d at 751.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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quiries before Locke v. Davey.2 2 By no means all-encompassing, this
background merely provides a basic review of the underlying Free Exerthat will surface in the Supreme Court's consideration of
cise issues
23
Davey.
A. Sherbert v. Verner

24

The Supreme Court first established "a simple, standard test for
evaluating free exercise claims" in its 1963 decision in Sherbert v.
Verner.2 5 In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
was denied unemployment benefits because she was unavailable to work
on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. 26 The South Carolina Employment Security Commission found that she was ineligible for benefits
because the restriction on her Saturday work availability was equivalent
27
to "fail[ing], without good cause," to accept work when offered.
The Court enunciated a test balancing the protection of the free ex28
ercise of religion with the protection of compelling state interests.
First, the Court considered the effect of the law in Sherbert, and held that
forcing an individual to choose between following her religion and forfeiting benefits inflicts "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise
of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worApplying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the possibility of
ship."
fraudulent claims was insufficient to justify such a substantial burden on
an individual's First Amendment rights.3 °
According to the Sherbert doctrine, once a court determines that a
governmental action imposes a substantial burden on religion, strict scrutiny is applied. 31 Under strict scrutiny, a law will be invalidated as unconstitutional unless the government is able to demonstrate that the ac22.
124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S 618 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see
generally ERWIN CHEMERtNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.3 (2d ed.

2002) (providing a general background to the Free Exercise doctrine).
23. See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(holding that timber harvesting and road construction by the government in an area traditionally used
for religious purposes by Native American Indian tribes did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because the government was not "prohibiting" the exercise of religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing that a state's interest in universal compulsory education was insufficient to justify interfering with Amish children's religious beliefs by compelling them to attend
school).
24.
25.
26.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Axtell, supra note 13, at 595.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401.

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 401.
Id. at 401-06.
Id.at 404.

id. at 406. "[1]n this highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, endan30.
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' Id. (quoting Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
Axtell, supra note 13, at 595.
31.
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tion was the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state
32
interest. Thus, the Sherbert doctrine is essentially an effect test, focusing the key inquiry on whether the challenged law imposes a substantial
burden, or a sufficient effect, on religion.33
34
B. McDaniel v. Paty

In McDaniel v. Paty, a Tennessee statute disqualified clergy from
participating in the legislature. 35 Appellant McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church, filed candidacy for a position with the constitutional convention. 36 An opposing candidate sued for a declaratory judgment, contending that the Tennessee statute disqualified McDaniel from
serving as a delegate to the convention. 37 The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the statute barring ministers from serving as delegates
deprived McDaniel "of the right
to the free exercise of religion guaran38
teed by the First Amendment.
The majority in McDaniel held that the statute prohibiting ministers
from participating as delegates to the constitutional convention did, indeed, violate McDaniel' s protected right to the free exercise of religion.39
The majority noted that under the provision, "McDaniel cannot exercise
[his right to be a minister and his right to seek and hold office] simultaneously because the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other., 40 The majority used the Sherbert analysis to conclude that this statute imposed a substantial burden, stating .'[[t]o] condition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot] upon
this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [his] religious faith [by surrendering his religiously impelled ministry] effectively
penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional liberties. ' A' Having
found a substantial burden, the majority applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the Tennessee statute.42

32.
Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and
the GeneralApplicabilityRequirements, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851-52 (2001).
33.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
34.
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
35.
McDaniel,435 U.S. at 620.

36.

Id. at 621.

37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 629.

40. Id. at 626. The Court noted that "the right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably
encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions .... " Id.
The Court also mentioned that Tennessee "acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to
seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention." Id.
41.
Id. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406) (alteration in original).
42.
Id. at 628-29. The majority held that Tennessee's interest was not compelling, stating that
there is "no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful of
anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts." Id. at 629.
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McDaniel supplements the doctrine outlined in Sherbert by once
again applying an effect test and focusing the determinative inquiry on
whether the challenged law imposes a substantial burden on religion.43
McDaniel suggests that a generally available benefit cannot be conditioned on any action or inaction relating to religion. 44
C. Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
45
Smith
The Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith limited the application

of Sherbert and created the modem structure for evaluating Free Exercise
infringement claims. 46 In Smith, the respondents were fired from their
positions with a drug rehabilitation organization after they consumed
peyote at a sacramental ceremony of the Native American Church.47
Subsequently, the respondents were determined to be ineligible for unemployment benefits by the Employment Division because their employment discharge resulted from misconduct.4 8 The respondents relied
upon the "compelling state interest" test outlined in Sherbert49 in their

assertion that their religious motivation for 50
the use of peyote placed them
beyond the reach of Oregon's criminal law.
The majority in Smith severely limited the Sherbert doctrine, excepting neutral laws of general applicability from strict scrutiny, even
where there is a substantial burden on religion.5 1 The majority opined
that "incidental effect[s] of. . . generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision[s]," which burden the free exercise of religion do not offend
the Free Exercise Clause. 52 In an "attempt[] to cabin [Sherbert's] significance somewhere on the musty shelves of history, ' 3 the majority
declined "to breathe 54into Sherbert [any] life beyond the unemployment
compensation field.,

43.

See id. at 626.

44.
Id.
45.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
46.
Colleen Carlton Smith, Zelman's Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular Private
Schools in State School ChoicePrograms, 89 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1968 (2003).

47.
OR. REV.
48.
49.
50.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (peyote is a controlled substance prohibited by Oregon law); see
STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
See generally Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (."prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' includes requiring any

individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act
that his religious belief forbids (or requires)") (alteration in original).
51.
Axtell, supra note 13, at 595-96.
52.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Axtell, supra note 13, at 595-96.
53.
Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 763 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting), rev'd 124
S. Ct. 1307 (2004).

54.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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The doctrine developed in Smith denotes a significant shift from the
effect test applied in Sherbert and McDaniel.55 Rather than applying
strict scrutiny to a law that imposes a substantial burden on religion,
Smith declines to consider effect, applying a rational-basis test where a
law is neutral and generally applicable. 56 Thus, the Smith doctrine focuses on the overall purpose, or intent, of a provision.57 This novel intent
test suggests that the effect inquiry of Sherbert is misplaced and inapplicable, instead focusing the determinative inquiry on the neutrality of the
challenged provision.58
59
D. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

In 1993, the Court affirmed Smith and applied it to a fundamentally
different set of facts, demonstrating the effect the test would have on a
non-neutral and non-generally applicable law.6° In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Lukumi Babalu Church, whose
members practice the Santeria religion and employ animal sacrifice as a
"principal form[] of devotion," leased land and announced plans to create
a place of worship in the city of Hialeah.6' In response, the city council
held an emergency session and passed an ordinance that prohibited animal sacrifice.62 Once the city adopted the ordinance, the church filed a
suit alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.63
The Court made clear that the requirements of neutrality and general applicability articulated in Smith continued to apply, 64 and any law
that failed to meet those requirements would be subjected to strict scrutiny. 6;5 The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor gen55.

See Axtell, supra note 13, at 595-96.

56.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual devel-

opment') (emphasis added) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). Moreover, comparing Free Exercise jurisprudence to racial discrimination
and free speech, the majority concluded "that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have
the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest .

i.."
Id. at 886 n.3 (emphasis added).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. at 885.
Id.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
Id. at 520.
id.

63.
64.

Id.
See generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. The Court in Lukumi explained the neutrality in-

quiry: "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks
facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the
language or context." Lukumi. 508 U.S. at 533. Additionally, the Court explained the general applicability inquiry: "inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it
seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation." Id.
at 542-43.
65.
Id. at 533 ("[a law] is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly

tailored to advance that interest.").
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erally applicable. 66 Further, in applying strict scrutiny, the Court held
that the interests presented by the city failed to justify the ordinance.67
Lukumi provides the logical extension to Smith, applying strict scru-

tiny to a non-neutral law, as might have been anticipated from the Smith
Once again, in Lukumi, the Court declined to consider the
opinion.
effect of the law, instead resting its fundamental inquiry on the overall
purpose, or intent, of the challenged law. 69 Lukumi demonstrated that the
Court planned to adhere to the doctrine developed in Smith. 70 In addi-

tion, Lukumi suggested that the Court was satisfied with avoiding the
effect inquiry of Sherbert, instead focusing on intent and
7 hinging its application of strict scrutiny on a neutrality determination. '
72

IV. LOCKE V. DA VEY
A. FederalDistrictCourt

In January 2000, Davey filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington against Governor Locke
and officials of the HECB, seeking to reinstate his Promise Scholar66. Id. at 532.
67.
Id. at 547. The city claimed the ordinances "advance[d] two interests: protecting the
public health and preventing cruelty to animals." Id. at 543.
68. See id. at 531-32; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
69. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. The Court stated "that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has an
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Id. at 531 (emphasis added). However,
"if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation,
" Id. at 533
the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest ....
(citations omitted). In his concurring opinion Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined, voiced his concern for the intent approach that the majority adopted, noting that "it is virtually impossible to determine the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body... " Id. at 558.
This concern seems disingenuous because Justice Scalia rid Free Exercise jurisprudence of an effect
inquiry and introduced an intent inquiry in his majority opinion in Smith. See generally Smith, 494
U.S. at 872 (1990).
70. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
71.
Although this Comment focuses on the Free Exercise Clause, commentators have often
discussed the Establishment Clause in relation to Davey. See, e.g., Carlos S. Montoya, Constitutional Developments, Locke v. Davey and the "Play in the Joints" Between the Religion Clauses, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1159, 1170-72 (2004); Axtell, supra note 13, at 606-11; Joseph P. Viteritti,
Davey's Plea: Blain, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of Religious Freedom, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 299 (2003). However, because the crux of the issue in Davey is a Free Exercise question and
because the Promise Scholarship Program passes muster under the Establishment Clause, this Comment avoids an exhaustive background of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a school voucher program that provided tuition
assistance for students to attend either public or private schools where the program is "neutral with
respect to religion" and provides assistance "to a broad class of citizens"); Witters v. Dep't. of Serv.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding vocational assistance for a blind student pursuing a
bible studies degree). Zelman and Witters demonstrate that state sponsorship of a general scholarship that incidentally directs some state funds toward students pursuing devotional theology degrees
is permissible so long as there is an "independent private choice" involved. Zelman, 536 U.S. at
640; Witters, 474 U.S. at 481; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(holding that providing an interpreter to a student at a Catholic high school did not violate the Establishment Clause).
124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004).
72.
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ship. 73 Davey moved for summary judgment, claiming that Washington's "prohibitions on the use of state funds for religious instruction violate[d] [the right to free exercise of religion] secured by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution ...

.

The HECB

also moved for summary judgment, arguing that allowing Davey to use
state funds to pursue a degree in devotional theology would violate
Washington's establishment clause,75 and arguing that withdrawal of
Davey's scholarship "did not violate any of Davey's constitutional
rights."76
The court ruled in favor of the HECB on summary judgment, dismissing all of Davey's claims for relief.77 Judge Rothstein dismissed
Davey's Free Exercise claim because the HECB had not prohibited
Davey from pursuing a degree in pastoral ministries, and because Davey
had no right to have Washington fund his higher education.78
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, Davey contended that by singling him out for unfavorable treatment by his choice of a religious major, the HECB policy violated the rules of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah79 and McDaniel v. Paty.80 He argued that a government offering
a benefit may not condition the benefit on the basis of religious status. 81
Accordingly, Davey contended that the restriction is subject to strict
scrutiny. 82 Conversely, the HECB contended that strict scrutiny is inapplicable because, in refusing to subsidize the education of students pursuing a degree in theology, Washington did not prohibit Davey from freely
practicing his religious beliefs.83 The HECB contended that declining to
finance a right is permissible and that "[tihe focus in free exercise inquiries is on what the government prohibits rather than on what the individual can exact." 84
In determining that the HECB's policy failed the neutrality test and,
thus, was subject to strict scrutiny, the majority first applied an effect

73.

Davey v. Locke, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (Wash. 2000), rev'd 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir.

2002), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
74. Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *4.
75. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
76.
77.

Axtell, supra note 13, at 591.
Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 2002).
Locke, 299 F.3d at 752 ("Washington's restriction may not stand unless it is narrowly

tailored to advance a compelling state interest.").
Id.
83.
Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation
84.
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439

(1988)).
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inquiry and relied heavily on an analogy with McDaniel.85 Applying this
analogy, the court stated that "[a] state law may not offer a benefit to all
...but exclude some on the basis of religion .... 8 6 The majority acknowledged that Washington is not required to fund the exercise of
Davey's religious rights. 87 However, relying upon Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,88 the majority analogized
Davey's situation to an abridgement of speech and concluded that the
government's provision of financial benefits must meet the requirement
of viewpoint neutrality, an inquiry reminiscent of the intent test in both
Smith and Lukumi. 89 The "bottom line" of viewpoint neutrality "is that
the government may limit the scope of a program that it will fund, but
once it opens a neutral 'forum' (fiscal or physical), with secular criteria,
the benefits may not be denied on account of religion." 90 Applying this
"bottom line," the majority determined that the HECB's policy was facially discriminatory and, thus, subject to strict scrutiny. 9' The majority
held that the Promise Scholarship Program did not pass muster under
strict scrutiny and reversed the lower court's judgment. 92
Dissenting, Judge McKeown opined that Washington "neither prohibited nor impaired Davey' s free exercise of his religion. 93 First, Judge
McKeown discussed the intent of the Promise Scholarship and distinguished Davey's claim from Lukumi, emphasizing that a constitutional
provision as old as the state itself was far different from a reactionary
city ordinance with likely discriminatory objectives.94

Additionally,

Judge McKeown argued that the majority mischaracterized the Promise
Scholarship Program as viewpoint discrimination. 95 Next, Judge McKeown applied an effect test reminiscent of Sherbert v. Verner,96 comparing
85.
Id. at 754 (comparing the benefit of holding a public office to the benefit of holding a
Promise Scholarship). See also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626.
86.
Id. The court went on to state: "Washington's restriction disables students majoring in

theology from the benefit of receiving the [Promise] Scholarship just as Tennessee's classification
disabled ministers from the benefit of being a delegate." Id.
87.
Id.
88.
515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that denial of funding of a student organization that published a Christian editorial amounted to viewpoint discrimination).
89.

Locke, 299 F.3d at 755-56.

90.

id. at 756.

91.

Id. at 757-58.

92. Id. at 759-60.
93.
Id. at 761 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
94. Id. ("Washington's decision not to fund religious education simply reflects its strong
desire, as reflected in its constitution since ratification in 1889, to insulate itself from the appearance
of endorsing religion-a concern cut from cloth wholly distinct from . . . the city ordinances in
Lukumi."). This discussion by Judge McKeown in the Ninth Circuit foreshadowed the Supreme

Court's introduction of an animus inquiry as the Supreme Court, like Judge McKeown, sought to
distinguish the facts of Davey from Lukumi. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).

95.
Id. at 767 (arguing that "[n]o aspect of [the Promise Scholarship] chills Davey's 'individual thought and expression') (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995)). She further argued that because the Promise Scholarship Program fails to drive
viewpoints from the educational marketplace at Northwest, the majority's viewpoint concerns "are
simply unfounded in this case." Id.

96.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Davey's financial dilemma with that of an indigent woman seeking an
abortion.97 She noted that the state has no obligation to fund a woman's
right to an abortion, even when it funds other medical procedures. 98 Following this analogy, Judge McKeown concluded that if a state's decision
to not fund an indigent woman's abortion does not substantially burden
her, then Washington has not substantially burdened Davey by refusing
to fund his pastoral ministries degree. 99
C. The United States Supreme Court

Initially, the Court disposed of any Establishment Clause concerns °° and framed the issue as whether Washington can deny the Promise Scholarship to students preparing for the ministry "without violating
the Free Exercise Clause."' ° Curiously, in light of the intent approach
enunciated in Smith and Lukumi, the Court first distinguished the effect
of Davey from the effect of Lukumi.1 2 Yet, the majority seemed to revert back to the intent test of Smith and Lukumi, resting its holding on a
distinction between the facts of Davey and Lukumi1 °3 The majority acknowledged that Washington treats devotional theology students differently from students pursuing a secular education; however, it distinguished those facts as "[flar from evincing the hostility toward religion
which was manifest in Lukumi ....104 Because there was nothing in the

history, text or operation of the Promise Scholarship Program that sug97. Locke, 299 F.3d at 764-65 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 765 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)).
99. Locke, 299 F.3d at 765. Similar to the indigent woman in the abortion funding analogy,
Davey's pursuit of his chosen degree is no "more difficult than it would have been in the absence of
[the scholarship] funding." Id.
long said that 'there is room for play in
100. The majority emphasized that "[the Court] ha[s]
the joints between [the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause]..' Locke v. Davey, 124
S.Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
In the anti-establishment history of the United States, there have been numerous uprisings against
at 1313. Initially many states sought to
Id.
I..."
using "taxpayer funds to support church leaders .
avoid this sensitive issue of established religion and, thus, embodied in their constitutions provisions
against using tax dollars in support of the ministry. Id. at 1314. Some states (such as Washington)
drew a more stringent anti-establishment line in their constitutions than the one drawn by the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1313. A more stringent state anti-establishment provision is permissible so
long as it does not go so far as to infringe upon rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
Id. at 1312. The Court declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon viewpoint
101.
neutrality, stating: "[t]he purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is ... not to 'encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers."' Id. at 1313 n.3 (quoting United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)). Thus, the speech forum cases are "simply inapplicable." Id. Moreover,
the Court applied "rational-basis scrutiny to [Davey's] equal protection claims," and determined that
Davey's Equal Protection Clause rights were not violated. Id. (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S.
361, 375 (1974); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)).
102.
Id. at 1312. The majority emphasized that the policy does not impose criminal or civil
sanctions on the free exercise of religion, it does not interfere with participation in political affairs,
and it does not force students to choose between receiving a government benefit and practicing their
religious beliefs. Id. at 1312-13.
103.
Id. at 1313-14.
104. Id. at 1314.
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gested animus toward religion, the majority concluded that the law
should be subjected to a rational-basis test. 0 5 Under rational-basis review, Davey's
claim failed, and the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
06
judgment.1
Dissenting, Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined,' 0 7 argued for adherence to the plain language of Lukumi, and argued against
the introduction of an animus inquiry that would apply rational-basis to
some non-neutral laws. t° 8 He contended that "'[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral ...

must undergo the most rigorous of

scrutiny .....
.09Next, attacking the majority's discussion of the effect
of the Promise Scholarship Program, Justice Scalia argued that there was
no authority for "approving facial discrimination against religion simply
because its material consequences are not severe." 110 Yet, he argued,
even if there was a substantial burden requirement in Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Promise Scholarship Program has met that threshold."'
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's animus inquiry will create
a slippery slope of discrimination justifications, stating that "[wihen the
public's freedom of conscience is invoked to justify denial of equal
treatment, benevolent
motives shade into indifference and ultimately into
2
repression.""

Thus, the Court in Davey was able to apply a rational-basis test to a
non-neutral law by relying on a new Free Exercise inquiry." 3 Conversely, Justice Scalia would have continued to apply strict scrutiny to
14
non-neutral laws, regardless of whether there was evidence of animus.'
Whether the majority's new animus test is a much-needed supplement to
105.
Id. at 1315. The majority contends that the Promise Scholarship is actually amiable to
religion, noting that the program permits students to attend religious schools and take classes in
devotional theology. Id. at 1314-15.
106.
Id. at 1315.
107.
Justice Thomas also wrote separately to note that "the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith." Id. at 1320 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108.
See id. at 1315-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109.
Id. at 1315-16 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 535 (1993)) (alterations in original). He further argued that "'the minimum requirement of
neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face."' Id. at 1316 (quoting lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533).
110.
Id. at 1318. Justice Scalia suggested that he is opposed to considering the effect of a
facially discriminatory law at all. id. He argued that the Court is "[no longer] in the business of
reviewing facially neutral laws that merely happen to burden some individual's religious exercise
Id. . (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
Justice Scalia's critique of the majority's use of a burden analysis is especially interesting considering that he introduced his dissent with a burden discussion. Id. at1316. He stated that by "mak[ing]
a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens
on religion are measured; and when [Washington] withholds that benefit from some individuals
solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a
special tax." Id.
111.
Id. at 1319 (arguing that "when the State exacts a financial penalty of almost $3,000 for
religious
exercise-whether by tax or by forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit--religious
practice is anything but free").
112.
Id. at 1320.
113.
See id. at 1315.
114.
See id.
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the Free Exercise doctrine or whether the test is a divergence from the
established doctrine is uncertain. The analysis portion of this Comment
will consider the new animus inquiry and the possible problems with an
animus distinction. Moreover, the analysis will discuss the outcome of
Davey and whether it is possible to achieve the doctrinal goals of the
majority without addressing animus at all.
V.

ANALYSIS

The effect of Locke v. Davey'15 is to add a guidepost onto the contextual continuum of Free Exercise jurisprudence. The factual circumstances of Davey fall on the continuum somewhere between the reactionary prohibition of animal sacrifices of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah'16 and the non-discriminatory criminal statute prohibiting the use of peyote of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.1 17 However, because the facts of
Davey forge a middle-ground between the poles of the existing doctrine,
the majority created an additional inquiry--declining to apply strict scrutiny to a non-neutral law, as might have been anticipated from the doctrine developed in Lukumi. 118 Instead, the majority limited its application
of strict scrutiny to those laws evincing animus toward religion." 9 This
limitation of strict scrutiny effectively expanded the use of a rationalbasis test to cover facially discriminatory laws evincing no animus, as
20
well as neutral laws.'
Prior to Davey, Free Exercise jurisprudence relied fundamentally on
an intent inquiry, as outlined in Smith and Lukumi.' 2 1 This inquiry
sought to place a challenged law into one of two categories: neutral or
non-neutral, with little regard to the effects of the law on religious practice. 12 2 On its face, the Davey Court split the existing non-neutral category into two subcategories-applying strict scrutiny where there is evidence of animus but applying a rational-basis test to facially discrimina123
tory laws that evince no animus toward the free exercise of religion.
Thus, the Free Exercise doctrine after Davey seems to focus on intent,
seeking to place a law into one of three categories: (1) neutral laws of
general applicability ("neutral"); (2) facially discriminatory laws that fall
115.
124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
116. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1309-11; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 52628; Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-75.
118. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (applying strict scrutiny to a non-neutral law). Because the
Promise Scholarship Program is non-neutral, a strict adherence to the Lukumi doctrine would apply
strict scrutiny. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (rejecting Davey's contention that the law is presumptively unconstitutional but declining to reject Davey's argument that the law is not facially neutral).
119. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15; see also Montoya, supra note 71, at 1173.
120. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
121.
See supra notes 56, 69.
122. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532.
123.
See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15 (distinguishing the discriminatory intent of the Promise
Scholarship from the animus demonstrated in Lukumi).
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short of evincing animus toward religion ("non-animus discrimination");
(3) laws that demonstrate a hostility toward religion ("animus"). However, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas condemned the majority's dis124
Rather, the
tinction between non-animus discrimination and animus.
to strict
Program
dissent would have subjected the Promise Scholarship
125
scrutiny because the law was not facially neutral.
The introduction of an animus test in Davey does not necessarily
12
limit the doctrine developed in Smith and Lukumi. 6 Instead, Davey
serves to supplement the doctrine, presenting an appropriate standard of
review for a factual middle-ground. After Davey, a neutral law of general applicability will be subjected to a rational-basis review, as in
Smith.127 Moreover, a reactionary law directed at prohibiting the activities of a religious group will continue to be subjected to strict scrutiny, as
in Lukumi.12 8 Thus, instead of destroying the doctrine of Smith and Lukumi,129 Davey elucidated a distinct standard of review for non-animus
discriminatory provisions, applying a rational-basis review1 30to a law that
"goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits.
on this intent
Although the majority purported to rest its holding
1 3 and dissent132
characterization, some of the discussion in the majority
suggested that effect considerations were key to the outcome of Davey.
Below, this analysis argues that: (1) Davey represents a resuscitation of
an effect test similar to Sherbert1 33 that, when combined with the intent
test introduced in Smith, will provide a comprehensive Free Exercise
doctrine; (2) the animus distinction introduced in Davey may be problematic as a doctrinal tool; and (3) the animus distinction is unnecessary
because the outcome of Davey hinges on an effect consideration.
A. Conceptual Categoriesof Free Exercise Challenges
To demonstrate the tools necessary for a comprehensive Free Exercise doctrine, it is helpful to consider the six conceptual categories of
Free Exercise challenges. These categories are: (1) neutral without substantial burden; (2) neutral with substantial burden; (3) non-animus dis124.

dissenting). Justice Scalia reiterates language from Lukumi,
Id. at 1315-16 (Scalia, J.,

stating that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral.., must undergo the most rigor-

ous of scrutiny," and noting that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face." Id. (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 546).
125. Id. at 1315-21.
126. See Montoya, supranote 71, at 1172 (contending that the use of precedent by the majority
was "'nothing short of bizarre,' and borders on the disingenuous").
127.
128.

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.

129. See Montoya, supranote 71, at 1172.
130. Davey, 124 U.S. at 1314.
See id. at 1312-13 (discussing the insubstantiality of the burden imposed on Joshua Davey
131.
by the Promise Scholarship Program).
See id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is a substantial burden on religion to
132.
withhold a generally available public benefit "solely on the basis of religion").

133.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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crimination without substantial burden; (4) non-animus discrimination
with substantial burden; (5) animus without substantial burden; and (6)
animus with substantial burden. The Court's modem Free Exercise
precedent provides some guidance for applying the appropriate standard
of review to each of these categories. Smith addressed a neutral law having a substantial burden on religion, applying a rational-basis review to
Category 2.134 Lukumi applied strict scrutiny to Category 6, a law evincing animus toward religion that imposed a substantial burden. 135 Finally,
the majority placed the facts of Davey into Category 3 and applied rational-basis review to a non-animus discriminatory law where there was
no substantial burden on religion. 36 The context provided by modern
Free Exercise precedent provides a good baseline for discussion of the
appropriate standard of review for the remaining three conceptual categories--Categories 1, 4 and 5.
1. Neutral without substantial burden
Although this category does not precisely align with the circumstances presented in Smith,137 consideration of that case is insightful. If a
rational-basis review is appropriate for a neutral law imposing a substantial burden on religion, the logical extension of that doctrine is that rational-basis would also be appropriate for a neutral law imposing no substantial burden. Thus, the standard of review applicable to Category 1 is
rational-basis review.
2. Neutral with substantial burden
As noted above, Smith addressed this situation. 38 Thus, the appropriate standard of review for this category is rational-basis review.
3. Non-animus discrimination without substantial burden
The majority suggested that the facts of Davey fit into this category,

rather than Category 4, in their discussion of the effect of the Promise
Scholarship Program.1 39 Seemingly discussing substantial burden, the
majority observed that "[the Promise Scholarship Program] imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions ....
Moreover, the majority stated

that "[iut does not deny ... the right to participate in the political affairs
of the community."' 14' Finally, the majority asserted that the scholarship
"does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
See supra Part m.C. and accompanying text.
See supra note 134.
See Davey, 124 U.S. at 1312-13.

140. Id. at 1312 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993)).
141.
Id. (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)).
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receiving a government benefit."'' 42 Apparently concluding that the
Promise Scholarship imposed no substantial burden on religion, the majority noted that "[Washington] has merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction."'' 43 Thus, the holding in Davey demonstrates that
a rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for this conceptual
category. 144
4. Non-animus discrimination with substantial burden
Unlike the conceptual categories of Free Exercise reviewed thus far,
this category proves problematic. Initially it seems valid to presume that
a rational-basis review should be applied to this category because the
Court's holding in Davey applied rational-basis to a non-animus discriminatory law. This presumption is well-founded because in modem
Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Court has gone to great lengths to dispose of the residual substantial burden inquiry from Sherbert.14 Thus,
without an effect inquiry, the appropriate standard of review should stem
from an intent categorization as in Smith, Lukumi, and, arguably, Davey.
However, as discussed in Category 3, the Davey majority analogized the effect of the Promise Scholarship Program with the effect of
pre-Smith Free Exercise precedent. 146 This extensive discussion seems to
be more than inconsequential dicta.' 47 Rather, the effect considerations
were likely demonstrative of a fundamental inquiry, dispositive of the
outcome of Davey. Although the Court stopped short of expressly advocating a reintroduction of a Sherbert-like effect analysis, Justice Scalia
the subtlety introduced by the majority's effect discusacknowledged
14
sion. 1
After briefly objecting to the animus distinction introduced by the
majority, Justice Scalia embarked on an effect discussion of the Promise
Scholarship Program. 149 He argued that Washington had substantially
burdened Joshua Davey by denying him a generally available public
benefit on the basis of religion. 50 Later in his dissent, Justice Scalia
again suggested that the Promise Scholarship Program imposed a substantial burden on religion, stating: "[tihe indignity of being singled out
for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling ...

can never

Id. at 1312-13 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
142.
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
Davey, 124 U.S. at 1313.
143.
144. See id. at 1315.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (declining "to breathe into Sherbert [any] life beyond the unem145.
ployment compensation field .... "). Along with limiting Sherbert, the majority in Smith suggests
that effect should be ignored altogether. See id.; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
146. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be dismissed as insubstantial.' 151 Next, Justice Scalia argued that a substantial burden consideration was misplaced in Free Exercise challenges
because other forms of discrimination require no proof of substantial
burden. 52 Finally, Justice Scalia argued that if there was such a requirement, Joshua Davey had been substantially burdened because of the
53
$3,000 financial penalty imposed by the Promise Scholarship Program.1
This tension over substantial burden plausibly demonstrates that the
majority considered an effect inquiry fundamental to the doctrine developed in Davey. At the very least, the majority limited its holding in
Davey to non-animus discriminatory provisions that fail to substantially
burden religion. It would be beyond the scope of the majority's opinion
to suggest that substantial burden is inconsequential and that a rationalbasis review should be applied to all non-animus discriminatory laws.
The majority's limitation suggests that they would have decided Davey
differently had the substantial burden inquiry returned a different result.
Because the outcome of Davey likely hinged upon a determination of
substantial burden, where there is substantial burden and non-animus
discrimination, strict scrutiny should be applied.
5. Animus without substantial burden
This conceptual category consists of laws evincing animus toward
religion that fail to effectively impose a substantial burden. At first
glance, it would seem that this form of ineffectual bigotry should be subjected to strict scrutiny because the law targets religion. Yet, analogizing
this situation with Equal Protection jurisprudence, it is evident that a
rational-basis review would be sufficient to strike down an ineffectual
bigotry provision. For instance, in Romer v. Evans,154 the Court demonstrated the effect of a rational-basis review of a law evincing animus."'
The Court stated that "[b]y requiring that [a discriminatory classification]
bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative
end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging [a group of people].' 156 Similarly, ineffectual bigotry in the
Free Exercise arena would fail to demonstrate any relationship to a le7
gitimate legislative purpose.1

151.

Id. at 1318-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

152. Id. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that "[t]he Court has not required proof of
'substantial' concrete harm with other forms of discrimination.., and it should not do so here." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
153.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
155.
Evans, 517 U.S. at 633; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a
homosexual sodomy prohibition because the statute failed to further a legitimate state interest under
a Due Process challenge).
156. Evans, 517 U.S. at 633 (citing R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,181 (1980)).
157.
See id.
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Moreover, applying a textual analysis, it could be argued that ineffectual bigotry is beyond the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 58 Justice Scalia made this argument in his concurring opinion in Lukumi, contending that the Court is not "in the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors."' 159 Because strict scrutiny might
be inconsistent with a textual interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
and because a rational-basis review is sufficient to invalidate ineffectual
bigotry, the appropriate standard of review for Category 5 is likely rational-basis review.
6. Animus with substantial burden
As noted in the introduction of this analysis, this conceptual category was accounted for in Lukumi. t 60 The appropriate standard of review
for Category 6 is strict scrutiny.
B. Resuscitation of SubstantialBurden

The above discussion of the six conceptual categories of Free Exercise challenges demonstrates the insufficiency of a doctrine that focuses
strictly on intent. An interpretation of Davey that suggests that an appropriate standard of review can be determined by a characterization of neutrality, non-animus discrimination, or animus alone ignores a fundamental inquiry in the opinion. It is beyond the scope of Davey to suggest that
rational-basis review is appropriate for all non-animus discriminatory
laws, even laws that impose a substantial burden on religion. Quite the
contrary, the Court limited its holding, noting the insubstantial burden
imposed by the Promise Scholarship Program.16 1 In doing so, the Court
demonstrated the necessity of a substantial burden inquiry in Free Exerthat the result of the inquiry
cise jurisprudence and strongly suggested
162
was outcome-determinative in Davey.
On the other hand, a doctrine that attempts to determine an appropriate standard of review based entirely on an effect inquiry is equally
insufficient. This approach would altogether ignore Smith, once again
applying strict scrutiny wherever there is a substantial burden, reversing
the exception for neutral laws. 163 A strictly effect inquiry was also beyond the scope of the majority opinion in Davey. Had the majority intended to completely rid Free Exercise jurisprudence of an intent inquiry,
its discussion of Lukumi would have been superfluous and misleading
dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment
158. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558-59 (Scalia, J.,
refers to the effects of laws rather than the "purposes for which legislators enact laws").
159. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[hiad the [lawmakers] set out resolutely to
suppress the practices of [a religious group], but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do
not see how those laws could be said to 'prohibit the free exercise' of religion." Id. at 558-59.

160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra note 135.
See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
See id.
See Smith. 494 U.S. at 885. 888.
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dicta.' 64 Instead, the Davey opinion indicates a two-prong Free Exercise
approach.165 First, the majority distinguishes the factual middle-ground
of Davey from its intent inquiry precedent and creates a new category,
166
allowing a rational-basis review for a non-animus discriminatory law.
Second, and of equal importance, the majority gave a breath of life to an
effect inquiry reminiscent of Sherbert167 and limited
its holding to a law
68
that imposes no substantial burden on religion. 1
C. PotentialPitfalls of an Animus Inquiry
The Court in Davey was clear that a rational-basis review is available, even to non-neutral laws, so long as there is no animus and no substantial burden. 169 The animus inquiry was useful to distinguish the
Promise Scholarship Program in Davey from the reactionary prohibition
on animal sacrifices in Lukumi. 70 Yet, whether an animus inquiry will
be useful as a doctrinal tool in future Free Exercise challenges is uncertain. To demonstrate the potential problems associated with an animus
distinction, it is helpful to consider Equal Protection jurisprudence,
where pursuing an animus inquiry produces some surprising results.
In the Equal Protection arena, it has been argued that the relevant
intent should be the "intent to discriminate, [rather than] the intent to
harm."' 171 The most notable and convincing argument against animus in
Equal Protection "is that [an animus distinction] cannot account even for
[past Equal Protection precedent]."' 72 For instance, in race discrimination, it could be argued that the drafters of segregation laws failed to
demonstrate animus toward African-Americans.
Perhaps the drafters
desired to promote social stability, or held a sincere, albeit misguided,
belief that segregation aided African-Americans.1 74 Even if they recognized the harmful effects of discrimination, perhaps they considered the
164.
165.

See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314.
See id. at 1312-15.

166.

See id. at 1314-15.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Part ll.A; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
id. at 1312-15.
id. at 1314 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520).
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.

935, 962-64 (1989). Strauss contends that a discriminatory intent standard, much less the narrower
malice approach, is inadequate "as a comprehensive account of discrimination." Id. at 1014. Instead, to provide an adequate account of discrimination, the Court must consider some effect inquiries, in addition to the intent inquiry of discriminatory intent. Id. The government should not be

"free to undervalue the interests of a class of citizens, to treat them with indifference, to ignore the
burdens it imposes on them, so long as it does so in order to achieve an objective other than injuring
the group." Id. at 963. Under an animus approach, "[n]o matter how little weight the government
accords to the interest of a class of its citizens, it acts properly so long as it does not set out to inflict
injury on them." id.
172.

Id. at 964; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,

364 U.S. 339 (1960).
173. Strauss, supra note 171, at 964.
174. Id
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effects "a regrettable byproduct of a system that was the best for society
as a whole."1 75 None of the aforementioned hypothetical situations
would have amounted to animus. 176 However, in the context of race discrimination, it would be unacceptable to allow discriminatory segregaof whether the discrimination reached the threshold of
tion, regardless
1 77
animus.
In the area of sex discrimination, the inadequacy of an animus inquiry is even more apparent.1 78 In many instances, people not intending
to harm women may have promoted sex discrimination. 179 Some may
have thought that women enjoyed and benefited from their traditional
roles; others may have thought that women were harmed as an unfortunate byproduct of a successful system.180 Once again, permitting the
discrimination of women because of misguided benevolence, or at least
misguided discriminatory intent not amounting to animus, would be unacceptable. 181 Thus, "[s]ince we cannot assume that overt and covert
segregation and discrimination against [African-Americans] and women
always reflect a desire to harm them, the [animus] definition... will not
always condemn even the kinds of statutes invalidated in [segregation
and discrimination precedent]."' 82
Considering that an animus inquiry presents such complex problems
in Equal Protection, it is questionable whether animus will be useful as a
doctrinal tool in Free Exercise. The usefulness of animus in Free Exercise jurisprudence will be determined by its application to future challenges. To survive as a doctrinal tool, animus must provide a meaningful
distinction and account for all Free Exercise discrimination, instead of
being rendered impotent by inadequacy as it was in Equal Protection. In
any event, an animus inquiry alone, without a supplemental considerato provide "a comprehensive account of
tion of substantial burden, fails 183
[Free Exercise] discrimination."
D. The Animus Distinction is Unnecessary

Although the majority in Davey was successful at creating a comprehensive two-prong approach to Free Exercise challenges, a careful
consideration of the six conceptual categories provides a useful tool.
Most notably, Categories 3184 and 5185 have identical standards of review,
175.
176.

Id.
See id.

177.

See id.

178.
179.

Id.
Id.

180.
181.

Id.
Id.

182. Id.
183. Id. at 1014.
184. Category 3 represents non-animus discrimination without substantial burden. See supra
Part V.A.3.
185. Category 5 represents animus without substantial burden. See supra Part V.A.5.
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as do Categories 4186 and 6.187 This commonality demonstrates that the
animus inquiry introduced in Davey is unnecessary to achieve the doctrinal results of the majority. For non-animus discriminatory laws, a
rational-basis review should be applied where there is no substantial burden (Davey),188 and strict scrutiny should be applied where there is substantial burden. 89 Similarly, for laws evincing animus toward religion,
strict scrutiny should be applied where there is substantial burden (Lukumi), 190 and a rational-basis review should be applied where there is no
substantial burden on religion.' 9' In light of the potentially problematic
nature of an animus inquiry, this discovery uncovers a useful doctrinal
approach. A comprehensive Free Exercise doctrine could have been
developed without introducing animus at all. Perhaps the Court should
have explicitly endorsed the resuscitation of substantial burden and combined that inquiry with the intent inquiry of Smith, to create an approach
that could have avoided unnecessarily exposing the complexities of animus.
For the sake of discussion, this Comment will name the proposed
approach the "intent/effect" test. The first prong of the intent/effect test
will focus on the intent inquiry from Smith and Lukumi.192 This prong
will consider whether the challenged provision is neutral. If the law is
neutral, a rational-basis review will be applied, just as in Smith, and no
further inquires will be required. 93 However, if the law is non-neutral,
the second prong of the intent/effect test will be invoked to determine the
appropriate standard of review. The effect inquiry will consider whether
the challenged law substantially burdens religion. This prong of the in94
tent/effect test will act much like the doctrine developed in Sherbert
and discussed in Davey. 195 On the one hand, if a non-neutral law substantially burdens religion, the provision will be subject to strict scrutiny,
as in Lukumi. 196 On the other hand, if a non-neutral law does not substantially burden religion, the provision will be subject to a rational-basis
review, as in Davey.197 By considering both intent and effect, the proposed two-prong test provides a comprehensive doctrinal approach to
Free Exercise challenges without consideration of an animus distinction.

186.
V.A.4.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Category 4 represents non-animus discrimination with substantial burden. See supra Part
Category 6 represents animus with substantial burden. See supra Part V.A.6.
See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
See supra Part V.A.4.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
See supra Part V.A.5.
See supra Part III.C-D; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888.
See supra Part HIA; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
See supra Part 1V.C; see also Davey, 124 U.S. at 1312-13.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
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Far from a reversion to the doctrine of Sherbert, the intent/effect
test incorporates the modem intent inquiry developed in Smith and Lukumi as the first prong to a comprehensive approach. 98 Nor does the
intent/effect test strictly adhere to the doctrine of Smith and Lukumi, ignoring effect.' 99 Instead, the proposed doctrine applies a substantial burden inquiry as its second prong, determining the appropriate standard of
review for non-neutral provisions.
E. Application of the Intent/Effect Test to the Facts of Davey
For the purposes of demonstration, this discussion will walk
through the two-prong approach of the intent/effect test as applied to the
facts of Davey. This proposed test provides a coherent approach to addressing future Free Exercise challenges.
1. Intent inquiry
The first prong of the intent/effect test is an intent inquiry, as in
Smith and Lukumi, which distinguishes between neutral and non-neutral
laws.2°° The Promise Scholarship Program, as acknowledged by the majority and argued by the dissent in Davey, is facially non-neutral toward
religion.2 0 ' A program that withholds scholarship funds from students on
the basis of their religious educational preference is far from the general
Had the Promise
non-discriminatory ban on peyote use in Smith. 2
Scholarship Program passed a neutrality inquiry under the first prong of
the intent/effect test, no further inquiries would be necessary. A rationalbasis review would apply to a neutral law, regardless of whether the law
imposed a substantial burden on religion, just as in Smith.2 °3 However,
because the Promise Scholarship Program failed a neutrality inquiry, it
must be subjected to the second prong of the intent/effect test to determine an appropriate standard of review.
2. Effect inquiry
Because the Promise Scholarship Program is non-neutral, an effect
inquiry is necessary to determine the appropriate standard of review.
This second prong of the intent/effect test will determine whether the law
imposes a substantial burden on religion. If there is a substantial burden,
.204
as in Lukumi, strict scrutiny is applied. Where there is no substantial
201
burden, a rational-basis review is applied.

198.

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.

199.

See supra notes 56, 69.

200.
201.

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-16.

202.
203.
204.

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
See id. at 885, 888.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.

205.

See generally Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1307.
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Whether a denial of $3,000 in scholarship funds to students pursuing degrees in devotional theology constitutes a substantial burden on
religion is not obvious. On the one hand, as the Davey majority articulated, denial of funding for higher education is dissimilar to those provisions in Lukumi and McDaniel v. Paty20 6 that imposed a substantial burden. 207 On the other hand, as Justice Scalia argued in the dissent, the
denial of scholarship funds could be construed as imposing a special tax
on religion. 208 Because analysis of Free Exercise precedent provides
little in the form of a guiding context here, it is helpful to consider other
areas of constitutional law.
The precedent most analogous to Davey is the state-funding of abortion services. 20 9 Much as it is a violation to substantially burden the free
exercise of religion with a non-neutral law, "the Constitution 'protects
the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy., 210 As articulated in Judge
McKeown's Ninth Circuit dissent, the abortion funding cases hold that
denial of funding for an abortion does not amount to an "unduly burdensome interference" with a woman's Constitutional right to have an abortion.2 1 Rather, the cases suggest that a state is free to fund medical procedures such as childbirth while it chooses to deny funding to abortion.212
This holds true even where the woman is indigent and the funding policy
effectively leaves
her with "no choice in terms of exercise of her consti213
tutional right.,
In abortion funding cases, "a woman has a constitutionallyprotected right to an abortion, but the state has no obligation to fund that
206.
207.
208.

435 U.S. 618 (1978).
Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

209.

Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting), rev'd, 124

S.Ct. 1307 (2004); see generally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980). School voucher case law provides a consideration of funding decisions within the
Religion Clause arena. However, because the crux of the school voucher program involves consideration of the Establishment Clause and because Davey hinges upon a Free Exercise analysis, school
vouchers are probably not the most helpful analogy. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002) (holding that an Ohio school voucher program was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
210. Locke, 229 F.3d at 765 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (quoting Maher,432 U.S. at 473-74).
211.
Id. at 764-65; see also Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74; Harris,448 U.S. at 316; Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
212. See Locke, 229 F.3d at 765 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
The [state regulation prohibiting abortion funding] places no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an
abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of [the state's] decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that
was not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult and in some cases, perhaps, impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the [state's] regulation.
Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Maher,432 U.S. at 474).
213.
Id. at 764.
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right, even when it has chosen to fund other medical procedures."
Similarly, Joshua Davey has a constitutionally protected right to the free
exercise of religion. 2 15 However, by creating a generally available state
scholarship that is not available to devotional theology students, the state
of Washington has not violated that right because, arguably, the state has
no obligation to fund it.216 Even if Washington made the pursuit of a
non-theology degree more attractive, applying the analogy from abortion
funding case law, it has not made Joshua Davey's situation any more
difficult than it would have been had the state chosen not to provide a
217
scholarship at all.
This analogy demonstrates that denial of a scholarship to students
pursuing degrees in devotional theology was not a substantial burden on
their free exercise of religion because: (1) Washington had no obligation
to fund their pursuit; and (2) the Promise Scholarship Program did not
make attaining the degree in devotional theology any more difficult.
Finding no substantial burden, the second prong of the intent/effect test
applies a rational-basis review, even where the law is non-neutral. This
result is consistent with the outcome of Davey. Applying the proposed
intent/effect test to the facts of Davey illustrates that there is a comprehensive approach available in Free Exercise jurisprudence that avoids the
precarious animus distinction altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Davey decision provides Free Exercise doctrine with a distinct
standard of review for a contextual middle-ground between Smith and
Lukumi. On its face, this new doctrine maintains the modem tradition of
focusing on the intent of the provision and ignoring the burden it imposes
on religion. Davey accomplishes this result by creating an animus distinction, distinguishing benign discriminatory provisions from those
evincing animus toward religion.
Yet, a deeper analysis of Davey suggests that there was an intense
debate between a doctrine that reintroduced a substantial burden inquiry
and a doctrine that continued to focus strictly on intent. Along with creating an animus distinction, the majority seemingly reintroduced substantial burden as a supplement to its intent-focused doctrine. This resuscitation of substantial burden was a necessary addition because the intent
doctrine alone failed to account for all forms of Free Exercise
discrimination.
Despite the apparent utility of animus in Davey, the distinction is
both potentially problematic and unnecessary as a doctrinal tool. Ani214.
215.
216.
217

Id.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 764-65.
Id at 765.
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mus is potentially problematic because it is uncertain that animus is actually required for a law to be invalidated as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. As in Equal Protection jurisprudence, there may be situations in Free Exercise where an unacceptable law falls short of evincing
animus; this remains to be seen. Moreover, the animus distinction is
unnecessary because the standard of review for both non-animus discrimination and animus hinges on substantial burden.
The Free Exercise approach proposed by this Comment circumvents
an animus inquiry altogether, instead focusing on neutrality and substantial burden. The intent/effect test first applies a rational-basis review to
neutral laws, applying the doctrine developed in Smith. Non-neutral laws
will be subjected to an effect inquiry under the intent/effect test and strict
scrutiny will be applied where a substantial burden exists. This proposed
approach accounts for all of the six conceptual categories of Free Exercise challenges and applies the appropriate standard of review to each.
The two-prong test accomplishes the doctrinal objectives of Davey without applying a potentially problematic animus distinction.

Abran Kean*

* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, University of Denver College of Law. Thank you to my
father, Robert Kean, as well as Professors Martin Katz and Dori Kaplan, for their time, insight and
thoughtful critique throughout the evolution of this Comment.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: CHILD VICTIMS OF SEX
CRIMES IN COLORADO AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S REVISED APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that on several occasions an adult male molests a threeyear-old child named Jimmy who lives in a Colorado neighborhood.1
The man threatens Jimmy with a knife, promising to slit Jimmy's throat
and kill Jimmy's parents if Jimmy ever reveals their secret. The man
may do it right away or he may do it twenty years from now, but he assures Jimmy he will someday fulfill his promise. Jimmy is terrified.
Local law enforcement eventually becomes aware of the situation after
Jimmy musters the courage to confide in his parents. A physician examines Jimmy. During their investigations, police officers and social workers interview Jimmy, gaining sufficient details about the molestations to
obtain an arrest warrant. An expert in child molestation cases interviews
Jimmy, his friends, and his family, determining that changes in Jimmy's
behavior since the alleged molestations began are typical of a sexually
abused child. The police arrest the man, charging him with several
counts of sexual assault. The case proceeds to trial.
Because of Jimmy's youth and the defendant's threats against
Jimmy and his parents, Jimmy cannot speak when called to the witness
stand. The court rules Jimmy incompetent, and, thus, Jimmy is unavailable to testify at trial. 2 The prosecution then moves to admit hearsay
statements by Jimmy via testimony from police officers, the physician,
social workers, and Jimmy's parents. The prosecution notes that in cases
of unlawful sexual offenses against children, the court may accept these
hearsay statements into evidence under Colorado's child hearsay exception provided the presence of "sufficient safeguards of reliability" and
1. The criminal acts against "Jimmy" are hypothetical and presented here for illustrative
purposes. Although this Comment focuses on the effects of Crawford v. Washington on a trial of the
defendant for alleged sexual abuse of Jimmy, the effects are the same if the alleged acts solely consisted of physical abuse.
2.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-106 (2004) ("The following persons shall not be witnesses: Children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts respecting which they are examined or of relating them truly."). The hypothetical scenario
assumes that Jimmy was not "able to describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of that age
the events or facts respecting which the child is examined." Id. Alternatively, a court could find
Jimmy unavailable ahead of trial if it determines that testifying might harm him emotionally or
physically. See People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 750 (Colo. 1989) (holding that "unavailability
...can be met when the court makes a particularized finding that the child's emotional or psychological health would be substantially impaired if she were forced to testify and that such impairment
will be long standing rather than transitory in nature.").
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"corroborative evidence."3 The prosecution argues that the independent
findings of the child molestation expert support these two criteria.
Objecting, the defense claims that admission of the statements under Colorado's child hearsay exception would violate the defendant's
right of confrontation as outlined in Crawford v. Washington.4 Specifically, the Confrontation Clause requires that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.",5 Crawford declares, "Where testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.",6 According to Crawford, "[the Confrontation Clause] commands
. . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by . . . crossexamination."7 Because the defense considers all the statements at issue
"testimonial," they claim that the trial court cannot admit Jimmy's hearsay statements, regardless of any "safeguards of reliability" and "corroborative evidence," because they could not cross-examine him.
This Comment analyzes Crawford v. Washington8 with particular
emphasis on determining what constitutes a testimonial statement and
whether Colorado courts must now refuse to admit hearsay statements by
child molestation victims if they cannot testify in open court before their
alleged abusers. Part I describes key precedent cases. Part II recites
Crawford's facts and procedural history. Part III summarizes the majority and concurring opinions. Part IV analyzes critical parts of Crawford,
attempting to predict whether a Colorado trial court will consider
Jimmy's various hearsay statements testimonial and, thus, refuse to admit them into evidence. Included in the discussion is a summary of postCrawford Colorado state court decisions. In conclusion, Part V predicts
that for testimonial statements the Colorado child hearsay exception,
enacted to protect alleged victims of sexual offenses against children,
may not withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Crawford approach
to the Confrontation Clause.
I. KEY PRECEDENT CASES
For more than one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court
has attempted to define the precise rules for the admissibility of hearsay
statements made by witnesses rendered unavailable to testify against a

3.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2004).
4.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
7.
Id. at 61. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (stating that confrontation "forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth.").
8.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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criminal defendant at trial.9 Because a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of any hearsay statements, these rules
represent exceptions to a defendant's confrontation right.1° The followConfrontation Clause decisions leading summarizes key Supreme Court
11
ing up to Crawford v. Washington.

The first significant Supreme Court case dealing with exceptions to12
a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause is Mattox v. United States.
In Mattox, an 1895 decision, the Court approved the admission at trial of
the official transcripts of testimony from two deceased witnesses based
on the defendant's prior opportunity to cross-examine them fully.1 3 Prior
to their deaths, the two witnesses testified in the defendant's initial federal first-degree murder trial. 14 The defendant, however, successfully
appealed his conviction, and the two witnesses died before his new
trial.' 5 The Court ruled that admission of the transcripts at the new trial
did not violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause right because "[t]he
substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in
the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination."' 6 The Court noted
further, "general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."' 17 Over
the next one hundred and nine years leading up to and including Crawford, much of the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence sought to
articulate the appropriate circumstances under which the Confrontation
right "gave way" to these considerations.
The Court widened the right of Confrontation through two opinions
issued in 1965. In Pointer v. Texas, 18 the Court invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to expand the Confrontation Clause to
include state court criminal proceedings. 19 In Douglas v. Alabama,2 ° the
Court stated "that a primary interest secured by [the Confrontation
Clause] is the right to cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical

9.
See Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 556-91
(2003) (discussing the history of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence from 1895 to 2003).
10.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).

11.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

156 U.S. 237 (1895).
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 238-40, 250.
Id. at 240, 251.
Id. at 238, 240.
Id. at 244.

17.
18.

Id. at 243.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).

19.
20.

Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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confrontation. ' 2 ' These decisions, however, did not address exceptions
to the Confrontation Clause for unavailable witnesses.
In two subsequent opinions, the Court focused on the circumstances
under which a court may appropriately consider a witness "unavailable"
and, thus, invoke exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. In a 1968 decision, Barber v. Page,22 the Court stated, "a witness is not 'unavailable'
for purposes of the ... exception to the confrontation requirement unless
the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his
presence at trial.",23 The Court provided further guidance as to the meaning of "unavailable" in a 1970 case, California v. Green.24 In Green,
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion deemed unavailability "a question of
reasonableness. 2 5 In addition to providing guidelines for unavailability,
the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence leading up to
Crawford dealt almost entirely with determining the appropriate degree
of reliability required for the admission into evidence of a statement
given by an unavailable witness.
In its most significant Confrontation Clause decision preceding
Crawford, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of reliability in a 1980
case, Ohio v. Roberts.2 6 In Roberts, the Court summarized its Confrontation Clause philosophy by stating:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at

trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within afirmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
27
absent a showing of particularizedguaranteesof trustworthiness.
The phrases, "firmly rooted hearsay exception" and "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," essentially comprise a two-part test for
admissibility of statements by unavailable declarants.2 8 At issue in Roberts was the admissibility at trial of testimony given by an unavailable
witness against the defendant at a preliminary hearing. 29 "The Court
found guarantees of trustworthiness in the accouterments of the preliminary hearing itself' because the defendant was represented by counsel
and had already had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the wit-

21.

Douglas,380 U.S. at 418.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

390 U.S. 719 (1968).
Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25.
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Green, 399 U.S. at 189 n.22 (Harlan, J., concurring).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Roberis, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 58-62.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

2004]

ness. 30 Given a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," the Court allowed for the admissibility of
statements by unavailable declarants without cross-examination. 3' Both
of these phrases, in addition to "unavailability," acquired further clarification in the Court's subsequent decisions.
Six years later in United States v. Inadi,32 the Court rejected a literal
reading of its Roberts holding, stating, "Roberts cannot fairly be read to
stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be
introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable." 33 In Inadi, the court affirmed admission of a coconspirator's out-of-court statement despite an inadequate showing of the
witness's unavailability under the hearsay exemption for statements by a
co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy.34 Because statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy are "usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence [because their admission] . .. furthers the Confrontation Clause's
very mission which is to advance the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials," 35 the Court declined to apply an unavailability
rule to them. 36 Furthermore, the rule for co-conspirator statements would
"place[] a significant practical burden on the prosecution" because of the
practical difficulties in identifying and locating such declarants. 37 Since
trial courts do not admit many co-conspirator statements to prove the
truth of the matter asserted,38 the Court reiterated a position it took one
year previous in Tennessee v. Stree?9 that "admission of nonhearsay
raises no Confrontation Clause concems." 4 Given a valid hearsay
statement, the question remained as to whether a particular hearsay exception qualifies as "firmly rooted" under Roberts.
In Idaho v. Wright,41 a 1990 decision, the Court further clarified
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" by saying such an exception "[is] so
trustworthy that adversarial testing [can be expected to] add little to [its]

30.
31.

Id. at 73.
ld. at 66.

32.
33.
34.

475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) ("A statement is not hearsay if ... the statement

is offered against a party and is... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in

furtherance of the conspiracy.").
35. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
36. Id. at 394-95.
37. Id. at 399.
38. Id. at 398 n.11.
39.
471 U.S. 409 (1985).
40.
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 398 n.l 1 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
Valid non-hearsay purposes include: questions, verbal acts, clarifications of conduct, state of mind

(including knowledge of the declarant, notice of the recipient, intent, motive, beliefs, thoughts, or
other states of mind), acquaintance, or connection. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 801.11 (2d ed. 2004). Crawford maintained Street's approach.

124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. See also infra note 170 and accompanying text.
41.
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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reliability. ' '42 In Wright, a pediatrician asked a two and one-half year old
43
girl a series of questions about alleged acts of molestation against her.
After determining that the girl could not communicate with the jury and,
therefore, was unavailable, the trial court allowed the pediatrician to tes44
tify as to the girl's statements via Idaho's residual hearsay exception.
Pointing to the "ad hoc" nature of the residual hearsay exception, the
Court did not consider it "firmly rooted. '4 5 Thus, under the Roberts doctrine, the statement was admissible only if it bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 46 The Court said that these guarantees are
"shown from the totality of the circumstances, but ... the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." 47 The Court
carefully noted, however, that in order to avoid "bootstrapping" on other
evidence at trial, corroborating evidence plays no role in determining
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '48 After Wright, the Court
returned to the "unavailability rule" and the hearsay exceptions for which
to apply it.
The Court applied the Inadi rationale in White v. Illinois, 49 a 1992
decision, by refusing to apply an "unavailability rule" to the hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course
of receiving medical care.50 The Court noted that "such out-of-court
declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of
their trustworthiness [and that] . . . the statements' reliability cannot be
recaptured even by later in-court testimony.",51 The Court also provided
some guidance as to whether the two hearsay exceptions in question
were "firmly rooted," referring to their respective age, enumeration in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and acceptance among the states. 52 Justices
Thomas and Scalia, however, strongly disagreed with this philosophy.
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in White, joined by Justice
Scalia,53 foreshadows Crawford by hinting at the key Crawford term,
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Wright, 497 U.S. at 821.
Id. at 808-11.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 818. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also supra text accompanying note 27.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 818.
Id. at 823.
502 U.S. 346 (1992).

50.
White, 502 U.S. at 348-49. Rule 803(2) excludes from the hearsay rule "[a] statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition" even though the declarant is available as a witness. FED. R. EvID.
803(2); Rule 803(4) excludes from the hearsay rule "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensa-

tions, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" even though the declarant is available as a witness. FED. R.
EviD. 803(4).
White, 502 U.S. at 355-56.
51.
52. Id. at 356 n.8.
53.

Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Crawford.
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"testimonial. 5 4 Justice Thomas stated that he believed the "federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually
testifies at trial.",55 As for the admissibility of statements made by those
who do not testify, Justice Thomas opined, "the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained
in formalized testimonialmaterials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions." 56 Justice Thomas suggested that this narrowing of the Confrontation Clause "would greatly simplify the inquiry in
the hearsay context. ''57 Justice Thomas offered his point of view because
he reasoned "the Confrontation Clause was [not] intended to constitu,,58
Nevertheless, through
tionalize the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
White, the Court continued to hold to the Roberts "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" and "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" two-part
test.
In Lilly v. Virginia,59 a 1999 opinion representing the Court's final
pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause decision, the Court exhibited the
uncertainties inherent in the two-part Roberts test, as well as philosophical differences amongst the nine Justices.60 In Lilly, a witness invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the separate
criminal trial of one of his accomplices. 6' Given his unavailability, the
trial court admitted the witness's tape-recorded confession to the police
pursuant to Virginia's hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest. 62 On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, finding this
hearsay exception "firmly rooted" and reliable. 63 All nine Justices of the
untested
United States Supreme Court agreed that "[t]he admission of the 64
rights."
Clause
Confrontation
petitioner's
violated
.
confession..
Despite their agreement that a Confrontation Clause violation occurred, the Court nevertheless issued a plurality opinion plus four different concurring opinions to describe its reasoning. In the plurality opinion, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer did not consider the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest "firmly rooted"
because of the tendency for such statements to shift blame to a criminal

54.
55.
56.

White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
57.
Id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Richard P. Friedman, Confrontation: The
58.
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1020 (1998) (stating that "[a] near synonym for

'firmly rooted,' it seems, is in the Federal Rules of Evidence."). Although Crawford ultimately
adopted Justice Thomas's position, it did so as part of a much broader philosophy of what constitutes
"testimonial." Crawford,541 U.S. at 51-52. See also infra text accompanying notes 157-159.
59. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
60. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 120-21.
61.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id. at 122. See also Lilly v. Virginia, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998).
64.

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 119, 139.
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defendant. 65 The Justices termed the exception "presumptively unreliable. 6 6 They also stated that the witness's "statements were [not] so
inherently reliable that cross-examination would have been superfluous." 6 7 Justice Breyer indicated in his concurring opinion a willingness
to "reexamine the current connection between the Confrontation Clause
and the hearsay rule" but declined to do so because "the statements at
issue violate the Clause regardless. 6 8 Justice Scalia, writing separately,
considered use of the tape-recorded confession without crossexamination "a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation. 69 Justice
Thomas, also writing alone, reiterated his belief first presented in White
that the Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses testifying at trial and
to four specific types of extra-judicial statements, one of which is confessions. 70 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy agreed that the hearsay exception was not firmly rooted,
but they feared that the approach of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer would place a "blanket ban on the government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant."'- Rather than considering the exception "presumptively unreliable," Chief Justice Rehnquist
preferred to "limit our holding to the case at hand., 72 Based on the plurality opinion and four concurring opinions, Lilly illustrates the problems
with Roberts due to the difficulty in grasping the meaning behind "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" and "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
The Colorado Supreme Court, as well as courts in other states,
adopted specific guidelines for determining the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" of a given statement.7 3 In People v. Farrell,74
the Colorado Supreme Court, after noting "a statement against interest
made by a co-defendant during custodial interrogation does not fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, ' 75 applied an eight-factor test
to find
the statement bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 76 The Colorado Supreme Court justified these factors
based on

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 131 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., joining).
Id.
Id. at 139 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., joining).

68.

Id. at 142 (Breyer, J., concurring).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 60.

74.
75.
76.
(1)

34 P.3d 401 (Colo. 2001), overruled in part by People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
Farrell,34 P.3d at 406 (quoting Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 304, 313 (Colo. 2001)).
The eight factors were:
whether the statement was truly self-inculpatory; (2) whether the statement was de-

tailed; (3) whether police officers threatened or coerced the defendant to make the statement; (4) whether the confession was offered in exchange for leniency; (5) whether the
declarant was likely to have personal knowledge of the events in the statement; (6)
whether the declarant made the statement shortly after the described events; (7) whether
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the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Wright, giving "a court...
considerable discretion in determining77 what factors may enhance or detract from the statement's reliability.
Thus, Lilly and Farrell illustrate the status of the Confrontation
Clause just prior to Crawford as it pertains to the admissibility of statements made by unavailable declarants: apply the Roberts two-part test
according to the Court's guidance in its post-Roberts opinions. The next
two parts of this Comment contain a detailed discussion of Crawford.
II. FACTS AND PRIOR HISTORY: CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON78
On August 5, 1999, police arrested petitioner Michael Crawford for
allegedly stabbing Kenneth Lee.79 Mr. Crawford believed Mr. Lee had
previously tried to rape his wife, Sylvia Crawford.8 ° Mrs. Crawford led
Mr. Crawford to Mr. Lee's apartment, where she witnessed the stabbing. 81 Following the altercation, Mr. Crawford claimed self-defense.82
Accounts given by Mr. and Mrs. Crawford of the fight between Mr. Lee
and Mr. Crawford differed "with respect to whether Lee had drawn a
acweapon before [Mr. Crawford] assaulted him." 83 Mrs. Crawford's
84
count suggested the stabbing was not an act of self-defense.
At trial, the State sought testimony from Mrs. Crawford against Mr.
Crawford, but the state of Washington's marital privilege barred her testimony. 8S The statutory privilege, however, "[did] not extend to spouse's
out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception., 86 Alternatively, the State sought to admit into evidence previously recorded
statements from Sylvia Crawford to the police. 87 Because Mrs. Crawford
led Mr. Crawford to Mr. Lee's apartment, the court admitted these stateinterest. 88
ments under the hearsay exception for statements against penal
the declarant had a reason to retaliate against the defendant; and (8) whether the declarant
was mentally or physically unstable at the time of the confession.
Id.at 406-07 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 406. See also Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. The United States Supreme Court even
hinted at a four-factor test in Wright for determining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22 (stating that "spontaneity and consistent repetition.., mental state of the

declarant ...use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age [and] lack of motive to fabricate [are] factors relatting] to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the
truth when the statement was made."(citations omitted)).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
78.
79.
80.

541 U.S. at 38.
Id.

81.
82.
83.

Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 39.

84.

Id. at 40.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.; see WASH. ER 804(b)(3) ("A statement which was at the time of its making ...so far

tended to subject the declarant to ... criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."). See also FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3).
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Mr. Crawford objected, claiming admission of the evidence violated his
rights under the Confrontation Clause. 89 The trial court nevertheless
admitted Mrs. Crawford's statements based on a reliability analysis under Ohio v. Roberts.90 The court determined that her statements bore
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 9' The jury convicted Mr.
Crawford, and he appealed.92
Mr. Crawford's appeal hinged on the determination of "trustworthiness." 93 In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals applied a ninefactor test to determine the trustworthiness of Mrs. Crawford's recorded
statements. 94 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled that her statements
failed the test.95 The Washington Supreme Court, however, restored Mr.
Crawford's conviction,
finding that Mrs. Crawford's statements were
96
indeed trustworthy.
In petitioning for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Mr.
Crawford asked the Court to reconsider its holding in Roberts regarding
the admissibility of statements by unavailable hearsay declarants.97 The
Court "granted certiorari to determine whether the State's use of [Mrs.
Crawford's] statement violated the Confrontation Clause." 98
III.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION: CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON 99

While refashioning its Confrontation Clause doctrine, effectively
overturning Roberts, the Court reversed the Washington Supreme
Court's decision to uphold Mr. Crawford's conviction and remanded the
case for further proceedings. 1 ° While all nine Justices supported reversing the conviction in its March 8, 2004 opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
89.

Crawford,541 U.S. at40.

90.

Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); See also supra text accompanying note 27.

91.

Crawford,541 U.S. at 40.

92.
93.
94.
[1]

Id.
at41.
Id.at41-42.
Id.at41. The nine factors
were:
whether the declarant had an apparent motive to lie

[2]whether the declarant's

general character suggests trustworthiness . . . [3] whether more than one person heard
the statement . . . [4] whether the declarant made the statement spontaneously . . . [5]

whether the timing of the statements and the relationship between the declarant and the
witness suggests trustworthiness ...[6] whether the statement contained express assertions of past fact ...[7] whether cross-examination could help to show the declarant's
lack of knowledge .. .[8] whether the declarant's recollection was faulty because the
event was remote . . . [9] whether the circumstances surrounding the statement suggest
that the declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement.

Washington v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *13-16 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 30, 2001).
95. Id. at*16; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.

96.

Washington v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41-42.

97.

Crawford,541 U.S. at41.

98.

Id. at42.

99.
100.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Crawford,541 U.S. at69.
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and Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's new Confrontation
Clause doctrine. l t
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion: The Reliability of Testimonial
Statements Will Be Evaluated Solely by Cross-Examination

Claiming "[t]he Constitution's text does not alone resolve this
case," ' 0 2 Justice Scalia's majority opinion began with an extensive history-spanning from Roman times to the mid-nineteenth century-of a
defendant's right to confront his or her accuser.10 3 Particularly notewortreason,'04
thy are discussions of the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for
English cases following the Raleigh decision supporting the right of
cross-examination, 0 5 adoption of a confrontation right in the declarations
of rights of eight colonies during the initial phase of the American Revo07
lution, 10 6 and early state court decisions in the new United States.
derived two inferences about
From this historical perspective, the Court
10 8
Amendment.
Sixth
the
of
the meaning
The first inference was that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused."' 1 9 After the Court carefully pointed out that the
Confrontation Clause applies to both in-court and out-of-court witness
statements, it noted that not all hearsay statements bear "resemblance to
the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted."" 0 To distinguish out-of-court statements that fall under the scrutiny of hearsay rules
from those that fall under the scrutiny of the Confrontation Clause, the
Testimonial stateCourt fashioned a term, "testimonial statement.""'

101.

Id. at 70.

102.
103.
104.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. In many of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause decisions, the trial of Sir Wal-

ter Raleigh for treason receives mention because it dramatically illustrates the importance of confrontation. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J. concurring). At Raleigh's 1603
trial, an English court sentenced him to death based on a letter from Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged
accomplice. Crawford,541 U.S. at 44. During the trial, Raleigh, convinced Cobham fabricated the
story to save himself, repeatedly protested the court's refusal to bring Cobham before the jury. Id.

The judges refused and Raleigh was sentenced to death. Id. In California v. Green, Justice Harlan
stated that the right of confrontation "was a common law right which had gained recognition as a
result of the abuses in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh." Green, 399 U.S. at 178 (Harlan, J. concurring).
ld. at 44-45.
105.
106. Id. at 48-49.
107. Id. at 49.
108. id. at 49-57.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 50.
Id.at 51.

Id.
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ments fall under scrutiny ofl2 the Confrontation Clause, while nontestimonial statements do not."
The second inference from the Court's historical analysis was "that
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination." ' 3 Furthermore, "the common law in 1791 conditioned
admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a
prior opportunity to cross-examine." ' 14 Alluding to and refuting the reliability analysis in Roberts, the Court noted that cross-examination was "a
necessary [] condition for admissibility of testimonial statements" with
5
the only exception being dying declarations."
In summarizing its precedent case law, the Court stated it had remained faithful to two key principles derived from the historical perspective: 1) thwarting the evil of admitting ex parte examinations into evidence against the accused and 2) barring out-of-court testimonial statements made without the opportunity for cross-examination. 116 With respect to Roberts, the Court stated that while "the results of our decisions
have been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause,
the same cannot be said of our rationales."' '17 Specifically, the Court
chose to reconsider its Roberts two-part test in order "to reflect more
1
accurately the original understanding of the [Confrontation] Clause." 18
In changing its approach to the Confrontation Clause, the Court indicated a preference that jurors rather than judges determine the reliability of testimonial statements." 9 Specifically, the Court stated that the
Confrontation Clause is a "procedural rather than a substantive guarantee," requiring that "reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
cross examination.,, 120 Under Roberts, because a judge rather than a jury
determined the reliability of statements, Roberts "replace[d] the constitutionally1 prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign
12
one."

The Court also described the poor framework that resulted in the
lower courts due to the reliability analysis dictated by Roberts.'12 Because various courts developed different tests for determining reliability,
112.
113.

Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 53-54.

114.
115.
116.

Id. at 54.
Id.at 55-56.
Id.at 58-60.

117.

Id. at 60.

118.

Id.

119.
120.

Id. at62.
Id.at 61.

121.
122.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 63-(4.
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predictability suffered. 123 Beyond unpredictability, tests for reliability
under Roberts developed an ability to "admit core testimonial statements
24
that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude."'1 As an example, the Court stated that the Washington trial court found Mrs. Crawford's recorded statement reliable because, among other reasons, law
125
The Court noted
enforcement was "neutral to her" during questioning.
that "[t]he framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony
defendant because it was elicited by
could be admitted against a criminal
'neutral' government officers."' 26 Because judges can "not always be
trusted," the Court stated that Roberts may not provide meaningful protection to defendants27 during politically charged public trials like that of
Sir Walter Raleigh. 1
The majority summarized its position with the following:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach
that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavail128
ability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
The court "leaves for another day" the task of determining the definition of "testimonial.' 29 The Court said, however, that "it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations" because they are
"modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."' 130 In closing, the Court explicitly qualified its Roberts holding by stating that "[w]here testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontaHence, the majority appears to have overruled Roberts only
tion."''
with respect to testimonial statements.
B. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion: The Court Should
Not Overturn Ohio v. Roberts
Joined by Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in
the Court's decision to reverse and remand the decision of the Washing123.
124.
125.

Id. at 62.
Id. at63.
Id. at 66.

126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 67.

128.

Id. at 68.

129.

Id.

130.
131.

Id. See infra Section IV.A. for an extensive analysis of what constitutes "testimonial."
Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
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However, both Justices dissented "from the

Court's decision to overrule [Roberts].'

33

Preferring to rely on the

Court's "long-established precedent," the Chief Justice stated that the
majority opinion "casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials
in both federal and
state courts, and is by no means necessary to decide
134
the present case."
The Chief Justice disagreed with the two-thousand-year historical
summary the majority invoked to help justify its holding. 35 He presented his own historical summary and said, "[tihe Court's distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim,
is no better rooted in history than our current doctrine."'136 Because
"unswom hearsay was simply held to be of much lesser value than were
sworn affidavits of depositions," the Chief Justice believed there was
historical preference for statements taken under oath. 137 He reasoned
that, "[w]ithout an oath, one usually did not get to the second step of
whether confrontation was required.' 38 The Chief Justice referred to the
majority's distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements-outside of affidavits and depositions-as arbitrary because he
was unable to find a distinction in common law between unsworn testimonial statements and nontestimonial statements. 39 Pointing out that the
Court had never made such a distinction, the Chief Justice saw little
value in changing precedent.140
The Chief Justice also suggested, "to find exceptions under the
Clause is not to denigrate it as the Court suggests.,"14' He noted, "some
out of court statements are just as reliable as cross-examined in-court
testimony due to the circumstances in which they were made."' 142 On this
basis, the Chief Justice argued for retention of several hearsay exceptions: co-conspirator statements, spontaneous declarations, statements
made in course of procuring medical services, and "countless others.' 4 3
Thus, the Chief Justice stated that because "a statement might be testimonial does nothing to undermine the wisdom of one of these [hearsay]
exceptions.'" 144

132.

Id. at 68 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 69-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

137.
138.

Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Aside from his preference for precedent and hearsay exceptions, the
Chief Justice criticized the majority for the uncertainty the decision
would create in state and federal criminal trials. 145 Specifically, he
warned that the majority's failure to define "testimonial" left "thousands
of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors...
in the dark."' 46 Nevertheless, the Court left an analysis of "testimonial"
to others.
IV. ANALYSIS

Although the Confrontation Clause contains only eighteen words,
United States Supreme Court cases spanning more than a century from
Mattox through Crawford indicate an inherent complexity in articulating
its proper usage. From a historical perspective, the Supreme Court obviously intended Crawford to restore the Confrontation Clause to a position as close to its roots as possible. Yet, from the more practical perspective of prosecution and defense attorneys, the Court replaced one
generally worded doctrine, Roberts, with another, Crawford. Roberts
challenged practitioners to determine the meaning of "firmly rooted" and
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Crawford challenges
practitioners to answer a question that will undoubtedly receive considerable attention for many years to come: was that statement a testimonial
statement?
Recall that the hypothetical case against the man who allegedly molested Jimmy hinges on the admissibility of statements Jimmy made to:
1) the police; 2) a physician; 3) social workers; and 4) his parents. Since
Jimmy is unavailable for cross-examination, this analysis explores
whether each of these types of statements are testimonial and reviews
post-Crawford opinions from various jurisdictions. Section A dissects
Crawford v. Washington 47 further, summarizing the key phrases useful
to both prosecutors and defense attorneys when arguing the testimonial
or nontestimonial nature of such statements. Using some of these clues
and catchphrases, along with various post-Crawford decisions, Section B
analyzes whether the four types of statements in the case against
Jimmy's alleged perpetrator are testimonial. Section C predicts that
Colorado's child hearsay exception, which would probably permit the
admission of all four statements pre-Crawford, will face a difficult constitutional scrutiny post-Crawford. Finally, Section D describes significant post-Crawforddecisions issued to date by Colorado state courts.

145.
146.

Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

147.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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A. The Meaning of "Testimonial:" Key Phrases
This Section summarizes key phrases within Crawford that will aid
prosecutors and defense attorneys in arguing the testimonial or nontestimonial nature of Jimmy's statements. As mentioned, Jimmy will not be
testifying due to his unavailability, and the defense has not had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him. Numbers (1) through (18) below list
the key phrases in the order in which they appear in Crawford:
(1) Testimonial "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."' 148 Courts should interpret the term, "interrogation," in a colloquial rather than a legal sense.149
(2) "[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was diuse of ex parte examinations as evidence
rected was the civil-law..,
150
against the accused."
(3)

Clause applies to both out-of-court and inThe Confrontation
151

court statements.

under the Confrontation Clause are "those who bear
(4) Witnesses
' 52
testimony."'
(5) Testimony under the Confrontation Clause is "a solemn declaramade for the purpose of establishing or proving
tion or affirmation
153
some fact."'

(6) "An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that 54a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not."'
(7) Testimonial statements include "ex parte in-court testimony or
its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
This is the first of
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."'' 55
' 56
three "core class" formulations of "testimonial."'

148. Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
149. Id. at 53 n.4. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2463 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating, "police questioning during a Terry stop qualifies as an interrogation,
and it follows that responses to such questions are testimonial in nature.").
Crawford,541 U.S. at 50.
150.
151.
Id. at 50-51.
152. Id.at 51.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23).
156.

Id.
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(8) Incorporating Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois,157 testimonial statements include "extrajudicial statements
. . . such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."' 5 8 This is the second of three "core class" formulations of
59
"testimonial."1
(9) Testimonial statements include those "statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial." 16 0 1This is the third of three "core class" formulations of
6
"testimonial." 1
(10) Whether statements are sworn or unswom makes no difference
162
in determining whether they are "testimonial."
(11) Business records are nontestimonial.

163

(12) Statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are nontestimonial.164
(13) Dying declarations may or may not be testimonial. 16 5 When
they are, they represent an exception to the bar against admission of
testimonial statements into evidence without a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. 166
(14) When a defendant wrongfully renders a witness unavailable, a
court may still admit a testimonial statement via "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing [which] extinguishes confrontation claims on es67
sentially equitable grounds." 1
(15) "Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse .... This consideration does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modem hearsay exception,
168
even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances."

157.
158.

502 U.S. 346, 358-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Crawford,541 U.S. at 51 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (Thomas, J. con-

curring)).

159.

Id.

160. Id. at 52 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. at 3).
161.
Id. at51.
162. See id. at 52.
163. See id. at 56.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 56 n.6.
166. Id. The Court indicated, however, that it might address the issue in a future case. "We
need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial
dying declarations." Id.
167. Id. at 62.
168. Id. at 56 n.7.
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(16) "[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the

no constraints at all on the use of his
Confrontation Clause places1 69
prior testimonial statements."

(17) "The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted."'70
plea allocutions,
(18) "Plainly testimonial statements" also include:
171

grand jury testimony, and prior trial testimony.

For some types of statements, phrases (1) through (18) will clearly
indicate whether they are testimonial. For those in the gray area, these
eighteen phrases provide only possibilities or indications. For these
types of statements, the final determination of "testimonial" will likely
depend in the short term on the facts of a particular case plus the argumentative skills of prosecutors and defense attorneys, and in the long
term, on the development of case law.
For gray area statements, Crawford appears to rely on the intent of
both the declarant and the listener/receiver in distinguishing testimonial
statements from nontestimonial ones. From the declarant's perspective,
a nontestimonial statement would be a casual remark (Phrase 6), or more
broadly, a statement made without both a reasonable belief that it would
be used prosecutorially (Phrase 7) and an objective reasonable belief that
it would be used at a trial (Phrase 9). The likelihood of a statement being
nontestimonial will increase if the declarant made it to an acquaintance
rather than a government official (Phrase 6). From the listener/receiver's
perspective, simply being a government official significantly decreases
the likelihood of a nontestimonial designation (Phrases 1 & 6). A government official, however, can receive a nontestimonial statement so
long as it was not received with "an eye towards trial." (Phrase 15).172
Given the Court's concern with ex parte examinations against the accused (Phrase 2), attempts by prosecutors to argue that a government
official received a statement without an eye towards trial will probably
receive scrutiny. Thus, for gray area statements, the eighteen key
phrases contained within Crawfordindicate that 1) a declarant can give a
testimonial statement to a nongovernmental listener; and 2) a governId. at 59 n.9.
169.
fd. See People v. Reynoso, 814 N.E.2d 456, 465 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that admission of
170.
of the matter asserted, but rather to show the detective's state of
statement "not to establish the truth
mind" did not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford). See also supra note 40
and accompanying text.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65.
171.
172.
Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Restores Confrontation Clause
Protection,CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 9 (stating "I do not believe that participation by gov-

ernment officials-either receipt of the statement as the initial audience of the statement or active
procurement of the statement through interrogation-is the essence of what makes a statement
testimonial.").
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mental official can receive a nontestimonial statement. In the case
against the defendant accused of molesting three-year-old Jimmy, several
of Jimmy's statements fall into this gray area.
B. Are the Statements in the Case Against Jimmy's Perpetrator"Testimonial"?
This Section discusses whether the following statements are testimonial: Jimmy's statements to: 1) the police; 2) a physician; 3) social
workers; and 4) his parents. As illustrated below, whether a court will
consider each of these statements testimonial will depend on the specific
circumstances surrounding the statement itself.
1. Are Jimmy's Statements to the Police "Testimonial"?
In all likelihood, Crawford will not allow admission of Jimmy's
statements against the defendant as attested to by the police. Crawford
explicitly referred to statements given during police interrogations as
"testimonial."'' 73 The Court mandated the "colloquial meaning" of interrogation, 174 which could simply mean to "question formally and systematically.' 75 Thus, the trial courts might determine that statements given
by Jimmy to the police are "testimonial." Because the defendant lacked
the ability to cross-examine Jimmy when Jimmy made his statements to
the police, the Crawford interpretation of the Confrontation Clause explicitly bars their admission. 76 Nevertheless, a chance to admit the
statements may exist if the prosecutor draws a distinction between statements made to the police by children and statements made to the police
by adults.
In interpreting the Confrontation Clause, Crawford defines witnesses against the accused as "those who bear testimony."'' 77 Testimony
is defined as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact."' 7 8 When adult witnesses speak to
the police, particularly in the wake of a crime, they usually understand
the importance of their statements. They are likely to realize that their
spoken words may someday become part of a judicial proceeding. One
might reasonably impugn to them the knowledge that, when speaking to
the police, they bear testimony. Conversely, a three-year-old child like
Jimmy may not understand he is bearing testimony when speaking to
anyone, much less the police. Perhaps this distinction can overcome a
testimonial designation, allowing admission of his statements under the
173.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. See also supra text accompanying notes 130 and 148.
174.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5.
175.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com/home.htm (last
visited Apr, 11, 2005).
176.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 69; see also supra text accompanying note 128.
177.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 51.
178.
Id. (quoting 1. N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(1828)).
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hearsay exception for excited utterances. 179 Crawford may support this
position, given that testimonial statements are "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' 180 So far, courts
have largely rejected this line of argument.' 81
In response to Crawford, one victim's rights advocate adjusted her
police officer training program. 182 The new training suggests that officers "take notes of a victim's demeanor at the scene-such as, 'she was
screaming, she was crying'-to prove that the statement was an excited
utterance and not the product of interrogation."' 183 Presumably, this technique will decrease the likelihood that a court will consider the victim's
statement testimonial. Unfortunately, taking such notes may not produce
the advocate's desired results. Under Crawford, if the police officer's
interrogation fits within the colloquial meaning of an interrogation, the
statement is testimonial regardless of the manner in which the declarant
made it.' 84 Furthermore, although a declarant may be screaming or crying, she may still "reasonably . . . believe that the statement would be

available for use at a later trial."' 8 Although the fact that the declarant is
screaming or crying increases the chance that a court will deem her
statement an excited utterance, Crawford does not guarantee that it is
nontestimonial, particularly when a police officer records the statement
on a notepad with an eye towards trial. 186 Crawford addresses the issue
by stating, "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard."' 87 As re-

See COLO. R. EViD. 803(2) ("A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
179.
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."). See also
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
180.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 52.
See People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating "[i]t is
181.
more likely that the Supreme Court meant simply that if the statement was given under circum-

stances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably foreseeable by an objective observer, then the
statement is testimonial"), petition for review denied, No. S125799, 2004 LEXIS 8716 (Cal. Sept.
14, 2004); People v. Rolandis, 817 N.E. 2d 183, 189 (Ell. App. Ct. 2004).
Given that the declarant must be unavailable for the confrontation clause issue to come
into play, how would the speaker's subjective understanding be determined? The State
merely speculates about the thought process of young children generally. The objective

circumstances surrounding V.J.'s statements to Cure and Weber show that they were testimonial.
Id. But see People v. Vigil, No. 02CA0833, 2004 LEXIS 1024, at *7-9 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17,
2004) (applying test from "objective person in the child's position," but nevertheless labeling a
seven-year-old child's statements testimonial due to the presence of a police officer who made
statements to child indicating accused could go to jail), cert. granted, No. 04SC532, 2004 LEXIS

1030 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
182.
Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?: Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as
Judges Consider Which Evidence to Allow, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 24 (2004).
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 24.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 53.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at62.

187.

Id. at 52.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

2004]

flected by a series of decisions in New York, emergency 911 calls touch
on the precise limits of this "narrow standard."
In People v. Cortes,188 a New York trial judge considered a 911 call
testimonial because it "was [made] for the purpose of invoking police
action and the prosecutorial process."' 189 In response to a 911 dispatcher's questions, an unidentified eyewitness provided information on
the "location, description, and direction of movement" of a shooter.' 9
Because "callers to 911 reporting crimes are likely to know the use to
which the information will be put," Cortes considered the circumstances
of this particular 911 call an interrogation.
To support its position,
Cortes noted that police department internet web pages in New York
City and other jurisdictions often contain a very specific list of questions
for 911 callers to answer if they have observed a crime.' 92 A check of
similar web sites in Colorado shows that the Boulder Police Department's site contains a similar set of questions. 193 Referring to 911 calls
reporting a crime as the "modem equivalent, made possible by technology" of the ex parte examinations frowned upon in Crawford, Cortes
considered the 911 call testimonial and, thus, inadmissible.194
In contrast, two other New York trial judges did not consider 911
calls testimonial given the facts of their cases. In People v. Moscat,195
both the prosecution and defense believed a domestic assault victim
would refuse to testify and, thus, debated the admissibility of a recording
of the victim's 911 call. 19 6 Terming a 911 call "the electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry for help," usually made while a crime is
in progress or in its immediate aftermath, Moscat did not consider the
call testimonial. 97 Based on Crawford, Moscat stated, "[a] testimonial
statement is produced when the government summons a citizen to be a
witness; in a 911 call, it is the citizen who summons the government to
188.
189.

781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 416.

190.
191.

Id. at 404.
Id. at 407.

192. Id. at 405-06. Cortes noted that the New York City Police Department's website stated:
What should you do if you see a crime occurring?; Call 911 immediately; Are there any
weapons involved?; What is the address?; Any physical characteristics such as height,

weight, race, beard, or scars?; Any clothing description?; How many people involved?;
Are the persons involved on foot or in a vehicle?"
Id. (citation omitted).
193.
The Boulder Police website advises callers to:
Be prepared to answer the following questions: What is happening?; When did it happen?; Where is the incident taking place?; Are there weapons involved?; What does the

vehicle look like?; What is the license plate number?; What do the suspects look like?;
What is the direction of travel of the suspects, either on foot or in a vehicle?
City of Boulder Police Department, The 9-1-1 Emergency Dispatch System,
http://www3.ci.boulder.co.us/police/reference/911 .htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).

194.
195.
196.
197.

Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
Id. at 880.

at
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her aid." 198 In People v. Conyers,199 a mother made two 911 calls within
minutes of each other regarding a street fight involving her son, the defendant.2° In the first call, the mother screamed for police assistance.2
In the second, she screamed for an ambulance.20 2 The mother never testified at trial.20 3 Conyers did not consider the calls testimonial because,
given her "panicked and terrified screams. . . her intention in placing the
911 calls was to stop the assault in progress and not to consider
2 4 the legal
ramifications of herself as a witness in a future proceeding."
Considered together, the three New York cases exhibit the tension
created by Crawford between whether the question of labeling a statement testimonial properly hinges on the declarant's intent in giving it, the
government's intent in receiving it, or both. From one perspective, the
declarant's intent is irrelevant because Crawford considers statements
testimonial when made with the "[i]nvolvement of government officers
in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial ....

Cer-

tainly, this is one reason jurisdictions choose to record 911 calls. They
know such recordings provide valuable information for criminal proceedings. From the opposite perspective, Crawford also defines testimonial
statements as "statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.''206 Some objective 911 callers
may only reasonably believe that their call will be used to acquire assistance. Hence, different circumstances and different ways of looking at
the 911 call affect whether it is testimonial. Under Crawford, therefore,
situations involving 911 calls will require a "case-by-case assessment
,,207
....
, Hence, although Jimmy's statements to police will probably be
testimonial under Crawford, the 911 cases indicate that, depending on
Id. at 879. But see supra Section V.A. (clearly Crawford does not limit testimonial
198.
statements to situations where the government summons a citizen to be a witness).
777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
199.
200.

Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.

201.

Id.
at 275.

202.

Id.

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at 277.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. See also supra text accompanying note 168.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. See also supra text accompanying note 160.

Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confronta207.
tion Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer, 2004, at 4, 10; see also Minnesota v. Wright, 686
N.W.2d 295, 302-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev granted in part, No. A03-1197, 2004 Minn. LEXIS

750 (Minn. Nov. 23, 2004).
A 911 call is usually made because the caller wants protection from an immediate danger,
not because the 911 caller expects the report to be used later at trial with the caller bearing witness-rather, there is a cloak of anonymity surrounding 911 calls that encourages
citizens to make emergency calls and not fear repercussion, [and] no evidence suggests
...that... [the] 911 call was handled under a formalized protocol.
Id. People v. Caudillo, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1430-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that

"details provided by [anonymous 911] caller were elicited in order to facilitate appropriate
police response, not to provide evidence to be used at a later trial."), rev grantedbriefing
deferred, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. 2005).
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the facts of a given situation, statements to police or government officials
are not automatically per se testimonial.
2. Are Jimmy's Statements to a Physician "Testimonial"?
As part of the sexual assault investigation, a physician examines
Jimmy. During the examination, the physician discovers injuries indicative of molestation. When the doctor asks Jimmy who hurt him, Jimmy
identifies the defendant. As indicated by three recent state court decisions, whether Jimmy's statements to the physician are testimonial will
depend heavily on the specific circumstances under which they were
given.
In Nebraska v. Vaught,20 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a
four year-old girl's identification of the defendant as a sexual assault
perpetrator to an emergency room physician. 209 Vaught held that the
child's identification was nontestimonial because "[t]here was no indication of a purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of the examination., 210 The physician testified at trial that "it is important for [the
physician] ... to know who the perpetrator was, both so that he does not

release a patient into the care of a perpetrator and for purposes of treating
the patient's mental well-being., 211 Although Vaught considered identification statements to physicians nontestimonial, other courts have not
taken the same approach.
People v. T.T.212 differentiated statements given by a seven-year-old
girl to a physician for purposes of symptoms and pain from those given
to the same physician for purposes of identifying the perpetrator. 2" The
girl made her statements six months after the alleged assault. 21 4 T. T.
considered the portion of the girl's statements "regarding the nature of
the alleged attack, the physical exam, and complaints of pain or injury"
nontestimonial. 5 T.T., however, considered the portion of her statements that "concerned fault or identity" testimonial. 216 The doctor to
whom the girl made her statements "was a member of a child abuse protection unit at the hospital and had previously testified as an expert witness in child abuse cases." 217 Although social services referred the girl to
the doctor, the court in .T. did not find that fact controlling.218 Nor was
208.
209.
210.

682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004).
Vaught, 682 N.W. 2d at 285-87.
Id. at 291.

211.

Id. at 287.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

815 N.E.2d 789 (111.App. Ct. 2004).
T.T., at 804.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id.
Idat 803.

218.

ld.
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it persuaded by the relationship between the doctor and social services
unit.2 19
under the umbrella of the hospital's child abuse protection
Rather, TT. simply considered the girl's identification statement testimonial because it was accusatory.22 °
In People v. Cage,2 ' the California Court of Appeals determined
that a fifteen-year-old boy's statement to an emergency room doctor that
222
"he had been held down by his grandmother and cut by his mother"
22
was nontestimonial. z23 Cage determined that the boy's statement was
nontestimonial because "[the doctor] was not a police officer or even an
agent of the police [and that to use the statement against the defendant]
bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause
targeted. 2 2 4 Furthermore, Cage rejected the defendant's attempt to argue that the boy, as a reasonable person, made the statement with a belief
that it would later be used at trial.225 Cage rejected this argument even if
the boy "had thought the doctor might relay his statements to the police
[because] anyone who obtains information relevant to a criminal investi,226
Cage did not consider
gation might.., pass it along to the police."
for the boy's
designation
a
testimonial
justify
to
enough
this possibility
27
statement.
Thus, because Jimmy's statements to his physician fall into a gray
area rather than one of Crawford's explicit definitions of "testimonial,"
admissibility will hinge on the specific facts of his case. As indicated by
Vaught and Cage, his statements may be nontestimonial if a court does
not find a reasonable expectation that his statements would be used at a
trial. T.T., however, seems to indicate that the mere accusatory nature of
identifying one's perpetrator may be testimonial by default. Hence, the
persuasive abilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys, the specific
facts of Jimmy's case, and the developing case law will all determine
whether his statements to his physician are "testimonial."
3. Are Jimmy's Statements to Social Workers "Testimonial"?
Admissibility of Jimmy's statements to social workers presents a
similar challenge because Crawford did not explicitly list out-of-court
statements to social workers as "testimonial." In Crawford, the Court
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 804.
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petitionfor rev granted,99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).

222.

Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petitionfor rev granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal.

2004).
223.

Id. at 854-55.

Id. at 854.
224.
Id. at 855. Interestingly, Cage opined the rather radical proposition that the three "core
225.
classes" of testimonial statements identified in Crawford were not adopted by the United States
Supreme Court, but rather, the Court "merely noted that they exist." Id. at 855. See supra notes
155-161 and accompanying text for the three "core classes."

226.
227.

Id.
Id.
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indicated, "an accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony .... ..,228 While some social workers may not be
per se government officials, they all have duties imposed upon them by
the government. For instance, Colorado requires social workers to report
child abuse or neglect if they have "reasonable cause to know or suspect
that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect., 229 If a trial court
considers the social workers to be government officials, then the process
for determining admissibility follows that of Jimmy's statements to the
police. If the trial court does not equate the social workers with government officials, then Crawford seems to indicate that the next step for the
trial court is to determine whether admitting the statement is a "modern
practice with close[] 23kinship
to the abuses at which the Confrontation
0
Clause was directed.,
As stated in Crawford's lengthy historical analysis, the founders directed the Confrontation Clause at the evil of using ex parte examinations against the accused. 23' Suppose a social worker interviews Jimmy
in a non-leading fashion. Eventually Jimmy tells her about the molestation committed by the defendant. A determinative factor is whether the
interview resembles an ex parte examination against the accused.232 If a
court determines that the social worker's purpose in working with Jimmy
is to ascertain for law enforcement whether the defendant committed acts
of sexual molestation, the statement will be testimonial.2333 Several recent
decisions in state courts reflect the difficulties in admitting testimony
from social workers post-Crawford.

In Maryland v. Snowden, 234 the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal of a defendant's child molestation conviction obtained in part on hearsay statements made by two child abuse victims to a
social worker.235 Pursuant to Maryland's "tender years statute," the social worker testified in lieu of the children.
The Maryland Court of
Appeals based its decision on the fact that the defense did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the children and that "an ordinary person in
the position of any of the declarants would have anticipated the sense
that her statements to the sexual abuse investigator potentially would
have been used to prosecute Snowden. ' 37 Snowden rejected arguments
228.
229.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(1) (2004).

230.
231.
232.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 49-50. See also supra text accompanying note 109.
Id.

233.
Id. at 61-62. One possible way for the social worker to testify is to confine her analysis
solely to an observation of Jimmy's behavior, and later testify as an expert witness as to the likeli-

hood that someone molested him. This possibility seems rather useless, for it requires the social
worker to refrain from eliciting statements from Jimmy.
234.
No. 42, Sept. Term, 2004, 2005 Md. LEXIS 35 (Md. Feb. 7, 2005).
235.
Id. at *3.
236.
237.

Id. at *8-9.
/d. at *29.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

made by Maryland's Solicitor General, who claimed the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals decisions affirmed by Snowden "misconstrued Crawford, and that "statements of young children to a social worker are not
testimonial. 238 Snowden indicates that unless child molestation victims
testify at trial with the opportunity for cross-examination by the defense,
239
In
courts may bar hearsay statements attested to by social workers.
other jurisdictions, various opinions indicate a strong tendency towards
240
Thus, because
considering statements to social workers testimonial.
Jimmy's statements to social workers may be testimonial, and therefore
inadmissible, Crawford could significantly change the methodologies by
which social workers discuss instances of alleged sexual abuse with
young children.

4. Are Jimmy's Statements to his Parents "Testimonial"?
Jimmy's parents are not government officials. In confiding to his
parents, Jimmy probably did not make his statements with the intent of
bearing testimony. He simply spoke to his parents. Nevertheless, admissibility of Jimmy's statements to his parents depends on whether they are
"testimonial." In Crawford, the Court states, "[a]n accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that24a1
not.,
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
Jimmy's statements to his parents do not conform to either extreme. He
did not make them to a government official, and, given the subject matter, they certainly were not casual. His statements fall in the gray area
between the two endpoints. Admissibility may, therefore, depend on the
nature of Jimmy's statement. To illustrate, consider two extremes. First,
David L. Hudson Jr., New Clout for Confrontation Clause: Citing U.S. Supreme Court,
238.
Maryland Overturns Sex-Abuse Conviction, 3 No. 17 ABAJEREP 1, at http://www.westlaw.com
(last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
Snowden, 2005 Md. LEXIS at *3.
239.
See In re T.T., 815 N.E. 2d 789, 803 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (stating "[w]e do not hold that all
240.
statements made to a social worker are per se testimonial under Crawford. We think it possible that
a scenario could arise in which a report to the [social worker agency] hotline or statements of sexual
abuse overheard by a social worker would be admissible as nontestimonial hearsay"); Minnesota v.
Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that statements elicited from a child
during an interview by a child-protection worker monitored by the police chief via closed-circuit
television were testimonial), rev. granted in part and denied in part, No. A03-790 and A03-791,
2004 Minn. LEXIS 575 (Sept. 29, 2004); People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that since a detective observed multi-disciplinary center specialist's interview with a
minor child "it was reasonably expected the interview would be used prosecutorially and at trial");
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a child's statements
to social workers was testimonial because the "interview took place after a prosecution was initiated,
was attended by the prosecutor and the prosecutor's investigator, and was conducted by a person
trained in forensic interviewing." The Court declined to hold that statements to all trained interviewers are testimonial), petition for rev. denied, No. S125799, 2004 LEXIS 8716 (Cal. Sept. 14,
2004); But see People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that "the child's
statement was made to the executive director of the Children's Assessment Center, not to a government employee, and the child's answer to the question of whether she had an 'owie' was not a
statement in the nature of 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent."'), appeal denied,
688 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 5 .
241.
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Jimmy complains to his parents of pain and soreness in his private areas.
Since it is unlikely Jimmy expressed his pain with any inclination towards a trial, the statements are not testimonial. Under the hearsay exception for then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions and/or
the hearsay exception for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,
Jimmy's parents may recount their son's complaints in court.242 Second,
at another extreme, suppose Jimmy says to his parents, "that man down
the street has been touching my private areas." Since this is no longer a
casual remark, but rather, an accusatory statement, courts may consider it
testimonial and allow the parents to describe it only if Jimmy later testifies in court with an opportunity for cross-examination by the defense.
Accordingly, "whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial is
going to depend
on the circumstances of the particular out-of-court
24
statement."

Jimmy's statements to the police, to an emergency room physician,
to social workers, and to his parents do not appear to conform to any
explicit definition of "testimonial" found within Crawford. Prosecutors
and defense attorneys must therefore draw from the various phrases from
Crawford,case law, the facts of their cases, and their persuasive abilities
to argue for or against the admissibility of each statement. 244
C. The Uncertain Fate of Colorado'sChild Hearsay Exception

Colorado's child hearsay exception, based on Roberts, provides for
admission of Jimmy's out-of-court statements. 245 Similar laws protecting
child victims of sex crimes, commonly referred to as "tender age laws,"
exist in many other states.24 6 In People v. Diefenderfer,247 the Colorado
242.

See COLO. R. EvtD. 803(3) ("A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,

emotion, sensation, or physical condition."); See COLO. R. EviD. 803(4) ("Statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."); See also FED. R. EvID. 803(3); FED. R.
EviD. 803(4). Even if Jimmy identifies the alleged perpetrator when talking to his doctor, his statement may still be nontestimonial. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004) (ruling that a
child's identification of the alleged molester during examination by an emergency room physician
was nontestimonial because there was no "indication of a purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor

was there an indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of the examination."
The physician testified at trial, "it is important for [the physician] ... to know who the perpetrator
was, both so that he does not release a patient into the care of a perpetrator and for purposes of
treating the patient's mental well-being.").
243.
David L. Hudson Jr., New Clout for Confrontation Clause: Citing U.S. Supreme Court,
Maryland Overturns Sex-Abuse Conviction, 3 No. 17 ABAJEREP 1, at http://www.westlaw.com
(last visited Apr. 11, 2005).

244. Justice Thomas's complaint in White still seems to apply post-Crawford: "[i]t is ... not
clear. . . whether the declarant or the listener (or both) must be contemplating legal proceedings."
White v. Illinois 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2004).
246.
See Snowden v. Maryland, 846 A.2d 36, 39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd by, No. 42,
Sept. Term, 2004, 2005 Md. LEXIS 35 (Md. Feb. 7, 2005); Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the
ConfrontationClause, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1003, 1059-60 (2003).

247.

784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1989).
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Supreme Court upheld Colorado's child hearsay exception under Roberts.248 Specifically, the exception states that a court may admit Jimmy's
out-of-court statements if:
(a) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the

jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and
(b) The child either:
(I) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(l1) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborativeevidence of
the act which is the subject of the statement 2 49 (emphasis added).

Many approaches to determining "sufficient safeguards of reliability" exist. 250 Corroborative evidence is "evidence, direct or circumstantial, that is independent of and supplementary to the child's hearsay
statement and that tends to confirm that the act described in the child's
statement actually occurred., 251 In Jimmy's case, behavioral observations made by the child molestation expert may have qualified as corroborative evidence independent of and supplementary to Jimmy's hearsay statements.
Post-Crawford,admissibility of Jimmy's statements under the child
hearsay exception will depend on whether they are testimonial. Crawford will not affect the admissibility of nontestimonial statements, because for those statements Crawford "afford[ed] the States flexibility in
their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts ..... 252 ifJimmy's
statements are testimonial and, thus, require cross-examination for admissibility under Crawford, then Colorado's hearsay exception, given its
Roberts-based reliance on "sufficient safeguards of reliability," cannot
survive constitutional scrutiny. Post-Crawford,Colorado's child hearsay
exception should apply only to nontestimonial statements and testimonial
statements coupled with an opportunity to cross-examine the child.253
248.
249.
250.

Diefenderfer,784 P.2d at 746-53.
COLO.REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2004).
See People v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo. 1989) (establishing an eight-

factor test for reliability in cases concerning children); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990)
(establishing a four-factor test for reliability concerning a child's hearsay statement). See generally
People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (Colo. 2001) (establishing a general eight-factor test for
reliability), overruled in part by People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
251.
People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 525 (Colo. 1990).
252.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.

253.
Due to a lack of standing, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutionality of COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(b)(Il), the portion of Colorado's child hearsay exception
modeled after Roberts. People v. Argonamiz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1018-19 (Colo. 2004). In an
order reversing a trial court's decision to exclude videotaped interviews of two children by the
police, the Court noted that the children would be testifying at trial. Id. Because defense counsel
could cross-examine the children, the Court declined the defendant's request to "pass . . .judgment

"Id.
on the constitutionality of that portion of the child hearsay statute ....
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For cases like the hypothetical one involving Jimmy, Crawfordcreates a difficult situation: sometimes it may force prosecutors to put a
very young and vulnerable child like Jimmy on the witness stand. In
Diefenderfer, the decision that upheld the constitutionality of Colorado's
child hearsay exception under Roberts, the court stated that the Colorado
child hearsay exception "effects the substantive policy of protecting certain witnesses-in this case child witnesses-from the sometimes traumatizing effect of facing their abusers openly in court., 254 At least for
testimonial statements, Crawfordtrumps this policy.
The potential demise of Colorado's child hearsay exception for testimonial statements carries with it a potentially increased frequency for
defense attorneys to use cross-examination to manipulate very young
children like Jimmy into contradicting their previous statements. 25 5 Of
course, such tactics may backfire on the defense by creating sympathy
for the child in the jury's eyes. 6 Nevertheless, Colorado does provide
for in-court techniques designed to mitigate the negative impact on
young children while simultaneously maintaining the defendant's confrontation rights.
Colorado law already allows for two techniques to help protect
young children: videotaped depositions and closed circuit testimony.
Colorado permits videotaped depositions prior to trial if a child is less
than fifteen years of age and is "medically unavailable or otherwise unavailable., 257 If the child is still unavailable once trial begins, the court
may admit the videotape into evidence. 258 Second, Colorado law allows
testimony via closed circuit television in cases concerning alleged sexual
offenses against children less than twelve years of age if the child's testimony "would result in the child suffering serious emotional distress or
trauma such that the child would not be able to reasonably communicate. ' ,259 For such testimony, only the prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, guardian ad litem, operators of the closed-circuit television
equipment, a person who "contributes to the welfare and well-being of
the child victim", and the jury may be in the room with the child. 26 The
judge and defendant remain in the courtroom. 61 So long as trial judges
allow their use, both videotaped depositions and closed circuit television
254.
Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d at 753.
255.
See Richard P. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles,86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1037-38 (2003).

256. See id.
257.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3413 (2004). See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401.3
(2004) (providing videotape depositions for non-sexual child abuse).
258.
Id. at § 18-3-413(4). Since this statute mandates that the court carry out the child's deposition according to COLO. R. GRIM. P. 15(d), prosecution and defense attorneys for both sides are

present before the judge, and, thus, the deposition affords the defense an opportunity to crossexamine the child. COLO. R. GRIM. P. 15(d).

259.
260.

COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5(l)(a)(fl) (2004).
COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5(2)(a) (2004).

261.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5(2)(b) (2004).
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will continue to provide protection to alleged victims of child molestation even after Crawford.
D. Post-Crawford:An Indication of Colorado'sApproach
This section summarizes Colorado court cases issued since Craw-

ford. Because a few cases represent only a marginal relationship to the
hypothetical case against Jimmy's alleged perpetrator, they do not appear
in detail below.263 Instead, the following contains descriptions of the
more significant cases.26"
In People v. Fry,265 the Colorado Supreme Court determined that
"preliminary hearings in Colorado do not present an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. ' '266 Inreaching this conclusion, the Court
262. See e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (holding that "the state interest in
protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness .. . to testify . . . in the

absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant."); Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REv. 537, 588 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's acceptance of
allowing a child to testify outside the court room in the presence of prosecution and defense counsel
with the defendant, able to communicate with his attorney, watching a live television feed); Wendy
N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?: Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as Judges Consider Which
Evidence to Allow, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 24 (arguing that the trauma created in children by their abusers
may allow prosecutors to argue that the defendant waived their rights to confront the children in
court); but see United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cit. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
973 (1996).
[Tihat when a person who eventually emerges as a defendant (1)causes a potential witness's unavailability (2) by a wrongful act (3) undertaken with the intention of preventing
the potential witness from testifying at a future trial, then the defendant waives his right
to object on confrontation grounds to the admission of the unavailable declarant's out-ofcourt statements at trial.
Id.
See generally People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 11124 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
263.
that Crawford "does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review where ... the defendant's
conviction became final before Crawford was announced."), cert. granted, No. 04SC565, 2004
Colo. LEXIS 1000 (Colo. Dec. 6, 2004); People v. Moore, No. 01CA1760, 2004 Colo.App. LEXIS
1354, at *9-11 (Colo. Ct. App. July 29, 2004) (holding under the rule of forfeiture that defendant
cannot claim Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford after killing the declarant), cert. dismissed and remandedfor cause, No. 04SC571, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 772 (Colo. Oct. 4, 2004); People
v. Candelaria, No. 01CA2467, 2004 Colo.App. LEXIS 1021, at *13 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004)
(holding that there was no violation of confrontation rights under Crawford when witness with
cancer testified subject to cross-examination, but could not remember key facts); People v. Turley,
No. 03CA0845, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1895, at *3 (Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (holding that
Crawford does not change "the settled principles governing admission of hearsay in probation revocation proceedings"); People v. Garrison, No. 01CA0527, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1819, at *3-4
(Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2004) (holding that defendant's statements to a training manager were nontestimonial because they did not fall into any of Crawford's three core classes of testimonial statements); People v. Shreck, No. 02CA1413, 2004 Colo.App. LEXIS 1712, at *34-36 (Colo. Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2004) (holding that "admission of documentary evidence showing [defendant's] prior
");People v. King,
convictions [did not] violate[] his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation ....
No. 02CA0201, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 111, at *16 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2004) (holding that
when "a victim makes an excited utterance to a police officer, in a noncustodial setting and without
indicia of formality, the statement is nontestimonial interrogation under Crawford.").
264. For an alternate discussion of the effect of Crawford in Colorado, see Will Hood InI &
Lucia Padilla, The Right to Confront Witnesses After Crawford v. Washington, COLO. LAW., Sept.
2004, at 83-90.
265. 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
266.
Fry, 92 P.3d at 972.
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took the opportunity to reject the eight-factor reliability analysis contained in Farrell.267 The Court stated, "[w]e therefore change our Confrontation Clause inquiry to whether a defendant had an adequate prior
opportunity to cross-examine, not whether the previous testimony is reliable." 268 Although Fry clearly implicated the constitutional validity of
Colorado's child hearsay exception, the court never mentioned it in its
decision. 269
To date, the Colorado Supreme Court has not addressed the
exception.
In People v. Compan,270 the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted
Crawford and presented its own definition of "testimonial. 2 7 1 Although
this case predates Fry by one month, Fry did not cite to it. Under Crawford, the Compan defendant sought to appeal a domestic violence conviction achieved partially through the admission of hearsay statements
under the excited utterances and medical diagnosis and treatment exceptions.22722 Based on their reading of Crawford, the Court of Appeals formulated the following "testimonial statement" philosophy:
Thus, it appears that testimonial statements under Crawford will gen-

erally be (1) solemn or formal statements (not casual or off-hand remarks), (2) made for the purpose of proving or establishing facts in
judicial proceedings (not for business or personal purposes), (3) to a

government actor or agent (not to someone unassociated with government activity). 273
Since "[t]he victim's statements were not made for the purpose of
establishing 274facts in a subsequent proceeding", the statements were not
testimonial.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction. 275 For nontestimonial hearsay, Compan retained
the Roberts reli276
ability approach previously adopted in Colorado.
Because Compan oversimplifies the meaning of the term "testimonial," Compan might produce results inconsistent with Crawford. First,
Compan implies that testimonial statements "will generally ...

be sol-

emni or formal statements (not casual or offhand remarks)."277 Crawford
did not present these two extremes as a choice between one or the other,
but instead, recognized that gray area may exist between them. 278 A
267. Id. at 976.
268. Id.
269. See supra note 253.
270.
100 P.3d 533 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No. 04SC422, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 849
(Colo. Oct. 25, 2004).
271.
Compan, 100 P.3d at 536-37.
272. Id. at 535-36.
273. Id. at 537.
274. Id. at 538.
275.
Id. at 535.
276. Id. at 538.
277. Id. at 537.
278. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; See also supra text accompanying note 154.
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statement that is neither "solemn or formal" nor "casual or offhand" may
still be testimonial under Crawford.7 9 Jimmy's statements to his parents, for example, fall into this category. Second, Compan oversimplifies the "purpose" required for a statement to be testimonial by stating
that a testimonial statement "will generally be ... made for the purpose
of proving or establishing facts in judicial proceedings."280 Crawford
does not support this. On the declarant's side, Crawford says that a
statement is testimonial "under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.",28 ' By using the terms "made for the purpose, 282 Compan has incorrectly replaced Crawford's objective test with
a subjective one. Compan ignores the listener's purpose in receiving the
statement, something to which Crawford devoted considerable attention. 283 Under Crawford, if the listener is a government agent and carrying out an interrogation in the colloquial sense, the statement may be
testimonial regardless of the declarant's purpose.284 Third, Compan incorrectly implies that a statement to a government actor or agent is determinative in the testimonial analysis.285 Certainly, the involvement of
the government is a significant factor, but Crawford does not end the
testimonial analysis there. 286 Crawford requires a deeper examination of
the circumstances. In a noble attempt to do what the United States Supreme Court refused to do-define "testimonial"-Compan tends to
gloss over the subtleties in Crawford itself.
Finally, two simultaneously issued Colorado Court of Appeals decisions from the same three-judge panel involved the admissibility of
videotaped police interviews with sexually abused children. In People v.
Vigil,287 the court deemed the videotape of an interview with a sevenyear-old boy testimonial.288 The Court said that the police obtained the
child's statements under an interrogation, in the colloquial sense of the
word, because the interviewer had extensive training in interviewing
children, identified herself as a police officer, and ascertained that the
child understood what it meant to tell the truth. 289 Furthermore, the court
believed that the child "reasonably expected his statements to be used
prosecutorially" because the child indicated "that [the] defendant should

279.

Id.

280.

Compan, 100 P.3d at 537.

281.
282.
283.

Craviford, 541 U.S. at 51; see also supra text accompanying note 160.
Compan, 100 P.3d at 537.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 62; see also supra text accompanying note 168.

284,
285.

Crauford,541 U.S. at 51-52.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

286.

Id.

287.

People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted in part and denied in

part, No. 04SC532, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 1030 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
288.
Vigil, 104 P.3d at 262.
289.
Id. at 262.
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go to jail. 29 ° In addition, the police officer told the child he would need
to talk to her friend, the district attorney, who would "try to put [the]
defendant in jail for a long time."29' In the second case, People v. In re
R.A.S,929
the court ruled on similar facts, citing Vigil to justify its deci2 3
sion.
In addition to the Maryland Snowden case, other jurisdictions have
tackled Crawford in the context of sex crimes against children. So far,
appellate decisions in this area indicate that making a statement to a government official proves quite important in determining whether a statement made by an unavailable out-of-court child declarant is "testimonial.

294

The Crawford opinion did not contain any explicit language to justify a "testimonial" label for the four types of hearsay statements in the
hypothetical case against the man who allegedly molested Jimmy. To
determine whether the statements were testimonial required consideration of Crawford's eighteen key phrases, the circumstances in which
Jimmy gave his statements, and the circumstances in which the different
listeners received them. Different circumstances will lead to different
results. Furthermore, as a result of Crawford, Colorado's child hearsay
exception, due to its Roberts foundation, probably will not survive constitutional scrutiny as far as testimonial statements are concerned when
the defendant cannot cross-examine the child.295
CONCLUSION

While proponents of restoring the Confrontation Clause to a position closer to its historical roots will no doubt delight in Crawford, the
opinion challenges those wishing to protect very young sexually and
physically abused children from the trauma of in-court testimony. Crawford may result in the elimination of "tender age laws" previously formulated with Roberts in mind. Less than one month after Crawford, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals struck down Maryland's "tender age

290.
Id.
291.
Id. at 263.
292.
No. 03CA1209, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1032, (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004).
293.
R.A.S., at *4-12.
294.
See State v. Casatilla, 87 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Wash. App. 2004) (ruling that "[tihe statements were extremely limited, and did not go to any disputed issue but merely asserted Nelson had
been touched sexually. Further, these statements were not testimonial in nature-they were not
elicited by a government official and were not given with an eye toward trial"), petition for review

deferred, 2005 Wash. LEXIS 46 (Wash. Jan. 4. 2005); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that "the child's statement was made to the executive director of the Children's Assessment Center, not to a government employee, and the child's answer to the question of
whether she had an "owie" was not a statement in the nature of "'ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent."'), appeal denied, 688 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004).
295.
People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6573, at *18 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 13, 2004).
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law, 2 96 and the survivability of Colorado's child hearsay exception is
unlikely so far as testimonial statements go. Nevertheless, the proper
use of videotaped depositions and testimony via closed-circuit television
can mitigate the impact of Crawford on abused children.
Crawford will undoubtedly confound lawyers and judges for many
years to come, all trying to determine whether a particular statement
given by an unavailable declarant is "testimonial." The Court refrained
from providing a definition of testimonial, and it may never do so.
Crawford, like the Lilly decision that preceded it, is indicative of the
Court's one hundred year struggle to identify the proper exceptions to a
literal reading of the Confrontation Clause. Unlike the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which Crawford places beneath the Confrontation Clause, the
Crawford decision does not provide judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys with the clear and definite language that they might desire. If
Crawford provides one single lesson for lawyers and judges, it is that
whether a statement receives a testimonial label will depend almost entirely on the circumstances in which the declarant gave it and the listener
received it.
Finally, the effect of Crawford on criminal prosecutions like that of
Jimmy's alleged sexual abuser cannot be understated. Given Jimmy's
unavailability, prior to Crawford a prosecutor could still take the case to
trial via Colorado's child hearsay exception. Post-Crawford,all testimonial statements are inadmissible without cross-examination, and the
prosecutor may have to drop the charges as a result. While Crawford
strengthens the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation, in criminal
cases like that against three-year-old Jimmy's perpetrator, it weakens the
ability of prosecutors to press forward.

Paul Kyed*
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THE PROBLEM OF COURT ENFORCED MORALITY
INTRODUCTION

On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded shortly after take off,
killing all 230 people on board.' Sixteen of those passengers were highschool students from Montoursville, a small town in rural Pennsylvania. 2
After some of the pain and mourning subsided, the parents who were left
behind began debating what should be done to prevent a similar tragedy
from befalling others. Some parents wanted revenge; others wanted to
make someone pay for killing their children. Once the parents decided
that litigation was the best course of action, they quickly learned how
painful the process would be. Each family would have to litigate its case
separately. Since Boeing had admitted liability, the only issue at trial
would be damages. Each family would have to prove, in dollars and
cents, the worth of their child. In the words of the attorney for many of
the families, "[t]he only thing on trial will be your loved ones."4
Boeing initially made identical offers to all sixteen families, which
were summarily refused. In an attempt to avoid protracted litigation, the
parties headed for mediation. After hearing from two of the parents,
Boeing's attorneys came back with another offer, this one rumored to be
in the neighborhood of $2.5 million per child. Bob and Irenay Weaver,
who had been chosen to represent the parents at the mediation, decided it
was enough. In the end, Boeing and the families agreed to a confidential
settlement, but the families discovered a hard truth: the settlement did not
provide accountability, nor would a trial. Steve Uzupis, one of the fathers, summed up the feelings of the families when he said:
This is your child, and in the back of your mind, there's this feeling
that you're standing up for her, that you're trying to make some
meaning out of her death. To make something positive occur so it
does not happen ever again. And the settlement means that the fight
is over, and you know that the end result is not going to change anything. It's a horrible feeling.
It's like, "Jeez, there should have been
5
more to it than just this."
The recent criminal trial of professional basketball star Kobe Bryant
is just one of many examples of a criminal case that never went to a full

1.

Stephanie Williams, A Loss Beyond Measure, SMARTMONEY, July 2001, available at

http://www.smartmoney.com/l 0/index.cfm?Story=feature-measure.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5.
Id.
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trial before a judge and jury. 6 Bryant was accused of raping a 19-yearold woman in a hotel near Vail, Colorado.7 Unlike many criminal cases,
which never go to trial because of plea bargains, Bryant's case was dismissed because the accuser no longer wanted to proceed. 8 The alleged
victim has remained silent; however, her lawyers' statements have led
many to conclude that she could no longer handle the public scrutiny of a
trial.9 The Bryant case was unusual in another respect: the alleged victim
received a public apology.' 0
These high-profile cases are representative of the fact that few legal
disputes ever reach full-blown trial. These two examples highlight some
of the reasons that many of today's legal scholars are concerned with the
state of the trial court system in the United States.
In The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do
What's Right, Fordham Law School professor Thane Rosenbaum criticizes many aspects of the legal system in the United States. 1'
Rosenbaum's book comments on the manner in which trial courts operate, 12 the ethics and professional responsibility of attorneys, 13 plea bargains, 14 and civil settlements. 15 In his own words, Rosenbaum's central
argument is that "moral consideration and private conscience should be
integrated into legal decision-making."' 16 Combining recent high-profile
cases with popular books and movies, Rosenbaum argues that the public
expectation of law and justice differs significantly from the reality of law
and justice. 17 Rosenbaum's work is a continuation of decades of growing
criticism of the American legal system.
This book review focuses on two major areas in which Rosenbaum
criticizes the current legal system. Part I examines Rosenbaum's criticisms of the trial court system. Part II examines Rosenbaum's criticisms
of attorney conduct and his proposed changes to legal ethics and professional responsibility. Each part also suggests that Rosenbaum's ideas,
while perhaps good in theory, are impractical and shortsighted.
6. Bryant Apologized To Accuser As Criminal Case Is Dropped, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Sept. 2,2004, atAl.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10.
Id. Although Bryant issued a public apology, it was given under the condition that it
could not be used against him in any subsequent civil
action. The apology was also worded insuch
a way thatdenied any realresponsibility on the part of Bryant: "Although I trulybelieve this
encounter between us was consensual, I recognize now thatshe did not and does not view this
incident the same way I did."Id.
11. THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO
Do WHAT'S RIGHT (2004).
12.
Id.at 103-13.
13.
Id. at 114-38.
14.
Id. at 100-03.
15.
Id. at 93- 100.
16.
Id.at231.
17.
Id.at 16-17.
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I. THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The overarching theme of The Myth of Moral Justice is that anyone
who feels wronged should be allowed his or her day in court, in front of a
judge and a jury.' 8 In other words, "the story itself is and provides its

own remedy."' 9 While this theme is the underlying premise for all of
Rosenbaum's criticisms, it is most dominating throughout his criticism of
the trial court system.
A. Rosenbaum's Criticismof the Current Legal System
Through critical analysis of several aspects of the trial court system
and examples of how he believes the system should function,
Rosenbaum lays out his paradigm of moral justice.
Although
Rosenbaum's vision of moral justice may seem simple, it would provide
trials much different than those provided by the current system. Parties
and witnesses would provide an unfettered and uninterrupted recounting
of the facts in a public forum. 20 Settlements and
plea bargains would be
21

eliminated and replaced with open public trials.
1. Storytelling as Remedy

Rosenbaum suggests that courts should be a place for not only the
discovery of the truth but also the healing of injuries. 22 Public trials are
the only way to discover the truth.23 One of the questions asked by
Rosenbaum is:
[W]hether, instead of limiting their role to presiding over zero-sum
contests, courts can entertain broader conversations about moral outcomes that don't rely exclusively on crowning winners. Is it possible
for courts to infuse and align their legal decisions with an appreciation of the moral universe? And, in doing so, can judges and lawyers
find ways to humanize the law so that it does not coldly ignore 2the
4
pain that resides within and around the creases of human conflict?

In Rosenbaum's system of moral justice, the telling of the story
would govern the process. Even "[i]f nothing else gets accomplished, if
criminals go free and tortfeasors succeed in causing further negligence,

2
the telling of the story, by itself, is still the morally correct outcome. , 5

After the story telling is through, if the court grants a legal remedy,

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 58.
See id. at 58-59.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 58-59.
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Rosenbaum feels that the remedy "must also2 6 offer moral and spiritual
relief, and be directed to both body and soul.
2. Courts Should Consider Morality
Describing the current legal paradigm as the "Legal-BodyPunishment/Money" system, Rosenbaum contends that this current paradigm focuses almost exclusively on finding the "legally correct" outcome and is only concerned with damages to property or physical injuries to the human body.27 Rosenbaum proposes an alternative paradigm:
"Moral-Soul-Acknowledgement/Restoration." 28 Under his new system, courts would work toward "moral outcomes," and the human spirit
would be protected from "spiritual violence, indignity, and neglect. 29
The moral outcomes that Rosenbaum would have courts provide include
acknowledgement of any harm done by the defendant followed by an
apology. 30 The final step in Rosenbaum's system of moral justice would
be the restoration of the damaged relationship between the parties. 3'
Rosenbaum provides only a vague notion of where the structure of
his morality should come from. 32 He repeatedly refers to a nexus between law and religion, 33 but he does not believe morality must necessarily be connected with religion:
[l]n an age where we are naturally suspicious of moral absolutes, and
where moral relativism reigns supreme, some people are made uncomfortable by any notion that there is a universally shared standard
of morality, or that there even is such a thing as doing the right thing.

But what's right and what's moral doesn't have to conform to a particular religious ethos. In our fear of religious intolerance, we
shouldn't ignore
that morality and conscience can and should guide
34
private lives.

3. Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence Get in the Way
Rosenbaum suggests that the rules of civil procedure and the rules
of evidence are two of the biggest enemies of story telling, placing these
rules and procedures at "the very core of what passes for immoral justice
in America." 35 Rosenbaum believes that the rules of civil procedure and

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 33.
Id.

30.

Id. at 34-35.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 14-15.

33.
34.
35.

Id. at 12-15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 93.
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and says that
the rules of evidence "mercilessly trump[]" moral justice,
"without them, moral justice has a fighting chance." 36
In Rosenbaum's system of moral justice, litigants would tell their
stories uninterrupted and unrestrained by rules of procedure or evidence. 37 He envisions courthouses as "public grieving grounds., 38 The
"true path to moral justice," he says, would be "a legal system that is as
much interested in grieving, healing, and restoration as it is in compensation and punishment. 39 Parties and witnesses would dictate the flow of
the trial rather than judges. Rosenbaum accuses judges and lawyers of
not understanding "how little the lay person cares about the evolution of
40
rules and precedents, and how much he simply wants to tell his story."
This argument stems from Rosenbaum's idea of "what it means to do
justice": 4'
Giving people an opportunity to speak about what happened to them,

and to confront those who are responsible for their hurt, is an indispensable part of what it means to do justice, and to administer a legal
system that is just .... A court of law.., should function as a sanc-

remedies limited not just to law, but to
tuary for truth-telling, with
42
personal healing, as well.

Specifically, Rosenbaum would change or eliminate the rules of
43
evidence that limit the introduction of a defendant's prior bad acts.
Rosenbaum also would alter the rules of procedure that mandate dismissal of a case when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, an as well as those that bar the filing of a case due to the
statute of limitations.45 Under Rosenbaum's paradigm, plaintiffs would
be given time in front of a judge and jury even if their claim was not a
violation of law or was not pled in the proper manner. 46 In addition,
36. Id. at 93. But see FD. R. EviD. 102 ('These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.") (emphasis added).
ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 108-09.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
sure that

Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 112. "[A]side from the possible prejudice, isn't this exactly the kind of full disclothe jury should hear in deciding guilt and innocence? .. . [What] we have now is truth-

seeking with many of the truths in permanent lockup." Id. "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." FED. R. EvtD. 404(b).
44. Id. at 116. Rosenbaum specifically attacks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
which states in part that "the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion
...(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ......

FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
45.

ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 133.

46.

Id. at 116-17.
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plaintiffs would be allowed to bring a claim no matter how much time
had passed since the alleged injury.47

Rosenbaum goes so far as to place the blame for immoral outcomes
on the constitutional rights that many hold sacred, including the presumption of innocence, the right to have illegally obtained evidence excluded from trial, and the rights to due process and equal protection under the law.48

4. Settlements do not Fulfill Parties' Wishes
Rosenbaum argues that out-of-court settlement of civil litigation
does not fulfill the wishes of the parties. 49 He questions the morality of
settlements, alleging that "in most situations they merely serve to silence
the story in return for a cashier's check." 50 In seeming contradiction of
his later criticism of the win-at-all-costs adversary system, 51 Rosenbaum
suggests that the system should not assume that litigants are better off
reaching a compromise in settlement.52 In addition to describing civil
settlements as "entirely lawful, economically efficient bribe[s], ' 3
Rosenbaum argues that settlements strip the legal system of "its therapeutic, healing potential. 5 4 Calling settlements "spiritually unsatisfying,",55 he views the courtroom trial as a public catharsis that brings communities together in "the search for the truth and the moral lessons that
are learned from those truths. 56 He seems to believe that one of the
problems of settlement is the lack of emotional outbursts and histrionics
that frequently occur during trial.57 Rosenbaum feels that settlements
belittle the claims brought by the plaintiff, "pretend[ing] that the story
was never important enough to tell. 58 In sum, Rosenbaum claims settlements are immoral and unjust because they deprive people of the
chance to tell their stories, they involve no truth-finding, they do not allow for outside or public scrutiny of the parties involved, and they produce little or no public record of the proceedings.5 9
5. Plea Bargains Inhibit the Search for the Truth
Along with settlements in the civil arena, Rosenbaum also attacks
plea bargains as being immoral because they "undermine truth and sub47.
48.

Id. at 134.
Id. atI 17.

49.
50.

Id. at 93.
Id.

51.
52.

Id.at 130.
Id.at94.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at96.
Id.at94.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 94.

57.

Id. at 95.

58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 94.
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vert justice., 60 He is critical of what he sees as a lack of truth in a system
where criminal defendants end up jailed for crimes that they did not
commit, but plead guilty to anyway, all in the name of judicial efficiency. 6' "Truth," he says, "becomes hostage to the efficiencies gained
from negotiated pleas." 62 Rosenbaum proposes that the morally correct
solution would be for the legal system to rely less on plea bargains and
more on trials, with 63prosecutors representing the interests of both the
state and the victims.
Cognizant of the public desire for justice and punishment,
Rosenbaum questions whether people would ever accept a system of
criminal justice where historical and restorative justice would be seen as
equals to retributive justice. 64 In the end, he concedes that "moral and
historical justice, no matter how laudable, would lose much of its moral
authority if guilty criminals went unpunished. 65
Rosenbaum is not alone in his criticism of plea bargains. What is
unique about Rosenbaum's criticism, however, is his focus on the harm
caused to the alleged victim by the plea bargain; many of Rosenbaum's
premises assume the guilt of the defendant. 66 His criticisms of criminal
plea bargains, similar to his criticism of civil settlements, focus almost
exclusively on the perceived injustice done to the alleged victim without
ever really addressing any injustice done to the defendant or alleged perpetrator.67
Most other critics have instead focused on the violation of the de68
fendant's constitutional rights. Timothy Lynch has said that "[p]lea
bargaining rests on the constitutional fiction that our government does
not retaliate against individuals who wish to exercise their right to
trial.",69 Lynch presents evidence that the sentences handed out to defenmuch as five times as long as
dants who lose at trial are frequently as
what had been offered in a plea bargain.70

60.

Id. at 100.

61.
62.

Id. at 87.
Id.

63.
Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 102. Rosenbaum describes historical justice as "knowing the truth of what hap64.
pened," and restorative justice as a system that seeks to "heal wounds and enable some reconciliation
to occur." Id.
Id. Rosenbaum qualifies this concession by claiming that under the current system there
65.
are many defendants who end up incarcerated because they accepted a plea bargain instead of risking stricter punishment at trial. Id.
Id. at 89. Rosenbaum distorts the right to confront one's accuser into the victim's right
66.

"to confront those who have harmed them." Id.
See id. at 85-90.
67.
68,
WHITNEY
69.
70.

Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 26;
NORTH SEYMOUR, JR., WHY JUSTICE FAILS 88 (1973).
Lynch, supra note 68, at 26.
Id.
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Other critics of plea bargaining have equated the practice to de facto
sentencing. 71 Defendants who cannot afford bail often sit in jail for several weeks or months, only to be released after agreeing to a plea of
guilty and a sentence of time served. Many have argued that this is the
equivalent of a conviction and a sentence without a trial.72
B. Why Rosenbaum's Ideas Will Not Work

There are numerous reasons why Rosenbaum's proposed changes
will not work. Moreover, many legal scholars have commented on the
benefits provided by settlements and plea bargains, two of the tools that
Rosenbaum would severally restrict or even eliminate.
1. Giving Everyone His or Her Day in Court is Inefficient
Rosenbaum's system is impractical. A situation where everyone
who is wronged would have his or her day in front of a judge and jury is
not possible in today's clogged court system. 73 Providing more access to
justice is a noble goal, but simply expanding the court system will not
achieve this goal.74 Bringing more disputes to trial would mean more
hours spent by attorneys in court. While this might give clients more
attention from their attorneys, it would also force attorneys to take fewer
cases. Even if it may be possible to create more courtrooms, hire more
judges and support staff, and train more attorneys, the increased economic costs of doing so would result in a legal system that even fewer
people could afford.
2. There is No Place for Morality in the Courtroom
Among those who disagree with Rosenbaum is United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who has said that "[g]overnment is
not meant to save souls but to protect life and property and serve the
common good. Its responsibility is the here, not the hereafter." 75 Justice
Scalia feels that while morality may have a place in the making of laws,
it has no place in the judicial system when those laws are interpreted.76
Others have gone further, comparing the imposition of morality on the
77
courts as "nothing more than the will of the majority at the moment.
Rosenbaum's suggestion that morality be imposed on the justice
system has an even greater opponent than Justice Scalia: growing public
71.

SEYMOUR, supra note 68, at 88.

72.

Id.

73.
See ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 89 (admitting that trials are rare because courthouses
are overburdened with too much litigation and criminal prosecution).
74.
See id. at 89-90 (proposing the building of more courthouses and appointment of more

judges).
75.

Dale Kueter, Scalia Lectures at Cornell-Justice, morality and the law, GAZETrE ONLINE,

May 7, 1999, at http://www.gazetteonline.com/news/9905/mayO30.htm.
76
d.
77.

Id.
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resistance to the incorporation of religion into government. One of the
more famous examples of this conflict is the recent high-profile incident
involving Roy Moore, the former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court.7 8 Moore was removed from the bench in 2003 for his refusal to
remove a two-and-a-half ton monument of the Ten Commandments from
the rotunda of the Alabama Supreme Court.7 9 Moore defended his refusal to remove the monument as an expression of the right to "acknowledge God as the moral foundation of our law.",80 The monument was
eventually removed after a protracted legal battle that was initiated by
several groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union and
Americans United for Separation of Church and State; both organizations
claimed the monument was an unlawful promotion of religion in a public
place. 81
3. Civil Procedure and Evidence Protect Litigants and Promote
Truth-Seeking
Despite Rosenbaum's assertions to the contrary, 82 the rules of civil
procedure and the rules of evidence have not been promulgated to create
an excuse for courts to not hear a case. 83 The rules of evidence have
been created not only to ensure that a trial proceeds in an orderly and
predictable manner, but also to define the roles of all participants.84 A
further purpose of these rules is to exclude evidence that, while relevant,
prejudicial, mislead the jury, confuse the legal issues, or
may be overly
85
waste time.
Many of the rules of civil procedure have been implemented to dictate the flow of trials in an efficient manner, as well as to protect each
party from frivolous or time-wasting maneuvers by an opposing party.
Statutes of limitations have been upheld on the basis that it is contrary to
the notion of justice to fail to put one's opponent on notice that he will
need to defend himself within a reasonable amount of time and that "the
right to be free from stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right
to prosecute them.",86 These time limitations allow plaintiffs a reasonable
amount of time in which to bring a claim, while at the same time protect78. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Judge Is Removed; Moore Installed Monument to Commandments, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at AO1.
79. Id.
80.
Janita Poe & Bill Rankin, Commandments Feud Spurs Arrests; Supreme Court Stays Out
of Dispute in Alabama, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 21, 2003, at lB.

Id.
81.
82. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 133 ("When the legal system can find an excuse not to
hear a case-to have it excluded or dismissed-it will do so rather than undertake the more moral,
truth-seeking path where full, uninhibited, uninterrupted stories can be heard.").
See, e.g, STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN, & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE
83.
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.03 (2000).

84.

Id.

85.

Id. at40 [§ 4.03].

86.

Ry. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
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ing defendants, as well as the courts, from
having to determine the truth
87
of something that happened years before.
Another way that the rules of civil procedure protect the litigants is
by requiring that a complaint meet a standard of legal sufficiency.8 8 Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the dismissal of a
complaint when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. 89 Despite Rosenbaum's charges that this rule leads to
what many view as an immoral and absurd outcome,90 Rule 12(b)(6)
protects the defendants and the court from wasting time when there is no
relief or remedy that the court can provide to the plaintiff.91
4. Settlements Can in Fact Fulfill the Wishes of Parties
Although Rosenbaum is not the only commentator opposed to settlement of civil litigation, 92 there are some who support settlement.
Geoffrey P. Miller notes that litigation "seems to stir up animosity and
hatred in a particularly unpalatable way '93 and sees settlement as a way
to avoid these side effects of litigation. Miller acknowledges that settlement and litigation "accomplish the same result," however, he argues
that because settlement is the less expensive alternative, social resources
94
are put to better use.
In reviewing the many criticisms of settlement, Miller notes a common theme that is very similar to Rosenbaum's argument: "trials are, or
95
should be, more 'just' or 'fair' than the private resolution of disputes."
Miller notes the parties involved in litigation have a better understanding
of the facts, and that judges cannot always be depended upon to act in
accordance with the law. 96 He says there is no evidence to support "[t]he
proposition that judges are better able than individual litigants to deter-

87.
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (citing United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 322, n.14 (1971)) (explaining that over time, evidence is lost, witnesses die or disappear,
and memories fade, thus impairing the ability to ascertain the truth).
88.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., COLIN C. TAIT, & WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 645 (8th ed. 1999).
89.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("A complaint should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
90. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 116-17.
91.

JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE-EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 314 (4th ed.

2001).
92.
See generally Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that the
party with fewer resources is often forced, due to financial constraints, to accept a less favorable
settlement than what they could have obtained at trial); Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in

Settlements, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y. 103 (Autumn 1986) (arguing that settlements inhibit substantive
justice by replacing the judgment of a court with an agreement by the parties).
93.
Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A CriticalRetrospective, in REFORMING THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996).
94.
Id. at 13.

95.
96.

Id. at 22.
Id.
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mine the 'just' result." 97 Miller concludes that if dispute-resolution
mechanisms other than litigation are available at little or no cost, then
those mechanisms should be made available to litigants so that they may
reach voluntary private settlements.98
5. Plea Bargains are a Viable Alternative
Plea bargains are widely accepted and commonplace in the criminal
justice system. Only about ten percent of all criminal cases ever go to
trial. 99 Most of the cases that do not go to trial are resolved by the defendant pleading guilty. 1°0 Plea bargains have received approval from the
United States Supreme Court' l ' and are considered by their supporters as
an effective method for reducing not only court dockets, but also overcrowded prisons.'0 2 Plea bargains are viewed by many as a way to use
the courts' and the prosecutors' limited resources on prosecuting crimes
that have the most egregious effects on society, such as murders, rapes,
and drug-trafficking, while allowing efficient disposition of less serious
crimes such as petty theft. 0 3 Miller has suggested that the use of plea
bargains may actually increase deterrence by allowing prosecutors to
utilize their limited resources in a more effective manner. [04
In addition to economic efficiency, the Supreme Court has asserted
that plea bargains provide justice through their expediency. ' 5 As opposed to a full trial, the Court noted that a plea bargain provides a quick,
and in most cases, final resolution to many criminal cases. 0 6 The Court
further noted that a plea bargain "avoids much of the corrosive impact of
enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied
release pending trial ... and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of
the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned."' '
11. THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS
Embedded throughout Rosenbaum's attacks on the legal system is
the underlying notion that those who control the system, particularly
attorneys, are the source of all that is wrong with the system.
Rosenbaum would create a more morally correct system by reforming
the current understanding of ethics and professional responsibility.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.at25.
Lynch, supra note 68, at 24.
Id.

101.
102.
103.

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977).
ARTHUR ROSET" AND DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 34-35 (1976).
Id. at 35.

104.

Miller, supra note 93, at 25.

105.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).

106.
107.

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
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A. Rosenbaum 's Criticismof Attorney Conduct
Rosenbaum saves perhaps his harshest criticism of the legal system
for attorneys. Rosenbaum attacks two pillars of the practice of law: the
concepts of zealous advocacy and attorney-client privilege.
1. Zealotry as Bloodsport
Rosenbaum likens courthouses to "legally sanctioned fight clubs"
that encourage "immoral, emotionally destructive contests that bring
about little relief and tremendous suffering."' 0 8 Although his comparison
of the legal system to the "coliseums of Ancient Rome" or the "rings of
the World Wrestling Federation ' ' 09 may seem extreme, he is not the first
to compare the practice of law to bloodsport. In other commentary, lawyers have been compared with gladiators, and their tactics likened to
weapons. 10
Rosenbaum blames zealous advocacy for the lack of civility in the
courtroom. 1 ' He makes this argument by defining zealotry and then
imputing his definition to the legal system through a clever twisting of
words. Although zealotry may have many connotations, the common
definition of zealotry is fairly neutral." 12 Rosenbaum's definition of zealotry, however, is not so neutral. Rosenbaum says that zealotry "is the
highest fulfillment of evil" and "is for people who are out of control in
their beliefs, completely locked into their own truths, and out of touch
with the rest of the planet.""13 Rosenbaum uses his definition of zealotry to criticize the concept of zealous advocacy set out in the ABA
Model Rules." 4 "Zealotry," Rosenbaum says, "has a way of trampling
over any respect for the truth. So much of what passes for zealous advocacy in the law is all about fudging, spinning, and explaining away the
unflattering elements of a client's
story. And in the worst cases, the law' 5
yer engages in outright lying." "
2. The Attorney-Client Privilege Encourages Lying
Rosenbaum also criticizes the attorney-client privilege. He disputes
the notion that lawyers are better able to defend a client due to privilege,
because without it, the client may withhold information that could be
108.
109.

ROSENBAUM, supranote 11, at 50.
Id.

110.

Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.

1031, 1039 (1975).
111.
112.

See ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 129-30.
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1455 (11th ed. 2003). Zealotry is

defined as "excess of zeal; fanatical devotion." Id. Zeal is defined as "eagerness and ardent interest
in pursuit of something." Id.
113.
ROSENBAUM, supranote 11, at 129.
114.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2003). "As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." Id.
115.
ROSENBAUM, supranote 11, at 130.
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critical to an effective defense.' 6 Rosenbaum argues that when conversations between attorneys and their clients remain privileged, there can
be no moral justice:
The safeguarding of secrets ultimately compromises truths ....
Moral justice becomes impossible to achieve when attorneys fail to
reveal what they know when it is morally wrong not to. The attorney-client privilege serves the interest of clients who wish to speak
frankly with their attorneys, but it also has the social and moral consequence of perpetuating secrets and lies.'
There has been some support for modifying the rules regarding the
attorney-client privilege. Marvin Frankel has proposed that truth should
be made "a paramount objective" and that there should be an affirmative
duty upon everyone involved to work towards the achievement of that
objective. 1 8 Frankel further notes that while the litigation attorney has
often relished the role of "hired gun," lawyers should consider that "'selling' our stories rather than striving for the truth cannot always seem,
because it is not, such noble work as befits the practitioner of a learned
profession."" 9 He proposes that the rules of professional responsibility
for attorneys should not only require the disclosure of material facts but
also should "forbid material omissions rather than merely proscribe positive frauds.' 120 As a way to implement such changes, he submits a draft
for new disciplinary rule based on SEC's Rule lOb-5.12 He concludes
that the ethical and moral standards that have been created for businesses
122
can also be applied to the legal profession.
B. Why Rosenbaum 's Arguments Fall Short
Rosenbaum's criticisms of professional responsibility are based on
anecdotal evidence, pop cultural, and his own personal experience. Several legal scholars, as well as the American Bar Association, have taken a
different view.
1. Zealotry is Neutral
Although some attorneys may be guilty of the behavior Rosenbaum
describes, his argument is fallacious because it fails to include much of
what the ABA Model Rules have to say about zealous advocacy. The
Model Rules acknowledge that lawyers face many difficult decisions in
116.
Id. at 126.
117.
Id. at 122.
118.
Frankel, supra note 110, at 1052.
119.
Id. at 1055.
120.
Id. at 1057.
121.
Id. at 1057-58. SEC Rule lOb-5 states in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ...
[tlo make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading ... "See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
122.
Frankel, supra note 110, at 1058.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

the practice of law. 123 Yet the Rules do not call for, and in fact outright
prohibit, much of the conduct that Rosenbaum ascribes to zealous advocacy:
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a
satisfactory living ....Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to
protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of
and civil attithe law, while maintaining a professional, courteous
24
system.'
tude toward all persons involved in the legal

Rosenbaum's proposals raise a very interesting contradiction. He is
opposed to the Rules of Evidence interfering with the story-telling that
he feels is necessary to any trial, but he is also opposed to lawyers adding
any "spin" to a client's story or attempting to explain away "unflattering
elements," one of the very things that the Rule of Evidence attempt to
limit. 25 His ideal justice system, it seems, would be one in which all
parties tell the truth in as neutral a way as possible. While this is a noble
ideal, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to fully achieve. Many parties
and witnesses are going to tell their stories in a light that is most favorable to achieving their desired result. One important point that
Rosenbaum appears to miss is that usually the reason that a law suit is
filed in the first place is because someone is not telling the truth or is
refusing to take responsibility for his or her own actions.
2. The Attorney-Client Privilege Puts Clients in Control
Another commentator takes a critical look at the role-differentiated
behavior of lawyers and when it might be justified. 26 Richard Wasserstrom agrees that such behavior is proper in the criminal defense context.' 27 He concludes, however, that even 12if8 such behavior is justified in
other situations, we still pay a social price.
12 9
Wasserstrom says there is a specific role of the lawyer at trial.
Trial, he says, is a "well-established institutional mechanism" for resolv-

123.
124.
125.
126.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2003).
Id. (emphasis added).
ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 130.
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 3

(Fall 1975) (describing "role-differentiated behavior" as the ability "for the person in a particular
role to put to one side considerations of various sorts-and especially various moral considerations-that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive").
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 12.
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ing disputes.130 "Each side is represented by a lawyer whose job it is both
to present his or her client's case in the most attractive, forceful light and
to seek to expose the weaknesses and defects in the case of the opponent." 131 While Wasserstrom believes that this mechanism "helps to
guarantee that every criminal defendant will have his or her day in
court,' 32 he agrees with Rosenbaum's assessment that attorney-client
privilege in the civil context is unnecessary and "almost certainly excessive."' 33 Wasserstrom submits that justice might be better served if lawyers did not subscribe to the theory of role-differentiated behavior: "In
this sense it may be that we need a good deal less rather than more pro134
fessionalism in our society generally and among lawyers in particular."'
Wasserstrom offers the argument that "[i]f lawyers were to substitute their own private views of what ought to be legally permissible and
impermissible for those of the legislature, this would constitute a surreptitious and undesirable shift from a democracy to an oligarchy of lawyers. ' 4 35 He leaves unanswered the question of whether such behavior
by lawyers can be justified within the legal system
but concludes that
136
society will pay a high price for such behavior.
While Rosenbaum addresses many areas of legal ethics that are
viewed negatively by the non-legal community, his proposals create
many questions that he leaves largely unanswered. Who is to decide
what is morally right and wrong? Should morality be codified similar to
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Should we have a legal
system in which it is up to each individual attorney to decide for himself
or herself what is morally right and what is morally wrong?
Rosenbaum criticizes the current system because there is "no duty
to disclose contemplated acts of spiritual violence, such as emotional
harm, or the causing of humiliation or indignity."'137 Many of these acts,
however, are not considered to be crimes or illegal activities. Under
Rosenbaum's system of moral justice, the attorney-client privilege seemingly would be sacrificed not just to prevent future harm to other people,
but also to prevent another person's feelings from being hurt. Furthermore, the realm of what lawyers should or must disclose would become
even murkier as lawyers struggled to determine what actions by their
clients may lead to emotional harm or spiritual violence.

130.
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Id.
Id.
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of legal ethics by
Rosenbaum perhaps best sums up his ideal system
1 38
Practice:
The
show
television
popular
the
to
referring
Clearly the assistant district attorney on The Practiceis right: there is

a great difference between legal ethics and private morality. When
legal ethics starts to resemble moral behavior, it will go a long way
pertoward restoring confidence in a legal system that
39 unsparingly
petuates immoral justice under the guise of law. 1

III. CONCLUSION
In a system of moral justice as envisioned by Rosenbaum, each
family from Mountorsville would have paraded into court to tell the stories of the children they had lost and how much they meant to them.
Representatives and attorneys from TWA and Boeing would have been
required to spend weeks, if not months, listening to the tales of the grieving parents. At the end of it all, however, the available remedies in
Rosenbaum's system would differ little from what the parents were given
under the current system: money and maybe an apology.
According to Rosenbaum, the best remedy for an alleged victim of a
crime is the opportunity to confront the accused in an open courtroom
140
and explain how much harm the actions of the defendant have caused.
His system would allow the alleged victim to speak without any restraint.
He is silent, however, with respect to the rights of the accused to do the
same. Under his system, Kobe Bryant's accuser would have sat on the
witness stand and told her version of the events unchecked by any rules
or procedural mechanisms. This appears to be exactly the opposite of
what the alleged victim actually wanted to do, especially when Bryant
and his attorneys attempted to exercise for themselves the very rights that
Rosenbaum would grant to his accuser.
In The Myth of Moral Justice, Rosenbaum suggests that the current
legal system should be changed to more closely comport with the general
public's notion of fairness and justice. Some of his changes may be feasible, if not desirable. When taken as a whole, however, Rosenbaum's
ideas would render a system of justice that would provide less justice
than the one it would replace. Rosenbaum's system would drive up legal
fees and court costs while simultaneously increasing the time needed to
resolve disputes. Rosenbaum's system also would be extremely vulnerable to shifts in public opinion. In sum, while Rosenbaum's ideas set a
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Id. at 128-29.

140.

Id. at 59 ("[T]hat's why the community is brought in as witnesses, to serve as jurors and

to listen not just to the proceedings, but, more important, to the pain .... The aggrieved have the
right to shout their pain out to the world, and the courthouse must be their megaphone.").
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noble standard for the way all people should interact, they are not entirely suitable for a system of laws.
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